Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
11-15-2013 12:00 AM

Dark Sympathy: Desiring the Other in Godwin, Coleridge, and
Shelley
Jeffrey T. King, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Tilottama Rajan, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in English
© Jeffrey T. King 2013

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Literature in English, British Isles Commons

Recommended Citation
King, Jeffrey T., "Dark Sympathy: Desiring the Other in Godwin, Coleridge, and Shelley" (2013). Electronic
Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 1702.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/1702

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

DARK SYMPATHY:
DESIRING THE OTHER IN GODWIN, COLERIDGE, AND SHELLEY
(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Jeffrey Todd King

Graduate Program in English

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

© Jeffrey Todd King 2013

ABSTRACT
Dark Sympathy: Desiring the Other in Godwin, Coleridge, and Shelley explores
how Romantic writers took up and responded to eighteenth-century discourses of
sympathy in the context of an increasingly influential materialist epistemology and
ontology. In its formulation by David Hume and Adam Smith, sympathy plays a central
role in society, using the imagination to smooth over uncertainties about the status of the
self and its relation to the world that might otherwise paralyze human activity. Sympathy
therefore carries a twofold purpose: on the one hand, it provides a feasible substitute for
personal identity; on the other hand, it facilitates social interaction. While these ends are
not incompatible in Hume’s work, given his pragmatic suspension of any overly idealistic
desire, the effect of an emerging materialist discourse upon English Romantic writing is
to widen the representational gap between the self and the external world. In its insistence
upon a hard distinction between human ideas about the world and its potentially
inaccessible true constitution, the threat of materiality conflicts with the socializing
conceit of the sympathetic imagination. If sympathy is the key vehicle for social cohesion
in the modern era, then “dark” sympathy recalls the rejected or unmanageable strands of
desire for the other. The Romantic fascination with negative affects, anti- or countersocial thought, and limit-experiences prompts them to find means of representing these
transcendent desires.
Where the dissertation’s first two chapters undertake an intellectual history of
sympathy and materialism, the last three chapters on William Godwin, Samuel Taylor
Coleridge, and Mary Shelley read their works as attempting to sublimate this conflict by
experimenting with forms of what Jean-Luc Nancy calls “community,” which is the bare
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relation of being-with-others uninformed by any common bond, as a substitute for the
social harmony implied by sympathy. In addition to participating in the growing critical
interest in the cultural and historical evolution of sympathy, Dark Sympathy attempts to
contribute to the scholarship on ethics and literature by exploring the sources and
figurations that have contributed to a more radical understanding of alterity.

Keywords
Sympathy, materiality, William Godwin, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Mary Shelley, Percy
Bysshe Shelley, community, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, ethics, desire in literature
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1
PREFACE

“No man can completely put himself in the place of
another, and conceive how he would feel, were the
circumstances of that other his own: few can do it even in a
superficial degree. We are so familiar with our own trains
of thinking: we resolve them with such complacency: it
appears to us, that there is so astonishing a perverseness in
not seeing things as we see them!”
— William Godwin, Fleetwood
“My grandmother used to tell a story about a magnetic
mountain: ships that sailed too close were suddenly
stripped of all their ironwork, the nails flew to the mountain
and the wretched travelers perished in the falling timbers.”
— Goethe, The Sorrows of Young Werther
In August 1806, 1 Samuel Taylor Coleridge visited the home of his friend and
correspondent, William Godwin. After supper, Coleridge recited his famous poem, The
Rime of the Ancient Mariner, while Godwin’s young daughters, the future Mary
Wollstonecraft Shelley and her stepsister, listened in secret. Upon discovering the girls,
Godwin’s wife ordered them to bed. Whether it was the hour of the recitation, the poem’s
dark subject matter, or what Coleridge’s presence represented more generally in terms of
Godwin’s radicalism, the illicit fascination of the children in this context struck an
incongruous chord and appeared to Mary Jane Godwin as somehow inappropriate and
requiring restraint. Yet Coleridge intervened so that they could hear the rest of the poem. 2

1

Anne Mellor suggests that this incident took place on August 24, 1806 (11). This is the only date in
August that Godwin records Coleridge coming over for supper, which he did along with Charles and Mary
Lamb. Others have speculated a much earlier date, possibly before Coleridge left England in 1804. See
Martin Garrett, Mary Shelley Chronology. For a summary of the relationship of Godwin and Coleridge (and
Shelley), see Beth Lau, 75.
2
This scene is discussed briefly by Michelle Levy (693), who refers us to Mellor, Mary Shelley: Her Life,
Her Fiction, Her Monsters, 11, and William St. Clair, The Godwins and the Shelleys: The Biography of a
Family, 295. Beth Lau also describes the scene, citing both Mellor and also Emily W. Sunstein’s biography
of Shelley, Mary Shelley: Romance and Reality, 40. According to Sunstein, the story originates in Lucy
Madox Brown Rossetti’s 1890 biography, Mrs. Shelley, 25. Assuming the August date proposed by Mellor

2
The scene offers a somewhat definitive moment: an encounter between the two
generations of Romantic writers in the context of the pervasive hospitality that so
characterizes their shared idea of community. The added detail of the stepmother
attempting to separate the enraptured coterie further allegorizes the tableau—a figure of
the social order with its attendant duties and laws endeavouring to explode the
community of poetic desire. That the poem fuelling their desire is Rime of the Ancient
Mariner is also particularly suggestive in the context of this study. The image of the
solitary mariner, doomed upon his return to shore to stand always on the fringes of
society, repeats in an inverted way a figure that will be central to my argument: the
solitary sailor at the end of David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1. For Hume,
this figure of the solitary epitomizes the limitations of radical scepticism and necessitates
the turn to sociality that he takes up in Books 2 and 3. The listeners on that night in late
August, including the three authors discussed in this study, encounter in Coleridge’s
poem what turns out to be a major critique of Hume’s strategy: the possibility that
sociality would not be adequate to satisfy desire. 3
The literary implications of this inadequacy lie at the heart of this study.
Sympathy, mobilized culturally through the theoretical work of David Hume and Adam
Smith, presents itself as the solution to the dangers of an excessive desire for otherness,
transforming alterity into sameness, the other person into a reflection of the self. 4 Yet this

is correct, Coleridge had just returned from Malta, arriving on August 17, “again in my native country, ill,
penniless, and worse than homeless” (Letter to Josiah Wedgewood, 25 June 1807).
3
Anya Taylor discusses the relation between Hume’s reflections at the end of Book 1 and Coleridge’s
writings on persons and identity, noting that, in the despair of that concluding section, “Hume anticipates
Frankenstein’s monster and other alienated and fragmented Romantic heroes” (“Coleridge on Persons in
Dialogue” 360).
4
As the term appears in this dissertation, “otherness” or “alterity” is meant to interact with several
(sometimes conflicting) theoretical frameworks. On the one hand, the ways in which the “Other” functions
in the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva are helpful for uncovering the means by

3
excessive desire does not simply disappear. Instead, it gets provisionally displaced into
objects and situations associated with the emerging discourse of materialism. Materialism
and its representation over the course of the eighteenth century preserve the extreme
desire for otherness by revealing the unrepresentable element of every representation.
Despite their assessment of social sympathy as having failed to accommodate the scope
of human desire, the Romantics attempt to reintegrate this extreme desire for the other
with the sympathetic process. Sympathy, that is, continues to be taken as a vital aspect of
human experience: only its theorization limits it. While most critics have recognized the
resulting ambivalent semantics of sympathy that emerge at the end of the eighteenth
century, a specific assessment of what that ambivalence entails for desire and its
representation in literature has yet to be undertaken. In what follows, I take up the work
of Romantic writers such as William Godwin (1756-1836), Samuel Taylor Coleridge
(1772-1834), and Mary Shelley (1797-1851) to explore their attempts at managing
sympathy’s conflicting desires through the literary deployment of situations and
characters that express both the social desire for stable, comprehensible relations with
others and an absolute or transcendent desire to engage the other without mediation.
As I will explore in greater detail below, my basic argument begins from the
premise that the social desire for the other, which defines the dominant character of
sympathy in the work of both Hume and Smith, implies a desire for a shared frame of
understanding. Alongside social desire—and generally in conflict with it—is a

which desire orients itself towards alterity and the effects of this turning. On the other hand, the
phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas posits a radical notion of the other that in many ways resists desire,
particularly as it is taken up and critiqued in deconstruction. John Lechte helpfully highlights the
differences between these views as well: “Kristeva adheres to a conception of historical, material origin of
society, which influences social, cultural and political life, while, for Levinas, materiality – including
violence – is only one dimension of human existence, the other dimension being the realm of
transcendence, the realm of the Other, infinity and difference” (86).

4
transcendent desire for the other that implies an absolute sharing of identity: an imagined
relational space that not only precedes, but also makes possible both self and other. If
these desires each correspond to an imaginary field characterized, respectively, either by
stability and limits or by alterity and excess, a third term—materiality, which emerges as
a site of figural inquiry during the eighteenth century—is that which eludes every
imaginary and which remains even after the exhaustion of desire. Out of the encounter of
these imaginaries and the radical otherness of materiality, an event I call “dark sympathy”
takes place. While the Romantics differ on the precise nature of this event of dark
sympathy, I will suggest more generally that it occupies an encrypted relation to
conventional sympathy. If conventional sympathy foregrounds social desire almost to the
exclusion of all other forms of desire, then dark sympathy can be said to express instead
the desire for transcendence that continues to haunt social desire even after it fails in the
wake of the experience of materiality.

The Emergence of Modern Sympathy
An underlying contention of this project is that the modern discourse of sympathy
comes into being primarily with the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776) and
specifically his Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40). While he is indisputably building
upon earlier developments in moral philosophy advanced by thinkers such as the Earl of
Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), Hume is the first to make
sympathy the primary vehicle for social cohesion. 5 Where his precursors had included

5

See Norman Kemp Smith, Ch. 2, pp. 23-51. Kemp Smith writes of Hutcheson’s influence in particular:
“What chiefly influenced Hume was not, as we might too hastily assume, Hutcheson’s insistence upon the
merely sequential, de facto character of the connexion holding between subject and predicate in perceptual

5
sympathy as just one of several manifestations of the moral sense, Hume makes
sympathy prior to such a sense, positing it centrally as “the soul or animating principle”
of every human passion (Treatise 235). 6 Yet Hume’s theorization of sympathy is also
significant for its speculative character. As I show at greater length below, Hume posits
sympathy as a solution to an epistemological problem, so that its initial appearance in
Book 2 of the Treatise only comes after Hume’s turn away from a radical form of
scepticism and towards the stability of social life at the end of Book 1. This problem that
precedes his explorations of the passions and morals corresponds to the immense scope
he sets for himself: a metaphysics of human nature, beginning with the understanding.
When it becomes apparent that this scope cannot be adequately addressed, Hume
constrains it to concern human nature as it unfolds socially, with sympathy as the primary
mechanism for facilitating the communication of this nature with others. Nevertheless,
the effect of Hume’s initial investigations into the understanding haunts the rest of the
text, disrupting its confidence in the overall effectiveness of sympathy.
In subsequent eighteenth-century thought, sympathy’s capacity for meeting the
needs of the social order gets more smoothly rendered. 7 One of the key ways these later
thinkers accomplish this is by omitting the metaphysical dimension, treating sympathy
instead as a purely social mechanism from its inception. For instance, Edmund Burke

and evaluating judgments, but the inversion of the roles ordinarily ascribed to passion and to reason
respectively” (44). Offering a key example, Kemp Smith continues: “Accordingly Hutcheson’s teaching
appears in a new and revolutionary light when Hume reformulates it in his fundamental maxim that ‘reason
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,” citing Hume’s assertion in the Treatise 2.2.3 (emphasis
original). See Ildiko Csengei for a brief discussion of Shaftesbury’s contributions to the development of
thinking on sympathy in the eighteenth century (34).
6
David Fate Norton writes, “Without question, Hume and Hutcheson had different views of the role of
sympathy in morals. Hume took sympathy to be centrally implicated in at least most forms of moral
approbation and disapprobation, a view not shared by Hutcheson” (“Hume and Hutcheson” 254).
7
See Eagleton, The Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics, Chapter 3 (“Edmund Burke and Adam
Smith”), esp. 67-69.
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embeds his discussion of sympathy in his much broader aesthetical investigation, A
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful
(1757). Like the moral philosophers, Burke includes sympathy as one of the many
passions that serve the “variety of ends […] in the great chain of society” (40). For
Burke, sympathy is “a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another
man, and affected in many respects as he is affected” (41). He connects this general view
of sympathy first with its function in real society and then with the vital role it plays in
aesthetic experience. As Immanuel Kant observed of Burke’s discussion of the sublime,
his meditations are mostly determinate, which is to say, observational and psychological
in nature, rather than reflective. For example, Kant describes Burke’s analysis of the
sublime as an “empirical exposition” rather than a “transcendental” one (Critique of
Judgement 108). The same can be said of his discussion of sympathy: while it serves as a
good description of what seems to occur empirically during a sympathetic exchange, it
does not speculate upon a possible origin or a priori structure.
Like Hume, Adam Smith locates sympathy at the core of his argument: after all,
his analysis of sympathy begins on the first page of The Theory of Moral Sentiments
(1759; sixth edition, 1790). As I will explore at greater length in Chapter 1, Smith
appears throughout to be acutely aware of the artificial nature of sympathy. He refuses to
entertain the idea of a primordial nature for sympathy that might continue to affect its
social mobilization. Knud Haakonssen notes: “Smith sees art, technology, science, deistic
religion, including natural providence, as parts of the explanatory web that the
imagination creates to satisfy its desire for order. Such desire for order is in many ways
more urgent in our dealings with people” (xiii; emphasis mine). On the one hand, Smith’s

7
theorization of sympathy is thus much more comprehensive than Hume’s. The process by
which sympathy becomes possible and its foundational relevance to the proper
functioning of society are taken up at length. Nevertheless, on the other hand, as we see
in Haakonssen’s explanation, Smith understands sympathy fundamentally as only an
expression of social desire—a desire for order (within and without the self) for the sake
of society as a whole.
In Hume, by contrast, the desire for order arises primarily from our reliance upon
habit or custom for understanding the world around us and is therefore distinct from
desire in its more expansive (and problematic) senses. This latter form of desire appears
pervasively in Book 1 of Hume’s Treatise as the radical scepticism he enacts in response
to a Cartesian method of doubt that fails to go far enough. As I argue in Chapter 1,
Hume’s scepticism elaborates a transcendent desire, yet it is of necessity only negatively
expressed. Thus it appears as a kind of apophasis in so far as scepticism reveals how all
objects of desire fail to satisfy desire itself, disclosing the void at the centre of desire
through an articulation of what it is not, similar to the apophatic rhetoric of negative
theology. 8 To delineate in more positive terms the scope and character of the excessive
desire that Hume’s social turn represses will require recourse to theories more explicitly
concerned with the nature of desire.

8

For example, Hent de Vries describes the “scepticism” of Emmanuel Levinas in terms of a project of
negative theology (499), arguing that “[s]kepticism bears witness to ‘the rupture, failure, impotence or
impossibility of discourse’ ([Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being] OB 168 / 214), that is to say, of the
said. […] Language, including even prophetic speech, is incapable of comprehending in its own terms its
own origin and goal, that is to say, of presenting them without revoking and contradicting them at the same
time” (504-505).

8
Desire in Sympathy
Describing how desire functions in Hegel, Jean Hyppolite writes: “During the
course of this experience [of desire], I discover that desire is never exhausted and that its
reflected intention leads me to an essential otherness” (163). Although desire does aim at
“the unity of the I with itself” (160), this unity is always ultimately deferred because of
the discovery that self-consciousness (the “I” itself) requires an object of desire so that it
“can negate it” (162). From one perspective, Hyppolite writes, the otherness that is being
desired “appears to be merely provisional in the case of this or that particular desire”
(162), yet, he continues, “its essentiality results from the succession of desires” (162).
Sympathy contains a similar ambiguity. As Jacques Khalip suggests about sympathy’s
implications in the eighteenth century, “sympathy supports ethical models of
intersubjectivity that solicit alterity through mutual recognition or likeness, while keeping
the self intact” (99). In Godwin’s reflections on sympathy, which I will explore in
Chapter 3, this general movement towards unity is part of what makes sympathy so
amenable to social ends. In sympathy, there is a tension between the aim of overcoming
differences in favour of that which is held in common and the aim of maintaining the
differences that comprise self and other. If the former desire to collapse the gap between
self and other forms the basis of society, then the latter desire to keep it intact derives
from the need for desire to be perpetuated. 9

9

Peter Singer exposits desire in Hegel’s writing similarly: “Desire appeared as the expression of the fact
that self-consciousness needs an external object, and yet finds itself limited by anything that is outside
itself. But to desire something is to be unsatisfied; so desire is—to make a typically Hegelian play on
words—an unsatisfactory state for self-consciousness. Worse still, self-consciousness seems doomed to be
permanently unsatisfied, for if the object of desire is done away with as an independent object, selfconsciousness will have destroyed what it needed for its own existence” (76).

9
In sympathetic discourse, this tension is expressed in at least two forms of desire
analogous to the modalities of the signifying process in language that the post-Lacanian
psychoanalysis of Julia Kristeva distinguishes. Hume’s Treatise, for example, implicates
the communication of sentiments in the dominating structures of eighteenth-century
society and presents such communication as a universal language—a common tongue for
human nature. The result, as Adela Pinch remarks, is that “Humean sympathy
communicates feelings along well-worn paths: it causes us to admire the rich and
powerful; […] it strengthens our ties to our fathers and loosens our ties to our mothers”
(25). Pinch’s observation about the classist and patriarchal framing of modern sympathy
encourages a correlation between Hume’s desire for society at the beginning of the
Treatise, Book 2, and Kristeva’s deployment in Revolution in Poetic Language of the
Lacanian concept of “the symbolic”. 10 Kristeva describes the symbolic as “a social effect
of the relation to the other, established through the objective constraints of biological
(including sexual) differences and concrete, historical family structures” (29). As we will
see, language in Kristeva’s schema differs from how it appears in most “modern
linguistic theories,” which, she argues, “consider language a strictly ‘formal’ object”
(21).
Recovering a more fleshed-out subject of enunciation that is lacking from Lacan’s
model, Kristeva shows that these formal approaches only touch upon the linguistic
categories that correspond to the symbolic. The result of this kind of deployment of
language is what she calls a “phenotext,” which “obeys rules of communication and
presupposes a subject of enunciation and an addressee” (87). Hume’s suggestion of an
10

Kristeva borrows much of her terminology from Lacan, whose three categories of the psyche (the Real,
the Imaginary, and the Symbolic) also correspond to three elements in a topology of psychological
development.

10
individual-to-individual regulative communication model for sympathy resembles such a
phenotext, particularly as it underscores the symbolic’s organization according to what
Lacan named the Law of the Father. The Law of the Father demands that the diffuse or
chaotic energies that precede and accompany more structured forms of desire submit
themselves to the authority of a powerful social agent—in Hume’s picture, for instance,
towards fathers and away from mothers.
To the extent that sympathy does function for Hume as a social mechanism, the
description above is largely unproblematic. Nevertheless, for Kristeva, the symbolic is
always in the process of covering over a movement of dispositions that she calls the
“semiotic chora” (25). She writes that the semiotic chora is “articulated by flows and
marks: facilitation, energy transfers, the cutting up of the corporeal and social continuum
as well as that of signifying material” (40). I have shown how Kristeva’s idea of the
symbolic modality of language describes the regulative and stabilizing desire that shapes
the social order and how the idea serves as a suitable analogy for the primary form of
desire Hume identifies with sympathy; that Kristeva perceives a larger scope for
signification, therefore, also invites a further investigation of Hume’s system. In a similar
way to how Kristeva’s chora provides the agitated ground out of which the subject may
emerge into the context of the social order, Hume’s discussion of sympathy follows his
famous extended meditation in Book 1 on the understanding, specifically as it relates to
the limits of selfhood. My reading of Hume’s epistemology traces its trajectories of desire
by juxtaposing its radical conclusions about the impossibility of self-coherence with
Hume’s repeated attempts to find a solution to this problem of the self. While I would
agree with the warning against making Hume into a “deconstructor of the self” (Potkay

11
53), the affective “remains of [his] former disposition” (Treatise 175) continue to haunt
Hume’s exploration of the social program of sympathy in Books 2 and 3. The concept of
the semiotic chora offers itself, therefore, as a possible response to the unanswered
question posed by Hume’s failure to contain the “bundle or collection of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a
perpetual flux and movement” (165) within the bounds of a theoretically legitimated
Self. 11
We can read sympathy as it is articulated in the Treatise as a set of symbolic
positions and the underlying struggle over the impossibility of a unified selfhood as the
semiotic ground informing those positions. Yet, between the semiotic ground and its
symbolic positions lies an additional threshold. Kristeva writes that “establishing the
identification of the subject and its object as preconditions of propositionality” requires
“a break in the signifying process,” which she calls “the thetic phase” (43). The thetic
phase coincides with the point at which the body’s semiotic chora posits itself as the
image it beholds in what Lacan calls the mirror stage. 12 In the context of Humean
sympathy, a thetic-like phase occurs when one encounters another in sympathy and sees
in that other person an image of someone so wholly similar to oneself as to make the
process of sympathy with him or her an exercise in repetition, or what Hume would call

11

See Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, Ch. 5, where he writes: “We thought that we had
located the essence of empiricism in the specific problem of subjectivity. But, first of all, we should ask
how subjectivity is defined. The subject is defined by the movement through which it is developed. Subject
is that which develops itself. The only content that we can give to the idea of subjectivity is that of
mediation and transcendence. But we note that the movement of self-development and of becoming-other is
double: the subject transcends itself, but it is also reflected upon” (85). As Constantin V. Boundas writes of
the major influence Hume has upon Deleuze: “the intensity named ‘Hume’ has not ceased to resonate
throughout Deleuze’s writings” (2).
12
In Trouble With Strangers, Terry Eagleton also makes this connection between the Lacanian Imaginary
and eighteenth-century sympathy. See Chapter 1, especially, “Sentiment and Sensibility.”

12
“custom.” 13 This sympathetic identification with the other, which involves using the
other as a stand-in for the self in order to organize and symbolize the self’s manifold
dimensions and energies, obviously retains many of its affective—semiotic—
dispositions. Indeed, Kristeva emphasizes that, while “[t]he thetic phase marks a
threshold between two heterogeneous realms: the semiotic and the symbolic,” “[t]he
second includes part of the first” (48). In other words, the symbolic order made possible
for Hume by means of sympathy continues to be haunted by the afterlife of a semiotic
dimension that prompted the desire for the other in the first place. Nevertheless, this
semiotic dimension only ever inflects the symbolic: the systematization of sympathy in
Hume’s Treatise has compressed the spontaneity of the sympathetic interaction into the
form of a principle, which he notes “is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an
impression by the force of imagination” (273). No longer operating at a level of sheer
unconscious affectivity via an older theory of sympathy understood as cosmic
attunement, 14 Hume’s revision of sympathy for the modern era mostly abandons an
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Hume famously writes in the Abstract of his Treatise: “’Tis not, therefore, reason which is the guide of
life, but custom. That alone determines the mind, in all instances, to suppose the future conformable to the
past. However easy this step may seem, reason would never, to all eternity, be able to make it” (411).
14
The longer provenance of sympathy, stretching back into ancient times with the Stoical concept of
sympatheia, plays an important role in continuing to shape its meaning even after the modern social turn.
See Jeremy Adler who suggests that the idea of “a hitherto unexplained, because insufficiently researched,
universal order, stretching from chemical matter to the stars,” which appeared for instance in Goethe’s
1809 novel, Effective Affinities, “can in fact be traced from the pre-Socratics to the Stoa and to Plotinus,
and thence to the Renaissance theory of a universal sympathia [sic] linking all parts of the cosmos” (265).
Ernest Gilman discusses this early modern usage in greater depth, specifically as it was put to use by Sir
Kenelm Digby in his famous Powder of Sympathy, “with its dubious ability to effect cures at a distance by
the action of ‘sympathy’” (270). Digby is important because he represents an early experimentation in the
idea of a material sympathy. As Gilman writes, “In his defense of the working of his Powder, Digby wants,
above all, to preserve a view of the world in which sympathetic connections are possible, a world in which
things are held together and work their influence on each other and yearn to return to their source […] he
must secure this vision on a material basis if it is to be credible” (276-77). Ildiko Csengei also discusses at
length the magnetic and mechanistic associations with sympathy during the eighteenth century (40-44) and
directs us to Patricia Fara’s Sympathetic Attractions: Magnetic Practices, Beliefs, and Symbolism in
Eighteenth-Century England for additional information.
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intuitive response to the other (i.e., one prompted by a transcendent desire for relation) in
favour of a response prompted by social convention.
I have introduced these structures of psychical development (particularly as
Kristeva redeploys them along the register of language) in order to interrogate the
consequences of sympathy’s social program as it first develops in Hume. This analysis of
the semiological implications of sympathy articulates two important questions. First,
what is the character of that “semiotic” form of desire that sympathy’s overdetermination of sociality has displaced? Second, what is the nature of the force that
compels this displacement? Kristeva suggests that there is a “principle of negativity”
(131) operating within the symbolic order that itself draws upon the semiotic. This
principle foreshadows the kinds of creative “transgressions” by the semiotic within the
symbolic that occur because of the liminal position of the thetic. To draw upon examples
from subsequent chapters, we might mention the social disruptions caused by Casmir
Fleetwood’s madness in William Godwin’s novel, Fleetwood, the female body in
Coleridge’s “Christabel,” or the materialization of death in the depiction of the plague
appearing in Mary Shelley’s The Last Man. In each of these events, the “thetic” appears
as an unspoken determination about the subject and his or her place in the larger
society—and the semiotic re-appears in the unsettling of that determination.
For instance, in Godwin’s novel, Fleetwood has fled England, where he believes
his wife has cuckolded him. While he has confirmed this identity legally by divorcing
her, his ongoing (and ultimately ineffable) desire for his wife profoundly complicates his
desire to reject her and rejoin society in the marginal role that he best fits—that of the
misanthrope. In the ensuing scene of madness, where Fleetwood destroys wax effigies of
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his wife and her reputed lover, the inexpressible form of (transcendent) desire acts upon
the dominant and coherent form of (social) desire according to a “principle of negativity,”
transgressing that desire to exist within society (even if only on the margins) in order to
express a more transcendent desire for an unmediated relation. At the peak of
Fleetwood’s madness, he momentarily believes he sees the wax figure of his wife move.
As I will argue in Chapter 3, the event constitutes an example of dark sympathy because
it puts the subject’s imaginative faculties in service not of his social desire, but rather of
his repressed transcendent desire. Importantly, Godwin’s representative strategies here
(and in other depictions of an excessive desire for the other) rely upon images, processes,
and analogies that attempt to point towards what I call, after Paul de Man, “materiality.”
Materiality, as I use it in this study, aligns with what Jacques Derrida describes as “all
that resists appropriation” (“Typewriter Ribbon” 353), including bodily responses,
involuntary reactions, and other expressions of sensibility; natural events without a
human influence, producing both form and chaos; animalistic or non-signifying
interactions; and other attenuated forms of expression. As I explore in Chapter 2,
materiality develops as a constellation of cultural presuppositions about the world
alongside the emergence of materialist discourse. In the work of all the authors I read
below, there is recourse to it as a symbolic placeholder that emphasizes above all the
failure of representation to reflect certain categories of meaning.
If Romantic writers seek to create conditions out of which that repressed
transcendent desire can find at least provisional expression, then eighteenth-century
thinkers of sympathy work to escape its demands. As I explore below, their turn to the
social extends earlier movements in the paradigm shift of modernity, which Charles
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Taylor describes as “the massive subjective turn of modern culture” (The Ethics of
Authenticity 26). For instance, Annette Baier describes the significance of Hume’s
Treatise as residing in its reorientation of philosophy “towards human persons, instead of
towards God and the universe” (25). In the course of this reorientation, however, this
emphasis upon the shared humanity of people (i.e., as social others) appears unequal to
the desires that had hitherto been directed towards such expansive, cosmic objects. The
promise that Hume finally offers, therefore, is not, as in the epigraph for the Treatise,
“[t]he rare good fortune of an age in which we may feel what we wish and say what we
feel” (423). Instead, the freedom made possible by sympathy is a paradoxical and
mitigated freedom to “yield to the current of nature, in submitting to my senses and
understanding” (175), which he reminds us are formed through custom and habit. Still,
that desire to “feel what we wish and say what we feel”—in other words, the desire for an
utterly unencumbered and transparent relation with others—lingers throughout Hume’s
work and into the next century.

Framing Sympathy
Over the last twenty-five years, intellectual historians and literary critics have
considered sympathy within a number of frameworks: as a vehicle for sensibility, as a
mechanism for facilitating the operations of the public sphere, and—more recently—as a
discourse for exploring the representation of alterity. Read as an agent of sensibility,
sympathy expresses the intersection of feeling subjects in society. Arguing that the
sympathetic process gained influence because of its ability to establish communities,
Janet Todd writes: “The most potent force for community is emotional ritual or the
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display of sensibility, where the tearful master or mistress may show inferior spectators a
posture of sympathy or a gesture that provokes responsive tears” (Sensibility 83). This
generous, positive reading of sympathy is the perspective taken by the majority of
sympathy’s proponents in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Instead of a society
grounded upon law and reason, sympathy as a functional sensibility-for-others appeals to
the feelings, moods, and bodily senses for confirmation and direction in forming human
relations. 15
Drawing upon the term’s inherent polysemy, advocates of sympathy also attempt
to move beyond the sentimental register, distinguishing it from the sentimentalism that
had otherwise shaped it in the modern era. Todd describes how, by the end of the
eighteenth century, sentimental literature comes to be accused of “selfishness,
irrationality and amorality” (144). Yet, despite this critique, sensibility’s primary vehicle,
sympathy, remains pervasive in the culture’s ethical imagination. As Ildiko Csengei
writes: “The term sympathy was used widely in the literature of science, medicine, and
philosophy, and, in fact, surfaces in all areas of eighteenth-century life, including market
reports, music, and even contemporary calculations of longitude” (31). As a lubricant for
the newly inaugurated public sphere, sympathy established networks of shared
benevolent feeling along which reasoned conversation and debate could run freely. If
sensibility ultimately failed to facilitate this process, eighteenth-century notions of
sociality could still be rendered distinct from sensibility. Indeed, by disconnecting
sympathy from the overly excessive discourse of feeling, it could be implemented as a
mechanism in the service of reinforcing purely social bonds.
15

More recently, Jerome McGann has attempted a similar reading of the social potential of sensibility. See
also Chris Jones, Radical Sensibility, who notes, “The ideas associated with the concept of sensibility in the
eighteenth century were a powerful force in the development of art, philosophy, and social thinking” (1).
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For those critics that narrow their focus to the intersection of sympathy with lateeighteenth-century thought, the result is most often a telling discovery of sympathy’s
failure. Nearly all of the recent work with a particular focus on sympathy shares this
recognition of its failure or impossibility. Amit Rai describes how “[i]n a specific sense,
sympathy produces the very inequalities it decries and seeks to bridge” (6). Jacques
Khalip notes that “[s]ympathy […] is a profoundly dissimulating and specular process”
(119). Csengei writes of sympathy’s paradoxical “self-interest, cruelty, solipsism, social
disruption” and notes that “the boundaries of sympathy are fragile, and the reaction that a
certain stimulus is meant to elicit is often hard to control” (12). This shared recognition
may be traced in part to David Marshall’s 1988 monograph, The Surprising Effects of
Sympathy. In his analysis of Frankenstein, Marshall writes: “Sympathy appears to be
impossible because both impressions and expressions will be misconstrued” (216). He
offers an encounter between the monstrous creature and the blind man, De Lacey, in the
novel as a case-in-point, suggesting that “the imaginative transport that might convey his
beholder [i.e., De Lacey’s vision of the Creature] across the epistemological void that
separates even fellow beings, carrying him beyond or across the purport of appearances,
will be blocked by the insurmountable barrier of the human senses” (216). This
recognition of the epistemological impasse is nothing new for sympathetic discourse, as I
will show in my reading of David Hume. Yet, unlike the Romantics, Hume attempts to
overcome this impasse provisionally by means of an appeal to the social realm itself.
Over the second half of the eighteenth century, intellectual exigencies (the most
predominant of which—materialism—I investigate at length in Chapter 2) undermine the
adequacy of Hume’s solution.
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For Marshall and also for many others, sympathy gets its fullest treatment in the
work of Adam Smith. 16 While I will explore in greater detail the relationship between
Smith and Hume in Chapter 1, I want to emphasize my agreement with this view to the
extent that Smith is the key representative of the dominant mode of social sympathy. Yet,
as I have already suggested briefly, I also want to position Hume as the philosopher
responsible for what we might describe as the aporia of sympathy that will trouble all of
its later iterations, including Smith’s. The intent behind this critical move is to emphasize
Hume’s unique connection to the Romantics and his singular contribution to what
amounts to their deconstruction of sympathy in the period—the subject of the study that
follows. 17 As I will analyze at length in Chapter 1, Hume’s initial positing of social
sympathy at the beginning of Book 2 of his Treatise is meant to stave off the failure of a
more transcendent, immediate desire for otherness that he raises in Book 1. Critics have
thus tended to focus on the way writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sought
to reorient and recover sympathy for society in the face of its impossibility. For instance,
Rai notes this tendency when defining the so-called “rules of sympathy,” which in fact
amount to a series of paradoxes: “[c]ircular and tangential, awkward and unreliable […]
if these rules of possibility for the sympathetic operation are strictly speaking impossible,
this does not mean that sympathy doesn’t ‘exist,’ or that there is no sympathy, or that for
Burke, Smith, or Hume sympathy was a sham that we have now finally unmasked” (59).
16

Miranda Burgess summarizes the critical camps: “There are scholars, like David Marshall (1988) and
Julie Ellison (1999), who take Adam Smith’s heavily individuated and volitional understanding of
sympathy in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) as exemplary of the period. Others, like [Adela] Pinch,
argue instead for an account of late-eighteenth-century and Romantic sympathy more closely associated
with David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), in which sympathy appeared as an inescapably
contagious form of affective migrancy” (297).
17
Burgess offers a useful breakdown of the differences between Adam Smith’s unique deployment of
sympathy and David Hume’s. Centrally, Smith’s distinction lies in the role of “the mediating imagination,”
which Burgess notes plays little or no part in Hume’s treatment of sympathy as “both inescapably social
and entirely unmediated” (298).
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This critical approach of considering how writers attempt to make sympathetic
community “operative” again is common, except in a handful of cases.
The Romantic era offers some support for critics that resist this redemptive
approach. For instance, Khalip notes that “what is at stake” in P. B. Shelley’s work on the
subject “is a reconceptualization of basic assumptions about what sympathy is” (115).
Against eighteenth-century models that might posit it as “an anxious reiteration of
subjective power over the other” (115), Shelley’s recognition of this inexorable tendency
of sympathy presses him to “refus[e] entirely the kind of linkage between sympathy and
the mimetic principle that moralizing aesthetics install” (117). By mobilizing the concept
of anonymity as a solution to the problems of representation encountered in the period,
Khalip suggests a unique response to sympathy’s failure on the part of Romantics:
namely, that it be understood as “the experience of an otherness that (mis)represents itself
to the subject—it is an obligation to otherness that cannot be properly defined, but to
which the subject remains critically open” (132). Csengei’s exploration of the “magneticmechanistic notion of sympathy” points to a similar unmanageability, as it “conveyed
anxieties related to the disruptive – and politically threatening – force of excessive
feeling which would spread from person to person like an infection” (31-32). This turn in
criticism about sympathy to questions surrounding alterity and its representation signals
an important shift that is producing a more nuanced historical and philosophical portrait
of the Romantic period. 18 My aim here is to take up not only this necessary issue
18

For example, Robert Mitchell argues that “theories of sympathy and identification emerged around
period of financial crisis […], for it was precisely during periods of financial panic that state finance
became visible as a ‘system’ that connected people to one another through affective bonds of belief,
‘Opinion,’ and desire” (5). In response, Romantic writers mobilized “affect,” which he defines as
“experiences of intensity that seem to demand the invention of new systems of communication” (20).
Where Mitchell uncovers the complex social structures that lead to the development of modern sympathetic
desire and beyond, I want to explore the conditions under which such sympathy comes undone.
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regarding the way sympathy introduces otherness to thought, mobilizing a repressed
transcendent desire, but also the implications of the persisting social desires that
dominate sympathy. 19

Towards a Theory of Dark Sympathy
Throughout this study, I will employ several specific terms that participate
centrally in my reading of the breakdown of sympathy. At the most basic level, I assess
sympathy as giving expression to two general categories of desiring the other: social
desire and transcendent desire. Social desire is a desire to be with the other or to
understand the other under the relatively stable conditions established by “society.” As I
show below, society—or, to borrow Hannah Arendt’s term, “the social”—includes all
political, cultural, educational, and moral institutions and value-systems that guide or
shape human action. 20 William Godwin, for instance, would align the social with systems
and institutions, which he defines antagonistically as “the powers of man as they have
modified, or may hereafter modify his social state of existence” (PJ3 1:2). I have
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Recently, Mary Fairclough has argued that “during the Romantic period the association between
collective behaviour and the physiological processes of sympathy leads almost inevitably to denunciation
of the crowd on the grounds of its instinctive, unthinking and potentially violent qualities” (226-27). This
presents an intriguing situation in which the transcendent desire that accompanies sympathy is seen as
invalidating the social desire sympathy ostensibly facilitates and might otherwise encourage.
20
For Arendt, the Greek public sphere, or polis, was the place where individuality appeared in that culture.
She writes: “it was the only place where men could show who they really and inexchangeably were” (41);
in other words, it was the realm of freedom. Underpinning the possibility of this public realm was the
private realm of the household economy. The private realm was organized around meeting the conditions
necessary for survival. As Arendt notes, “force and violence are justified in this sphere because they are the
only means to master necessity […] and to become free” (31). The social appears when the life-and-death
concerns belonging to the private realm emerge “from the shadowy interior of the household into the light
of the public sphere” (38). Once the state takes on the responsibility for keeping its citizens alive, the social
supplants the public realm. It accomplishes this in at least two ways: first, through the “early substitution of
behaviour for action” and, second, by means of the “eventual substitution of bureaucracy, the rule of
nobody, for personal rulership” (45). The result, according to Arendt, is “to reduce man as a whole, in all
his activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal” (45).
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suggested that the social itself is characterized by the psycholinguistic realm of the
Symbolic; to borrow another term from Lacan, our relation to the social might therefore
be understood along the lines of “the imaginary,” which is the underlying set of
representations, images, narratives, and other symbolic orderings that determine how the
world seems to be. It is an inescapable dimension of human experience, though much of
the Romantic effort consisted in attempting such an escape or at least a radical
revisioning.
Terry Eagleton describes the imaginary (following Lacan) as “a realm in which
things give us back ourselves, if only we had a determinate enough self to appreciate it”
(3). It is “a matter of unity, stasis, resemblance, correspondence, autonomy, mimesis,
representation, harmony, plenitude and totality” (5). Unlike Eagleton, however, who
maintains the distinctions between Lacan’s psychic categories of the Imaginary, the
Symbolic, and the Real, I want to appropriate the term “imaginary” in particular and use
it to mark out the field of phenomenality in general. 21 An imaginary, thought in these
terms, is a kind of narrativization or representation emerging within a particular social
space and providing the interpretive lens through which perception at an individual level
becomes possible. As Eagleton writes, “The imaginary, in short, is a kind of ideology”
(10). This alignment of the imaginary with ideology will become most obvious with
Mary Shelley, whose work recognizes the persistent thread of what Paul de Man calls
aesthetic ideology in the Romantic writing both of her generation and the one that
21

In some ways, my use of the term is also close to that of Charles Taylor. For Taylor, “Our social
imaginary at any given time is complex. It incorporates a sense of the normal expectations we have of each
other, the kind of common understanding that enables us to carry out the collective practices that make up
our social life. This incorporates some sense of how we all fit together in carrying out the common
practice” (Modern Social Imaginaries 24). Taylor uses it in distinction from “theory,” which he argues
corresponds to “explicit doctrines” (25). I retain the term’s Lacanian inflections, however, in order to
underscore what I take to be its specific connection with desire.

22
preceded it. At this point, I want to introduce the idea of the imaginary as an interpersonal
space in which desire may become “properly” managed. This social management of
desire ultimately runs up against the excessive forms of desire that I will theorize
beginning later in this chapter, but also at greater length in Chapter 2. Such desire is
excessive precisely because its scope extends beyond any possible object, tending
ultimately towards the Real. Where the imaginary tends to be mediated and contained by
representation as it is deployed socially, transcendent desire – which is itself also a part of
the imaginary – inherently strives to exceed such bounds.
I describe this conflicting category of desire as “transcendent” in order to signal
its vertical orientation towards the absolute. This desire to understand the other without
mediation and in absolute proximity has also been called “metaphysical desire” by
Emmanuel Levinas (TI 33). In Totality and Infinity, he writes, “The metaphysical desire
does not long to return, for it is desire for a land not of our birth, for a land foreign to
every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we shall never betake
ourselves. [...] It is a desire that can not be satisfied” (33-34). Where social desire begins
from an existing sense of the self that the self wishes to preserve in its dealings with the
other and follows the circuitous trajectory that Levinas describes as “long[ing] to return,”
transcendent desire begins with the other. As I indicate above, closely aligned with
transcendent desire, at least as it gets represented by Romantic writers, is the concept of
materiality. The recognition made in part via the burgeoning scientific discourse of the
period that representation always leaves a gap between our knowledge of others (and
otherness) and things as they are not only marks that Real as the true other to be desired,
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but also promotes increasingly primal and anti-social modes of expression that aim at
spanning that gap.
Although I explore a number of these materialist expressions in the texts that I
read below, the majority of these may be subsumed under the key term I deploy
throughout, “dark sympathy,” which also serves as my study’s title. The term does not
appear in the writings of the English Romantics, yet it gestures towards the paradox I am
most interested in exploring: namely, how the Romantics use the failed framework of a
social sympathy to express forms of transcendent desire that exceed that framework (and
are even partly responsible for its failure). Dark sympathy refers to the way the more
extreme forms of relational desire at work in sympathy continue to operate even after
they cease to function socially. 22 Levinas discusses “darkness,” noting that “[t]o see is
hence always to see on the horizon. The vision that apprehends on the horizon does not
encounter a being out of what is beyond all being. Vision is a forgetting of the there is
because of the essential satisfaction, the agreeableness [agrément] of sensibility,
enjoyment, contentment with the finite without concern for the infinite” (TI 191). If
(social) sympathy relies upon the horizon of sight and finite vision, then dark sympathy
entertains the infinite from within the constricting limits of things as they appear to be.
On the other hand, dark sympathy also highlights the illusiveness of sympathy
itself, pointing to desires and impulses that precede these constricting limits of the social.
Despite “dark sympathy” never appearing as a phrase in English Romantic writing, the
American Romantic, Nathaniel Hawthorne, uses it once in his novella, The Marble Faun,
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As may be gleaned from the examples in the chapters that follow, dark sympathy is accompanied by an
intense set of conflicting emotions. Levinas’s earlier definition of emotion as that which “puts into question
not the existence, but the subjectivity of the subject” and “prevent[s] the subject from gathering itself up,
reacting, being someone” (EE 68).
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to describe the shared exhilaration of transgression. He writes: “The foremost result of a
broken law is ever an ecstatic sense of freedom. And thus there exhaled upward (out of
their dark sympathy, at the base of which lay a human corpse) a bliss, or an insanity,
which the unhappy pair imagined to be well worth the sleepy innocence that was forever
lost to them” (207). Transgression is an important element of dark sympathy that will
accompany the majority of its appearances in Romantic writing. As Michel Foucault
writes, “Transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line
where it displays the flash of its passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its
origin; it is likely that transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses” (“Preface to
Transgression” 34). Dark sympathy, likewise, generally takes the form of an event, rather
than anything extended. It is not purely oppositional in the sense that transgression is
sometimes understood, but rather it can be understood as a moment of passing across the
bounds set down by the social in an attempt to contain the transcendent desire that is
working to escape from it. Thus, although this project attempts to trace the origins and
paradoxes of the modern understanding of sympathy, it is not strictly concerned with the
work of sympathy itself. Instead, it proposes, on the one hand, a description of how
sympathy helps to establish the modern social imaginary along with its concomitant
anxieties, and, on the other, an exploration of sympathy’s breakdown.
The dissertation is thus composed of two parts: first, I trace the entwined
intellectual histories of sympathy and materialism; second, I turn my attention to three
Romantic authors, William Godwin, S. T. Coleridge, and Mary Shelley, each of whom
approaches the conflict in desire I call “dark sympathy” through the deployment of
counter-social dispositions that capture the expressive content of a repressed transcendent
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desire for the other. In Chapter 1, I focus upon the conflict in desire located at the heart of
modern sympathy. This conflict, as I have already indicated above, is between desire
implying a stable hierarchy of the self over the other person (i.e., a social relation) and
desire understood as an immediate relation of the self and the other (i.e., a transcendent
relation). These two forms of desire in fact emerge much earlier in the epistemological
and political reflections of René Descartes and Thomas Hobbes. The contradicting
inheritance of these impulses about the ideal character of human relations comes to a
head in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Beginning with David Hume, sympathy
starts to be treated as an exclusively social mechanism, though it continues to be haunted
by a certain transcendent desire even in Hume’s own reflections. The work of Adam
Smith and others in the latter half of the eighteenth century reinforces Hume’s elision of
sympathy’s transcendent content. This transcendent potential for sympathy remains
encrypted in the idea of sympathy until after the world-disrupting events of the 1790s,
which helped to usher in the Romantic era of literature and thought in Britain. As I will
argue in closing this first chapter, the theorization of sympathy in the eighteenth century
harbours a psychosocial anxiety over the repression of transcendent desire, leading to a
renewed exploration into sympathy’s limits and possibilities by Romantic writers.
Chapter 2 continues this history of thought by tracing more closely the dislocation
of transcendent desire from its central position in the imaginary of pre-modern sympathy
to its inflective position in the radical materialism of post-Epicurean thought. With the
dawn of the materialist imagination, transcendent desire receives a new vocabulary and
representational framework, which I trace through the work of Descartes, Hobbes, and,
more recently, Paul de Man. The result is a series of attempts to imagine materiality—a
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paradoxical endeavour that I explore through three examples: Joseph Priestley’s
“immaterial” materialism, the scientific varieties of vitalism, and the emerging discourse
of sensibility. In all cases, I suggest that these attempts to imagine materiality lend it a
transcendent tone, which the Romantics attempt to extend. In closing, I test this historical
investigation with close readings of P. B. Shelley’s early materialist poem, Queen Mab,
and his Gothic novella, St. Irvyne.
Chapter 3 takes up the work of William Godwin (1756-1836). I argue that
Godwin’s utopian vision of a just social order, outlined in the three successive editions of
Enquiry concerning Political Justice, encounters a profound (and compelling) resistance
in the spectral figure of the misanthrope in his fiction. If sympathy represents the central
vehicle for social harmony, then misanthropy corresponds to a miscarriage of such
relational desire. Specifically, misanthropy suggests itself as a conduit for the repressed
desires of modern sympathy in its response to the narrative vehicle of sympathy: namely,
its reactive expressions of madness. As a good Humean, Godwin believes firmly in the
necessity of social desire, though he loses much of his optimism about it as his career
progresses. Instead, transcendent desire must express itself within the social, which is a
framing that ultimately gives way to counter-social forms of desire like misanthropy.
In Chapter 4, I turn to the politics and poetry of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (17721834). Coleridge is partly influenced by Godwin’s social vision, but also continues to
hold on to a sense of community that he explores iteratively over the course of his life.
Focusing first on his Pantisocratic schema and literary experimentation in his
conversation poems, I will argue that these experiments repeatedly fail to articulate the
transcendent desire he wants to express because of his ambiguous relation to the
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otherness of materiality throughout. With his unfinished poem “Christabel,” however,
Coleridge is able to encounter this materiality—especially as it expresses itself in the
body—with less resistance, uncovering the many effects it has upon desire itself. If
Christabel’s encounter with the materiality of Geraldine’s body leaves her horribly
connected in a “forc’d unconscious sympathy” from which she cannot extract herself,
Coleridge’s poetry in light of his growing awareness of the implications of materiality is
woven throughout with a pervasive sense of what he calls “dejection.” Where
transcendent desire imagines the possibility of a fundamental relation that supersedes all
things, dejection is a state in which the subject maintains only an attenuated transcendent
desire for the other by mobilizing the bare and singular potentiality of hope.
Finally, Chapter 5 explores three novels by Mary Shelley (1797-1851). For
Shelley, dark sympathy both accompanies the desire encrypted within sympathy and
emerges under the influence of an encounter with the threat of materiality; however, it
also marks the differences between such transcendent desire and materiality. Shelley
emphasizes in particular the impact of materiality upon desire through her figuration of it
in Frankenstein’s Creature, in the emotional corollary in Matilda of the eponymous
narrator’s incestuous father, and, above all, in the all-pervasive force of death in The Last
Man’s worldwide plague. In the idea of death, she discovers not only the contours of
what a transcendent desire would look like without its social enframing, but also a
community that is apart from desire. In the space between transcendence and community,
dark sympathy permits Shelley – as it did Godwin and Coleridge – to suspend any final
judgment on the possibility or nature of desiring the other.
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By way of closing, we may return to Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, where the
listening wedding-guest, prevented from participating in the social exercise of the
wedding, encounters one whose destruction of a supposedly transcendent object—the
albatross—leads to his total expulsion from all forms of human society: “Alone, alone,
all, all alone, / Alone on a wide wide sea!” (232). 23 The mariner, like Hume at the end of
his epistemological investigation, destroys in an act of scepticism the promise the
albatross signals for his fellow sailors: “As if it had been a Christian soul, / We hailed it
in God’s name” (65-66). The result is the evanishment of any ideal capable of sustaining
the ship homewards. When the mariner finally arrives on shore, he learns the “penance of
life” that he must now fulfill:
I pass, like night, from land to land;
I have strange power of speech;
That moment that his face I see,
I know the man that must hear me:
To him my tale I teach. (586-90)
This “strange power,” which the wedding-guest discovers also “holds him with his
glittering eye” (13), forms a relation that stands apart from the social order, a dark
sympathy that works against the socializing efforts of conventional sympathy. Assuring
the wedding-guest, who (Coleridge’s gloss tells us) initially “feareth that a spirit is
talking to him,” the mariner declares that the desire that informs their irresistible relation
is profoundly material: “This body dropt not down […] The many men, so beautiful! /
And they all dead did lie: / And a thousand thousand slimy things / Lived on; and so did
I” (231, 235-38). The oppressive materiality of the mariner’s bodily presence and
relentless proximity contrasts with the ceremony of the wedding so that, when the guest
finally “[t]urn[s] from the bridegroom’s door” (621), the tale has made him “[a] sadder
23

Tellingly, Shelley also cites this stanza in one of her later journal entries (April 1841).
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and a wiser man” (624) because it has subjected his social desire (to participate in the
wedding) to a transcendent desire (to hear the mariner speak) and found the former
lacking.
Whether or not the suggestive scene at Godwin’s house actually occurred as
posterity claims, the problem that Coleridge’s poem explores was one that troubled all the
Romantics. If the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the rise of the social and its
attendant mechanisms, then the Romantic period emerges out of a crisis in the possibility
of the social to attend to desire. This crisis recalled a form of desire that had become
incompatible with the view of the social as a natural good. As Hume notes in a passage
that is particularly telling for its overdetermination of the value of the social,
’Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up
to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority
above them. By society all his infirmities are compensated; and tho’ in
that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him, yet his abilities
are still more augmented, and leave him in every respect more satisfied
and happy, than ’tis possible for him, in his savage and solitary condition,
ever to become. (312)
The attempt to recover this transcendent desire and the consistent failure to do so within
modern society are the defining features of what I am calling dark sympathy. Sympathy,
according to Hume, assumes a sameness between individuals that permitted society to
flourish. To desire the other as other would mean moving beyond such observable
similarities into the darkness of what Emmanuel Levinas calls the “face of the Other” (TI
50-51). 24 This study will explore the ambivalent roots of such a radical notion of alterity
as it emerges during this fraught period in the intellectual history of sympathy.

24

Levinas writes: “The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves
me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum—the adequate idea” (TI 50-51).
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CHAPTER ONE
The Dark Side of Sympathy

“The real threat is that faced with the impenetrable aspects
of others, faced with the impossibility of knowing other
people’s sentiments except through acts of imagination,
sympathy itself might be impossible”
— David Marshall, The Surprising Effects of Sympathy
“Thus a longing felt in the dark is transformed into a fear of
the dark.”
— Sigmund Freud, “Anxiety”

Sympathy has conventionally been thought of as a vehicle for social cohesion.
Through a focalized operation of the imagination, sympathy promises to fortify existing
social relations. Yet this social orientation is also accompanied by a repressed desire that
extends beyond the mere wish for personal or civic stability. Following the upheavals in
thought and culture of the latter part of the eighteenth century, Romantic writers take up
the disclosed limits of social desire and investigate the possibility of other forms of
relation. These alternative communities would continue to draw upon the discourse of
sympathy while attempting better to account for the transcendent desire sympathy had
repressed. As I will demonstrate in the exploration of individual authors that follow, the
results of these attempts were mixed. For instance, in July 1814, Percy Bysshe Shelley
told his wife, Harriet, that he had fallen in love with the sixteen-year-old daughter of his
mentor William Godwin. He explains in a letter a few months later:
I shall never cease to interest myself in your welfare—you were my wife,
you are the mother of my child: you will bear another to me. But these are
ties which only bind to worldly matters where sympathy in the great
questions of human happiness is wanting. They produce mutual kindness,
compassion & consideration […] but the sacrafice [sic] & self devotion of
an elevated friendship cannot exist when the causes have ceased to act.
(Letters 1:404)
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Employing the term, “sympathy,” in a sense opposite to the one intended by
eighteenth-century philosophers for whom it was explicitly a function for strengthening
such “[bonds] to worldly matters,” Shelley insists that there is more than one way to
desire the other. He does express a social desire for Harriet, an “interest […] in [her]
welfare,” which Shelley attempted to maintain throughout the remainder of Harriet’s
short life. 1 This social desire “produce[s] mutual kindness, compassion & consideration,”
which parallel the kinds of virtues writers like David Hume associate with sympathy:
‘Twill be easy to explain the passion of pity, from the precedent reasoning
concerning sympathy. We have a lively idea of every thing related to us.
All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons,
therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must
strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the
original one… (238)
Yet Shelley is unsatisfied with this “worldly” sympathy and seeks another form of
relation: “sympathy in the great questions of human happiness.” In an earlier letter to
Harriet, he writes: “It is no reproach to me that you have never filled my heart with an
all-sufficing passion—perhaps, you are even yourself a stranger to these impulses”
(Letters 1:389-90). Setting aside the fact that Harriet’s impassioned, tragic response of
suicide two years later disputes his speculation, we may perceive at the root of Shelley’s
contention his belief in a deeper form of desire than mere kinship or duty—a desire
possessing the impossible scope of “an all-sufficing passion.”
In the study that follows, I will show how this belief stretches the limits of the
Romantic imagination to include a plurality of expressions of desiring the other—both
positive and negative. Indeed, if social sympathy serves as one of the organizing
1

For instance, after securing £1000 per annum from his father, Shelley allocated £200 to Harriet. He also
attempted to keep abreast of her circumstances, as we see tragically in his letter to Thomas Hookham of
November 1816, which came too late to intercept her suicide the following month.
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mechanisms for eighteenth-century sociality and its attendant public sphere, 2 then
sympathy’s breakdown may serve as the quaking grounds of what Jean-Luc Nancy calls
“community.” For Nancy, community is a radical inversion of the sympathetic
projection-mechanism, which only seeks out the self in others, eradicating all differences.
Instead,
community is a matter of […] existence inasmuch as it is in common, but
without letting itself be absorbed into a common substance. Being in
common has nothing to do with communion, with fusion into a body, into
a unique and ultimate identity that would no longer be exposed. […] [It]
means, to the contrary, no longer having, in any form, in any empirical or
ideal place, such a substantial identity, and sharing this (narcissistic)
“lack of identity.” (Inoperative xxxviii)3
This sharing, I will argue in this chapter, is the ultimate object of a transcendent desire for
otherness or the other that orients much Romantic writing. To understand the way
transcendent desire appears and then is repressed within the discourse of sympathy, I
want to trace the categories of desire that inform the work of modern sympathy’s first
great proponent, David Hume. Hume, I argue, plants the seed of an anxiety that will
blossom in the counter-social experiments of the Romantics. This anxiety works against
the established primacy of the social and of sympathetic identification within the culture
of the latter half of the eighteenth century in England. In order to prepare for my analysis
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Describing the influence of the novel and epistolary fiction upon the rise of the public sphere in the
eighteenth century, Jürgen Habermas writes of how “[t]he relations between author, work, and public
changed. They became intimate mutual relationships between privatized individuals who were
psychologically interested in what was ‘human,’ in self-knowledge, and in empathy” (50). Likewise, Marc
Redfield notes, “Sentimentalism, which here denotes not just the era of Sterne, Rousseau, and Klopstock,
but also, more generally, a certain focus on and valorization of affect that remains a recognizable literary
idiom until the First World War, may be distinguished from earlier discourses of the passions by its implicit
or explicit claim to universality” (135-36).
3
Nancy’s definition of community (one of several throughout his corpus) sounds initially like a shorthand
for social sympathy, in which the self discovers itself in the other. Yet the phrasing is much more careful
than this, as the other and the same are identified with a third term, “le semblable,” which is itself not an
identity. Instead, he points here to what he calls, in Being Singular Plural, “being-with”: “Therefore, it is
not the case that the ‘with’ is an addition to some prior Being”—as it seems to be in conventional
sympathy—“instead, the ‘with’ is at the heart of Being” (BSP 30).
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of Hume and my reading of how Hume’s ultimate social turn and attempt to seal off this
anxiety gets taken up and expanded by Adam Smith, I will therefore begin with two
philosophers whose divergent views greatly influenced Hume’s thought: René Descartes
(1596-1650) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). In these thinkers, we find important early
reflections on how the other might be desired: on the one hand, according to a
transcendent desire for an unmediated relation to the Real, as I noted in the Preface, or,
on the other, according to a social desire for day-to-day stability.

Sources of the Conflict in Sympathy
Descartes and Hobbes each framed questions that are representative of the initial
crisis in the discourses of human experience, which may be said to give birth to, or at
least be coextensive with, what is called the Enlightenment. Moreover, the ideas
advanced by these writers—specifically pertaining, in the case of Descartes, to the
organization of the passions, and, in Hobbes, to the role of the state—help to explain the
nature of the argumentative path Hume takes in the Treatise. My introduction of these
seventeenth-century writers, often identified as diametrically opposed thinkers, stems in
part from the observation that “any attempt to understand the philosophical parameters of
modernity must go back to its source in Hobbes and in Descartes” (Hoffman vii);
however, insofar as my reading of sympathy attempts to account for the ways its modern
development contradicts or unsettles itself, my use of these writers focuses particularly
upon the way their philosophical inquiries reflect conflicting responses to similar
trajectories of desire.
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Broadly considered, these “founding fathers of modern philosophy” (vii) both
seek to proceed along what Piotr Hoffman describes, with an eye to Horkheimer and
Adorno, as “the road of total mastery of the conditions of [human] existence” (187). Yet,
as I hope to indicate in my brief survey of their contributions to modern thinking on the
human condition, the major qualitative differences between each writer set the stage for a
theoretical incoherence in Hume that gets further exacerbated and drawn out in the
subsequent literary experiments of Romantic writers. What Horkheimer and Adorno
identify as the “triumphant calamity” of “the wholly enlightened earth” (1) starts down its
destructive path with a methodological conflict: on the one hand, Cartesian scepticism’s
attempt to uncover a kernel of identity impervious to the alterity of the passions because
of its fundamental position; on the other, the empiricist drive for an assertive and secure
social system capable of regulating and directing the internal flux of human desires, such
as Hobbes evokes. In each case, the philosopher advances a distinct strategy for making
the relation to the other or to others possible: either by positing the soul as the foundation
of all experience or by positing the state as the primary condition for securing peace. Yet,
in both cases, the desiring subject they describe fails to be made whole by the imaginary
they propose. In the chapters that follow, this internally divided self will appear again and
again.

Descartes: Controlling the Outside
Much of Descartes’s concern derives from the nature of our relation with the
outside. Passions, for instance, originate with the other. Indeed, Descartes begins from a
traditional understanding of the passions as the inverse of actions. As he notes in a
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somewhat sophisticated elaboration of these definitions in the context of a description of
the soul:
The ones I call its [the soul’s] actions are all of our volitions, because we
find by experience that they come directly from our soul and seem to
depend only on it; as, on the other hand, all the sorts of cases of perception
or knowledge to be found in us can generally be called its passions,
because it is not our soul that makes them such as they are, and because it
always receives them from things that are represented by them. (Passions
28)
Thus we may conceive of actions as centrifugal movements that seek to orient the desire
of the soul out towards an external object, while the passions operate according to a
centripetal force, moving inwards. As signals of alterity, the passions are fundamentally
affective in constitution, which means that they can be understood to a certain extent only
retrospectively, once the force of their unfolding has been felt upon the soul. This
definition underscores the involuntary character of the passions and emphasizes what an
enormous shift has taken place in Descartes’s adaptation of earlier notions of the work of
the passions.
In the first place, Cartesian passions, understood as “intermediaries of mind-body
union” (Brown 28), have a different relationship with the will than they do within the
prior contexts of Aristotelianism or Stoicism, out of which Descartes’s thought emerges.
In the case of the recovered Aristotelianism of seventeenth-century Christian thought,
“the passions were connected with the Fall of humanity, and strict control by reason and
the will was required for them to be compatible with virtue” (31). This subordination of
involuntary tendencies to a more self-consciously directed set of behaviours is not an
attempt to negate or neutralize such urges, but rather to convert them by means of their
rational organization into forms that reflect existing Christian ideals. The result, however,
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is an attempt to transform the other into the same, repudiating the alterity inherent in the
passions. A similar repudiation occurs in the Stoical legacy, which aims at “a state of
complete freedom from (bodily) passions (apatheia)” (32). For the Stoics, the problem of
the passions lies in their ability to make people do things involuntarily—that is, in their
“othering” of the centre of one’s identity, the will. Deborah Brown explains the Stoical
position: “By exercising direct control over one side of a passion, we may gain control
over the whole, and by extension, over our actions” (34). This control is interpretative in
nature rather than functional as in Aristotelianism. The involuntariness of the passions
can be brought into contact with the will through an act of interpretation, with the result
that the passion’s conventional value is reassessed in light of a higher value. As Martha
Nussbaum writes regarding Stoical values, “only virtue is worth choosing for its own
sake; and virtue all by itself suffices for a completely good human life [...] Virtue is
something unaffected by external contingency—both (apparently) as to its acquisition
and as to its maintenance once acquired” (359). 4 If Aristotelianism attempts to transform
negative passions into positive activity, Stoicism closes off the self from all exteriority in
an asceticism of negated desire.
Drawing upon these two influences, Cartesian moral philosophy enjoins us “to
use our reason to discriminate what is and what is not within our control, and to regulate
desires accordingly, so that our contentment of mind does not depend on what is beyond
our power to control” (Brown 34). In this definition, we see both the functional,

4

Brown directs us to Nussbaum’s The Therapy of Desire, Ch. 10, for an overview of Stoic detachment
(33n.9). Nussbaum writes: “Not only traditional ‘external goods’ like wealth and honor, not only ‘relational
goods’ like having children, having friends, having political rights and privileges, but also individual forms
of virtuous activity, such as acting courageously, justly, and moderately, are held to be, strictly speaking,
worthless, on the grounds that they can, as Aristotle has argued and as anyone knows, be cut off or impeded
by accidents beyond our control” (362).
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Aristotelian vision of the passions, which would subordinate passions within a hierarchy
of faculties as tools by which reason may achieve its ends, and the interpretative, Stoical
vision, which seeks, by way of a kind of “everlasting No,” to extirpate the influence of
externally derived forces upon direct experience. 5 While these influences seem at odds,
given their contrasting understanding of the passions (as, on the one hand, salvageable,
and, on the other, corrupting), an idea of the self emerges in the course of what Charles
Taylor describes as “[t]he internalization wrought by the modern age” (Sources 143) that
permits these contradicting positions to subsist in a dynamic tension. Moreover,
following a third influence, which Taylor identifies as Augustine, Descartes facilitates “a
transposition by which we no longer see ourselves as related to moral sources outside of
us, or at least not at all in the same way” (143). That is, instead of grounding identity in
conformity to an ideal set of behaviours, as in Aristotle, or through “accept[ance] and
rejoic[ing] in whatever happens qua event in this providential order” (Taylor 147), as in
Stoicism, Descartes posits a rational kernel of identity as an organizational (and hence
relational) agent influencing the body’s diverse modulating energies, which he calls the
passions.
This kernel of identity is what I have generally called “the self,” but it appears
under several subtly different terms in Descartes’s work: in particular, as soul or as
cogito. Against the relaxed attitude he displays in his advice on how to deal with the
passions, I want to suggest that Descartes’s uneven sense of what constitutes the desiring
subject – that subject who is supposed to “regulate [its] desires accordingly” – sets the

5

Cf. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis’s description of Descartes as “the adversary of the Stoics when they condemn
all passion,” but also as “borrow[ing] practical counsel from them when they stress the risk of accelerating
disorder: to strive to destroy by reason fallacious opinions that perturb the soul, but also to temporize when
the disturbance is too violent” (xxii).
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stage for a return of these repressed passions in later writers such as Hume. Thus, in The
Passions of the Soul (1649), Descartes does not use the term cogito; instead, he posits
“the soul” itself as something “joined to the whole body” (345). He goes on to assert that
“even those who have the feeblest souls can acquire a very absolute dominion over all
their passions if sufficient industry is applied in training and guiding them” (356). By
contrast, although the cogito has also been aligned with “soul,” this earlier sense of it in
his Meditations (1641) is far more limited: “I do not now admit anything which is not
necessarily true: to speak accurately I am not more than a thing which thinks, that is, to
say a mind or a soul, or an understanding, or a reason” (152). Indeed, as opposed to the
soul of the Passions that is connected to the “whole body,” the cogito is explicitly
connected only to the pineal gland, which makes it appear far less a pervasive guide like
the Holy Spirit, and more the Father God, directing from a single point.
In both cases, soul and cogito, Descartes is positing an ordering dimension (either
as a force or element) able to bring all of these conflicting urges under its sovereignty as
in a kind of court, as Jonathan Lamb suggests, “as if it were Versailles in fact” (19). 6 In
the face of what Judith Butler describes as the world of desire, “a world characterized by
radical particularism and arbitrary objects, delectable but disarmingly displaced” (1-2),
this “self” promises a form of stability against that which would invade and disturb it –
for example, the passions. The effect of this internalization is somewhat different from
the inward-looking tendency of Augustine from which it derives, since that view sought
not to arrive at “the Self,” but rather to move through the self in order to discover beyond

6

Lamb elaborates on the image of the cogito in particular: “Fetched by the animal spirits to where the soul
is seated on the throne of the pineal gland are images, pictures, and representations of objects of the senses,
all presented for its inspection” (19).
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it the transcendent mind of God. 7 Instead, as Taylor suggests, Descartes advances a
conception of knowledge in which a “representation of reality now has to be constructed.
As the notion of ‘idea’ migrates from its ontic sense to apply henceforth to intra-psychic
contents, to things ‘in the mind’, so the order of ideas ceases to be something we find and
becomes something we build” (144).
Nevertheless, both the general unevenness of the terms Descartes uses to denote
this kernel of identity (which I am disingenuously covering up with the term, “self”) and
his later fascination with these inward-moving elements of alterity, the passions, suggest
that the rational method by which he has proceeded has not been entirely successful. Leo
Bersani writes, “Perhaps the indeterminacy of the Cartesian subject (the I in the sum)—
[…]—has to do with its being a divided subject. There is the I that is searching, and there
are ‘the things within [him] which [the thinking thing has] not yet noticed’” (4). This
division stems partly from Descartes’s sense that “[t]he ultimate goal is the mastery of
nature, but knowledge of the world might also be considered […] as an afterthought” (45). More fundamentally, however, it stems from the modern development that “the mind
has become a secret object to itself” (6). 8 The desire for certainty, at the end of which
Descartes hopes to discover a thinking self adequate to the task of mastering the world,
encounters a pressure in the transcendent desire to know all. He suppresses this
encounter, Bersani notes, by “making explicit to his readers the procedures of
investigation” (16); however, the division at the heart of Descartes’s desiring subject –
7

Charles Taylor describes Augustine’s position at length in Chapter 7, “In Interiore Homine,” Sources of
the Self, 127-42.
8
Bersani’s essay aligns Descartes, Proust, and Freud in order to make this seemingly anachronistic claim;
however, this reading against the grain is precisely at the heart of the argument: “It is as if, in removing
himself from all human company in order to become modernity’s master athlete of self-exploration,
Descartes intuited the reality of a divided self articulated two and a half centuries later as the
psychoanalytic distinction between consciousness and an unconscious that is anything but a certainty of
being or of knowledge” (7).
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particularly a subject who claims such a transcendent position – will reverberate into the
eighteenth century and Hume’s response to Cartesian scepticism in Book 1 of the
Treatise.

Hobbes: Desiring Stability
Like Descartes, Thomas Hobbes sees the passions as originating externally, in this
case, as functions of nature; however, for Hobbes, human nature is also part of this
exteriority. For, where Descartes attempts to manage the threat of alterity as something
that moves inwards and unsettles the thinking self, Hobbes sees both the passions and the
subject who is defined by these in a state of nature as needing to be wholly suppressed by
the State. “All passions,” writes Arnold Green, “are finally reduced by Hobbes to the
involuntary drive to power after power” (76). This drive to power derives from and is
accelerated by the so-called “right of nature,” which F. S. McNeilly describes in the
context of Hobbes’s thought as “the absence of external impediments to the use of a
man’s power, as he wills, for the preservation of his own nature (that is, his life), and to
his doing whatever reason tells him is the best means of achieving that” (175). Because
this natural right has no real limitations, its corresponding natural law, which interdicts
anything that might lead to self-destruction, articulates a fundamental relationship in the
state of nature: the individual and death. The resistance to death orients human beings
towards a desire for peace, which redirects our egoism towards the social contract, which
would guarantee our self-preservation in exchange for a certain loss of liberty. While the
state of nature does not comprehend self-preservation as synonymous with a resistance to
death, under the first law of nature, which forbids humans from “omit[ting], that, by
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which he thinketh it [i.e., his life] may be best preserved” (Leviathan 189), Hobbes
demands that human nature assume a divided consciousness not unlike that which
Descartes implicitly advances. This kind of mind would be able to include in its
negotiation of natural rights and law the possibility that a better strategy for survival
might be discovered in a consideration of the needs of others rather than in unmitigated
aggression.
Yet this phrasing puts it all too optimistically: the point is that such an assumption
cannot be sustained by the will of a solitary individual, but must instead be imposed upon
the individual. Without the limitations imposed by the state, Hobbes argues, the human
condition appears as a struggle between people that arises from the fundamental equality
of their situations. The Commonwealth to which the individual must submit its
independence is neither the polis of the Greeks, which was “their guarantee against the
futility of individual life, the space protected against this futility and reserved for the
relative permanence, if not immortality, of mortals” (Arendt 56), nor the corpus Christi in
which the members “have been all made to drink into one Spirit” so that “the body is not
one member, but many” (1 Corinthians xii.12). Rather, on the one hand, the “guarantee”
of Leviathan is a security that is also a loss, and, on the other, its manifold unity does not
originate in the spirit, but in the law. What are lost are the passions, and this loss occurs
under the influence of law. Although, as he writes, “[t]he desires, and other passions of
man, are in themselves no sin,” this moral neutrality pertains only until “they know a
Law that forbids them: which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be
made till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it” (Leviathan 187). To end
the inevitable “warre of every man against every man” (Leviathan 188) will require “the
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introduction of that restraint upon themselves, [sic] (in which wee see them live in
Common-wealths)” (Leviathan 223). Significantly, this introduction is only possible via
the very elements of human nature requiring suppression: specifically, “[t]he passions
that incline men to peace,” which he lists as “fear of death; desire of such things as are
necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them” (Leviathan
188). This paradox of social desire desiring too much emerges repeatedly, as we shall
see, in Hume’s social turn, in Godwin’s just society, Coleridge’s Pantisocracy, and
Shelley’s Creature seeking sympathy from the De Lacey family.
A reading of the figure of Leviathan itself may offer more insight into Hobbes’s
psychology of the inwardly fragmented subject, which, as I have noted, emerges almost
passively out of the state of nature rather than through an exertion of agency. Thus the
famous frontispiece to Leviathan (1651), with its image of a looming, crowned giant,
inwardly populated with its subjects, pictures the ramifications of this argument. Along
these lines, Hobbes writes in his introductory description of Leviathan:
For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall
Man; [...] and in which the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life
and motion to the whole body; The Magistrates, and other Officers of
Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment [...]
are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and
Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the
peoples safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for
it to know are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an
artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and
Civill war, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants by which the parts of
this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble
that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.
(81-82)
The effect of this description, like that produced by the frontispiece, is to imply that this
body in pieces is held together by the force of analogy. Or, as the final comparison
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between the covenants of the body politic and the Fiat suggests, the unity is wrought by
language itself, represented in the design by the tenuous outline identifying the
monarch’s body. The unity implied for this social subject is neither equal to the
transcendent desire displayed by the self in nature, which is a desire to enter into the
alterity of the passions (a kind of death drive), nor is it sufficiently stable to justify itself
as a suitable if impoverished alternative. Nancy Yousef argues that the suggestion of
man’s originary incompatibility with society is part of an early modern theory of the
understanding in which the individual appears “as the self-begotten, self-sufficient hero
of a narrative of coming into knowledge of the world around him, proceeding from
sensation to the construction of ideas and eventually to reasoned and nuanced judgement”
(20). For Hobbes, it is precisely this originary mode of a free relation to the otherness
beyond the self that must be set aside to assure individual security and peace.

The Conflict of Sympathetic Desire in Hume and Smith
We can use the contexts provided by Descartes and Hobbes to frame the narrative
constructed by Hume. Although he has been labelled an anti-Cartesianist for his
empirical turn, which could not support something like the cogito, Hume’s thinking
displays a similar desire for subjective coherence. Indeed, as I will show, Hume pursues
this objective throughout the Treatise, despite his ultimate inability to discover the
conditions for such a coherence. Likewise, although he rejects completely Hobbes’s
claim regarding mankind’s originary incompatibility with society, insisting instead upon
our natural sociability, Hume predicates his social vision on the necessity of artifice in all
matters of belief, relation, and even knowledge. As I have suggested, both Descartes and
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Hobbes seek for ways to contain what Hume will posit as the major feature of human
nature: the passions. Yet even Hume recognizes that the passions must be mobilized—put
into a cycle of communication via sympathy—in order that they might be transformed
from impressions, which are “[t]hose perceptions, which enter [into our consciousness]
with most force and violence” (7), into ideas, which are abstractions and therefore subject
to measures of control.
What Descartes and Hobbes have put before the modern era are two possibilities
not only for managing these dangerous passions, symptoms of alterity, but also for
conceiving of the character of the self. In Descartes, the self appears often as the cogito,
which—like Hopkins’s “immortal diamond” surviving the “Heraclitean fire” of Nature—
emerges out of Descartes’s radical program of doubt as the final unassailable point of
existence. From the perspective of that point, the self discovers its absolute authority over
the rest of subjective existence. Hobbes’s pre-social self as an ideal of freedom remains
similarly an unattainable object, whose impossibility must be maintained via submission
to the State for the sake of preserving life and securing at least a degree of private agency.
While Hume rejects the feasibility of the cogito in what Annette Baier calls Book 1’s
“reductio ad absurdum of Cartesian intellect” (21), the effect of his maintenance of
something like the promise of the cogito in his section on personal identity and also in the
Treatise’s Appendix is to give place to the idea of the self without defining its limits.
This promise concerns the idea of a stable point at the centre of selfhood around which
the manifold energies of our passions may orbit in relative gravitational certainty. The
rejection of that central kernel of identity at the end of Book 1, without a similar rejection
of the possibility it holds out for organizing the passions, suggests that Hume’s original
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introduction of the epistemological problem of the understanding was intended to put
forward the promise of the passions’ organization, but to link it with something other
than the cogito: namely, the social. Hobbes’s description of the unity made possible by a
mutual submission to a common point apart from the self illustrates in some ways the
logic of the social as it appeals to Hume, though its implications for Hobbes are far more
bleak. The Hobbesian contract necessary for society represents a strategy of displacement
in which the social comes to stand in for the self. Yet this substitution is explicitly
flawed, as the self-sufficient—though likely short-lived—individual in a state of nature
gives up its holistic freedom in favour of the Sovereign. Hume’s argument for sociability
performs a similar displacement, yet instead of making explicit the necessity of
sacrificing transcendent desire, as Hobbes does, he calls this sociability itself “natural”
and emphasizes the fluid aspects of the principle of sympathy that facilitates it.
In the following sections, I want to cast this displaced transcendent desire in
Hume in sharper relief. I argue that we may uncover it partly in Hume’s turn from an
extreme, Pyrrhonic scepticism to the empiricist outlook of Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise
of Human Nature. To better understand this turn to the social, I then take up Adam
Smith’s reading of sympathy, which amplifies the role of the imagination in making
sympathy possible. 9 Having distinguished Smith in this way and identified him as the

9

In the decades following its publication, Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments was widely read; however,
this influence seems to have declined in the following century. Amartya Sen writes in an article in the New
Statesman: “On 12 April, Smith heard from his friend David Hume in London about how the book was
doing. If Smith was, Hume told him, prepared for ‘the worst’, then he must now be given ‘the melancholy
news’ that unfortunately ‘the public seem disposed to applaud [your book] extremely’. ‘It was looked for
by the foolish people with some impatience; and the mob of literati are beginning already to be very loud in
its praises.’ This light-hearted intimation of the early success of Smith’s first book was followed by serious
critical acclaim for what is one of the truly outstanding books in the intellectual history of the world […]
After its immediate success, Moral Sentiments went into something of an eclipse from the beginning of the
19th century” (“The economist manifesto” para. 1-2). The six editions that the book went through during
Smith’s lifetime – from its first appearance in 1759 to 1790 – also testify to this initial popularity. Also see
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theorist of the dominant view of sympathy in the period, I will prepare for my final
section on anxiety by suggesting that what Smith underscores is the simulatedness of
modern sympathy. Hume, by contrast, continues to oscillate between an earlier
commitment to the work of representation (in custom, habit, etc.) and this all-pervasive
simulation advanced by the social. As Jean Baudrillard writes: “Whereas representation
tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false representation, simulation absorbs the
whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum” (173). Hume’s ambivalence stems
from his desire for a relation prior to what can emerge via the imagination and represents
the key object of interest taken up by subsequent Romantic writers.

The Transcendent Impulse in David Hume
Gilles Deleuze understands transcendence in Hume’s thought specifically in
relation to the Humean concept of knowledge. He writes: “What is the fact of
knowledge? It is transcendence or going beyond. I affirm more than I know; my
judgment goes beyond the idea” (28). This exercise of affirmation—the result of
custom—resides on the other side of scepticism, which appears in Hume’s early
reflections as the negative revelation of this transcendent character of knowledge.
Following the resurgence of scepticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
especially as formulated in the methodology of Descartes, Hume introduces in Book 1 of
the Treatise a recovered form of Pyrrhonic scepticism described in the work of Sextus

Charles Griswold’s Introduction to Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment for a lengthier discussion
of Smith’s “influence and fame” (8). James Engell notes that Smith’s book “opened the floodgate to a
rising tide of interest in the sympathetic imagination. His book became hugely influential. Many authors,
among them Hazlitt, Thomas Brown, and Shelley, built their arguments with an eye to his” (149-50).
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Empiricus. 10 Although he will also come to modify its extreme claims, Pyrrhonism
represents for Hume a total scepticism that provides him with the grounds for levying a
critique against the rationalism that allows Descartes to start and halt his systematic doubt
at will. 11 As I will describe in greater detail below, Cartesian scepticism imagines a form
of selfhood (i.e., the cogito) that Hume—via his Pyrrhonic approach—argues to be
impossible. Yet the sheer boundlessness of the sceptical venture leads Hume by the end
of the first book to repress the transcendent desire reflected in scepticism. Angela
Coventry describes this shift as one in which, ultimately, “Hume recommends mitigated
scepticism” (164). This mitigated scepticism, on the one hand, “deflates the pretensions
of the arrogant intellectuals, revealing the emptiness of their metaphysical inquiries,” and,
on the other hand, ensures that we “limit ourselves to the narrow capacities of human
understanding and to such subjects that fall under daily practice and experience” (16465)—in other words, the knowledge that derives from empiricism, which is to say as
sensory experience. In this way, Hume reclaims scepticism from Cartesian rationalism
for British empiricism by means of a more radical (Pyrrhonic) scepticism that ultimately
disappears from view. 12
Over the course of his initial inquiry into the understanding, Hume takes the
Cartesian sceptical project further by submitting even identity itself to interrogation. As

10

Peter Fosl (after Richard Popkin) notes that “the 1718 Fabricius edition” of Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines
of Pyrrhonism is “the most likely source of Hume’s direct understanding of skeptical thought” (266).
11
Richard Popkin writes that Hume “agreed with the Pyrrhonian theory of the inability to find any rational
and certain basis for our judgments to the extent that an epistemological analysis of the nature and grounds
of human knowledge would reveal that there are no rational or certain grounds for our judgments, and that
we have no ultimate criterion for determining which of our conflicting judgments in certain fundamental
areas of human knowledge are true, or to be preferred” (106).
12
Coventry notes: “Much debate remains, however, as to what his scepticism amounts to and how his
scepticism is related to other more positive parts of his philosophical project. In fact, balancing Hume’s
scepticism with his constructive enterprise of establishing a science of human nature is said to be the
central task facing every Hume scholar” (139).
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Levinas writes: “In the Cartesian cogito, […] there is an arbitrary halt which is not
justified of itself” (92-93). Hume presses upon the cogito in order to show that the sense
of self-unity it implies in its claims about the one-who-thinks fails to account for the
larger desire to be with others. Again, Levinas articulates this limitation in Descartes
(though without reference to Hume): “Descartes seeks a certitude, and stops at the first
change of level in this vertiginous descent; in fact he possesses the idea of infinity, and
can gauge in advance the return of affirmation behind the negation. But to possess the
idea of infinity is to have already welcomed the Other” (93). Admittedly, Levinas here
idealizes the relation to the other in a way that Hume would not. To “welcome” is to in
some ways already have the upper hand. My contention in this section is that, rather than
“welcoming,” Hume inadvertently initiates this opening towards the Other in his
discussion of personal identity in the penultimate section of the Treatise, Book 1. As we
will see in his eventual return to the question of the self in the Appendix, the idea of
identity that he raises is similarly “infinite” and can no more be closed off with a
sceptic’s rejection than it can with a rationalist’s deduction.
Hume opens the section on personal identity with a discussion of “some
philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call
SELF” (164). Not only does he reject these metaphysicians, he also disclaims the validity
of any rationally derived proof for the self: “It cannot, therefore, be from any of these
impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is
no such idea” (164). The mind (as the host of those perceptions that purportedly make up
“the self”) appears to Hume more like a “theatre, where several perceptions make their
appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and
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situations” (165). Yet he adds to this analogy a further caveat that the mind is still in no
way as coherent as a theatre, noting that “[t]hey are the successive perceptions only, that
constitute the mind” (165). Thus, against the metaphysicians, he argues that the mind is
characterized by artifice and, moreover, that such artifice can never turn over into reality.
This analysis emerges from Hume’s Pyrrhonic scepticism, which refuses throughout the
first book to substitute any unacknowledged fiction for the Real despite its ultimate
inscrutability. His rejection of the argument of “some philosophers” has mainly to do
with their ascription of ontological status to a selfhood of their own description—the
confusion of their representation of reality with reality itself. Levinas describes this effort
on the part of Western philosophy as the “reduction of the other to the same by
interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being” (43).
The “Self” as a term introduces a common understanding of being that reduces the
manifold of human experience to a single universal category. Hume admits the reality of
the experience of a sense of self: “What then gives us so great a propension [sic] to
ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possesst of
an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro’ the whole course of our lives?” (165). The
error of these philosophers is to mistake this “sense” for the thing itself. His speculation
that “we add a sympathy of parts to their common end” (168; emphasis original) in order
to “feign a principle of union” (171) represents his initial attempt at explaining the feeling
of the self that we appear to have.
This reliance on “feigning” or “fiction” builds on a principle Hume introduces
earlier in the Treatise that posits, instead of knowledge, belief as the “vivacity of our
ideas,” in which “[t]he memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them
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founded on the imagination” (173). The imagination, for Hume, allows us to pass
smoothly between ostensibly discrete phenomena (whether these be the phenomena of
causation or those which make up what we call “the self”), relying upon custom and habit
in order to circumvent the “manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason”
(175), if only for long enough to permit us to act. In everyday life, “all reasonings are
nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but by enlivening the
imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object” (101). Thus the
imagination fills in the spaces between perceptions, which might otherwise be dismissed
as chance events or unrelated, by supercharging our observations with “vivacity” thereby
moving them from the level of mere thought to the level of belief (66). For Hume, our
“reasonings,” by which he means “all reasonings from experience” (465 n.11), do not
begin and end in an abstract vacuum of logical processing; rather, “[t]he custom,” which
attracts and facilitates the imagination’s work, “operates before we have time for
reflection” (72; emphasis mine). 13
When transcendent desire resurfaces, it begins to break down the universality of
the imaginary that social desire attempts to maintain. In the Appendix to the Treatise
published with Book 3 in 1740, which appeared a year after the first two books were
published, Hume returns to the discussion on personal identity. 14 Initially, the solution he
posited to the problem of the self appears to have sufficed as a way to suspend the
question altogether. Yet the renewal of his uncertainty in the Appendix suggests
otherwise, as he remarks: “I find myself involv’d in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess,
I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent”
13

Throughout, I refer to this realm of custom and feigned phenomenal union as the imaginary.
See Don Garnett, especially Chapter 8, where he explores the many theories that have been proposed for
Hume’s dissatisfaction with his earlier account of personal identity.
14
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(399). The original solution relied upon a fiction to “feign” the holism of the self—that
rhetorical appeal to an imaginary, which he also employs throughout Books 2 and 3
where he depends upon the imagination for simulating stable conditions where reality
refuses to provide them. This dependence undermines the radical scepticism he mobilizes
throughout Book 1. In Kristevan terms, it fails to account for the principle of negativity
that moves restlessly through the symbolic order. Aiming to “give to this science” of
human nature the “solid foundation” of “experience and observation” (4), Hume submits
every aspect of the understanding to a vigorous interrogation. In other words, Hume
combines his scepticism with an empiricism that takes literally the claim that the senses
alone demarcate the scope of what we might be able to know. Such a methodology frees
Hume from narratives about existence that contradict our everyday experience of the
world—his particular target, Cartesian rationalism, is just one major example.
In Books 2 and 3, however, he submits this scepticism to the system of
impressions and ideas that he has established empirically in Book 1. Instead of allowing
his empiricism to continue, which in its demand for sensory evidence might provide an
ongoing catalyst for his “mitigated” scepticism, the event in which his Pyrrhonic
scepticism encounters his empiricism and fails gets frozen as a phenomenality or
imaginary that entraps the rest of his argument, becoming a kind of framing narrative for
the longer excursion into the social. As Jacques Derrida reminds us, this framing is
inevitable for empiricism, which he calls only the “metaphysical pretension or modesty”
of “the dream of a purely heterological thought” at the source of philosophical discourse
(“Violence” 151; emphasis original). For Derrida, empiricism is a dream “because it must
vanish at daybreak, as soon as language awakens” (151; emphasis original). Hume’s aim
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has been to move beyond total scepticism towards a system in which empiricism
undergirds the social order by affirming social experience; however, as Derrida here
implies, the threat of the Real that scepticism posits undermines any easy transition. The
close proximity of total scepticism and empiricism troubles Hume’s text in a way that he
would subsequently remedy by recasting the Treatise as two distinct volumes, An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) and An Enquiry Concerning the
Principle of Morals (1751). This revision also involved his omitting the discussion of
personal identity altogether. 15 Recalling again Kristeva’s distinction between the semiotic
and the symbolic, we may thus read Hume’s initial radical scepticism as a kind of
semiotic methodology that cannot continue to operate within the empirical socialsymbolic order that Hume introduces in Book 2. On these terms, scepticism carries a
transcendent desire for otherness—a desire to allow that which is other to remain other—
that drives the argument of Book 1. As Romantic writers will also discover, the difficulty
of living with this scepticism can make more robust systematizing such as the theorizing
of the state and society appealing.

Adam Smith and the Social Horizon of Sympathy
The difficulty (or impossibility) of managing this transcendent desire leads not
only to its turning over into social desire in the Treatise, but ultimately to its general
omission in Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy as it appears in Theory of Moral
Sentiments. If Book 1 sees Hume attempt to explain his sense of the self as a kind of
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In part, his rewriting of his arguments in these two volumes came about because of the utter failure of the
Treatise to capture an audience; in his words, it “fell dead-born from the press” (qtd. in Treatise, Editor’s
Introduction, I97).
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productive fiction that makes the social possible, the second and third books of the
Treatise shift the terms of explanation to a society that might produce something like the
self as a remainder—that is, something that comes after the social as a kind of delayed
implication of the social encounter. Smith takes up this latter view more forcefully,
excising transcendent desire altogether by simply rendering explicit sympathy’s
entrenched location within the imagination. He begins by noting the universality of a
sympathetic tendency “which interest[s]” even the most selfish person sensibly “in the
fortune of others, and render[s] their happiness necessary to him” (11). The senses,
however, are inherently limited to the subject to which they belong. He notes that, “[a]s
we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the
manner in which they are affected” and also that “our senses will never inform us of what
he suffers” (11). Such limits recall the epistemological crisis that Hume narrates in the
Treatise, yet an important difference also appears. For Hume, scepticism’s transcendent
desire unravels centripetally towards the (im)possibility of self—hence, his turn to the
social. For Smith, the senses are always already turned outwards; they are already
themselves socially oriented. As I will also show, however, this characteristic of
Smithean sympathy does not diminish its negative, even dark, elements—as many critics,
including David Marshall, have indicated. Like Hume’s variant, Smithean sympathy can
manifest as cruelty, oppression, and excessive sensibility. Where it differs, however, is in
the source of its failure: an obstructed desire in Hume; a limited imagination in Smith. A
key effect of this difference is that Smith may obviate any recourse to the transcendent,
retaining only the problems inherent to the social realm.
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Vivasvan Soni similarly distinguishes Smith’s deployment of sympathy from the
more ambivalent view taken up by his predecessors, including Hume:
It would be a mistake to think that sympathy, for Smith, is an unmediated
relation to the feelings of others. Sym-pathy must not be confused with
tele-pathy or affective contagion: “As we have no immediate experience
of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they
are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like
situation” (9). How can we place ourselves in “the like situation”? The
means by which sentiments are communicated, though it is not thematized
in the Theory as sympathy is, and though it is called by various names
such as “imagination” (9), is nothing other than narrative. (299-300)
Narrative plays an indisputably crucial role in the creation of a sympathetic bond—as the
Romantics also well knew. And, as I explore in the last chapter, part of the ongoing
difficulty Romantic writers have in coming to terms with sympathy is the question of
whether it might be possible to relate to another without such narrative representations.
For example, Coleridge’s poem, “Christabel,” opens with the troubled daughter of an
aristocrat seeking solace and narrative self-unity through the symbolic (in
Kristeva/Lacan’s sense) assimilation of a stranger. Explicitly described in the chaotic
terms Hume lays out for the theatre of the mind, Christabel attempts to unify her
disparate desires—to discover herself as unified—through a sympathetic encounter with
the mysterious Geraldine. In this manner, Christabel is undertaking a conventionally
Smithean approach to sympathizing with the other. Yet Coleridge uses the poem to show
the ultimate limits of this view: attempts to suspend or repress the transcendent desire for
the other, which cannot but help to disrupt representations of selfhood, are always only
provisional at best.
Along these lines, Soni counters his previous statement by asserting that
sympathy nevertheless appears sometimes to function in Smith as “an affective contagion
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that does not need to pass by way of narrative” (301). He argues that this mode of
sympathy or “tele-pathy” appears as “a correspondence of the affective state of the
sufferer with the affective state of the observer” in which our focus is turned to “the
emotional state of the other without regard for narrative. When this happens, the
spectacle of suffering, devoid of narrative contextualization, suffices to produce an
experience of sympathy” (301). Interestingly, Soni compares this instinctual sympathy to
viewing a tableau, which he suggests “is a static spectacle of the scene of suffering,
stripped of its narrative prehistory” (302). Notably, “tableau” is also the term David
Marshall uses throughout his reading of Mary Shelley, drawing particularly on Smith’s
theatrical sense of tableau in the description of the Creature observing the De Lacey
family from his hiding place. There is certainly an atemporal quality to the tableau;
however, although it lacks narrative prehistory, we might also describe it as a symbol
onto which observers affix existing narratives (in this case, narratives of suffering). 16 In
this way, it epitomizes a simulacrum within which the sympathizing spectator already
desires to participate.
Nevertheless, regardless of whether the scene of sympathy is fundamentally
informed by narrative or not, Smith recognizes the imperative role of the imagination in
forming and enabling the sympathetic experience. As Soni writes, “Sympathy, then,
which promised to serve as a bridge between self and other, betrays its promise and
leaves the self embroiled in its own emotions, which it imagines to have come from the
other” (309). As I have already suggested, Hume discovers an unmanageable void in the
self that turns the subject outwards – though not entirely successfully – in the direction of
others. Smithean sympathy, by contrast, aims from the beginning at forming a social
16

I recount Marshall’s reading of this scene in Chapter 5.
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bond, yet finds itself limited by the subject’s imagination. In both cases, these turns
produce failure, though for different reasons. For Hume, the threat of facing the other,
which he encounters in Book 1, never entirely dissipates following his social turn, as we
see in its re-emergence in the Appendix. Just as Christabel discovers that Geraldine’s
alterity is ultimately much greater than her sympathetic narrative can manage, Hume
determines that his explanation for the sense of self fails to account for the scope of his
desire as it is revealed through his scepticism. For Smith, sympathy fails because of the
possibility that alterity cannot be fully encompassed by the imagination. As he writes
early on: “Though our brother is on the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our
senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us
beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any
conception of what are his sensations” (11). The central position Smith reserves for the
imagination sets him apart from Hume’s more ontological understanding of the origins of
sympathetic desire. Indeed, it is Smith’s emphasis that makes his views so amenable to
that aspect of Romantic thought that holds out hope for social desire. Nevertheless, the
Romantics’ interest in the imagination also leads them to interrogate both its limits and its
interpellation by the oppressive dimensions of Smithean sympathy.
These dimensions emerge partly as a result of Smith’s methodological approach.
Unlike Hume, Smith does not begin with the self, but with the sympathetic situation. This
situation comprises a sympathizing spectator and a sympathetic object. He writes,
“Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that
of the situation which excites it” (15). Many critics have commented on this peculiar
“theatrical, interpretative” quality of Smith’s understanding of sympathy (Mitchell 78).
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For Smith, the sympathetic process involves a commitment to share the terms implicit in
a particular situation and then to take turns playing the role of spectator and actor. This
fluidity on the part of the sympathetic subject should not be taken as an endorsement by
Smith of something like Kristeva’s adolescent, “a mythical figure of the imaginary that
enables us to distance ourselves from some of our failings, splittings of the ego,
disavowals, or mere desires, which it reifies into the figure of someone who has not yet
grown up” (“The Adolescent Novel” 135). Unlike this freewheeling figure, which also
“allows us to see, hear, and read these subjective fluctuations” (135), Smith’s
sympathetic subject continues to be held in check by the superego: that is, “an impartial
spectator who considers our conduct with the same indifference with which we regard
that of other people” (Smith 152 n.22). Indeed, this oppressive context represents the key
source of sympathy’s failure in Smith.
While at some level this impartial spectator is, as D. D. Raphael suggests, only “a
creation of my imagination […] indeed myself, though in the character of an imagined
spectator, not in the character of an agent” (35), it also corresponds to “[t]he voice of
conscience,” which is itself modulated conditionally so that instead of reflecting directly
my actual actions, it only “reflects what I imagine that I, with all my knowledge of the
situation, would feel if I were a spectator instead of an agent” (36; emphasis mine). The
impartial spectator acts as another version of that “middle or neutral term that ensures the
comprehension of being” in Levinas (43), creating an imaginary space in which human
activity and interpretation may unfold according to a common language of feeling. The
location of Hume’s book on the understanding at the beginning of his investigations into
human nature renders such a space, if not impossible, ultimately unbelievable. By
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contrast, since Smith introduces sympathy immediately, he does not posit an idea of
alterity as anything other than generic differences between self-identical subjects, which
is to say that he elides the fact that difference has a material or empirical effect. Even the
dead are treated as different from the living only in degree, as he suggests our sympathy
with the dead derives from imagining ourselves in their place: beneath the earth in a
coffin. Charles Griswold suggests that Smith insists upon sympathy as primarily
interested in situations rather than feelings because “it allows a measure of objectivity”
(87). For Smith, the impartial spectator is at once “a judge between ourselves and those
we live with,” “who has no particular relation either to ourselves, or to those whose
interests are affected by our conduct” (152 n.22), as well as a “man within the breast”
(252; emphasis mine). The impartial spectator, as Robert Mitchell writes, is affiliated
“with no particular person or party,” but is instead a “simulacrum that represents all
people” (85).
This concept of the impartial spectator as simulacrum indicates the extent to
which Smith’s vision of sympathy, having built upon Hume, has also moved beyond him.
Where Hume could only hope that an encounter with the other might confirm the interior
riches of the self, Smith simply posits the space in which self and other have always
already been exchangeable under the homogenizing gaze of the impartial spectator.
Although Hume repudiates generally the position that “expects ideas to stand for
something which cannot be constituted within experience or be given in an idea without
contradiction” (Deleuze 30), he is not consistent in this rejection when it comes to the
idea of the self. While he does not go so far as to admit the self despite its intangibility,
he retains it (for example, in the Appendix) as a placeholder for something that might
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accomplish the same unifying function. This gesture marks a fundamental difference
between Hume and Smith: on the one hand, Hume’s suppressed belief in the ultimate
impossibility of representing the self, and, on the other, Smith’s acceptance of the self as
a simulacrum appearing in the form of the impartial spectator.
Thus, while I agree with Deleuze’s characterization of the Treatise as advancing a
“critique of representation” (30), Hume’s return to the problem of the self in the
Appendix represents a kind of melancholia (a subject to which I will return) that tempers
this critique and which is absent in Smith. The lost object for which Hume yearns is what
Jean Baudrillard describes as the impossible wager of representation: “that a sign could
refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could exchange for meaning and that something
could guarantee this exchange—God, of course” (173). By the end of Book 1, Hume only
allows himself to get as far as imagining the conditions that would be necessary for the
first term to be possible. In positing sympathy as a response to the failure of the sign to
refer to these depths, Hume finally does attempt to supplant representation with
simulation, as I have suggested Smith also will do. Although Adam Potkay argues, citing
Hume’s description of the metaphysical relief a game of backgammon brings to him, that
“[t]he social instincts prove salvational” for Hume (56), the aesthetic effect of Hume’s
plumbing the depths in Book 1 of his scepticism’s desire for the other overwhelms these
attempts. This incongruity between the books of the Treatise contributes to the
emergence of an anxiety about the failure of desire and the insufficiency of what comes
to replace it. Smith’s rhetorical move, by contrast, allows him to circumvent many of the
metaphysical difficulties that Hume encounters. As Jacques Khalip notes, because
“[s]ympathy thus precariously positions the self on the brink of otherness; […] Smith will
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choose to limit its ethical and civic activity to more local circulations and
responsibilities” (99). The limitations Smith places upon sympathy allow him to avoid
the difficulties that cling to Hume’s initial formulation. Yet these difficulties are precisely
the residues of speculation that make Hume’s approach important for articulating the
Romantics’ anxiety concerning sympathy.

Anxiety and the Limits of Sympathetic Desire
Hume’s rejection of his earlier scepticism results not only in an ethics, but also a
recourse to aesthetics. As Jerome Christensen points out regarding the moving final
section of Book 1, the “nakedness of the pretense to be conducting an actual experiment,
performed before our eyes, is ostentatious” (81). 17 Hume articulates his despair through
carefully crafted figures and settings: his intellectual endeavour is an agonizing world
circumnavigation; his commitment to scepticism is a monstrosity that will result in his
isolation from society; his failure of reason in the explanation of personal identity
plunges him into “the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest
darkness” (175). Out of this despair, Hume discovers his natural tendency to return to
“the sphere of common life” (176) within which the speculations of philosophy appear
“cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous” (175). As Nancy Yousef summarizes this famous
passage, “the spell of melancholy is broken by moving from the solitary chamber to the
sociability of a drawing room” (41). Hume’s lyrical appeal to his readers’ emotions has
returned us to the Kristevan semiotic mode of language; however, his attentive
orchestration of the movement of this narrative indicates that the problems at hand
17

Christensen applies this description both to Hume’s “Experiments to Confirm this System” in Book 2
and (in a footnote) to a famous passage from the concluding section of Book 1.
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(concerning the self, alterity, and sympathy) are for him already fully implicated in the
symbolic order. Moreover, this careful crafting also invites us to raise a more difficult
question about the reasons for this particular plotting. Put succinctly, why does the shift
from sceptical desire for the transcendent other to the empirical desire for the social other
require a supplementary rhetoric of feeling? The answer to this lies in the anxious effect
that later writers would come to draw upon in exploring alternatives to a social sympathy
that failed to account for the full scope of their desire for the other.
The apparent repression of transcendent desire in Hume’s work might be
overlooked if the general reception of the Treatise had been less lopsided. Nevertheless,
since the beginning, Hume’s readers have tended to place more emphasis on the first
book of the Treatise than Hume anticipated. 18 As further evidence of the extent of this
misreading, Hume himself was forced to make his intentions more explicit in several
places outside the text. In addition to the section in the Appendix to the Treatise where he
renews his scepticism about personal identity, Hume belittles the so-called “identity
crisis” in his Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh, a text published five
years after the Treatise (cf. Potkay 58). Finally, Hume “formally disowned the work
toward the end of his life” (57), affixing an advertisement to copies of his Enquiries that
contained a detailed response to his detractors. Yet, to borrow two terms from William
Godwin’s essay “Of Choice in Reading,” the “moral” Hume insists upon for his Treatise
is distinct from the “tendency” of that work. As Godwin suggests, most authors “show
themselves superlatively ignorant of the tendency of their own writings” (117-18).
18

Potkay reviews several examples appearing in the criticism of Hume’s contemporaries, as well as in
readers up to the present day, noting that “[s]uch readers willy-nilly follow earlier commentators from
Thomas Reid and James Beattie through Leslie Stephen in wrongly assuming the centrality in Hume’s
writings of ‘perceptualism’ [...] and deducing as Hume’s intended consequence a conviction of our
perceptual isolation and of the insubstantiability of the external and social world” (53).
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Tilottama Rajan describes Godwin’s idea of a work’s tendency as “an
intersubjective and historically developing significance, generated by the interaction of
intention and its representation and subsequently of the text and its reading” (Supplement
169). As Potkay and others have demonstrated, many subsequent readers of Hume did
not properly understand what he hoped would be the Treatise’s message, ultimately “misreading” him. Yet this misreading produces another kind of meaning, which is equally
relevant to the text’s significance not only as a cultural artifact, but also in terms of the
historical impact of its ideas. Like Kristeva’s thetic phase, which is at once “permeable”
and committed “to ensur[ing] the position of the subject put in process/on trial” (63), 19
the Treatise remains open, despite its dominant symbolic mode (that is, the doctrine of
sympathy advanced by Hume to circumvent his inability to discover the conditions of the
selfhood), to “the irruption of the semiotic” (63). Following Freud’s description of
anxiety as a response to those “traumatic moments, when the ego meets with an
excessively great libidinal demand,” out of which “[t]he first and original repressions
arise” (“Anxiety and Instinctual Life,” 783), I want to explore the longer-term
ramifications of these irruptions of the semiotic in Hume’s text. Given my earlier
description of the semiotic mode in Hume as the manifestation of a totalizing desire for
the self, I will suggest that these breaches of the dominant symbolic outline of the
Treatise result in an anxiety that itself becomes aesthetically productive under the kinds
of conditions I explore in Chapter 2.
Hume’s transcendent desire, finding its antecedents in aspects both of the
Cartesian cogito and Hobbes’s state of nature, comes up against a possibility and a
19

Margaret Waller writes in the Translator’s Preface to Revolution in Poetic Language: “the Kristevan
subject is nonetheless always implicated in a heterogeneous signifying process: his identity, never become,
ever becoming, questioned and questionable, is always on trial (en procès)” (ix).
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consequence the combination of which seem to produce just such a “traumatic moment”:
first, the possibility that the self—social or otherwise—is just as inaccessible as any
object; and, second, the consequence of this inaccessibility being the wholly insatiable
status of that desire. 20 Hume entertains the possibility that absolute identity might turn
over into alterity in the Appendix where he “plead[s] the privilege of a sceptic” (400) and
declines to decide unambiguously for or against the possibility of identity. His social
response to the consequence such inaccessibility entails is found in the Conclusion to
Book 1, where he declares, “I may, nay I must yield to the current of nature, in
submitting to my senses and understanding” (175). In the face of the self’s insuperable
otherness, Hume affirms as reality what things appear to be. By mapping Freud’s later
vision of anxiety onto this encounter between transcendent and social forms of desire, we
can read Hume’s text as a description of how he comes to fear the libidinal energies at
stake in the desire for the self. 21 From this perspective, a metaphysical move such as his

20

Arthur Schopenhauer suggests a point of access to the thing-in-itself; however, since it is a movement
away from individuation and, following the ascetic turn, towards the world as will, the result is hardly the
unitary self: “I have stressed that other truth that we are not merely the knowing subject, but that we
ourselves are also among those realities or entities we require to know, that we ourselves are the thing-initself. Consequently, a way from within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to which we
cannot penetrate from without. It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which, as if by
treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could not be taken by attack from without. Precisely as
such, the thing-in-itself can come into consciousness only quite directly, namely by it itself being conscious
of itself; to try to know it objectively is to desire something contradictory. Everything objective is
representation, consequently appearance, in fact mere phenomenon of the brain” (Schopenhauer 2:195).
Schopenhauer’s reflections on the themes I am exploring extend this project beyond the intended scope of
its methodology, which focuses on English philosophy of the eighteenth century; however, a more
developed version of this project would benefit from Schopenhauer playing an enlarged role.
21
In a lecture called “Anxiety and Instinctual Life,” published in 1932 (and which built on his 1926 book,
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety), Freud argues “that the generation of anxiety is the earlier and the
formation of symptoms the later of the two, as though the symptoms are created in order to avoid the
outbreak of the anxiety state” (776). Anxiety is not a result of repression, as Freud earlier thought, but
rather that which prompts the repression in the first place. For, he notes, “we have also succeeded in
answering the question of what it is that a person is afraid of in neurotic anxiety and so in establishing the
connection between neurotic and realistic [or objective] anxiety. What he is afraid of is evidently his own
libido” (776). This fear of the libido results from “the reproduction of an old event which brought a threat
of danger” and is “psychically bound” to the symptoms formed during the process of repression (776).
Where anxiety is typically understood (and Freud had initially thought of it in this way) as a perverted or
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rejection of the solitary self is a strategy of repression Hume deploys in response to the
anxieties conveyed in the final section of Book 1. In both of his theories of anxiety
(developed, respectively, in “Anxiety” [1917] and Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety
[1926]), Freud posits repression as the obstruction of a libidinal cathexis by some
influence. 22 The earlier view suggested that the influence was external: the object of the
libido. The later view locates that influence within the ego in the threat that the libido
might become unmanageable. In the Conclusion to Book 1, this unmanageability of
desire is precisely the problematic issue for Hume—not simply its object. Thus, between
the ever-expanding desire implied by scepticism and its empirical repression as the
social, Hume inserts the term “sympathy” as the “soul or animating principle” that guides
“[w]hatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity,
revenge or lust” (234-35).

corrupted expression of the libido, the later view understands anxiety—insofar as it involves the repetition
of an earlier experience—as a kind of memory experienced at physiological and psychological levels,
which responds to the libido, rather than being its translation on the other side of repression. Yet what is
remembered is “a state of highly tense excitation, which is felt as unpleasure and which one is not able to
master by discharging it” (782). Anxiety’s fear of the libido is, in fact, a fear of an uncontrollable libido or
an ungratifiable desire; in other words, the fear concerns “the emergence of a traumatic moment, which
cannot be dealt with by the normal rules of the pleasure principle” (782).
22
As I have suggested, Freud’s 1926 exploration of anxiety represented a return and shift from his earlier
thoughts on the matter. In a 1917 lecture, simply titled “Anxiety,” Freud describes anxiety as an affect that
repeats “some particular very significant previous experience” (403) at an unconscious level. Such an
experience may be pinpointed somewhat, he argues, suggesting that “the first anxiety state arose on the
occasion of the separation from the mother” (404). This is not the separation from the mother’s breast that
occurs at the close of the oral stage; however, anxiety arising out of that separation does repeat the earlier
experience of a separation that takes place at birth. As Freud writes, “birth is the source and prototype of
the anxiety affect” (404). Indeed, the link between the child’s experience of anxiety and what Freud
distinguishes as “neurotic” anxiety in the adult is much stronger than the other type of anxiety he discusses,
“objective” anxiety, which is “essentially a reaction to danger” (408). In both cases, the anxiety affect
derives from the repression of the libido (417). Thus Freud describes the childhood fear of the dark (a
phobia that “is often retained throughout life” [414]) as something that begins as a desire for the mother, or
a “longing felt in the darkness” (414; emphasis original). Her continued absence blocks the gratification of
that libidinal energy with the result that the child’s “libido, unable to be expended, and at that time not to be
held suspended, is discharged through being converted into dread” (414). Ultimately, Freud modified his
thinking to suggest the opposite: that “anxiety produces repression; it is a signal whether appropriate or
inappropriate, realistic or neurotic, of danger ahead” (773).
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Where sympathy is intended to organize these elements, its inability to quell their
disorder, as evident for instance in the Treatise’s tendency to be read mainly in terms of
its epistemology, suggests that this ostensibly positive task of organizing is an attempt to
obscure the failure of the empiricism of Books 2 and 3 to account fully for the
implications of Book 1’s traumatic moment. 23 The initial trauma as it appears in the
Treatise revolves around the unstable pursuit of a knowledge that continually slips from
view—as we see in the example of personal identity, which ends up looking much more
like indeterminacy. To the extent that this tendency in the idea of sympathy also holds for
Romantic writers, those moments of anxiety that prove most productive in their writings
and thought must emerge out of a return to the site of trauma: namely, the threat of the
thing-in-itself. The path of sympathy out of the self and into the social is one that diverts
almost immediately from the goal of becoming a thing-in-itself, as the force of its alterity
impinges increasingly upon the social desire for stability. This traumatic threat is
rendered even more concrete, if also, paradoxically, obscure, with the emergence of
materialism.
Building upon Freud’s dynamic sense of anxiety—one that resonates with other
thinkers such as Søren Kierkegaard, for whom anxiety is “the dizziness of freedom” (61)
and thus occupies a similar relation to the impossible—we may begin to assemble
characteristics of this repressed transcendent energy within modern sympathy that I am
calling dark sympathy. Dark sympathy is not transcendent desire itself, but rather the
expression of that desire as it has been attenuated, modified, and reduced within the
social sphere. As early as Hume’s own work, the desire for the other that precedes (even
23

Midway through his second essay on anxiety, Freud describes how anxiety mobilizes repression: “The
ego notices that the satisfaction of an emerging instinctual demand would conjure up one of the wellremembered situations of danger” (779).
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as it gives rise to) social desire appears predominantly along specific affective, political,
and aesthetical registers. For instance, when Yousef describes Hume’s (potentially
artificial) state of mind at the end of Book 1 as “melancholy” (41), she repeats Hume’s
own identification of this sentiment: “This sudden view of my danger strikes me with
melancholy; and as it is usual for that passion, above all others, to indulge itself; I cannot
forbear feeding my despair, with all those desponding reflections, which the present
subject furnishes me with in such abundance” (172). As Freud notes, “The complex of
melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself cathectic energies […] from
all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished” (Freud Reader 589).
Likewise, only Hume’s social intervention—the promise of companionship—stops the
outpouring of Hume’s self-negation:
When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger,
calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but
doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me;
tho’ such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of
themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. Every step I
take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error
and absurdity in my reasoning. (172)
Woven through this melancholy tone are the signals that Hume will take up in
order to found his system in Books 2 and 3. In particular, he will take the paradox that
paralyzes him most—that the world opposes him, yet he cannot help but rely upon the
world’s approval—and locate precisely in that need for others the grounds of his
empiricism. Nevertheless, this desire for “the approbation of others” is not merely a
social desire, but also complements a transcendent desire that the condition of total
opposition between him and others be resolved. Thus, to take an important example from
Godwin’s fiction, the figure of the misanthrope plays a central role in allowing Godwin
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to articulate a transcendent form of desire that exceeds even as it relies upon the social for
its expression. Even as his hatred for society derives from his maltreatment by society,
the misanthrope desires a relation with others for which society can only ever be at most
a weak reflection.
The anxiety that Hume reveals in this section, attempts to resolve in Books 2 and
3, and returns to in the Appendix has a lingering influence upon the Romantic
imagination. 24 Although Hume claims to emerge out of the indeterminacy he experiences
when “inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every
member and faculty” (Treatise 175), the tendency of his work, I have tried to show, fails
to overcome at least some of that darkness. Moreover, this darkness as an expression of
epistemological uncertainty takes on new figurations following the materialist turn in the
cultural imagination, which I will explore in the next chapter. Romantic writers,
influenced by the interwoven discourses of sympathy and materialism, trace the etiology
of sympathy’s breakdown in order to imagine new forms of community that build upon
counter-social categories such as melancholia, misanthropy, dejection, or even dying.
Although many of their subsequent literary and communal experiments fail, the poetic
energy of those failures extends the latent forms of transcendent desire repressed in
Hume’s early reflections into what Charles Taylor calls “a secular age,” which involves
in part the emergence of a condition in which “we lose a sense of where the place of
fullness is, even of what fullness could consist in” (A Secular Age 6). 25 If the Romantic
24

Notably, this influence is a complex one. Tim Milnes writes: “Hume’s influence effectively paralysed
conventional philosophy of knowledge in the late eighteenth century,” but “it also gave rise to a
philosophically intense Romantic movement in poetry and aesthetics” (6). The Romantic reaction, Milnes
argues, to Hume’s scepticism was above all “troubled […] but unable to dissolve it” (6).
25
For Taylor, the experience of “fullness” occurs sometimes as a “limit experience” that “unsettles and
breaks through our ordinary sense of being in the world, with its familiar objects, activities and points of
reference” (5) and at other times as a less absolute experience in which “the deep divisions, distractions,
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period attempts to recover a desire for the other that transcends the social other
substituted by thinkers such as Hume and Smith, it does so in a paradoxically “posttranscendent” context. As I will describe at greater length in Chapter 2, transcendent
desire—as a result of a similar intellectual history to that of sympathy itself—is at most
“encrypted” within the cultural imaginary. Hence, it is to the field of anxieties, affect, and
desire that we must look to discover the dark side of sympathy, rather than to particular
limits in the discourse itself.

Relational desire in the modern era is directed towards two different objects:
transcendence, on the one hand, and society, on the other. In the eighteenth century, these
distinct categories begin to overlap within relational discourses such as sympathy, leading
sympathy’s major theorists to attempt to attenuate or repress that transcendent element.
This response arises in part pragmatically from the excessiveness of the desire and from
the lack of stabilizing political and theological contexts within which such desire might
be contained. For Romantic writers, however, the conflict prompts them to experiment
with forms of relation that might more successfully retrieve that transcendent dimension
of desire for the other. For instance, Godwin’s political imagination comes into contact
with his keen social analysis between Political Justice and Caleb Williams, producing a
series of reflections on the ways relational desire can be circumscribed, deferred, and at
times preserved in oppressive contexts, especially in the paradoxical form of
misanthropy, which he explores further in other novels. Similarly, although Coleridge’s
utopian plan to begin a colony in Pennsylvania with his brother-in-law, Robert Southey,

worries, sadnesses that seem to drag us down are somehow dissolved, or brought into alignment, so that we
feel united, moving forward, suddenly capable and full of energy” (6).
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fails, he discovers a relational energy in the ambivalence of that failure—what he calls
“dejection”—that incites a series of further literary experiments in bridging the gap
between a visceral yearning and the demands of the social. Mary Shelley’s speculative reimagining of her family and circle of friends also gives her the opportunity to draw out
threads of desire that extend beyond the social, such as she depicts in the scenes of death
in her post-apocalyptic novel, The Last Man. As the analysis of anxiety in Hume’s
presentation suggests, sympathy is haunted by an ongoing negativity that enables the
Romantics to put its desires to work in counter- or even anti-social ways extending far
beyond the purview Hume and Smith had set for it.
Thus the opening example of Shelley and Harriet establishes an appropriate, if
also uncomfortable and sombre, tone for the inquiries I pursue below. Whether in
Godwin’s appeals to madness and hatred, Coleridge’s ongoing struggle with the body’s
effects, or Mary Shelley’s painful realization of the problematic artifice of any idealism
about the other, the desire for community rather than mere society carries with it the
destructive effects of the latter’s critique or rejection. While I will investigate these
effects and the literary attempts to mitigate them, my primary intention in this chapter has
been to focus specifically on the faulty mechanism itself as instantiated in the discourse
of sympathy. In its modern conception, sympathy’s parallel sets of significations enter
into conflict as its transcendent meaning gets submerged beneath its more feasible social
meaning. As we see in Shelley’s appeal to a transcendent form of relation (what he calls
“elevated friendship”) outside of his marriage, the Romantic response to this conflict of
desire involves a sometimes problematic attempt to reclaim the hidden promise of
sympathy.
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In this chapter, I have tried to establish some of the discursive conditions
informing sympathy’s development through the course of the eighteenth century. As
philosophers begin to recognize the need for a new understanding of human nature,
incompatibilities surface between the different models advanced. Here, I have focused on
one incompatibility in particular relating to the desire for the other. On the one hand,
Descartes seeks to emphasize what is remarkable in human nature, imagining a much
larger scope for the other and for otherness altogether. On the other hand, Hobbes,
recognizing the limits of human nature, conceives of the other in social terms, appealing
to the stability such conceptions imply. As I suggest, this tension between different ways
of thinking about others and our relations with them accompanies sympathy from the
beginning of its tenure as modernity’s dominant relational mode. Hume draws upon both
of these sources to build a rich, if aporetic, mechanism for the expression of human desire
for the other, which attempts to respond to both its transcendent, expansive mode and its
need for social stability and security. The great contribution of Smith, by extension, is to
marshall a strong (and emphatically non-transcendent) defence for the modern social
imaginary and to determine modes for expressing the desire this imaginary engenders. As
I have suggested, Smith’s theory of sympathy aligns its failure with the imagination;
however, Hume entertains another form of desire (and failure) beyond this imaginary
realm.
As this transcendent desire is repressed, it produces a kind of cultural anxiety that
informs the relational experiments later thinkers—especially, the Romantics—take up as
a result of their encounter with this dark side to sympathy. Indeed, if this chapter exposes
how a transcendent desire for the other continues to cling to social discourse in the
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eighteenth century, then the next chapter will seek to elaborate what I take to be a key
catalyst in the cultural mobilization of this transcendent desire: namely, materialism. As
materialism takes on a life of its own, it widens the scope of what might constitute
alterity, recalling along the way the transcendent forms of desire that modern sympathy
had sought to abandon. Taking their guiding principles from the questions posed by
materialism and drawing upon the energy produced by the anxious underside of
sympathy, Romantic writers use materialist imagery and situations to imagine moments
or events of near and failed relation as ways of responding to the aporia of sympathy. In
its inability to face the insurmountable gap between a desire for stability and the
pressures of alterity, sympathy often functioned as a repressive mechanism for the social.
We may ask, therefore, whether an alternative sympathy or relation is possible that would
recognize this impasse and proceed into the darkness of the other nonetheless?
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CHAPTER TWO
Materialism and the Encryption of Transcendent Desire

“There is a great difference between the Idols of the human
mind and the Ideas of the divine. That is to say, between
certain empty dogmas, and the true signatures and marks
set upon the works of creation as they are found in nature.”
— Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Aphorism 23
“But as soon as materialism becomes intelligible it ceases
to be materialism.”
— Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria
“Materialism will be seen as a senile idealism to the extent
that it is not immediately based on psychological or social
facts, instead of on artificially isolated physical
phenomena. [...] When the word materialism is used, it is
time to designate the direct interpretation, excluding all
idealism, of raw phenomena, and not a system founded on
the fragmentary elements of an ideological analysis,
elaborated under the sign of religious relations.”
— Georges Bataille, “Materialism”

The first chapter sought to distinguish the entwined forms of desire at work within
eighteenth-century discourses of sympathy: a social desire for a stable relation with other
people, or society, and a transcendent desire to comprehend the other in its alterity. Over
the course of the eighteenth century, this latter desire—much more difficult, if not
impossible, to satisfy—gets increasingly subsumed within the former, yet without
entirely disappearing. Instead, the transcendent desire for the other continues to motivate
the representation of community in Romantic writing, as I will survey at greater length in
subsequent chapters. Understanding community as a form of relation that lacks the
intentional and systematic structure of society, expressing an inherent openness and
resistance to constraint, we can identify moments of transcendent desire by focusing on
efforts to imagine and relate to the other in new or unintuitive ways. As I argue in this
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chapter, the emergence of modern materialism is saturated with such efforts. Mary Lynn
Johnson notes that “[t]he rediscovery and rehabilitation of ancient Greek atomistic
philosophy, after centuries of Christian efforts to suppress and discredit it, occurred
almost simultaneously at several sites in seventeenth-century Europe” (108). Partly as a
result of the fraught conditions under which this revival occurs, materialism offers figures
for the imagination capable of attending to the anxiety I explored in the previous chapter.
Alongside the growing influence of sympathy in defining the relationship between
individuals and their society, this turn to materialism produces a diversely organized
paradigm revealing the otherness at the heart of reality.
If the seventeenth century establishes the conditions necessary for society to think
materialism, then the eighteenth century resounds with the effects of such conditioning
upon the imagination. As I will suggest in this chapter, writers attempted to represent this
newly material universe in a number of different ways, including as forces of attraction
and repulsion, as a passive site for the emergence of life, and as sensibility. Yet, for many
thinkers, all such representations fail to account for matter in its newly absolute sense.
Along these lines, Paul de Man usefully distinguishes between phenomenality, which
includes not only the world as it appears to be, but also the metaphysical conditions that
make any apperception possible, and materiality, informing, if never disclosing itself to,
the world of all-pervasive representation. 1 Jacques Lacan’s definition for the Real, as
“that which resists symbolization absolutely” (Seminar I, 66; qtd. in Evans 162), offers a
useful conceptualization, upon which Jacques Derrida will draw. Thus, for example, even

1

De Man’s terms, which appear at greatest length in his essay in Aesthetic Ideology, “Phenomenality and
Materiality in Kant,” seem to overlap in ways with Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung and Wille, the latter of
which Schopenhauer describes as “a blind impulse, an obscure, dull urge, remote from all direct knowableness” (1:149).
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as sensibility expresses the uniquely corporeal dimension of human experience, its
phenomenal aspect as a translation of that corporeality separates it from a materiality that
precedes it. One of the key arguments of this chapter, particularly as it relates to my
subsequent studies of specific Romantic writers, is that this distinction between what I am
calling “the imaginary” and a non-phenomenal materiality raises important questions
about the location and character of any transcendent desire for the other. Indeed, as Mary
Shelley explores in her fourth novel, The Last Man, transcendent desire may find its best
approximation not within an imaginary at all, but rather in the ambiguous alterity of a
world without us, which Orrin Wang suggests is characterized by “the irreducible specter
of antagonism” (155).
In the first section of this chapter, I will offer a brief genealogy of modern
materialism, focusing especially on Descartes’s and Hobbes’s respective contributions to
the discourse. I will argue that these contributions participate in – counter-intentionally in
the case of Descartes – a gradual turn to monism. By releasing libidinal energies within
the cultural imagination, this turn conditions Romantic writing in ways that have yet to be
fully explored. While these energies – understood as “passions” – had hitherto been
associated with the natural world’s apparent subjection to the divine, such desires now
return upon the material object from which they had before been definitively distinct.
Rather than only identifying transcendence with the spiritual, seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century thinkers often perceived within matter itself a transcendent scope,
which they aligned with its conceptual alterity. This monistic understanding of the world
makes possible both the empirical agnosticism embraced by Hume and Kant and their
successors, in which the noumenal realm prior to subjectivity remains unthinkable, and
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the subsequent Romantic return to this unthinkability as the source of an exciting and
troubling potentiality. Finally, I explore this transcendent materialism in greater depth by
focusing on critical readings of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century materiality initiated by
Paul de Man and taken up subsequently by writers such as Jacques Derrida, Andrzej
Warminski, and Orrin Wang.
In the second section, I will briefly discuss three key moments in eighteenthcentury materialist discourse in which this newly transcendent quality for materialism
attempts to pass into the field of representation, though never with entire success.
Instantiations of such experiments include, I will argue, Priestley’s “immaterial”
materialism, the emergence of vitalism, and, finally, the “culture” of sensibility. These
“materialist imaginaries” offer sites for examining the extent to which transcendent desire
may be expressed before it is rejected by the social realm as incompatible with social
desire. The strategies that each experiment deploys in order to strike the delicate balance
between a sufficiently robust and pervasive materialism, on the one hand, and a
recognizable idea of the transcendent, on the other, help reveal the cultural resonances of
each term and point towards a similar ambivalence in dark sympathy.
These investigations set the stage for a third section in which I read P. B.
Shelley’s “Queen Mab” (1813) and St. Irvyne (1811) as texts that attempt to reflect this
alignment of transcendence with materiality specifically in terms of its implications for
community. Shelley’s early texts – whose themes derive in no small part from the work
of the French materialists and of William Godwin – highlight in brief the major terms
surrounding dark sympathy and its two discursive influences and also outline the
relationships and conflicts between these terms. By placing Shelley’s early writing in this
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genealogy of materialism, I want to suggest, in the case of “Queen Mab,” that an
emphasis on the transcendent element in materialist thought to which Shelley is trying to
attend resolves many of the problems that accompany the poem’s otherwise uneven
construction. Likewise, St. Irvyne’s narrative weaknesses as well as its fascination with a
materialism informed by the philosophes reflect the inherent difficulty of describing
transcendent desire as it is constrained by the social. In both cases, the texts attempt to
imagine the conditions for relationships that exceed representation.

A Genealogy of Modern Materialism
If Plato and his successors advanced a dualism of mind and body or spirit and
matter, the modern turn of the seventeenth century (and beginning much earlier) re-folds
this distinction into a single, monistic understanding of the constitution of Being. 2
Catherine Wilson writes along these lines, describing the modern perspective on these
past thinkers: “We regard the metaphysical systems of the past with aesthetic interest, and
with appreciation for the ingenuity with which, applying logic and analysis, their authors
reasoned out and invented alternatives to and barriers against the philosophy they thought
of as atheistic corporealism” (3-4). This merely “aesthetic” investment derives, Wilson
notes, from the fact that “we are all, in a sense, Epicureans now” (3). Having adopted a
monistic understanding of the world, the modern mind identifies any supplemental
systematization as an organizational narrative distinct from “reality.” Wilson’s claim is
not only persuasive, but also suggestive for its framing: what does it mean for these once2

The debate over the so-called origins of modernity has become something of a parlour game of late. Even
with a focus upon the conceptual shift to an ontological univocity, the enquiry remains ambiguous; for
instance, others have identified the source of this shift in the work of the thirteenth-century philosopher,
Duns Scotus (Milbank 55, 304-5).
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vital inquiries into the nature of Being to be now of merely “aesthetic interest”? What has
happened to that vitality and how has it been transformed?
Epicureanism offers a useful introductory shorthand for marking the reemergence of a purely materialist thought within the early-modern world picture.
Building upon the atomism of Democritus, Epicurus’s non-theistic meditations upon the
exclusively material composition of the cosmos and its implications for human actions
were taken up most significantly in ancient times by the poet, Lucretius. His masterpiece,
De Rerum Natura, first appeared in English in Thomas Creech’s 1682 edition. Martin
Priestman suggests that, if this time just preceding the Glorious Revolution in England
represents the “first great Lucretian moment in Britain,” then the second “great Lucretian
moment” takes place between 1790 and 1820—auspicious years for Romantic studies
(289). 3 Lucretius’s On the Nature of Things is a philosophical poem in six books,
reflecting on the nature and behaviour of atoms, the material basis of mental operations
and sensation, and life at the individual and cosmic levels. While the poem does mention
gods and goddesses (including Venus in Book One’s opening invocation), the world it
describes is one that operates very much apart from any divine involvement. As I will
explore further in the third section below, the poem’s themes and implications proved
particularly compelling for Shelley in “Queen Mab.” Especially provocative was
Lucretius’s implicit claim that an exclusively materialist orientation to the world might
not only avoid the charge of nihilism, but even possess a meaningful beauty and
significance of its own. Such an aesthetic value would inhere not in the representation of
the world, the proximity to presence of which would depend upon the guarantee of an
3

See Catherine Wilson’s Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity (esp. Chapter 1, “Introduction: The
Revival of Ancient Materialism”) for a good summary of Lucretius’s rediscovery in Renaissance Europe.
For a more popular exposition, see Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern.
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onto-theology, but rather in the monistic, material form itself. In other words, Lucretius
posited an idea of transcendence anchored not in a Being that extends beyond
comprehension, but rather in the void at the core of human knowledge. As I have
suggested, Hume’s sceptical method in Book 1 of the Treatise is oriented provisionally
towards a similar transcendent void.
Alongside the Epicureanism of the seventeenth century appear many of the same
figures I introduced in the previous chapter. These forerunners of modern sympathy not
only were convinced to varying degrees of the necessity of incorporating materialist
thought into their systems, but also discovered in that materialism an opportunity for
retaining what was to become the more elusive element of sympathy in Hume’s
investigations: a transcendent desire for the other. In the preceding chapter, we saw how
Descartes’s positing of the cogito at the terminus of his radical scepticism enables him to
retain a kernel of identity, a transcendent idea of the self, which becomes responsible for
orchestrating the passions. Yet that idea of the self also contains an instability that primes
it for Hume’s later effort to describe human nature. Likewise, while the explicit social
desire Thomas Hobbes advances in his argument about the need for taming the passions
by submitting them to the rule of the state informs the dominant structure of eighteenthcentury sympathy, his argument also continues to maintain a space for the transcendent.
In particular, Hobbes follows Epicurus in treating the universe itself as an object of
transcendent desire. By more closely attending to the materialist content of both their
theories, I want to highlight the ways in which materialism begins to get treated
differently in this period—less as a vehicle for higher realities, and more as a backdrop
against which any reality may be judged.
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As I argued in the previous chapter, Descartes makes available to thought an idea
of the human self as transcendent. Inseparable from this development, however, is
Descartes’s explorations of the systems of nature and of the body. Adopting a perspective
in his reflections on substance that intersects with materialism, Descartes imagines a
body that is ontologically distinct from the soul. In some ways, the activity of the bodies
that he explores, including the human body as a mechanism under the influence of the
soul as it operates via the pineal gland, resembles the life-like behaviour of the automata
and other machines that were popular in his day. 4 As he famously writes in his Treatise
on Man, “I suppose the body to be nothing but a statue or machine made of earth, which
God forms with the explicit intention of making it as much as possible like us” (99).
Nevertheless, these things of earth are not identical with the “clocks, artificial fountains,
mills, and other such machines” (99) that share their ultimate physical constitution;
rather, as Fred Ablondi notes in his reading of Descartes’s mechanical biology, living
bodies possess both an inner “principle of motion” and “the complexity which only God
can give a thing” (185). While Descartes’s ideas seem on first glance to resist or
contradict the monistic turn I am describing, I want to suggest that they in fact help to
facilitate this turn in the cultural imagination. Living bodies seem mechanical, yet they
are distinguished by their God-given complexity and inner principle. The former
characteristic is a feature exclusively belonging to corporeal substance and raises the
possibility that materiality—and not just things of the spirit—is itself something that
cannot easily be grasped. In his Sixth Meditation, Descartes asserts that “we must allow

4

Wilson recounts how “[t]he construction of zoomorphic automata, resembling the moving statues
described and constructed by the ancients, further reduced the conceptual distance between machines and
animals, even when a soul was deemed necessary to initiate movement in animals. The lifelike figures in
the gardens of St-Germain-en-Laye made a remarkable impression on René Descartes” (23).
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that corporeal things exist” (191). His primary reason for arguing this is that we seem to
perceive such things as existing and for it to be otherwise would make God a deceiver.
From another perspective, however, Descartes’s reasoning depends upon his sense that
there is an inconsistency to sensory experience. If he were simply to dismiss experience
because of this inconsistency, then he would be an idealist with little interest in
discerning the linkages between matter and mind. His decision to retain sensory
knowledge under the category of “complexity” opens a space for imagining a materiality
that exceeds our understanding. Likewise, because of the assumption that God is not a
deceiver, we must accept even the inscrutable aspects of corporeal substances. Thus his
transcendent desire for God leads Descartes to affirm a complexity within matter,
implying by extension the beginnings of an alignment between the material and the
transcendent.
The characteristic of living bodies described above as an inner principle of motion
similarly advances an inscrutable element at the core of material existence. As Descartes
describes this principle later in the Sixth Meditation, “the nature of body is such that none
of its parts can be moved by another part a little way off which cannot also be moved in
the same way by each one of the parts which are between the two” (196). Hume would
later identify this principle with causation more generally. Subsequent eighteenth-century
writers such as William Godwin would call it “the doctrine of necessity.” As I explain in
this chapter’s section on Shelley’s “Queen Mab,” questions surrounding necessity play an
important role in reinforcing the monistic imagination. Unlike some religious forms of
discourse, the doctrine of necessity allows the materialist to reject any recourse to an
outside, instead discovering the unfolding of matter as part of an expansive and complex

81
– and troubling – unity. Descartes’s formulation of this aspect of materialist thought
resembles Lucretius’s argument for a plurality-of-causes, which similarly emphasizes the
inevitable, if often inscrutable, relation of cause-and-effect. 5
Nevertheless, despite this overlap, Descartes insisted that his materialist
tendencies were distinct from the theories of the ancients. As Catherine Wilson shows:
“[H]e referred in a letter to one of his critics to ‘that inane philosophy conflated of atoms
and the void, usually ascribed to Democritus and Epicurus, and others like it, which have
nothing to do with me’” (113). This resistance to being too closely associated with the
early materialists suggests at least in part Descartes’s commitment to a more traditional
understanding of the transcendent. Indeed, part of Descartes’s resistance to materialism
derives from its possible theological implications, which would develop especially in the
writing of the French philosophes and, later, in the work of the Marquis de Sade. 6 These
implications were already perceptible at the time Descartes was writing. 7 Descartes’s
ultimate rejection of materialism thus corresponds in part to the same rejection of
uncertainty that requires him to posit the cogito. Nevertheless, as in that case, he creates
the conditions for those who will take up his initial argument and proceed further with it.
Where Descartes resists materialism even as he prepares the way for its ultimate
inauguration, his contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, avows it openly. For Hobbes, the

5

In Book Six, Lucretius writes: “There are some phenomena for which it is not sufficient to state one
cause: you must mention several causes, though only one of these will be the true cause” (196).
6
Pierre Klossowski writes: “The materialists and the Encyclopedists, Sade’s contemporaries, when they
admit matter in the state of perpetual motion as the universal agent that excludes any need for the existence
of a god, imply that knowledge of the laws governing this matter will make possible a better individual and
social morality, as well as an unlimited rational exploitation of Nature by man. […] For Sade, the
substitution of Nature in the state of perpetual motion for God signifies, not the arrival of a happier era for
humanity, but only the beginning of tragedy and its conscious and deliberate acceptance” (81).
7
See Wilson for an extended discussion of Descartes’s failed attempts to disassociate himself from atheism
(111-25).
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universe does not require additional narratives, particularly ones that obscure the
necessity of the social order. As we see in the closing part of Leviathan, for Hobbes,
[t]he World, (I mean not the Earth onely, that denominates the Lovers of
it Worldly men, but the Universe, that is, the whole masse of all things
that are) is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of
Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and Depth: also every part of Body,
is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every
part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the
Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is no part of it, is
Nothing; and consequently no where. (689)
Significantly, Hobbes’s unequivocal description of this monistic universe accompanies
his critique of institutional abuses of power, especially those ideologically motivated
abuses effected by religion and philosophy that “would fright [citizens] from Obeying the
Laws of their Countrey, with empty names; as men fright Birds from the Corn with an
empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick” (691). As I suggested in Chapter 1, the social
desire Hobbes hopes to advance depends upon a radical suppression of the human desire
for exerting power over others. Indeed, Hobbes identifies such desire as the reason why
people, when they are in the state of nature, exist in “a condition of Warre of every man
against every man” (196). His critique of these institutions stems from a fear that
theological and philosophical narratives will extract power illegitimately from the very
social systems intended to cultivate safe and secure spaces for developing human virtue.
While his emphasis on such an artificial order suggests that Hobbes retains the
category of the imaginary as a central aspect of his system, his rejection of narratives that
do not acknowledge their own artifice in fact reveals his intolerance of any alignment of
the transcendent with the imaginary. As I have already suggested, the social in Hobbes’s
system is meant to bind the state of nature in order to prevent the dominance of its violent
tendencies. Yet the state of nature—a pre-civil state—is part of the larger “Corporeall”

83
world that Hobbes identifies as the Real subtending all possible imaginaries. The benefit
of Hobbes’s thought of a wholly neutral materialism (which is to say, neither gnostic nor
anthropocentric in character) is that it frees people to accept the security of the social (an
openness to transparent “fictions” that we also see in Hume and Smith). It also paves the
way for thinking about the Real as something that must be managed imaginatively (via
social desire, for Hobbes), yet which nevertheless retains its absolute and total form. In
the movement between this imaginative social venture—the inherent reality of which
must be disavowed—and a world of Body besides which no thing may be, a transcendent
desire emerges once more. The desire to grasp or comprehend the variegated human will
and, in so doing, to permit the inscrutable absoluteness of the universe to remain intact
transfers this expansive impulse from a super-natural space to a natural one, though one
now charged with much greater significance.
Earlier in Leviathan, Hobbes has already raised this conception of a material
transcendence. He writes: “Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea,
or conception of anything we call Infinite” (99). While this statement undercuts
metaphysical transcendence, it is not Hobbes’s last word on the subject. He goes on to
observe, “When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to
conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but
of our own inability” (99). Hobbes takes as his example the transcendent object par
excellence: “And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he
is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may
honour him” (99). Not only does Hobbes’s word, “Incomprehensible,” call to mind
Coleridge’s use of the word in “The Eolian Harp,” but his idea of an absolute and
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inscrutable object that is not distinct from (nor exactly identical with) the material offers
an expression of transcendent desire that resembles the shape of that desire in the
Romantic period. 8
Hobbes’s version of the transcendent thus also emerges (like Descartes’s) in the
space between idealism and materialism. It is transcendent, not in the Platonic sense of a
transcendent realm of Ideas, but in a sense closer to Jean-Paul Sartre’s notion of
transcendence as “that inner and realizing negation which reveals the in-itself while
determining the being of the for-itself” (249). Understood as “negation,” transcendence is
not an amplified substance or more-real reality, but a recognition of that which
demarcates the edge of any phenomenalization and a realization that the nature of such a
boundary lies beyond our capacity to know it. Both Descartes and Hobbes, though
diverging in their emphases and interpretations of the significance of this monistic shift in
thinking about the universe, agree on the necessity of a materiality that is somehow
distinct from our thinking of it. Yet, as we can see in this paradoxical phrasing, the very
idea of a non-phenomenal materiality is difficult, if not impossible, to uphold. As they
did in the first chapter, so again these early-modern thinkers offer to the future two sets of
emphases that rest upon the same conceptual continuum, reactions to which subsequent
writers (such as the three I take up in the following chapters) will use to orient their
8

A key thread in the criticism on this subject revolves around Hobbes’s assertion later in life of the
doctrine of God’s corporeality. Geoffrey Gorham pinpoints Hobbes’s explicit affirmation of this view as
appearing in the “1668 Latin edition of Leviathan” (240). He subsequently expands upon this in his 1682
(written in 1668) work, Answer to Bramhall, where he writes, “To his lordship’s question here: what I
leave God to be? I answer: I leave him to be a most pure, simple, invisible spirit corporeal” (qtd. in Gorham
241). Gorham notes that scholars are divided about whether these assertions are in fact sincere – after all,
an “invisible spirit corporeal” seems something of a contradiction in terms. This division not only includes
those who suggest Hobbes is in fact an atheist (Gorham cites Wiley 1976, Berman 1987, and Tuck 1992),
but also those that suggest – somewhat bewilderingly – that Hobbes is an “orthodox Protestant theist”
(241n.4), with Gorham pointing to the work of Glover 1965, Martinich 1992, Geach 1993, Paachi 1998,
and Lessay 2004. For scholars exploring the more ambivalent theology of the corporeal God, Gorham cites
Duncan 2005, L. Strauss 1959, Lupoli 1999 and 2006, Leijenhorst 2004, and Weber 2009.
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marshalling of desire for the other. Where Descartes imagines an otherness in corporeal
substance that is distinct from, yet only realizable through, the cogito’s transcendent
position, Hobbes locates the otherness towards which the desiring subject is oriented
within an exclusively material universe. Nevertheless, again, since realizing such a desire
is impossible (or catastrophic), Hobbes also advocates its mediation by means of an
overtly social imaginary. The result in both cases is an indeterminate transcendence,
aligned with materialism on the one hand, yet retaining an idealistic character on the
other.
Paul de Man’s important intervention into the intellectual history of “aesthetic
ideology” has much to contribute to an analysis of how this indeterminate transcendence
finds expression at the end of the eighteenth century. De Man argues that Immanuel Kant
comes to recognize the need for a linkage between the phenomenal and noumenal spheres
that would maintain the significance of each one. Moreover, he brings the implications of
this articulation to the forefront. On the one hand, as de Man’s subsequent interpreters
have insisted, the phenomenal is not simply “meaningless”; rather, it is precisely “the
attempt to unite such understanding and feeling; as Jonathan Culler puts it, aesthetic
ideology ‘imposes, even violently, continuity between perception and cognition, form
and idea’” (Wang 120). On the other hand, the noumenal—or, more precisely, the “nonphenomenal materiality” that de Man culls from Kant’s reading—is only “real” in the
sense Žižek describes (again in Orrin Wang’s paraphrase): “the symbolic’s depiction of
social reality is always incomplete; the real (as opposed to reality) is the failure of that
depiction” (152). Phenomenality possesses a reality insofar as it corresponds to the
cognizable organization of what we perceive; materiality names the Being of those things

86
apart from their representation, yet as such it lacks cognizability. 9 From this perspective,
Descartes’s organizing cogito represents the epitome of phenomenality. That Hume seeks
to go beyond the cogito suggests an openness to materiality in his thought.
This issue of cognition presented an essential problem for eighteenth-century
thinkers. How does one think about that which cannot be perceived? Epicurean atomism
and (in a related, though distinct way) the corpuscularism of Newton had paved the way
for thinking about ideas such as unobservably small particles, the “void,” and forces
capable of passing through solids. It is little wonder that David Hume bracketed off such
scientific discussion in the opening part of the Treatise. 10 The exploration of such
counter-intuitive concepts responds ultimately to a desire for the other that refuses to be
satisfied by any discrete object—a deeply problematic premise for any empiricism
(though, as we have seen, one that Hume nevertheless acknowledges). As Jacques
Derrida writes of de Man’s essays on the subject: “materiality becomes a useful generic
name for all that resists appropriation” (353).
Thus, out of this monistic imagination emerges a sense of the world (and of life
itself) as somehow distinct from the stories humans tell about it. That is, as de Man writes
in his reading of Kant, “[t]o the extent that any mind, that any judgment, intervenes, it is
in error—for it is not the case that heaven is a vault or that the horizon bounds the ocean
like the walls of a building” (“Phenomenality” 82). The Copernican revolution of the
Kantian critical turn is the culmination of a much earlier movement in thought: first,
9

Charles Shepherdson offers a useful distinction between “reality” and “the Real” in Lacan, which overlaps
with the distinction I am making here: “reality is defined, not as an unknowable, external domain,
independent of our representations, but precisely as the product of representation. Our reality is imaginary
and symbolic, and the real is what is missing from reality—the ‘outside’ that escapes our representations
(the Ding-an-sich)” (32). Shepherdson goes on to note how the return of the Real in trauma reveals that it is
not simply “pre-discursive,” but also resides “at the innermost core of the imaginary” (34).
10
Hume writes: “The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers
than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be entered upon” (11).
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towards a monistic understanding of Being, and second, towards a realignment of matter,
not with mere appearances, as in Plato, but with a reality that precedes apperception
itself. As phenomenality becomes aligned with the operations of the imagination, the idea
of a realm that passes beyond or escapes the bounds of the human faculties ceases to be a
useful heuristic for solving real, human problems. Moreover, this is an alignment that
many, including the Romantics, perceived to have important, positive implications for
human freedom. 11 Such a transcendent quality, hitherto discoverable through meditative
introspection, as Charles Taylor has suggested (Sources 135), thus gets dislocated from
its supernatural position in this monistic revisioning.
In the course of its dislocation, however, transcendence does not simply become
“aestheticism.” Mary Shelley, for example, will reject any aesthetic ideology that
attempts to claim priority over the much more difficult “thorny truth of things” (360), as
she describes lived experience in The Last Man. For William Godwin, likewise, the
aesthetic is constantly at the beck and call of a dominant social hegemony of which he is
deeply suspicious. For instance, Fleetwood’s self-fashioning in the Parisian salons gets
critiqued for its inability to move beyond itself. The transcendent desire that stems from
his tendency “to attach myself strongly, where I attached myself at all” (Fleetwood 102)
proves at odds with the aesthetic framework of that society, in which “no man was
considered any thing, unless he were […] an individual devoted to the formation of
intrigues” (100). Yet the idea that an emphasis on matter in itself will lead humanity to
political justice proves just as problematic for him, particularly insofar as such an
emphasis contains no safeguards against materiality’s reappropriation by the social.
Indeed, Godwin seems to agree with Hume and Smith that social ordering is simply one
11

P. B. Shelley’s Defence of Poetry is just one example.
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process that humans cannot live without. As Andrzej Warminski writes in his
introduction to Aesthetic Ideology: “For de Man, as for Althusser, we are never so much
‘in’ ideology as when we think ourselves to be ‘outside’ it” (10). Nevertheless, as I show
in my readings of all three authors, the slipperiness of transcendence makes it difficult to
determine at any given point whether the tone resonates with an imperceptible materiality
or whether it is simply serving as an amplified form of social desire—the imaginary at its
limit.
Thus, while transcendent desire does get dislocated from its traditionally
supernatural position with the emergence of the materialist paradigm, not only does it not
disappear entirely, it also does not exactly get reappropriated by materialism. Instead, I
want to use the term “encrypted” (especially with its suggestion of a “crypt”) to signal the
way in which transcendent desire haunts every attempt at representing material
existence. 12 Materiality, thought in this way, remains endlessly elusive. On the one hand,
Hobbes’s suspicion about narratives contributes to the idea of the Real as distinct from
reality. On the other hand, if Descartes’s cogito discloses a transcendent desire because of
the sceptical method that produces it, then the cogito is in some ways offering itself as an
imaginative effort to comprehend and represent the otherness of the Real. Several similar
efforts were made during the course of the eighteenth century, three of which I explore in
greater detail below: Priestleyan materialism, vitalism, and sensibility. These are
particularly instructive because they cast into relief the transcendent character of the
12

Orrin Wang’s idea of “ghost theory” is useful for thinking about this indeterminacy: “Ghosts are
precisely not material to the degree that that term stands for an ontological certitude based on the reified
hypostasis of physical reality. But they are also not ideal to the extent that that word also refers to an
ontology this time based on the reality of the non-physical—of Spirit (Geist)” (139). See also the
discussions of “cryptic mourning” in Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel, vol. 1, which the
editor defines as “the mechanism of setting up a psychic enclave—the crypt—‘housing’ the departed loveobject in secret because the survivor is being deluded into behaving as if no trauma or loss had occurred”
(104).
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desire that all representation of the other—whether it pertains to the alterity of the
universe or of the other person—seeks to satisfy. Ultimately, however, as de Man
demonstrates, these imaginaries are doomed to fail because of how materiality presents
the mind with a field for thought that can both accommodate and exceed every
imaginative effort.

Materialist Imaginaries
To narrate the intellectual movement that takes us from the encryption of
transcendent desire within materialist thought to these attempts by writers to identify its
ongoing effects on the idea of alterity, I want to explore three eighteenth-century
responses to the emergence of materiality. In all three cases, the thinkers involved
recognize an expansive desire that extends beyond the bounds of what appears to be
possible for materialism. They address this distinction via a rhetoric of transcendence that
gets applied to material conditions. Thus, in his Disquisitions relating to Matter and
Spirit (1777), Joseph Priestley argues for the ultimate immateriality of matter, suggesting
that what appears to be “substance” is in fact much more accurately described as force.
Similarly, the myriad inquiries that have since fallen under the category of “vitalism”
seek out a supplemental element to explain matter’s development and ongoing processes.
Finally, a so-called culture of sensibility emerges from the recognition of human
experience as somehow inherently corporeal, rather than occurring exclusively within the
bounds of the mind. I have ordered these examples according to what I take to be the
strength of each one’s transcendent content. As Priestley is explicitly a materialist, his
system’s use of transcendent rhetoric is the most obscure of the three. Vitalism insists
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upon its scientific status and thus resists to a certain extent the ascription of
“transcendence” to its more nebulous elements. Sensibility builds upon the explicitly
transcendent idea of a shared imaginative space and thus is the most receptive to my
reading. Nevertheless, I also do not want to imply that these imaginaries build upon one
another, though they may overlap in certain places. Instead, they are discrete sites for the
encryption of transcendent residues within materialism, providing thought-environments
for the dark sympathy that emerges in the wake of transcendent desire’s failure within the
social context. These attempts to articulate the idealist dimensions of material
conditioning, while failing to maintain a strict or pure materialism, help to explain the
work of Romantics to account for both streams of modern experience.
More than just discovering a resonance between materiality and transcendent
desire, however, the attempt to imagine materialism connects the genealogy I have
described above with the paradoxes of sympathetic desire I explore in the previous
chapter. The persistence of transcendent residues within materialism provokes strong
social reactions, as they are each in their own way seen as threatening to the social
framework. This resistance is demonstrated, for example, in Coleridge’s strong rejection
of Priestley (as well as his contemporaries’ reactions and the larger rejection of dissent
that led to the 1791 Birmingham Riots). The threat could also appear from within the
discourse, as was the case for the vitalists, as they work to escape the transcendent tone of
the élan vital or Bildungstrieb by recapturing its mechanisms within their explanation.
Finally, sensibility collapses near the end of the eighteenth century under the weight of
critiques that it was either too limited or too capacious. In all three cases, the status of
these materialist imaginaries as threats help to link the work of imagining materialism –
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and the philosophical alignment of materialism with transcendence that precedes and
accompanies it historically – with the reaction that takes place in the encrypted core of
desire during an event of dark sympathy. For, although transcendent desire as I explore it
always has a dark inflection, particularly given its encrypted position within a social
desire that wishes to repress it, its translation into dark sympathy requires an encounter
with materiality to momentarily free it from such social bonds. Even then, as I show in
the chapters that follow, this process by which this event appears resembles what Slavoj
Žižek calls “anamorphosis,” which is a distortion signalling the intervention of the Real
(“The Matrix” 1559). These attempts at imagining a materialism that better expresses its
materiality are encountered as threats that must be contained. As we see perhaps more
clearly in literary examples such as St. Irvyne below, the threat implied by such attempts
to draw out the alterity of materialism establishes the conditions for a desiring subject, at
the same time, to want to break free of its social constraints and to reinforce them.

Priestley
Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), the Dissenting Minister and chemist responsible for
the discovery of oxygen, among other successes, attempted to span the apparently wide
gap separating materialist principles uncovered in the sciences and the spiritual doctrines
of Christianity. While he accomplished this partly through an adherence to heterodox
beliefs such as Socinianism (that is, the anti-Trinitarian heresy that Christ was only a
deified man, rather than the pre-existent son of God), the impulse to bridge this gap may
be taken in the first place as an attempt to preserve the transcendent quality in its
historical translation from a spiritual to a material discourse. For Priestley, matter itself, if
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understood in the right way, offers the conditions necessary for sustaining itself. As he
writes: “[W]e have no reason to suppose that there are in man two substances so distinct
from each other” as soul and body (xxxviii). Instead, he argues for a unified vision of
matter emphasizing relational ideas such as force, organization, and system. Rather than
matter being something implicitly inert and acted upon from without, he suggests that
“[a]ll properties that have hitherto been attributed to matter, may be comprised under
those of attraction and repulsion” (25). For instance, he remarks how even the powers of
thought seem to emerge only “in conjunction with a certain organized system of matter;
and therefore, that those powers necessarily exist in, and depend upon, such a system”
(26). In this way, Priestley completes the movement Descartes initiated towards thinking
matter universally.
In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge criticizes Priestley’s theory for “stripp[ing]
matter of all its material properties; substitut[ing] spiritual powers; and when we expected
to find a body, behold! we had nothing but its ghost! the apparition of a defunct
substance!” (226). Coleridge’s response articulates the more general view that Priestleyan
matter seemed, paradoxically, somewhat immaterial. 13 Given its abstract discussion of
unperceivable forces and counter-intuitive principles, how was Priestley’s model even
attending to “matter”? What is misleading about this reading, which notably contradicted
Coleridge’s earlier interest in and commitment to Priestleyan materialism (see Erving
225), is that it overlooks the crux of Priestley’s argument: namely, that matter simply is
not what we think it is. As John Yolton suggests, for Priestley,
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Nigel Leask writes that “[t]he ‘Unitarian materialism’ of both Priestley and [the early] Coleridge is more
accurately described as a form of pantheism, in which God is at once an inherent force in matter and yet
retains a certain transcendence” (20). As I argue in this section, the slipperiness of “materialism” as a term
in usage at this time includes even the “immaterial materialism” of Priestley’s near-pantheism.
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the kind of matter on which the two-substance view is based does not
exist. When the new concept of matter is put in place of the old one, the
radical difference between matter and spirit disappears […] When this
concept is put together with the view of man as a uniform composition, the
result is a sophisticated system of centers of force interacting with each
other, all organized into a whole. (114)
Such an insight subordinates what is typically taken as materialism’s emphasis on
substance to an emphasis placed on the relation itself. This is not a departure from
materialism; rather, it is an attempt to revive the transcendent kernel encrypted within
materialism.
Priestleyan materialism suggests that the identifiable relations between parts, their
very organization, provide the conditions for life. This recourse to “organization” as the
expressive site of transcendent desire fails, of course, to circumvent the problem of
phenomenality as de Man describes it, which is its persistent disclosure of its limits.
Hence, the following century’s inability to take Priestley’s theoretical physics seriously,
at least until Michael Faraday’s empirical discoveries in electricity and magnetism. 14
What Priestley’s idea does offer is a way of thinking-in-paradoxes, such as we see in the
central destabilizing and counter-intuitive suggestion (in the words of one of Priestley’s
critics, Richard Shepherd) that matter should be conceived “not as that inert substance,
which it is commonly represented, but as possessing the powers of attraction and
repulsion” (qtd. in Yolton 121).
As with the other examples I include below, the attempt to imagine a materiality
that can sustain itself without recourse to the spiritual appears in the period as a threat.
14

Yolton writes: “Priestley’s fascinating suggestions were not taken up and extended; they were hardly
even perceived as different from earlier versions of materialism” (125). In his second claim, Yolton is
describing the way Priestley’s contemporary critics failed to respond to his actual arguments, which were
very different from those of other materialists in the period—the latter tending to be much more
Newtonian, which is to say both mechanical and corpusclar (see Schofield). Notably, Faraday paid tribute
to Priestley in an address delivered on March 25, 1833, at a commemoration of the centenary of Priestley’s
birth.
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William St. Clair writes that, by 1791, Priestley was “one of the most hated men in
England: his brave attempts to combine reason with Christianity and to work peaceably
for reform by parliamentary means had proved worse than useless and he was shortly to
leave for permanent exile in the United States” (62). To take one contemporary response
to Priestley’s Disquisitions, we can refer to the Reverend Richard Gifford, who calls
Priestley’s theory of an immaterial materiality “an Attack upon the good People of this
Country” that “behoves every Man, who thinks he can make up an Antidote to this
Poison, to lose no Time in preparing it” (Gifford 2). For the reviewer and for those who
later perceived a link between Priestley’s writing and the larger threat of the French
Revolution, there was a profound moral incompatibility between the traditional
transcendent imaginary of faith and the new materialist imaginary that Priestley
proposed. 15

Vitalism
If the great contribution of Priestleyan materialism is that it gives pause to
assumptions about the nature of reality, vitalism recalls the vibrancy of life that the more
reductive versions of materialism threaten to overlook. This vibrant tone resonates with a
pre-modern transcendent vision of the world. Nevertheless, I want to suggest here that
modern vitalism emerges out of a monistic imagination—that is, that it follows from
materialism, rather than preceding it. As Denise Gigante, Timothy Lenoir, and others
have shown at length, vitalism is hardly a single movement or even a strictly anti-
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Gifford goes on to write, “I trust, it may […] be hoped, that so wretched a System will allure none to
embrace it, but those whose wicked Lives have pre-disposed them to wish for Annihilation” (126-27).
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materialist reaction. 16 Instead, vitalism raises anew the question of “how” in addition to
the materialist’s question of “what.” As with Priestley’s thought, I hope therefore to
argue here that vitalism should be understood in light of materialism, as an attempt to
express its transcendent content.
Admittedly, vitalism also has a history that is distinct from that of materialism. 17
Nevertheless, eighteenth-century vitalism (and to an even greater extent, its nineteenthcentury expression) understood itself in relation to materialism. Moreover, this relation is
one-way. The main reason for this relation is that vitalist theory itself undergoes a
profound methodological shift in the seventeenth century under the pressure of
empiricism. Thus, from one standpoint, one of the earliest modern proponents of vitalism,
William Harvey (1578-1657), simply updates Aristotle in his 1651 work, On Animal
Generation; from another perspective, however, he has attempted to translate vitalist
principles for a monistic—and thus, at its base, materialist—worldview. As Gigante
remarks: “Harvey’s empirical methodology and sense of the human body as a hydraulic
machine were here put in dialogue with the inexplicable: an invisible living principle”
(7).
Yet the question vitalism inevitably raises is why these thinkers insist upon such a
living principle that exists apart from matter itself? For example, Hans Driesch suggests
that, for G. E. Stahl (1659-1734), “who was considered during almost a whole century as
the authority in matters vitalistic” (30), the explanations offered by materialism were not
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Sean Quinlan remarks: “Despite its Enlightenment centrality, vitalism remains notoriously difficult to
define. Neither school nor creed, vitalism dealt broadly with definitions of life and death, constituting more
of a holistic approach to the study of living things. Rejecting mechanistic reductionism, its practitioners
affirmed the autonomy of life, emphasizing force, dynamism, spontaneity, complexity, differentiation,
reproduction, development, and growth” (300).
17
For instance, Hans Driesch offers Aristotle as its “representative of Antiquity” (11).
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“sufficient” to account for life: “It is just because of its extreme fragility that the living
body requires special powers of preservation”—powers, it should be noted, that Stahl did
not believe the body could derive from itself (31). Like Priestley, Stahl argues that “the
basis of life consists of activity not matter,” yet, unlike Priestley, he goes on to write that
this is an “activity not in matter but operating on it in such a manner that the matter
remains purely passive and indifferent” (qtd. in Driesch 34-35). This insistence upon the
passivity of matter was related to the fears that had emerged surrounding John Locke’s
notion of “thinking matter.” 18 In both cases, the idea that activity might inhere within
matter itself, rather than being imposed upon mere mechanism from without, raised anew
the atheistic (even nihilistic) implications of a monistic universe. Vitalism holds back all
such implications by maintaining a space for mystery.
Significantly, this very potential also runs the risk of aligning vitalism with the
aesthetic ideology I discussed above with reference to de Man. Gigante writes: “As the
concept of vital power sparked a preoccupation with self-generating and self-maintaining
form, it quickened the category of the aesthetic, elevating natural researchers into natural
philosophers attempting to account for a mysterious power buried deep within the
structures of nature” (5). Despite this potential for seeking out a mere phenomenality,
vitalism (like Priestelyan materialism and sensibility) is better understood as standing in
the gap between phenomenality and materiality. The key reason for this indeterminacy is
vitalism’s emphatically scientific status during the eighteenth century in Britain and
Germany. In the work of John Needham (1713-1781), Casper Friedrich Wolff (17331794), Albert Haller (1708-1777), and J.F. Blumenbach (1752-1840), among others,
vitalistic imaginaries (which is to say, narratives of a living principle) are submitted again
18

See Yolton, esp. chapter 1.
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and again to experimentation and review. In this way, the absence marked by
materiality—that void that resists all assimilation—may freely unsettle such false
stabilities. Furthermore, this transcendent movement of the negative allows the expansive
object of material desire to appear, if only in a refracted or encrypted way. 19
For example, in his influential writing on the Bildungstrieb, J.F. Blumenbach not
only based his reflections on amassed evidence, 20 but also subjected his findings to
repeated critique. 21 For Blumenbach, the Bildungstrieb “directed the formation of
anatomical structures and the operations of physiological processes of the organism so
that various parts would come into existence and function interactively to achieve the
ends of the species” (Richards 220). As Robert J. Richards and others have noted,
however, it is not always clear whether this process is meant to function in Blumenbach’s
thought as only a heuristic, that is, a “regulative concept” as it was for Kant (220).
Indeed, Richards points out that later in his career Blumenbach “refer[red] to the
principle of the Bildungstrieb precisely as a qualitas occulta, though in the positive sense
(pace Leibniz) that might be associated with Newton’s principle of gravity” (219 n.35).
This ambiguity about the reality of the formative drive helps to suspend the libidinal
dimension of monistic experience between the imaginary realm of an expansive desire
and the material realm as inscrutably complex.

19

The social consequences of the Abernethy-Lawrence debates of the 1810s reveal the way vitalism, just as
much as materialism, represented a threat to the status quo. John Abernethy posited the idea that life
derived from an immaterial force superadded to matter; William Lawrence, his former student, rejected this
idea in favour of a more thorough-going materialism. Paul Gilmore notes: “As the debate gained publicity,
Lawrence was attacked as an atheist and as unpatriotic, while Abernethy’s compromise position, though
more acceptable to most orthodox believers, also came under attack. Most significantly, Coleridge’s
rejection of electricity as the life-force or as the vehicle of thought largely grew out of his complete
dismissal of Lawrence and his skepticism about the materialist elements of Abernethy’s vitalism” (70).
20
Robert J. Richards writes that Blumenbach “piled up his evidence for the existence of a Bildungstrieb
from instances analogous to that of polyp regeneration” (219).
21
His Handbuch der Naturgeschichte went through eleven editions.
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I want to suggest that this emergence of modern vitalism out of materialist
discourse represents an incursion of the semiotic within the symbolic order, along the
lines of what Kristeva describes as “a breach [effraction] subsequent to the thetic phase”
(69). As Gigante shows, vitalism plays an important role throughout the Romantic period
not only as a scientific perspective, but also as a creative methodology emphasizing “life
in its plenitude—in the sheer gusto of its living power,” which “threatens to overwhelm
formal containment” (48). Given the basic tenets of materialism, especially as regards the
universality of matter, vitalism appears, as I have already suggested, a discourse in
explicit contradistinction. Yet I include it as a permutation of materialism, first, because it
emerges out of the evolution of materialism as a response to the rise of certain theoretical
emphases, and, second, because it is an attempt to think the “inwardness” of matter. This
latter aspect of vitalism is particularly revolutionary, since it makes room to reintroduce
the resonances of the spiritual within the domain of the material. To attempt to locate
“life” within matter is to locate the argument within the context of a materialist universe.

Sensibility
Like Priestleyan forces and vitalism, sensibility names the attempt to come to
grips with the possibility that matter has a life of its own. The age of sensibility, which
Janet Todd suggests reaches its ascendency “from the 1740s to the 1770s” (4), saw the
entwining of moral and natural philosophies, which meant the intersection of multiple
meanings of the single word: feeling. On the one hand, sensibility could refer to the
concept of feeling as an experience occurring within the confines of one’s consciousness;
on the other, it could mean a process occurring within the physical body primarily at the
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level of the nervous system. While these understandings of “sensibility” appear in
different contexts as far back as the sixteenth century, it is not until the middle of the
eighteenth century that the word gains cultural currency. 22 Thus feeling at the level of
consciousness and feeling at the level of the physical senses become mutually implicated
with two effects: pity—and, later, sympathy—acquires a physical character, and the
sensory experiencing of the world becomes understood as mediated through the psyche.
As Jerome McGann writes of sentimental writing, “The spiritual condition it celebrates
comes through a regimen grounded in the senses. Harmony is (paradoxically?) a function
of pleasure, whose increase transports one to a new sensual order—an order where one
may at last experience ‘the life of things’” (125).
G. S. Rousseau suggests that we may take John Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (1690) as introducing a new paradigm of thought via his
“integration of ethics and physiology” (125). By developing Descartes’s emphasis upon
physiology and accepting the assertion of anatomists like Thomas Willis (who taught
Locke at university) that “the soul was located in the brain” (127), Locke opens the way
not only for sensibility to give a material basis to moral feeling, but also for feeling to be
elevated to the level of an epistemology. This movement from sense to feeling to thought
traces an attempt to transform materiality into an imaginary—to discover the
transcendent element of materiality and render it phenomenally. Moreover, as critics have
widely recognized, sympathy plays a crucial role in facilitating this tri-part movement
from sense to thought. In turn, it appears as the dominant vehicle for disseminating the
22

The note in the OED on the etymology of “sensibility” says that it was “[r]are until the middle of the
18th century.” Dates are taken from entry 5.b. and entry 2.a. under “Sensibility.” Regarding the second
entry, I have disregarded the quotations listed prior to the 1533 example as it is only beginning with that
example that sensibility becomes connected to an idea of the “sinewes which make sensibilitie”; i.e.,
sensibility that is connected with the inner mechanisms of the human body.
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culture of sensibility as a guiding paradigm across several levels of society. Along these
lines, Jacques Khalip writes how, “[e]ven though sympathy is seemingly deployed to
promote a humanistic epistemology and ethics, it also generates a slippery rhetoric of
interpersonal communication that is in turn indebted to the eighteenth-century cult of
sentimentalism” (100). 23 As a process concerned predominantly with this polysemous
understanding of “feeling,” sympathy establishes a context in which the interior register
of sensibility may encounter and even engage with the world. Yet the extreme scope of
sympathy’s premises begs a question similar to the one posed by scepticism, that other
defining feature of Enlightenment discourse. As David Marshall puts it, “Both sympathy
and scepticism address the question of whether one person could enter into the thoughts
and sentiments of someone else,” and, thus, “the age of sensibility must be played out in
the age of scepticism” (180).
This observation recalls the ambiguity of sensibility as a discourse. Neither an
attempt to escape the monistic universe nor an effort to affirm it wholeheartedly,
sensibility is rather an experiment—or series of experiments—to discern the encrypted
form of something that extends beyond the “merely” material into the realm of
signification. Ildiko Csengei has shown how eighteenth-century writers attempted to
identify signifiers of sensibility in objects and gestures such as tears, blushes, and
swooning. These signifiers operated on sympathetic readers for a time, yet ultimately
come to be seen as excessive, anti-rational, or inappropriate. For instance, Csengei directs
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As G.J. Barker-Benfield (among others) reminds us, sentimentalism is a cognate of sensibility (xvii).
Khalip’s use of the term—marked as a ‘cult’—helps to recall the pejorative connotations of
“sentimentalism” in particular, which arose during the decline in popularity of the literature of sensibility
over the last two decades of the eighteenth century.
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our attention to Mary Wollstonecraft’s discussion and dismissal of sensibility in A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman:
the definition [of sensibility in Johnson’s dictionary] gives me no other
idea than of the most exquisitely polished instinct. I discern not a trace of
the image of God in either sensation or matter. Refined seventy times
seven they are still material; intellect dwells not there; nor will fire ever
make lead gold! (qtd. in Csengei 177)
As Janet Todd notes, for many English writers during the French Revolution, sensibility
“was the mode of an apathetic middle class which enjoyed dabbling in philanthropy […]
It did not mount a general attack on the social problems of an unequal and unfree society
and it did not encourage political response” (131). This resistance to sensibility, which
also highlights the uncertain attitude of many to what sympathy entailed as a means of
social cohesion, further underscores its inability to serve as an adequate marker of
transcendent desire. Sensibility constitutes a direct investment of materiality into the
social and therefore implies, on the one hand, a dilution of the threat of that materiality,
yet also, on the other hand, a reminder of the social’s limits. Its collapse under the
divergent critiques of either a Wollstonecraft, for whom sensibility is too material, or an
anti-bourgeois radical, for whom sensibility is too idealistic and abstract, reiterates the
encrypted position transcendent desire must occupy within a monistic universe.
Like the other experiments surveyed above, sensibility attempts to discern an
idealism within materialism, or to showcase a materiality charged with the transcendent
tone of an idealism that no longer holds. As will become clear in the following chapters,
this effort is characterized not only by paradox, but also consistently by failure.
Nevertheless, sensibility’s failure also points forward to its redeployment in several of the
texts described below as the vehicle for expressing the event of dark sympathy. If the
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threat that materiality poses to the social is what prompts the encrypted transcendent
desire within sympathy to press against its social constraints, then the specific catalyst
may be in the extensions of materiality unpacked by sensibility as it intersects with the
body, affect, pain, and other sites of meaning. By piercing the social to uncover the
interior otherness of the desiring subject itself, images of materiality such as are
described above recall an instability within the self that has been covered over through a
social turn such as the one exemplified by Hume. The interaction of the outside with the
discovery of otherness in the body itself reignites the anxiety that an immersion in the
social was meant to extinguish.

Resisting the Ideology of Sympathy in “Queen Mab” and St. Irvyne
This gap between the irreducibly complex reality of lived experience and its
representation is a key problem in the work of P. B. Shelley. Denise Gigante suggests that
all of Shelley’s “major poetry, from ‘Queen Mab’ through ‘The Triumph of Life,’
constitutes an aesthetic inquiry into life, ‘the great miracle’ that bears no reduction”
(155). We might extend this statement to include his early Gothic fiction as well. This
writing emerges in part out of his complex fascination with the work of the French
materialists. Anthony Howe writes that Shelley read “Laplace, Condorcet, Volney,
Cabanis, and Holbach,” the last of whom “seems to have been particularly influential”
(103), as he quotes him extensively in the notes to “Queen Mab.” If this early period in
Shelley’s career intersects with a materialist turn in his thought, then it also prepares the
way for a less straightforward revision of the philosophes’ ideas later. Howe notes,
“Although it is difficult to be precise, it seems that at some point from around 1813
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Shelley began to drift away from materialist dogma towards the less systematic views we
encounter in the later prose” (103). By reading these texts in terms of their contemporary
and unsettled engagement with the imaginaries eighteenth-century materialism makes
possible, we can perceive how these imaginaries also shape new forms of desire for
otherness.
“Queen Mab” can be read as an initial artistic attempt to mobilize transcendence
against social imaginaries in part because of its closing depiction of the conflict of desire
in the ambiguous relation of Henry and Ianthe. The reading I want to propose of
Shelley’s first major poem begins from this final scene not only because of how it
illuminates the essential social frame of the poem’s philosophy, but also due to its
emphasis on an inextricable connection between the somewhat abstract implications of
materialism and concrete political realities. As Monika Lee writes, commenting on the
standard critical readings of the poem: “If […] we choose to view the tensions between
the text’s materialist message and its supernatural setting as a flaw or inadequacy that
resulted from Shelley’s youth and immaturity, we risk overlooking what becomes a
dominant poetic strategy in this as well as in his later poems” (171). Moreover, this
reading of the poem as inadequate does not account for the possibility that Shelley’s
awkward juxtaposition of discourse and tone may attempt to respond to what he sees to
be the limits of traditional understandings of social desire. As I have tried to show, the
rise of an idea of materiality understood on its own terms sets the stage for a
redeployment of transcendent desire. The more this inscrutable material otherness comes
to be seen as permeating, and indeed, even constituting the “real” world, the more its
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encrypted transcendent tone latches on to social and relational concepts such as sympathy
in order to provide a viable framework for thinking about otherness in this new way.
In Shelley’s poem, thought about the other is radicalized through the idea of
death. As the reader discovers in the anonymously spoken opening statement, a fear of
“death’s disrobing hand” (9:171) informs the entire poem: “How wonderful is Death, /
Death and his brother Sleep […] Hath then the gloomy Power / Whose reign is in the
tainted sepulchres / Seized on her sinless soul?” (1:1-2, 9-10). The poem’s concern with
the fear of death shares a purpose with Lucretius’s poem, which argues: “Death, then, is
nothing to us and does not affect us in the least, now that the nature of the mind is
understood to be mortal” (3:830). Nevertheless, the fear of death in “Queen Mab” is
certainly distinct from that of Lucretius, who suggests that this fear arises in people
because of “the thought that after death they will either rot in the grave or be devoured by
flames or the jaws of wild beasts” (3:870-72). For Ianthe, the fear of death is linked rather
with “a bigot’s creed” (QM 9:186) and “the tyrant’s rod” (9:187): social institutions that
attempt to form the character of her desire for the other. She is encouraged not to fear
because death is “but the voyage of a darksome hour” (9:174); hence, the death that
social institutions can bring about should not diminish the transcendent desire for
“Freedom’s fadeless laurels” (9:178). The poem attempts to prioritize the demands of the
other (even on to death) over the threats of the social. The predominance of the poem
thus comprises Mab’s argument against the inherent authority of these institutions—an
argument that has its modern origin in Leviathan—and her aim, by extension, is to
reorient the site of authority from an imaginary to a material context.
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The poem does not conclude with an indication of whether she is successful in
this or not. Instead, we are presented with Ianthe awakening from her voyage with Mab
and beholding both Henry and “the bright beaming stars” (9:239). Adjusting the
otherwise traditionally romantic mise-en-scène is the presence of this new alterity: the
stars, which are earlier associated with “those mighty spheres / Whose changeless paths
through Heaven’s deep silence lie” (3:228-29), an image for the fundamental necessity of
material existence. In addition to the social bond imposed upon her and Henry, Ianthe
therefore discovers a transcendent bond with the universe that encompasses both of them.
The question of whether she will allow her desires to be dictated by social expectations or
by the transcendent potential at the heart of the material universe concludes the canto.
The careful details of this closing scene recall the ongoing ambivalence that guides the
Romantic exploration of what is here an invitation to dark sympathy. On the one hand,
Henry gazes upon Ianthe sleeping “with looks of speechless love” (9:238); on the other
hand, “the bright beaming stars” are visible only “through the casement” of the window
next to Ianthe’s bed. The scene thus describes a moment just prior to decision, fraught
with indeterminacy: the love of Henry and Ianthe has yet to be subjected to the
constraints of language. Similarly, Ianthe’s attraction to the Dionysian vision signalled by
the stars has yet to be tested outside of the social enclosure of the home. As I will argue,
this tension represents one of the defining features of Romantic experimentation with this
desire for the other that extends beyond the social.
Of course, as I will show in the chapters that follow, the Romantics regularly
break this tension completely with scenes of excessive desire for the other, which irrupt
within the social as perversions or skewed manifestations of relation. Shelley depicted
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such a scene in his Gothic romance, St. Irvyne (1811), published only two years prior to
“Queen Mab.” Like “Queen Mab,” the major relationship that closes the novel is defined
by the fear of death. Wolfstein’s deep connection with Ginotti revolves around the lifedebt Wolfstein owes the mysterious figure. When Ginotti finally returns to recover this
debt, Wolfstein discovers that his “horror” (225) of what he thought was “the darkness of
his future destiny” (222) gets replaced with a “resistless anxiety” (225). The anxiety—
similar to Caleb Williams’s relentless curiosity or Christabel’s fascination with
Geraldine—presses Wolfstein into a darkly sympathetic relation with Ginotti, “fix[ing]”
Wolfstein’s attention “upon Ginotti’s countenance, await[ing] his narrative” (233). Both
he and Ginotti desire each other in a manner that far exceeds a merely social connection.
Instead, they seek to be related through a secret that will eradicate their mutual fear of
death: “To one man alone, Wolfstein, may I communicate this secret of immortal life”
(238). The fear of death, Lucretius and Queen Mab teach, derives from an insufficient
understanding of materiality; here, Shelley aligns materiality with a secret, thereby
emphasizing what he takes to be its transcendent character.
Ginotti’s narrative of how he overcomes the fear of death escorts Shelley’s
thought further into the dark side of materiality—with similarly dark effects upon the
nature of his and Wolfstein’s relation. He declares:
I thought of death—I shuddered when I reflected, and shrank in horror
from the idea, selfish and self-interested as I was, of entering a new
existence to which I was a stranger. I must either dive into the recesses of
futurity, or I must not, I cannot die. (234)
Ginotti finds no solace in a bare materialism, which only exacerbates his despair with the
realization: “why am I to suppose that these muscles or fibres are made of stuff more
durable than those of other men?” (235). His encounter shortly thereafter with “a superior
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and beneficent Spirit” (236; emphasis original) follows an admission of the limits of “the
rules of science” (236). This encounter, leading to a dream that resembles the one Mab
gives to Ianthe, culminates in a choice between a “phantasm” taking “a form of most
exact and superior symmetry” (237) and “a form more hideous than the imagination of
man is capable of portraying” (237). Notably, Ginotti chooses not the immaterial form
epitomizing order, but the “form” that cannot be represented. This transformation of
Ginotti’s materialism into materiality ultimately directs him to “the method by which
man might exist for ever” (238; emphasis original). Like his dark lord, Ginotti avoids
representing his desire by communicating it only as a secret to Wolfstein. Shelley follows
suit through the use of aposiopesis—leaving sentences unfinished, marked with ellipses,
or simply redacted in the covenantal dialogue between Ginotti and Wolfstein.
This scene reveals the close interaction of transcendent desire with materialism.
The ambiguous ending of “Queen Mab” reveals the terms of the conflict of desire without
allowing the conflict itself to unfold as dark sympathy: this major encounter between
Ginotti and Wolfstein also prepares for the conflict to occur. Unlike “Queen Mab,”
however, this catastrophic conflict does finally occur in St. Irvyne. In the closing chapter,
Ginotti attempts to complete the ritual he has initiated with Wolfstein, but the social
obstructs him. He says: “Wolfstein, dost thou deny thy Creator?” Wolfstein’s response,
“Never, never. […] No, no, — any thing but that” (252), precipitates their mutual
destruction. His extreme refusal to deny his Creator and willingness to reject anything
else stem from his desire to maintain at least a vestige of an earlier imaginary. This desire
corresponds to two other moments in the chapter. First, upon discovering Megalena’s
body, “his soul was nerved by almost superhuman powers; yet the ice of despair chilled
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his burning brain” (251); second, he has “a thirst of knowledge [that] scorched his soul to
madness; yet he stilled his wild energies” (251). What lies behind this twofold movement
of frenzy and calm is his “[c]uriosity, resistless curiosity” (251). Ginotti’s demand, he
realizes, means a rejection of that “most exact and superior symmetry” (237)—in other
words, a representational order that might satisfy his curiosity at least provisionally.
Ginotti’s desire extends beyond representation, yet ultimately Wolfstein asks only for a
narrative: “to know what would be the conclusion of the night’s adventure” (225). The
result of this social impasse is an event of dark sympathy—a desire epitomized by
“Ginotti’s burning gaze” (252)—in which the impossible transcendent desire of Ginotti
gets contained and transformed by the recourse to social desire Wolfstein enables. Like
all instances of dark sympathy, moreover, it cannot last.

The materialist imagination in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries continued
to harbour a pervasive desire for something greater than mere substance, yet the collapse
of pure dualism necessitated the return of this desire into the fold of substance.
Philosophers as divergent as Descartes and Hobbes perceive in common a shift in the
conceptual constitution of reality. They each attempt to account for this shift in different
ways: Descartes seeking an epistemological certainty in the kernel of identity he posits
for the thinking subject, and Hobbes hoping to find stability in the power of the state. I
explored the implications of their differences in the previous chapter; where they overlap,
they have the effect of rendering materialism transcendent, albeit by encrypting idealism
within materialism.
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The eighteenth century explores the imaginative effects of this encryption,
attempting to rescue aesthetically the expansive desire that materiality’s inscrutable core
sets in motion. The problem all such attempts encounter is the same as that described by
Paul de Man in his reading of Kant: “The bottom line […] is the prosaic materiality of the
letter and no degree of obfuscation or ideology can transform this materiality into the
phenomenal cognition of aesthetic judgment” (“Phenomenality” 90). At the most basic
level, this materiality of the letter is the reminder that there is an insuperable gap between
representation and reality. 24 This gap (and our inability to let it stand) gets translated into
the eighteenth-century theories I explore above: “immaterial” materialism, vitalism, and
sensibility. The recognition that the sign can never more than refer to the thing itself (if
even that)—that the thing is forever occluded from our view—prompts scientists and
humanists alike to formulate in the period increasingly comprehensive systems for
signifying the thing. As the monistic turn of the preceding century gives rise to a much
greater sense of what reality might include, making its representation increasingly
difficult, the desire to accomplish such a representation and to comprehend the otherness
of the universe in spite of the impossibility of this task, increases in kind.
In Shelley’s “Queen Mab,” the artistic effects of this conflict of representation
with reality come full circle at Ianthe’s awakening. Under Mab’s direction, Ianthe has
been given the ability to see the limits of the imaginary within which she has acted and
understood her relation to Henry. Her fear of death, derived from one of the many social
narratives Mab disputes, has shaped her relationship thus far; its reframing within a
materialist understanding of the world provides her with a degree of liberty. Yet Mab’s
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Rei Terada writes on this passage in de Man that “the message of the larger narrative is that we are (only)
what we are, that the world is what it is—which is not to say that we know what it is” (para. 1).
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disclosure does not lead Ianthe to abandon imaginaries altogether. Instead, it invites her
to conceive of life in terms of activity rather than “a bigot’s creed” or a “tyrant’s rod”
(9:186, 187):
Life is its state of action, and the store
Of all events is aggregated there
That variegate the eternal universe;
Death is a gate of dreariness and gloom,
That leads to azure isles and beaming skies
And happy regions of eternal hope. (9:158-63)
This declaration is no less an imaginary or narrative than any other; however, like
sensibility, vitalism, or Priestleyan materialism, this new narrative keeps open the
possibility of difference—that is, the potential operation of the other. Shelley also
explores a somewhat terminal understanding of transcendent desire in the closing
paragraphs of St. Irvyne, which this time succeeds in overwhelming narrative altogether.
However, as we see in his attempt to arrive at a more ambiguous position in the later
“Queen Mab,” it is the tension between transcendent and social desires that ultimately
interests him—and many of his fellow Romantics.
Indeed, part of my objective in the subsequent analyses of Godwin, Coleridge,
and Mary Shelley is to explore the way materiality retains a paradoxically “social”
flavour, even as it expresses the transcendent desire encrypted within it. For Godwin, the
social is a necessary evil—inevitable, yet always verging on tyranny and oppression.
Moreover, Godwin recognized with increasing conviction an inscrutable element at the
heart of material temporality (i.e., the temporality of necessity), which subsequent critics
have called “contingency.” As he experiments with the representational potential of
contingency, he uncovers a role for the anti-social figure of the misanthrope in disclosing
the limits of this otherwise insuperable social. For Coleridge, the social emerges out of a
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failure of community; however, this community itself always fails because of its inability
to account for materiality. Given his general resistance to monism, 25 Coleridge held out
hope that transcendent desire might aim at something beyond the material, yet this hope
also faltered in the course of his expanding view of what this materiality might include.
The ongoing persistence (that is, to use Coleridge’s term, “constancy”) of such a
melancholy desire for the other keeps open a space that not only resonates with de Man’s
ideas about materiality’s resistance to representation, but also suggests a much larger
scope for sympathy than its eighteenth-century thinkers had envisioned. Finally, for Mary
Shelley, sympathy “works” most successfully for her in its repeated failure to satisfy the
dictates of representation. Her suspicion of the tendency for transcendent desire to be
merely an amplified social desire because of its cultivation of uncritical imaginaries
enables her to return to the question of transcendence and its relation to materiality and to
pose one of the questions that guides this entire study: how may we express a desire for
the other that extends beyond our ability to express it?

25

See McFarland (1969) for an extended discussion of the tensions in this aspect of Coleridge’s thought.
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CHAPTER THREE
“I wanted something, I knew not what”:
Sympathetic Narratives and Misanthropic Madness in William Godwin’s Novels

“So little was I aware of the cogs, the sockets, and the
teeth, by which the different parts of the social system are
connected with each other, and are made to act and react in
perpetual succession, and to sympathise to their remotest
members!”
— William Godwin, Mandeville
“Sanity can exist only because we are willing to function
within the conventions of duplicity and dissimulation, just
as social language dissimulates the inherent violence of the
actual relationships between human beings. Once this mask
is shown to be a mask, the authentic being underneath
appears necessarily as on the verge of madness.”
— Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality”

In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to trace the history of a fertile
encounter between two major ideas emerging in the eighteenth century. Both sympathy
and materialism make claims about the nature of “the other.” The former discourse does
so by imagining a life for the other similar to that led by the self, while the latter
identifies otherness itself as the central characteristic of its ontology. Where sympathy is
haunted by a desire for a relation that would stretch beyond subjectivity, materialism’s
own universalizing pretensions threaten to dispense with subjectivity altogether. In this
chapter and the two that follow, I will explore several literary instantiations of this
struggle over the meaning of the other and the question of what it entails to desire it. The
Romantic writers who reflect upon this problem are keenly aware both of the
representational possibilities a more robust understanding of materiality opens up to
thought and of the lingering transcendent desire that theories of sympathy fail to address
in a modern context. The combination of these tendencies enable the Romantics to
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inquire into forms of community emerging in the wake of society’s inability to account
for the whole of human experience.
This chapter will situate this encounter between sympathy and materialism in the
writing of William Godwin by examining one of the major character-types deployed in
his fiction: the misanthrope. In the four novels I will consider, Caleb Williams (1794), St.
Leon (1799), Fleetwood (1805), and Mandeville (1817), Godwin uses misanthropes to
delineate the horizon of the social realm by revealing that which it excludes: a desire for
the other that goes beyond the mere knowledge or comprehension of another person’s
actions or experience (i.e., beyond conventional sympathy). Instead, the repressed
transcendent desire that misanthropy reveals is a desire for an unmediated relation, which
would be a relation not dependent upon objectification. Using the language I have already
introduced, I want to suggest that misanthropy unsettles the imaginary realm of social
relations by drawing attention to its materially conditioned limitations. For Godwin, this
materiality manifests itself symbolically in terms of the unanticipated (and often bodily)
event that escapes the narrative logic of the social realm. This narrative logic is what
Godwin, and others following Hume, called “necessity”: the unavoidable linkage of an
antecedent event or motivation with its consequence. 1 Yet more than simply unavoidable,
this necessity also contains an element of inscrutability: at the heart of the matter is an
inability to know with certainty that the cause will produce its attendant effect. That is, it
extends Hume’s deconstruction of causality insofar as the mechanism by which cause
leads to effect is emphatically unknown, yet it affirms a retrospective fatalism in the

1

Godwin describes moral necessity in Political Justice as a “certainty of conjunction between moral
antecedents and consequents” (PJ3 1:363-64).
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sense that “things as they are” must unfold from events and through processes that have
preceded them.
As readers of Godwinian historiography have noted, the inscrutability of
necessity, implying its inherent potential for contingency, becomes an increasingly
important issue for Godwin over the course of his writing career. Jon Klancher, for
instance, writes that “[t]he notion of ‘necessity,’ as it will under intense historical
pressure, began to produce in Godwin’s revisions of Political Justice—and most fully in
his project of cultural inquiry and criticism, The Enquirer—the complex and chaotic
actions of the ‘contingent’” (27). 2 In the context of his use of misanthropy as a limit-case
for the social, Godwin aligns this contingency with that which exceeds the strictures of
reason—that is, with madness. The madness of the misanthrope, as Godwin depicts in his
novels, expresses indirectly a transcendent, if impossible, desire to overcome the limits of
social identity and to uncover the truth behind all narratives. By establishing the
conditions for suppressing this transcendent desire, the social realm forces it to appear
only in the form of a traumatic energy. Sympathy fails when it appears alongside such
feelings that cannot be properly imagined because of their traumatic character;
nevertheless, in this failure, the contours of a way of being with others that goes beyond
2
Tilottama Rajan, similarly, elaborates and expands upon Klancher’s postmodern understanding of
contingency by showing how Godwin’s own notion parallels earlier theorizations by Leibniz. In comparing
Godwin and Leibniz, Rajan offers an especially apt excerpt from an essay, “Of the Liberty of Human
Actions,” appearing in Thoughts on Man: His Nature, Productions and Discoveries (1831): “Hence arises
the idea of contingency ... and the opinion that, while, in the universe of matter, every thing proceeds in
regular course, and nothing has happened or can happen, otherwise than as it actually has been or will be,
in the determinations and acts of living beings each occurrence may be or may not be ... both issues being
equally possible till that decision has been made” (230; qtd. in “Between Romance and History” 248-49
n.11). Although Godwin does not fully accept contingency even at this late date, arguing later in that essay
that “the phenomena of mind are governed by laws altogether as inevitable as the phenomena of matter”
(232), his perspective has definitely altered by this point in his career, as he references Political Justice
repeatedly alongside contradicting caveats representing his attempt to come to grips with the feeling that
mind is not matter, but rather “an absolute prince [...] endowed with an initiating power” (230). He
continues to believe this feeling is “delusive” (231), yet he has come to recognize its vital role in giving rise
to “our moral sentiments” (235-36).
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the social emerges. Whether or not this alternative community is ultimately desirable,
however, is a question that will remain unanswered with the Romantics.
For the sake of both reference and clarity, I will briefly summarize the key critical
moves that I make in this chapter. As I have indicated, my central argument is that
Godwin experiments with misanthropy as a counter-social vehicle for carrying the kinds
of desires modern sympathy fails to accommodate in its capacity as the period’s
dominant relational vehicle. By reading both sympathy and misanthropy as vehicles for
desire, Godwin aligns them with the larger deterministic processes he raises initially in
Political Justice and then more pervasively throughout his novels: respectively, as
dependent upon necessity and what critics have come to identify as “contingency.” As he
will demonstrate most explicitly in Caleb Williams, Godwin understands sympathy’s
relation to necessity specifically in terms of its reliance upon narrative. For sympathy to
take place, the actor must express a narrative—i.e., a story composed logically of
antecedents and consequents—that can be reproduced by the social spectator. While
misanthropy itself seems to follow a similar social narrative (as I will show is the case
with the character of Bethlem Gabor), its potential for expressing transcendent desire lies
in its proximity to the ultimate anti-narrative: madness. If narrative follows the chains of
mere logic, then madness explodes out of the contingent moment that reveals the
inscrutable void that lies at the heart of reason. Moving forward, I will suggest that,
where St. Leon allows Godwin to explicitly locate misanthropy within the social realm,
his next novel, Fleetwood, allows him to explore more extensively misanthropy’s
susceptibility to conditions such as sensibility or madness, as opposed to a normative
rationality. As these conditions tend to emphasize contingent and anti-narrative elements,
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they may offer an exit route from constraining social narratives and provide the
conditions necessary to establish another form of relation. The final section on
Mandeville takes up the libidinal dimension of the misanthrope’s madness more directly
in order to consider both its role in forming communities that escape social reason and
the means by which these communities can be recaptured by the social.
As I have already suggested, the aftermath of the failure of sympathy in the
eighteenth century is a renewed focus on the repression of transcendent desire by the
social. This focus is made possible by speculations into the nature of a matter subsisting
prior to all imaginaries. In this respect, dark sympathy for Godwin traumatizes the subject
so long as the subject remains enmeshed within the social. While there can be no real
escape from the social for Godwin, the promise entailed by this trauma is the possibility
of locating an outside to history, of encountering an unexpected or contingent event, or of
discovering an unanticipated otherness within even social others that might suddenly and
without warning shift the dominating narrative of being altogether.

The Ambiguity of Sympathy in Godwin’s Thought
In his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1798), Godwin identifies the central
position occupied by sympathy in human experience. 3 As he notes in the opening
“Summary of Principles,” “[t]he most desirable condition of the human species, is a state
of society” (1:xxiv), precisely because such a state possesses the greatest opportunity for
experiencing “certain secondary pleasures, as the pleasures of intellectual feeling, the
pleasures of sympathy, and the pleasures of self-approbation” (1:xxiii). Sympathy, in this
3

Godwin published three editions of Political Justice in 1793, 1796, and 1798. For a brief summary of
Godwin’s modifications between the three editions and of the textual history in general, see Clucas 27-33.
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model, is as much a process of society, as in Hume, as it is an object of society; it offers
itself as a motivating factor for forming and sustaining social relations. To satisfy this
desire for a sympathetic “state of society,” Godwin offers two competing activities: on
the one hand, government, the “immediate object” of which is a “security” obtained
through “restriction, an abridgment of individual independence” (1:xxiv) and, on the
other hand, justice, which Godwin defines in several ways, including as “the production
of the greatest sum of pleasure or happiness” (1:xxv) and as an ethics that requires “I
should put myself in the place of an impartial spectator of human concerns, and divert
myself of retrospect to my own predilections” (1:xxv). If the first definition understands
justice as a kind of benevolent utility, then the second definition comes very close to
Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy, in which the exercise of imagining another’s
experience takes on a universal point of view. Nevertheless, justice in both definitions
goes beyond utility and even Smithean sympathy because of its evacuation of
subjectivity. In the latter case, this is explicit; in the former, it is implied by Godwin’s
omission of the second part of Bentham’s principle: “the greatest happiness of the
greatest number” (ii; emphasis mine). Justice posits a sum of happiness without a subject
of happiness. In its idealist vision of human relations, justice offers itself as a
transcendent object of desire, just as government offers in its provision of security a
social object of desire. Government and justice are central concepts in Godwin’s
exploration of sympathy because they both entail a form of relation through which
sympathetic desire may seek to satisfy itself, though neither appears to be ultimately
successful. The ambiguity of sympathy, I will argue, arises from its dual use.
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The distinction between government and justice corresponds, respectively, to a
rejection or validation of reason. In the section of Political Justice on “Political
Associations,” for example, Godwin writes that, “[i]f we would arrive at truth, each man
must be taught to enquire and think for himself” (1:288). He argues that the success of
this independent and individual use of reason increases as individuals are brought into
society with each other; however, such increase depends not upon the repetition of a
single idea, such as in “government,” but rather upon the multiplication of ideas brought
together through unreserved conversation. Thus he writes, “the chance [of success] will
also be increased, in proportion as the intellectual operations of these men are individual,
and their conclusions are suggested by the reason of the thing, uninfluenced by the force
either of compulsion or sympathy” (1:288). The perilous tendency of sympathy to
conjoin opinions rather than reflective judgments is particularly concerning to Godwin:
“While the sympathy of opinion catches from man to man, especially among persons
whose passions have been little used to the curb of judgment, actions may be determined
on, which the solitary reflection of all would have rejected” (1:293). Such “sympathy of
opinion,” which he also calls “imitation,” is the antithesis of Godwin’s stated aim of
helping individuals to use their reason, and its predominance thus aligns sympathy
generally with government.
In an essay called “Of the Obtaining of Confidence,” included in his 1797
Enquirer, Godwin elaborates further how sympathy can tend to support the restrictive
measures of government. While this essay explores the pedagogical work of gaining the
student’s trust, a precarious tone underpins Godwin’s reflections. He writes that “[w]here
sympathy is strong, imitation easily engrafts itself. […] There is, as it were, a magnetical
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virtue that fills the space between them: the communication is palpable, the means of
communication too subtle and minute to be detected” (124). 4 The sympathetic process
creates an imaginative space within which learning through the modeling of virtue
becomes possible. Nevertheless, such imitation raises the possibility of manipulation and
psychological subterfuge: “If any man desire to possess himself of the most powerful
engine that can be applied to the purposes of education, if he would find the ground upon
which he must stand to enable himself to move the whole substance of the mind, he will
probably find it in sympathy” (124). The threat sympathy poses—as it also does in
Godwin’s novels—lies precisely in its status as a “powerful engine that can be applied.”
Sympathy’s availability to multiple, even contradicting, uses—a feature of what we have
seen to be its work in support of social imaginaries—opposes the universality of what
Godwin wishes to see undergirding the system of things: justice as a commitment to
reason.
Just what reason entails for Godwin, however, shifts over the course of the 1790s.
In terms of its general character, the idea of reason is cast in increasingly transcendent
terms in Godwin’s writing of that period—making his idea of justice increasingly
transcendent as well. Thus, where the 1793 edition of Political Justice declares, “Reason
is the only legislator, and her decrees are irrevocable and uniform” (PJ1 1:166; qtd. in

4

As I explore below, Godwin’s use of “magnetism” as a metaphor for sympathy is slippery. In instances
such as the one cited here, it seems to indicate a straightforward sense of “strong attraction.” Elsewhere, for
instance, in his essay, “Of History and Romance” (1797), he writes: “We go forth into the world; we see
what man is; we enquire what he was; and when we return home to engage in the solemn act of selfinvestigation, our most useful employment is to produce the materials we have collected abroad, and, by a
sort of magnetism, cause those particulars to start our to view in ourselves, which might otherwise have laid
for ever undetected” (455). Here, magnetism functions more literally as a force operating at the level of
particulars rather than persons. In general, I see “magnetic virtue” as signaling the more general meaning,
which is aligned with social sympathy, and other instances as more ambiguous and possibly intersecting
with the idea of dark sympathy, which involves a resonance between alterities within and without.
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Collings 871 n. 1), the 1798 edition reads, “Immutable reason is the true legislator, and
her decrees it behoves us to investigate” (PJ3 1:221; qtd. in Collings 847). This slight
shift also marks a difference in Godwin’s evolving understanding of the relation between
social and transcendent desires. In the first place, he has added a layer of phenomenality.
The 1793 edition describes the legislations of reason as autonomous in their authority; by
adding the word “true” in the 1798 edition, he produces an over-determination that
implies a multitude of untrue legislations deriving, we can suppose, from
misinterpretations of reason. The third edition’s additional qualification of
“immutability” connects reason with Godwin’s doctrine of necessity. Reason is no longer
simply “things as they are,” but rather it is the unchangeable and necessary process. Yet,
as the second clause indicates, the truth of immutable reason must now be sought out
(“investigate[d]”). One of the key implications of this distinction is that it becomes
possible to pursue the principle raised in the opening pages of the third edition of
Political Justice, namely regarding “the improvement of reason” that will lead to “the
improvement of our social condition” (1:xxvi). Although the “immutability” of reason
and its propensity for improvement appear to contradict each other, it is precisely because
reason has been cast into the necessitarian backdrop of existence that the human
understanding of it is made improvable at all. Reason-as-immutable is therefore
ultimately inscrutable, though one may occupy a position more or less proximate to its
unchanging, occluded centre. As Godwin writes in the same paragraph discussing
“immutable reason”: “The functions of society extend, not to the making, but the
interpreting of law; it cannot decree, it can only declare that, which the nature of things
has already decreed, and the propriety of which irresistibly flows from the circumstance
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of the case” (PJ3 1:221; emphasis mine). By extension, David Collings argues that this
new distinction enables the radical critical exercise of Godwin’s Enquiry: “Because
reason is prior to its historical articulation, the latter is illegitimate” (847).
Once reason as a path to truth is distinguished from rationalizing in the sense of
interpreting things in order to satisfy desire, the transcendent ideals of Political Justice
become increasingly difficult to access. As he moves away from an uncritical view of
reason—reason as simply “things as they are”—towards a view of reason as both
immutable and therefore inscrutable at its root, Godwin increasingly conceives of the
idea of “things as they are” as itself a narrative distinct from the truth. The relation of
sympathy to such narratives is complex. Generally, as he suggests in Political Justice and
elsewhere, sympathy remains susceptible to being a purely social expression, which is to
say an expression in which the social precedes and determines the individual. Yet the
desire for the other that sympathy elicits also remains deeply lodged within the
individual. Thus, from the beginning, Godwin’s understanding of the desires contained
within sympathy attends to the conflict I introduced in Chapter 1. Sympathy tends
towards imitation, and it lends itself easily as a tool for manipulating and oppressing
others. Yet it also evokes a transcendent desire for something beyond the mundane reality
of either “my own predilections” or even simply “the conviviality of a crowded feast”
(1:293)—the latter description of which Godwin offers as a figure of the social.
This transcendent desire for an alterity subsisting at the root of nature ultimately
promotes an “individuality,” which Godwin insists is “the very essence of intellectual
excellence” (PJ 2:500) and “flows from the very nature of man” (PJ3 1:167). 5 Such

5

In this important passage, Godwin distinguishes between individuality and imitation. He writes: “He that
resigns himself wholly to sympathy and imitation, can possess little of mental strength or accuracy. The
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individuality constitutes what Robert Anderson calls “the sacred sphere of private
judgment” (617). Yet private judgment, although Godwin insists that it must not be
infringed upon, is not also infallible—far from it. Rather, private judgment must be
preserved so that what might be better termed the “community” of political justice (as
opposed to any “governed” society) can emerge. His idealism about the possibility of
such a community dissipates with the death of Mary Wollstonecraft, though it is perhaps
not surprising that the optimism of the Political Justice period overlaps the optimism of
St. Leon. Nevertheless, as I explore in the sections that follow, this waning conviction in
the possibility of transcendent desire does not mean that he stops pursuing it. Instead,
misanthropy reconstitutes private judgment as an explicitly anti-social posture, which can
only be expressed within the social as madness.
As he comes to discern the instrumentality of reason and thus the need for a
deliberate commitment to its inscrutable core, Godwin also discovers the role competing
narratives play in the amplification of social influence upon individuals. If sympathy
expresses the desire for others, obtained either through government (as in social desire) or
through justice (as in transcendent desire), then narrative represents the means by which
that sympathetic desire communicates itself, delineating a set of relations within which
the subject asks to be understood. Caleb Williams strives to show both how the social
strives to dominate all attempts at narration and how a material remainder nevertheless
escapes such totalization.

system of his life is a species of sensual dereliction. He is like a captive in the garden of Armida; he may
revel in the midst of a thousand delights; but he is incapable of the enterprise of a hero, or the severity of a
philosopher. He lives forgetting and forgot. He has deserted his station in human society” (2:500; emphasis
mine). If imitative sympathy implies a kind of captivity, individuality suggests freedom.
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Caleb Williams: The Failure of Sympathy and the Intervention of Misanthropy
While I will explore the figure of the misanthrope in much greater detail in the
subsequent sections of this chapter, I first want to consider Falkland, the prototypical
Romantic misanthrope Godwin developed in his first novel, in the unique context of his
self-fashioning in relation to Caleb and others. The central issue for Falkland (and the
reason the novel reveals the catastrophic failure of sympathy) is his inability to narrate his
life as he chooses. This difficulty is also a problem for Caleb and, indeed, this novel may
be read as a record of his training in misanthropy. My larger argument about misanthropy
is that it is the condition that emerges out of the repression of transcendent desire by the
social; in other words, it has the potential to manifest a dark sympathy. In this way, it
renders explicit the conflict of desire that appears in theories of sympathy in the mideighteenth century. Godwin seems intuitively to recognize this in his development of the
character of Falkland.
As Godwin himself (in the novel’s Preface) and many critics since have
suggested, Caleb Williams can be read as a fictional experiment investigating the ideas
Godwin raises in his nearly contemporaneous prose work. 6 I would like to extend this
observation to suggest that one of the key questions Godwin is revisiting in Caleb
Williams is the question of what is required to belong to society. In Political Justice,
Godwin grows increasingly suspicious of necessity’s ability to lead to justice; however,
he does not reject the utopian and future possibility of a social realm that might be
6

Evan Radcliffe writes, “There may be no other case as prominent in which a novel succeeds a
philosophical treatise so closely in time, is so closely connected to its concerns, and yet is so
unprogrammatic. Accordingly, a number of critics have explored the relations between Caleb Williams and
Political Justice, especially the complex ways in which the novel, which sharing and pursuing many of the
political and philosophical positions of Political Justice, diverges from them” (528). Radcliffe goes on to
distinguish between the two works in terms of their formal differences and the effects these make upon
their apparent incompatibilities.
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grounded upon this transcendent objective. Political Justice imagines a society founded
upon reason. Nevertheless, with each subsequent revision, reason becomes less and less
an immediate revelation of “things as they are” and increasingly a mystery requiring
interpretation—and therefore narration. Indeed, what is at stake is precisely the libidinal
status of narrative: can narrative be deployed to express a transcendent desire for the
other, or will it always collapse into a mere social desire because of its reliance upon
communication, exchange, and—ultimately—sympathy?
Several critics have identified this issue of narration and narrative as a central
concern in Caleb Williams. Cheryl Walsh writes that “Caleb Williams is a novel about
narratives and their credibility” (23). Emily R. Anderson notes along similar lines that the
novel “interrogat[es] the construction of narrative” and “tends towards a different view.
In every imaginable circumstance, the novel suggests that a good story is more
powerful—and ultimately more dangerous—than a true story” (100). David S. Hogsette
likewise argues: “The main purpose of Caleb’s own narrative confessional—the novel he
narrates—is to escape the prison of Falkland’s narrative legacy and to redeem himself in
the eyes of the public” (par. 10). In this section, I will continue this discussion of the
central role narrative plays in Caleb Williams and argue that Godwin links narrative with
sympathy and its failure. I will support this argument in the first place by narrowing my
focus to consider a centrally important scene in the novel: the “mousetrap” episode in
which Caleb attempts to trick his master into revealing the dark source of his
misanthropy. This scene indicates not only the limits of social desire (and therefore the
far edge of sympathy’s other), but also the mechanisms by which the social works to
reintegrate individuals on the cusp of escape. I will also read the novel’s original and
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revised endings, respectively, as Godwin’s attempt to preserve sympathy for justice
(rather than government) by casting Caleb fully out from the social realm and, in the
revised ending, as his return to the ambiguity of sympathy that he raised in Political
Justice. If sympathy is overly susceptible to the circulation of opinion that directs
government, then Caleb’s descent into madness outside the social realm, at the hands of
government, can promote the reader’s own sympathy and—by extension—desire for
justice. The original ending pits sympathy-as-justice against the more pervasive
sympathy-as-government. Just as Godwin would become increasingly suspicious of this
kind of optimism over the course of the 1790s, so does he opt for a less optimistic ending
in his revision of Caleb Williams. For, as we see in the revised ending, Caleb’s ability to
elicit sympathy helps him to find social acceptance, but at the expense of becoming a
misanthrope like his master. The subsequent sections of the chapter will consider at
greater length the representational value of misanthropy for revealing desire.
Desperate for the sympathy that Godwin identified as one of the chief aims of
human desire in Political Justice, both Caleb and Falkland ultimately seek the more
realizable social sanction of their personal narratives rather than an impossible
satisfaction of their transcendent desire for immediacy. Falkland has understood the
secret since his quarrel with Tyrrel, but Caleb only discovers it in the closing chapters of
the novel: that social sanction depends not upon truth-content, but upon convincing form.
The form that convinces the social is specifically one of necessity, in which each effect
follows “naturally” from its cause. As Falkland discovers many years prior to Caleb
joining his household, “All are but links of one chain. A blow! A murder! My next
business was to defend myself, to tell so well-digested a lie as that all mankind should
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believe it true” (214). Thus he articulates his actions as necessary moments reproducing
the narrative of honour he wishes to posit for social approbation. Unlike Caleb, who
continues for much of the novel (and, in the original ending, to its conclusion) to imagine
the possibility of an unmediated relation to the Real, Falkland believes that the secret at
the heart of history is the artifice of history itself, or what Godwin calls “the character of
freedom” in an especially resonant section of Political Justice:
All the acts, except the first, were necessary, and followed each other, as
inevitably as the links of a chain do, when the first link is drawn forward.
But then neither was this first act free, unless the mind in adopting it were
self-determined, that is, unless this act were chosen by a preceding act.
Trace back the chain as far as you please, every act at which you arrive is
necessary. That act, which gives the character of freedom to the whole,
can never be discovered; and, if it could, in its own nature includes a
contradiction. (1:378; emphasis mine)
Thus, on the one hand, Caleb’s initial (transcendent) curiosity grows the closer he
gets to Falkland, appearing ultimately as anxiety in its sheer “restless propensity” (187).
Yet, on the other, when this anxiety first encounters the social in the form of the
magistrate Forester whom Caleb believes to be similarly interested in the truth itself,
Caleb’s unvarnished tale fails to convince and collapses back into anxiety. In part, this
failure is because, in a manner of speaking, the “varnish” of the tale is precisely the point.
As Cheryl Walsh notes, “According to Forester, truth cannot be one’s main concern when
representing oneself to the judicial system. The object of the game, as it were, is to ‘make
the best story,’ where the criteria for a good narrative are plausibility and ingenuity” (30).
By the time Caleb encounters Falkland again in a scene of trial, he has learnt how to
manage his anxieties and how, as Eric Daffron suggests, “sympathy can be turned to
resistant uses” (214). The story must be told in such a way that it can be “carried […] to
every hearer” (CW 432), introjected, and its effects reinscribed. Caleb’s tragic discovery
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near the close of the novel is that the success of his sympathetic narrative has in fact
resulted in the obstruction of that original transcendent desire, which gets replaced
instead with “a secret foreboding, as if I should never again be master of myself” (423).
This anxious feeling describes the experience of Godwinian necessity, in which “man is a
passive, and not an active being” (PJ 1:389). Moreover, it is an experience of necessity
with no recourse to the potentiality implied by its inscrutable contingent core.
Nevertheless, as Godwin recognizes in Caleb Williams and elsewhere, all
sympathetic narratives are susceptible to disturbance. Indeed, as Paul de Man suggests,
the aesthetic ideology implied by these socializing narratives encounters an insuperable
obstacle in “the prosaic materiality of the letter” (“Phenomenality and Materiality” 90),
which underlies all forms of textuality as the condition of their possibility and ultimate
horizon. De Man writes elsewhere:
Sanity can exist only because we are willing to function within the
conventions of duplicity and dissimulation, just as social language
dissimulates the inherent violence of the actual relationships between
human beings. Once this mask is shown to be a mask, the authentic being
underneath appears necessarily as on the verge of madness. (“Rhetoric of
Temporality” 216)
The process by which this de-masking might occur—and the possibility it entails for
community—can best be described with reference to Godwin’s subsequent work, where
the figure of the misanthrope (introduced here with Falkland) takes on a central role as
does his concomitant outbursts of madness. Nevertheless, Godwin’s first novel sets the
stage for these later investigations through its close analysis of the intimate interactions
between Falkland and Caleb, the misanthrope and misanthrope-in-training. As Caleb
discovers, Falkland’s misanthropy—and especially his moments of madness—interrupts
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the unfolding of necessity, obstructing sympathy, while also opening a space for
community through the mutual experience of contingency.
On the surface, the so-called “mousetrap” scene at the beginning of the second
volume depicts a conflict of narratives, yet such conflict is driven unwittingly by a
material corollary that cannot be assimilated. Thus, when Falkland extols the virtues of
Alexander the Great, he does not realize that another inquiry is taking place
simultaneously. Even as he insists that Caleb will find “in Alexander a model of honour,
generosity, and disinterestedness” (184), Falkland fails to understand—until it is too
late—that his allegorical appropriation of the past (for, like Alexander, he “has been
much misunderstood” [185]) is already being framed within Caleb’s ironic testing of him.
Yet Caleb too does not foresee the consequences of this act. For, as Caleb reveals the
textual character of Falkland’s narrative, he radically disturbs its smooth continuity and
social propriety. Thus Caleb initiates the discussion by explicitly calling into question the
material grounds of a textual phenomenon: “how came Alexander of Macedon to be
surnamed the Great” (183). While the conversation that ensues on one level revolves
around the semantics of what constitutes “greatness,” on a deeper level, both parties are
interested in the nature of truth and each implicitly identifies with his respective reading.
Thus Falkland appeals to Alexander as “gallant, generous, and free” (184) and tasks
Caleb with “becom[ing] more liberal” (185), while Caleb suggests that this “freedom”
was little more than an expansive tyranny, “the common disturber of mankind” (184).
Yet undergirding this discussion is Caleb’s remarkable deployment of allegory against
itself. By appealing to a purely textual question, in which he counters a democratic
hermeneutic (“Man is surely a strange sort of creature, who never praises any one more
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heartily than him who has spread destruction and ruin over the face of nations!” [184-85])
against Falkland’s hermeneutic of glory, Caleb conceals until the last moment the
material corollary of this hermeneutic, namely, Falkland’s guilt. The veiled accusation he
ultimately levels against Falkland serves in the same instant as a critique of the textual—
that is, imaginary—basis of Falkland’s narrative and as an oblique disclosure of Caleb’s
own transcendent desire to know Falkland in an absolute sense.
The disclosure, although it posits a darkly sympathetic relation initially, also
almost immediately shuts down the full possibility of this relation: “The instant I had
uttered these words, I felt what it was that I had done. There was a magnetical sympathy
between me and my patron, so that their effect was not sooner produced upon him, than
my own mind reproached me with the inhumanity of the illusion. Our confusion was
mutual” (186). The agency described in this action presents a kind of non-intentional
experience, which develops contingently and non-linguistically as in “magnetism,” rather
than through narration. The provision of a narrative explanation for this feeling partially
subordinates its unanticipated quality, yet without sublimating it completely. Where
Caleb had attempted to posit his liberal narrative against Falkland’s classical narrative,
the material underside of this work of narration interrupts the competition, resulting in a
mutual “confusion” that cannot be fully explained away by mere sympathy. Moreover,
Falkland’s body reacts more violently than he would like. At first, he only “redden[s] at
these citations” (183). Once Caleb reveals his true intent to be an attack on Falkland’s
narrative domination, he inadvertently discloses the limits of the social imaginary they
both inhabit. The consequence for Falkland, the more entrenched in social desire of the
two, expresses itself again in material terms: “[t]he blood forsook at once the transparent
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complexion of Mr. Falkland, and then rushed back again with rapidity and fierceness”
(186). 7 This non-intentional, material response inducts Falkland into a community with
Caleb that neither member can quite articulate—but, above all, one that resides elsewhere
than within the bounds of the Symbolic order. Yet, as we see in the almost immediate
turn from “magnetical sympathy” to the narrative of his “mind reproach[ing],” this
unanticipated, contingent, and material community only corresponds to one aspect of
their desire for one another. Thus, even as he enjoys the destructive pleasure of pressing
truth in the form of material necessity against the fragile narrative webs that Falkland has
woven, Caleb ultimately desires a future situation in which “the world shall do justice on
us both” (421). Notably, here Caleb uses “justice” in a sense far different from Godwin’s
use of the term: to ask “the world” to do justice is ultimately a request for “government.”
This conflict of desires reflects the conflict of sympathy: a contention between, on
the one hand, a transcendent desire for a relation with the other that overcomes
subjectivity and, on the other, a social integration, which aims at a kind of totality, though
one diffused through sympathy’s ruse of only gesturing towards otherness. Caleb is never
quite able to enter into the former’s expansive relation with the other because he still
desires an identity for himself. Moreover, he understands that desire specifically in terms
of an identity within the social. Similarly, Falkland desires honour, but conceives of that
potentially transcendent object only in social terms as a kind of lingering, though
perverted, residue of the chivalric relationship. As John Bender writes, describing the
social systems of judgment as understood by both Falkland and Caleb: “Both the old
system, based upon honour, and the newer one based upon sympathetic introjection are
7

P. B. Shelley would draw on this description of physical response in a similar scene between Ginotti and
Wolfstein in St. Irvyne: “Wolfstein started. The terror which had blanched his cheek now gave way to an
expression of fierceness and surprise” (224).
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political in the worst sense because they personify judgment as an enforcing third person
rather than founding it upon the analogous but independent percipience of individuals”
(267). Thus, despite the differences separating Falkland and Caleb, the form of desire that
motivates both of their narratives is startlingly consistent: a desire for an immediate
relation with others disingenuously articulated through a desire for the social.
This desire to remain entrenched within the social helps to explain Godwin’s
different endings for the novel. In the original ending, Caleb abandons his desire for
social sanction and decides instead to pursue a truth unsullied by the machinations of the
social order; in this way, the ending represents a logical development following Caleb’s
realization that “[s]ympathy, the magnetic virtue, the hidden essence of our life, was
extinct” (414). As Cheryl Walsh notes, “In the manuscript ending, there is no reversal, no
new revelation. Caleb sticks to the calculated narrative strategy that is evident throughout
the novel, the concentrated purpose of which is to clear his name” (34). Caleb describes
his feelings freely to the indignant judge: “I expressed my sorrow for the apparent state of
Mr. Falkland’s health. I did not thirst for his blood. But I could no longer be easy to
confine within my own bosom the knowledge I had upon this terrible subject” (436).
David Collings writes regarding this scene that it “gives Caleb the chance to act out the
fantasy that he is the solitary truthteller in the face of a closed and total system of
oppression” (856). Thus he is able to perform his transcendent desire for the revelation of
truth without admitting that his decision to express this in the context of the trial stems
from a desire for society to approve of him. When that society does not, but instead
consigns him to his madness, the implication is that social sympathy (and government)
ought to be rejected. By extension, the reader is encouraged to imagine the conditions by
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which Caleb might be rendered sympathetic—to imagine truthtelling as sympathetic and
hence deserving of justice. Yet Godwin proposes instead to devise a “new catastrophe”
(qtd. in Handwerk, Caleb Williams, 435) because such an expulsion from the social—as
he explores at greater length in his later novels—does not reflect the totalizing aims of
the social as he has come to understand it. Furthermore, Caleb discovers that he has not
only been cast out of the social, but also from a realm in which transcendent desire itself
is possible. Instead, he finds himself in a realm emptied of desire, where “[t]rue
happiness” is “being like a stone” (443), and he is encompassed in madness and death by
the material otherness of what Žižek calls drive. 8
Although Caleb’s response to the scene of judgment in the revised ending seems
to depend upon straightforward sympathy in order to overcome the destructive effects of
the fabric of identity Caleb has woven for himself thus far, I want to suggest that it also
articulates the encrypted and perverted character of transcendent desire within a social
realm that cannot truly be escaped. Up to this point, Caleb has attempted to retain this
vision of himself as the truthteller and, in the original ending, he is permitted to live out
that fantasy to its logical conclusion. Yet, as we have seen in Godwin’s revisionings of
Political Justice, this “fantasy of reason” harbours a contingent core. This contingency –
the very alterity of materiality – surfaces momentarily when he encounters Falkland
dying and he finds himself in a position similar to his master’s experience in the
mousetrap scene. This is not simply a matter of “feeling with” Falkland. Instead, Caleb
perceives in the demand that he sympathize with this broken man the necessity that he
betray his own transcendent desire. The effect of this dark sympathy, which remains
concealed from the social scene of the trial until he textualizes it in his testimony, causes
8

For a more extended discussion of Žižek’s contrasting of desire and drive, see Chapter 4.
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him to tremble (his “whole frame shook” [428]), much as he had vowed to cause
Falkland to “Tremble!” (421) earlier. Despite the unmitigated transcendent desire he has
for justice earlier on, Caleb finds in the social context of the trial that the affective and
seemingly visceral reactions he displays both in his first encounter with Falkland and
during the course of his prosecution cannot properly be communicated to the court. Thus
he confesses his desire to “recall the last four days of my life” (428). The encounter has
led him to recognize, on the one hand, that his “fine-spun reasonings,” a phrase that
implies the artifice of his justification, had not accounted for the meaning of that moment
of desire for Falkland. This realization forms the basis of a rational critique of Caleb’s
own necessitarian use of reason: “There must have been some dreadful mistake in the
train of argument” (427). His discovery is that what he had taken for a transcendent
desire to know the truth about Falkland was in fact a social desire to have his own
narrative sanctioned instead of Falkland’s—and that such a desire had led him to this
scene of judgment. Yet, unlike the original ending, the revised ending requires that Caleb
remain within the horizon of the social, which he comes now to see as “a rank and rotten
soil, from which every finer shrub draws poison as it grows” (434).
As was the case in the mousetrap scene, Caleb discovers the depth of his desire
for Falkland traumatically and materially, as it comes upon him unaware, “fe[eling] what
it was that [he] had done” (186). This contingent event is inherently fleeting, yet it signals
Godwin’s working through of a concept of desire that extends beyond a mere social
desire for the other. Furthermore, as we can see in Godwin’s exploration of the way
Caleb’s and Falkland’s respective narrative trajectories gradually converge, with the
former ultimately (and Oedipally) supplanting the latter, the economy of social
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participation also implies an ongoing misanthropic element, which surfaces partly as a
result of this trauma. If Falkland exemplifies misanthropy throughout the bulk of the
novel, then Caleb’s development as a character emerges out of his own education in
misanthropy—his experience of life as “a theatre of calamity” (59). Godwin’s decision to
retain Caleb for misanthropy in the revised ending indicates a certain resignation to the
limits of the social, which he will nevertheless continue to probe in his subsequent work.

St. Leon: Misanthropy at the Limits of the Social
In Molière’s The Misanthrope (1666), the miserable protagonist, Alceste, claims
that his “main gift is for frankness and sincerity” (56). 9 This extreme sincerity alienates
him from society not only by making his presence uncomfortable to others, but also by
making the artifice of others distasteful to him. Although somewhat mitigated by an
ending in which the moderates, Philinte and Éliante, follow the solitary Alceste off-stage
in order to “do all we can to persuade him to give up this foolish plan” (75), Molière’s
play can be read as generally interested in the merits of sincerity. The most insincere
character, Célimène, is forced to confess her artifice, while the truthful Éliante gains a
husband. Godwin similarly aligned an ideal sincerity in Political Justice with the more
benevolent society he imagines there, as opposed to the current state: “At present, men
meet together with the temper, less of friend, than enemies. Every man eyes his
neighbour, as if he expected to receive from him a secret wound” (1:334). The “secret
wound” derives from the universal story of social disappointment that lies at the heart of
all of his subsequent fictional explorations of misanthropy. Yet, where Alceste’s
9
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misfortunes lead him to abandon society altogether and flee into solitude as the curtain
falls, the misanthropes of Godwin’s fiction find they cannot escape the social—as though
Hume’s social turn had denied them that option altogether.
As I have suggested, misanthropy is a regular feature in Godwin’s work,
appearing in one form or another in all of his novels. In his second novel, St. Leon,
Godwin introduces the historical character, Bethlem Gabor, as a limit-case for testing the
compatibility of social sympathy with misanthropy. 10 Gabor fits well the description of
an extreme sufferer that David Hume offers us in Book 3 of the Treatise. Hume argues
that, just as there is “an immediate sympathy which men have with characters similar to
their own” (383), a person’s excessive response to suffering (in which “angry passions
rise up to cruelty” [386]) produces an antipathy in which “[a]ll the pity and concern
which we have for the miserable suffers by this vice, turns against the person guilty of it,
and produces a stronger hatred than we are sensible of on any other occasion” (384).
Having lost his family and possessions suddenly and through a brutal violence, Gabor
“wandered a solitary outcast upon the face of his country […] but every day engendered
some new thought or passion: and it appeared probable that he would not yet quit the
stage of existence till he had left behind him the remembrances of a terrible and
desolating revenge” (SL 383). Godwin’s depiction of the relationship between St. Leon
and Gabor explores the extent to which this boundary of the social may be crossed.
Although he later claims that “there was little sympathy between us; he was
wrapped up in his own contemplations; he was withered by his own calamities; our souls
scarcely touched in a single point” (424), St. Leon initially discovers an intimacy with
this misanthrope that resembles the kind of sympathy Godwin describes elsewhere as
10
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“magnetic” (CW 414), which is to say predicated upon a shared, though unconscious,
worldview. He describes their relationship as a shared melancholy:
We had each by the malice of a hostile destiny, though in a very different
manner, been deprived of our families; we were each of us alone. Fated
each to be hereafter for ever alone; we blended ourselves the one with the
other as perfectly as we could. Often over our gloomy bowl we mingled
groans, and sweetened our draught as we drank it with maledictions. (38485)
Godwin would later describe a similar relationship in Mandeville in Mandeville’s shortlived acquaintance with Lisle at Oxford. There, too, their companionship consisted in the
exchange of world-denouncing execrations. Mandeville describes the appeal of their
union: “We found a social pleasure in looking in each other’s faces, and silently
whispering to our own hearts, Thank God, I have a companion, that hates the world as
much as I do!” (127).
In St. Leon, this attempt at finding sympathy in a sharing of their hatred ultimately
fails. When Gabor discovers that St. Leon is not a true misanthrope (indeed, that he
imagines himself the opposite, a philanthropist), he throws him in prison. As a novel of
ideas (“a text as playful as Godwin’s other novels are traumatic” [Rajan, Romantic
Narrative, 144]), St. Leon explores anew the potentialities of the social order that Godwin
initially raised in Political Justice, but partly undermined in his first novel, Caleb
Williams. As a wanderer and misanthrope, Gabor appears to stand outside society, and
indeed he believes that his imprisonment of St. Leon will satisfy “the scope of my
misanthropy” as “in your restraint, I image myself as making the human race an orphan”
(SL 403). In this act, however, Gabor inadvertently imitates St. Leon’s other
imprisonments (such as his time spent under the Inquisition) and thus reveals himself to
be complicit with—rather than opposed to—the social order. As we see in his ironic
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phrasing, explaining his impetus for imprisoning St. Leon, Gabor ultimately shares the
same goals as the social order: “Never shall Bethlem Gabor set at large a man of your
unnatural and gall-less disposition, and your powers for the indulgence of that
disposition” (403). Later, St. Leon’s son, Charles, a veritable representative of the
dominant social imaginary, will express similar sentiments when he discovers his father’s
duplicity: “If such a wretch as thou art, be permitted to go at large, what human
institution, what human possessions, shall ever be secure?” (444).
This perverse connection between the misanthrope and the social is consistent
throughout Godwin’s novels. As he develops his thinking on misanthropy, Godwin
strives to account for the possibilities it might also entail as a resistant force. Bethlem
Gabor serves not only to dispute the universality of social sympathy, but also to mark the
inherent misanthropy of the social order itself. In his contrast with St. Leon, Gabor
reveals that misanthropy is less an inversion of social desire than its own far limit. Thus
David Collings notes the similarity between Gabor’s demand that St. Leon support his
violence financially and Falkland’s demand that Caleb implicitly support his murder of
Tyrrel by signing a letter renouncing his earlier public charge. In both cases, misanthropy
reveals that “[t]he public authority of the English magistrate or Hungarian authority is
founded upon lies and violence, in the attempt to master, rather than serve, true
knowledge” (869).
Similarly, the maze-like subterranean dungeon of Gabor’s castle (“with a variety
of cells and lurking places, of which no man had to his knowledge ever ascertained the
number” [392]) appears as a stereotypically Gothic setting that lends itself to
psychoanalytic readings of this genre’s disclosure of the place of the unconscious. Yet,
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unlike the underground tunnels of Matthew Lewis’s The Monk, which open a space
within which transgressive desires may flow freely apart from social strictures, Gabor’s
dungeons are more akin to the Inquisitional labyrinths in Radcliffe’s The Italian, which
are hidden from view precisely because of how they render literal the machinations of the
social order aboveground. 11 On the one hand, St. Leon as alchemist signifies to both
Gabor and the reader a linguistic slipperiness and potentiality that we may associate more
broadly with, if not transcendent desire itself, then at least a desire emphasizing the
semiotic over the symbolic. He is, in his own words, “an equivocal character, assuming
different names, and wandering over the world with different pretences” (447). On the
other hand, Gabor comes to embody system—and its concomitant principles of necessity
and rationality. As St. Leon notes just before his imprisonment, “I felt as if I were the
slave of some dark, mysterious tyrant, and dragged along supinely wherever he motioned
me to go” (392). In this reference, Godwin recalls the language Caleb Williams uses to
describe the misanthrope of his tale: Falkland, the “dark, mysterious, unfeeling,
unrelenting tyrant!” (CW 420).
Nevertheless, despite similarities that might render Gabor “a second Falkland” (as
the Holcrofts remarked), 12 an important feature distinguishes the presentation of
misanthropy in St. Leon from its function in Caleb Williams and Godwin’s other novels.
For, although misanthropy is likewise condemned in these other novels, it is never as
wholly rejected as it is in St. Leon, which sees Gabor entirely vanish after Charles’s
attack. Indeed, that Godwin would reject misanthropy here is perhaps not surprising for a
11
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novel that ends with the optimistic promise “that this busy and anxious world of ours yet
contains something in its stores that is worth living for” (450). Furthermore, as I will
explore at greater length below, the misanthropes of Godwin’s other fiction regularly
experience unsettling bouts of madness, which render them at least provisionally distinct
from the social order. By contrast, Bethlem Gabor’s particular presentation of
misanthropy appears somewhat sanitized. While he is ostensibly given to fits of madness
(as St. Leon implies in his assertion that “I could fill volumes with the detail of the
multiplied expedients, the furious menaces, the gigantic starts and rhapsodies of passion,
by which he alternately urged me to compliance and concession” [404]), the reader never
encounters these. Moreover, it is striking to note the way Gabor is seen as using his
madness to “urge” St. Leon. Unlike those subject-destabilizing outbursts by Mandeville
or Fleetwood, or even Falkland, Gabor’s explosions of feeling are in fact cunningly
rational. Thus, having finally imprisoned St. Leon, Gabor gives him the terms of his
imprisonment plainly: “I have nothing to propose to you. Think you that, either as my
enemy or my slave, and I hold you for both, I would descend to negotiate with you? I
simply told you your situation. Yours be the consequences of your wilfulness and folly!”
(402). By deterministically condemning St. Leon to his fate, Gabor allies himself with the
doctrine of necessity that we have seen play an essential role in lending the social
imaginary its authority.
Bethlem Gabor reveals the misanthropic underpinnings of the social order; his
systematic approach indicates moreover the social’s claims upon necessity as a
mechanism. Yet Gabor’s eminent rationality ensures that contingency never infringes
upon the mechanisms he has established. Rather, the contingent event of Charles’s
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sudden appearance produces only Gabor’s disappearance from view. Thus, while St. Leon
affirms the association of the social order with what Godwin calls government in
Political Justice, the novel does not develop the alternative forms of relational desire that
surface in Caleb Williams. As I hope to show, such avenues for escaping the constraints
of social desire appear instead in Godwin’s subsequent depictions of the misanthrope’s
madness.

Fleetwood: The Traumatic Energy of Misanthropy
If Bethlem Gabor in St. Leon reveals the way misanthropy resides along the inside
edge of the social realm, that novel’s optimism impedes any exploration of the effects of
misanthropy’s traumatic energy. Unlike his first two, Godwin’s third novel, Fleetwood,
locates a misanthrope in the place of the first-person narrator. Bethlem Gabor’s
secondary position in the novel permits him (and Godwin) to conceal his conflicting
motivations and desires; by contrast, Fleetwood must attempt a sufficiently coherent
“confession” to convince his readers of his “penitence and humiliation” (59). The result is
Godwin’s tracing of the development of a repression. As I will show, Fleetwood—like so
many of Godwin’s characters—desires an unmediated relation with others; this
transcendent desire appears with greatest clarity in his childhood curiosity. Nevertheless,
in keeping with the Rousseauian model Godwin repeatedly employs, 13 Fleetwood’s
incorporation into the social realm does not simply cancel out that original desire. Rather,
the social realm has a perverting effect upon desire. To the extent that he continues to
desire this transcendent relation to the other, Fleetwood becomes misanthropic. Thus far,
13
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Fleetwood might serve as well as Bethlem Gabor for illustrating the dynamic Godwin
perceives underpinning misanthropy in modern society. The difference comes about in
the unique depiction of the affective excesses of this “new man of feeling.” In what
follows, I will sketch the connection Godwin makes between madness and the refracted
expression of that encrypted desire, that is, the way madness enables the misanthrope to
communicate a dark sympathy with the other. If narrative in the sense understood by
Falkland and Caleb proved complicit in every instance with the social realm and the
desire that motivates it, then madness renders narrative impossible. This discussion will
lead to the last section of the chapter, on Mandeville, in which I dwell at greater length on
the relational dimension of misanthropic madness, which seems intimately connected to
the traumatic energy that Godwin imagines for community.
As was the case with Caleb Williams, Fleetwood not only establishes a strongly
marked opposition between transcendent and social desires, it aligns these again with a
free-ranging curiosity, on the one hand, and a manageable social identity we might call
reputation, on the other. The truncation or attenuation of the former within the latter gives
rise to misanthropy—as it was depicted to do similarly for Falkland and Bethlem Gabor.
A closer look at this process as it appears in Fleetwood helps also to raise the crucial
question of the role of materiality in the Romantic response to sympathy, as I described in
Chapter 2. As indicated in the novel’s subtitle, “the new man of feeling,” this materiality
most regularly takes the form of sensibility. 14 Fleetwood’s excessive sensibility is acutely
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physiological in character: described in terms of nerves and physical reaction and
appearing in violent, irrational fits inscribed upon bodies. Yet sensibility is also aligned
with Fleetwood’s transcendent desire for an unmediated relation with others. As I hope to
show in my discussion of Mandeville, Godwin’s exploration of an affective epistemology
that extends beyond reason corresponds to his attempt to uncover the contingent core that
haunts necessity, such as we saw briefly in Caleb William’s mousetrap scene. That scene
showed a necessary train of events that may unfold along the narrated continuum
between social selves that Godwin calls “magnetical sympathy,” yet it also disclosed in
its initial moment the possibility of a relation that escapes articulation. Necessity’s
intimate connection to social forces, such as appears in ideological narratives, survives
only on the basis of a repression of the contingent core of the relation between antecedent
and consequent.
In Caleb Williams, the social’s appropriation of the force of necessity without the
mystery of necessity amounts to an unjustified influence of the imaginary upon the
material. The transcendent desire for the other, under these terms, is squeezed out in
favour of a more stable sociality predicated upon pre-determined values and narratives. In
Fleetwood, such purely social imaginaries appear in the narratives of Ruffigny and
Macneil. While both men distinguish their worldviews from the explicitly negative one
Fleetwood associates with superficial social contexts such as court life, literary clubs, or
his political work in the senate, they continue to assume the possibility underwriting
Political Justice: that there may be a harmonious reconciliation between our deepest
desires and reason within the social realm. As Steven Bruhm argues, by contrast, “The
novel squarely sets affections and emotions against a rationalist program to demonstrate
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that affections and rationality are always intertwined, mutually defining, and mutually
problematic” (106-107). Conflict, not harmony, characterizes the libidinal dimension of
human relationships for Godwin: whether that conflict is productive or not remains to be
seen. Furthermore, this conflict, to the extent it appears within the imaginary contexts of
sociality and transcendence, reflects at a deeper level the inherently agonistic condition of
materiality.
Like so many Romantic protagonists after Rousseau, Fleetwood grows up in
relation with nature. This harmonious condition, as I have suggested, rapidly unravels as
it is taken up and redeployed within the social. Nevertheless, it seems significant to notice
the formative position transcendent desire occupies in Fleetwood:
I had few companions. The very situation which gave us a full enjoyment
of the beauties of nature, inevitably narrowed both the extent and variety
of our intercourse with our own species. My earliest years were spent
among mountains and precipices, amidst the roaring of the ocean and the
dashing of the waterfall. A constant familiarity with these objects gave a
wildness to ideas, and an uncommon seriousness to my temper. My
curiosity was ardent, and my disposition persevering. (53)
Applying the language of relation and sympathy to the objects of nature rather than to
Fleetwood’s fellow members of society, Godwin articulates a form of attraction (a
“constant familiarity”) that escapes the constraining habitus of what Fleetwood takes as
the “jarring passions of men, their loud contentions, their gross pursuits, their crafty
delusions, their boisterous mirth” (54). From this perspective, the state of nature is a state
of pure selfhood, aligned with the pre-Oedipal stage of the infant in which no break
between it and its mother has yet been encountered. Notably, this immediacy produces a
transcendent desire in the form of “ardent” curiosity that leads Fleetwood to treat not only
animals and landscapes, but ultimately his fellow university students (whom he likewise
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calls “animals, so different from any that had been before presented to my view” [72]) as
objects of “wonder”—a term P. B. Shelley would take up only a few years later in
“Queen Mab.” 15
Although this wonder is short-lived (“It happened in this, as in all cases of a
similar nature, that familiarity annihilated wonder” [72]), it is worth underscoring the fact
that Fleetwood’s intense curiosity about—that is, his transcendent desire for—his fellow
students derives from the unknown quality of “their motives, their propensities, and their
tempers, the passions of their souls, and the occupations of their intellect” (72). Like the
transcendent desire of the student of history in Godwin’s “Of History and Romance,”
who “would follow [the man of history] into his closet” (CW 458), Fleetwood’s curiosity
takes as its initial object the other’s freedom, its contingent elements, its status as
unknown and (as-yet) unwritten. To accomplish this study, Fleetwood asserts that he
must only be “familiar” and not “intimate” with his object; however, as he comes to
realize, such familiarity extinguishes the wonder in a manner intimacy might have
avoided. This familiarity arises through the operation of sympathy so that, if “[i]n Wales,
the end I proposed to myself in my actions was my own approbation; at Oxford, I had
regulated my conduct by the sentiments of others, not those of my own heart” (99).
Unlike the open-ended nature of Fleetwood’s transcendent position at home, the
narratives that direct him at school in his interactions with others are pre-determined and
fixed. As he becomes increasingly entrenched in this social space, Fleetwood discovers
the manner in which the social puts necessity to work accomplishing its purposes.
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The most overtly social spaces explored by the novel after Fleetwood’s time in
university are found in the amorous court life in Paris, the literary club, and Fleetwood’s
work as a senator. I say “overt” because, while I hope to show how these spaces
emphatically correspond to elements of Godwin’s social critique, I also do not want to
suggest their exclusivity. I have already alluded to the amplified social narratives of
figures such as Ruffigny and Macneil—I will return to these figures shortly. In all cases,
the social—as it did in the world of Caleb Williams—aligns itself with a dominant
narrative composed of discrete, possible identities. Thus the societies of Paris into which
Fleetwood is introduced and where he determines to court various women of high station
require that he assume the identity of “un homme à bonnes fortunes,” who is “devoted to
the formation of intrigues” (100). Literalizing the narrative-making dimension of the
social, Fleetwood in this guise “gratuitously ascribed” to his lovers, such as the
Marchioness, “a thousand virtues” (106), inventing via the imagination the very
conditions of sympathy that would enable that sociality to sustain itself. Similarly,
Fleetwood’s participation in a literary club only functions on a surface level, failing to
fully substitute itself for a transcendent desire of the kind he experienced in his youth and
which now made him “the spoiled child of the great parent, Nature” (223). As was also
the case in Paris, the bare narratives of “intrigue” or, in this case, wit, do not yield “the
pleasure I had anticipated” (219). Fleetwood explains the discrepancy: “It might have
answered to the confections which amuse the palate at the end of a feast, but it could
never appease the appetite of him, who feels an uneasy and aching void within, and is in
hot chase for the boon of content” (223). Again, the aesthetic attractiveness of the social
space fails to account for the scope of Fleetwood’s desire. The same can be said for
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Fleetwood’s work as a senator, a position for which, initially at least, he entertained high
hopes. He “enter[s] with awe the walls of the British parliament” (224) and finds his
imagination stirred by “the glorious struggles of our ancestors” (224). Yet again he meets
with disillusionment at the narrowness of what his fellow senators desire: “I saw that
their aim was to thrust the ministers in possession out of office, that they might take their
places” (225). The social’s failure to extend beyond itself only serves to aggravate
Fleetwood’s misanthropy.
Even in the more transcendently inflected social imaginaries offered by Ruffigny
and Macneil, the scope of desire has been radically truncated. While I will explore the
implications of this version of the social in my chapter on Mary Shelley, it suffices to say
that Godwin perceives a similar “aesthetic ideology” to be at work in these deeply
Rousseauian characters. As Gary Handwerk notes, Ruffigny is “a character whose own
life story demonstrates the transformative power of human sympathy and benevolence”
(391). This “transformation” emerges out of a social desire that we might describe as
paternalistic, gesturing towards the dominant narrative themes Ruffigny wishes to impart
to Fleetwood by sharing his story. Thus Ruffigny quotes to his would-be son the selfperpetuating lines Fleetwood’s grandfather had spoken to him: “You belonged to me,
because you belonged to no one else. This is the great distribution of human society;
every one who stands in need of assistance appertains to some one individual, upon
whom he has a stronger claim than upon any other of his fellow-creatures” (195). Like
the magnetic sympathy Caleb experiences for Falkland, which threatens not only to draw
him unwillingly towards his master, but also to interpellate him back into a social
imaginary determined by Falkland’s narrative of honour, Ruffigny aligns an ethics of
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generosity with a narrative about property as the limit of desire. The narrative is effective
yet does not entirely shut out other strands of desire. Thus Fleetwood, backsliding into his
old amorous ways, “confess[es] that at moments Mrs. Comorin never appeared to me so
beautiful as now. I gazed on her with ecstasy; but that very ecstasy was tempestuous, and
interrupted with visions of my father and my father’s friend” (209). The transcendent
desire that Fleetwood now displaces into his more purely erotic desire buckles under the
weight of social expectations about the form his desire should take, resulting in a
strangely Oedipal condition in which Fleetwood experiences this desire only under the
disapproving gaze of his “father and my father’s friend.”
Similarly, in the case of the domestically blissful Macneil, what begins as
Fleetwood’s effort to articulate his transcendent desire turns into yet another sympathetic
relation in which the stable Macneil attempts to call the excessively sensitive Fleetwood
into the social realm. Fleetwood’s request for “the sight of a happy family” (242)
ultimately corresponds to the ineffable desire he describes earlier: “I spent more than
twenty years of my life, continually in search of contentment, which as invariably eluded
my pursuit. […] I wanted something, I knew not what” (233). His admission, “I know not
whether the answer I give to this question [of why he wants to see them], will be or ought
to be satisfactory” (241), indicates the connection between his transcendent desire for
others and the ambiguous desire for this “transient and momentary pleasure” (242) of
seeing a happy family. The problem for Fleetwood is that, rather than the event of “the
happy family,” he is ushered into a social imaginary extended in time and space, which
thus possesses the very narrative restraints and assumptions that have impeded his
transcendent desire thus far. Macneil himself recognizes this when he advises Fleetwood
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about “a conversion or a cure” of his excessive sensibility: “Every man has in him the
seeds of a good husband, a good father, and a sincere friend. You will say, perhaps, these
are not sublime and magnificent virtues; yet, if each man were enabled to discharge these,
the world upon the whole would afford a ravishing spectacle” (248). The heteronormative
narrative Macneil advances further interpellates Fleetwood into a realm that fails (though
it does not acknowledge its limits as “failure”) to account for the full scope of his
desire—indeed, the end result is his catastrophic marriage to Mary.
If the problem for Fleetwood, as Macneil summarizes it, is that “you are too much
alone” (251), then the solution—much as it was for Hume—is to “[s]ubject yourself to
the law of associating with your fellow-men […] You will be a million times the better
and the happier for it” (255). This entrance into society also involves, from Macneil’s
perspective, a marriage, which will exercise Fleetwood’s innate relational capacities by
forcing him to “please” and “sympathize” with another person different from him not
only in sex, but also in age. (Macneil foreshadows unwittingly the dire consequences of
this relation in his violent image of “grafting a young shoot upon your venerable trunk”
[254]). Yet, in an ironic reversal of David Hume’s image in the Treatise of the solitary’s
safe arrival on the shores of sociality, Macneil and his family (apart from Mary) perish in
a shipwreck. Without Macneil’s strong personality to sustain the social narrative into
which Fleetwood has imaginatively and legally projected himself, the strands of
transcendent desire resurface via a materiality that this social narrative had attempted to
circumvent.
Shortly after their marriage, for example, Fleetwood shows Mary his favourite
room and Mary asks that he give it to her. Notably, he immediately says that he will,
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ventriloquizing an appropriate response that he locates within a discourse of domestic
sacrifice: “Shall I think this too great a sacrifice, who would offer up my life for you? It
is no sacrifice! I have more joy in considering the things I love as yours, than in regarding
them as my own” (293). Yet violently running up against his attempts to maintain the
social imaginary of a certain kind of marriage is Fleetwood’s accompanying material
response. Although he says nothing to Mary, his confessional narrative describes his
inner turmoil in detail: “[m]y sensations at this moment were of a singular and
complicated nature” (292). This encounter with his “sensations” leads Fleetwood to a
realization about the limits of sympathy, which reside in the subjective experience of
necessity:
No man can completely put himself in the place of another, and conceive
how he would feel, were the circumstances of that other his own: few can
do it even in a superficial degree. We are so familiar with our own trains
of thinking: we resolve them with such complacency: it appears to us, that
there is so astonishing a perverseness in not seeing things as we see them!
(295)
While Fleetwood hardly takes his own insight to heart, the necessitarian language of “our
own trains of thinking” suggests that he recognizes the contingent as appearing in “the
place of another.”
The difficulty or impossibility of entering into this “place,” as Fleetwood
observes, and realizing an unmediated relation to the other stems from its inextricable
lodgment within social narratives of marriage, gender, and decorum. This encryption
reproduces Fleetwood’s longstanding misanthropy, which he aligns with an accusation
levied against his past self: “He who flies from all contradiction, must dwell alone, or
dwell with those to whom he never opens his soul” (304). To “fly from contradiction,”
yet continue to dwell with others, as he does, produces a restless negativity such as we
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have also seen in Falkland. (Here we may find another difference in the misanthropic
character of Bethlem Gabor: he seems, until he encounters St. Leon, to live only apart
from society). Such restless negativity—as Kristeva has noted—is not simply an absence
or void within the Symbolic order; rather, it is productive in its own right. 16 In an
extremely bizarre scene that follows Fleetwood’s abandonment of Mary, this semiotic
value finds full expression and a connection to the material dimension of being-together.
Fleetwood closes himself within a room containing wax figures representing
Mary and his nephew, Kenrick. This deliberate simulacrum of his paranoid imagination
about his wife’s infidelity takes on a life of its own in an important way: when Fleetwood
least expects it, “while I was still speaking, I saw her move—if I live, I saw it. She turned
her eyes this way and that; she grinned and chattered at me. I looked from her to the other
figure; that grinned and chattered too” (387). The scene of madness is still contained
within a social imaginary—after all, Gifford’s henchman is posted at the door to the
room. (Gifford functions as one more representative of the social, despite his countersocial tendencies: he is seeking, like Holloway in Mandeville, upward mobility within the
social realm). Nevertheless, despite this containment, which perpetuates the social frame,
the scene succeeds in gesturing at the same encrypted kernel of unexpected transcendent
desire as appears in Caleb Williams’s mousetrap scene.
Fleetwood’s momentary shift into the present tense, describing his shock at
having seen the wax figure of his wife move (“if I live, I saw it”), discloses a desire for
the other’s freedom and forms an unanticipated relation igniting the ruinous madness that
16

In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva writes: “Negativity constitutes the logical impetus beneath
the thesis of negation and that of the negation of negation, but is identical to neither since it is, instead, the
logical functioning of the movement that produces the theses” (109). The implication is further that
“negativity prevents the immobilization of the thetic, unsettles doxy, and lets in all the semiotic motility
that prepares and exceeds it” (113).
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follows. His “grinning and chattering” wife and the similarly behaving faux-Kenrick
open a space, beginning with the Other, into which Fleetwood also enters. Furthermore,
far from being a social space, it is material on several levels. Rather than speech, the trio
communicates in “murmurs, and hissings, and lowings, and howls” (388). This
movement into non-signifying (and thus non-imaginary) forms of expression becomes
increasingly prevalent as Fleetwood enters into his fury, violently destroying the room.
Like the cattle in Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts, who fill the “whole world” with
their “dumb yearning” (96) and thereby reveal the Dionysian underside of that novel’s
central scene of the Apollonian pageant, Fleetwood’s becoming-animal rejects the
socializing imaginary in favour of a material vehicle that carries a transcendent
significance.
But this disclosure is short-lived, or perhaps instantaneous: following this
outburst, he falls again under Gifford’s constraining influence. 17 Such provisionality is
suggestive once more of the common thread throughout Godwin’s analysis of the
transcendent desire for which sympathy fails to account. The pervasiveness of the social,
embedded in the very form of narrative itself, affects every expression of transcendent
desire in Godwin’s view so that the contingent moments, such as the one Fleetwood
experiences at the limit of his hyper-social ritual of misanthropy, can barely be
distinguished. Just as Caleb’s magnetic sympathy follows without interruption from the
indeterminate moment of his “fe[eling] what it was that I had done,” the reality of social
enframing refuses any return to a more transcendent desire. The ultimate tendency even
17

Notably, however, some after-effect of his transcendent desire remains: “I always opened [Gifford’s]
letters with vehement emotion; a strange expectation still lingered about me, that I should find the accused
parties innocent” (388-89). This action above all confirms his re-assimilation within the social, as he reverts
to the hope that he will discover a satisfaction to his transcendent desire in the very words of the social
narrator.
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of madness to be recaptured within this socializing drive to find sympathy is one of the
key discoveries Godwin makes in his fourth novel, Mandeville.

Mandeville: Madness and Community
If Fleetwood offered the inner voice of a misanthrope for the first time in
Godwin’s writing, then Mandeville, by extension, elaborates much more completely the
sources—and thus the implications—of this prioritized misanthropic sensibility.
Mandeville’s miraculous escape from the massacre of the Ulster rebellion in the arms of
his nurse, Judith, sets the stage for a conflict between the social desire of the “bigot[ed]”
British and a transcendent desire exemplified in Judith’s heartrending exclamation, “Kill
me, cut me to pieces, but do not ye, do not ye, be so barbarous as to put me away from
him, and leave me alive. My child! my child! my child!” (22). Introjecting his nurse’s
desire for him, Mandeville harbours an ongoing interest in the oppressed or rejected:
from Judith (in retrospect), to his uncle Audley, to the coward Waller at Winchester
College who proves the source of so much grief, he repeatedly takes the side of society’s
outcasts. Yet he has also introjected the oppressive social desire of his British
compatriots—in the first place, through the anti-Catholicism of his tutor, Hilkiah
Bradford, and also through his privileged situation as the heir of an aristocrat. 18 The
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Notably, both of these contexts are themselves inwardly unstable. For instance, despite Hilkiah’s staunch
anti-Catholic Protestantism, his Calvinism has him teach a doctrine of total depravity (to be applied,
presumably, universally), which suggests to Mandeville “that the most ragged and shivering beggar stood
an equal chance with myself, to receive the most exalted marks of divine favour in the kingdom of heaven
[…] a person of the most loathsome and offensive appearance might, in the sight of God, be among the
excellent of the earth, and be ranked by omniscience with his most chosen saints” (55). While Mandeville
“should have been content” if this doctrine had remained merely “as words” (55), that is, as an idea, the
fact that Hilkiah makes a point of connecting Mandeville’s moral defects with the doctrine renders it more
than just an abstraction. This material inflection gives the idea a weight that clashes with Mandeville’s
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implication of this psychical conflict for Mandeville is a profound misanthropy
characterized by an arrogant certainty about his rightful place in society and a
bewilderment at his inability to arrive there. The first-person narration of the novel
locates this incommensurability at the heart of the plot, drawing attention to the
contingent core of necessity in a more direct way than any of Godwin’s other novels thus
far. Yet, as I will show in closing, the novel also indicates Godwin’s ultimate pessimism
about the possibility of transcendent desire.
A brief consideration of Mandeville’s first personal encounter with this
contingency at Winchester College may serve to draw the interoperation of these
elements to the surface. At this school, Mandeville’s “unsociableness of nature” (96) and
“self-centred and untameable pride” (97) lead him to reject the ideal representative of
society, Clifford, and to be attracted instead to one to whom he feels he may condescend,
the son of Sir William Waller. When a book of anti-monarchy prints appears and Waller
shifts the blame from himself to his only friend, Mandeville, the prefects of the college,
led by Clifford, call both Waller and Mandeville to a trial—an important setting, as we
have seen, that appears throughout Godwin’s writings. 19 The call prompts a series of
responses in Mandeville that press upon his psychic conflict in different ways. In the first
place, before he fully comprehends the circumstances of the trial, he finds himself in the
stable locus of social sympathy: “I looked upon Waller, and saw that he was extremely
distressed; he turned pale, and was scarcely able to support himself. I pitied him from my
soul” (99). Waller’s unanticipated accusation, however, interrupts the inevitability of this
social understanding. Furthermore, Hilkiah’s fascination with martyrs and his general religious enthusiasm
often suggests a transcendent desire perverted within the social form of his anti-Catholicism.
19
Tilottama Rajan writes that “judgment is at the heart of the Novel as socialization and normalization”
(xxii) and suggests that “[t]he mousetrap scene [in Caleb Williams] is the prototype for the trial of
judgment” (137).
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social narrative, shocking Mandeville into a realization not only of Waller’s own free act,
but also of the threat the social narrative poses to his own freedom: “‘By me!’ I uttered an
interjection of astonishment merely.—But what an age of experience and horror was in
that moment communicated to me!” (99). This bewilderment gets reinscribed into his
misanthropic narrative as a counter-social circumstance within which he may mobilize
anew his freedom, if only in a perverted sense. As Emmanuel Levinas writes, freedom is
the condition “to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all
eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside—to receive nothing, or
to be free” (43). 20 This desire for freedom, for Mandeville as it was for Caleb and
Falkland, entails the freedom to plot one’s own narrative and is therefore generally
distinct from the anti-narrative of transcendent desire. Thus Mandeville convinces
himself that “there was something gallant, that at this time suited my savage temper, in
braving the imputation of guilt, when secretly in the chambers of my own heart, I knew
that I was innocent, and more than innocent. It accorded with the disdain which, without
yet knowing why, I entertained for my species” (103).
Nevertheless, in the process of setting up these narratives against each other,
Mandeville discovers a lingering effect of the original transcendent desire implicated in
his misanthropy: namely, his potential for madness. Following his indictment by Clifford
and the others, Mandeville’s misanthropy therefore enters a new phase as it shifts from
the necessitarian version embodied by Bethlem Gabor into the much less stable variety

20

In this statement, Levinas posits freedom as a product of the narrative “that neutraliz[es] the other and
encompass[es] him” (43). Freedom only becomes the transcendent desire that Levinas describes as “the
Desire for exteriority” (82) when freedom, “instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary
and violent” (84). At no point does Mandeville feel this about himself—unlike Fleetwood, for whom his
often self-defensive memoirs are still a “confession”—and this suggests the entangled position within the
social realm that I will argue he claims for himself in the closing paragraphs of the novel.
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exemplified by Fleetwood—an extreme sensibility that agents of the social, such as
Gifford or Mallison, cannot ultimately control. Even the more ambiguous (because
explicitly “good”) representatives of the social, such as Marguerite or Henrietta, cannot
tame these excesses because of their reliance upon moral narrative structures that cannot
accommodate the contingent character of madness. Mandeville reflects upon the material
dimension of this new phase in particular:
It will hardly be thought how fierce a havock this event made with my
constitution. It was exactly as if an envenomed arrow had entered my
flesh. My blood boiled within me. The whole surface of my body burned,
so that every one that approached me, and touched my flesh, suddenly
snatched away his hand, as if it had been scorched with fire. I was in a
raging fever. […] My agonies, and the distress both of my mind and body,
were insupportable. (104-105)
Misanthropy occurs when the oppressive mechanisms of the social turn upon the
transcendent desire that compelled social desire in the first place. Furthermore, if
misanthropy is itself a form of social desire, then, as I explored in the previous chapter,
the ghostly remainder of the evanished transcendent desire for the other may be found
haunting the material vehicle of desire itself.
Godwin works out the relational implications of Mandeville’s misanthropy in his
protagonist’s fraught relationships with his rival, Clifford, and sister, Henrietta. While
Mandeville marked Clifford out as an antagonist following the injustice at Winchester
College, his enmity with Clifford takes on a transcendent significance following the
latter’s usurpation of the position of secretary to Sir Joseph Wagstaff, which Colonel
Penruddock had attempted to secure for Mandeville. Initially, entering his “first scene
upon the theatre of real life,” Mandeville describes his “joy at the attention and partiality
I had […] experienced” (120). This joy corresponds to a sense of necessity working itself
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out in his favour and of the social somehow supporting his desires. When this is
obstructed (notably, by the inherently oppressive mechanisms of the social itself, as we
see in Wagstaff’s bigoted dismissal of Mandeville based upon his Presbyterianism), the
material remainder of that transcendent desire surfaces upon his body. His earlier
encounter with Clifford predominantly remained within a social register, as it is a case of
his alternative social imaginary of privilege and condescension running up against the
democratic one advanced by his rival: he accepts an unjust punishment out of sympathy
for the guilty Waller. The second catastrophe with Clifford, however, unfolds without
recourse to such an alternative social. In the first place, he is no longer able to function
within the social scene that Clifford attempts to maintain with his apology; instead, “I
stammered and grew inarticulate. My voice faltered; my colour changed. I felt a film
come before my eyes, that I could see no object distinctly” (125). Yet this failure within
the social becomes a success, according to Mandeville’s retrospective gaze, within a
different kind of relational contest. When Clifford follows Mandeville out to attempt his
apology again, he encounters the horror of Mandeville’s face and “the sight of the
passions that were working in it. His hand, which had been extended to grasp mine, fell
nerveless, like a dead thing, to his side” (126). The realm of the social imaginary that
Clifford is able to navigate so easily and smoothly dissolves in the harsh light of the
material effects of Mandeville’s mad hatred.
While such imaginaries prove ultimately to be inescapable and re-surface
inevitably following such an interruption, the material event that momentarily interrupts
the dominating social narrative is significant for the Romantics precisely because of the
way it opens up the possibility of alternative imaginaries. As Mandeville says following
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this scene, “the passion of Clifford, beautiful as it was, sunk into nothing, before the eddy
and whirlwind of mine” (126). In his retort to Clifford, Mandeville articulates this
sublime passion as a refusal to relate, “Kindness! keep it, keep it to yourself! Hug it to
your heart, and applaud yourself that you have so much humanity, and so much
friendship! I will not hear you! I never will hear you more!” (125); however, as he
reflects on the success of this declaration, he emphasizes the bond that draws him and his
rival together. This bond may be characterized by a lack of communication, yet the
disillusionment Mandeville has just experienced seems also to open a space for imagining
a togetherness based upon such a refusal to engage with another.
For instance, in the scene that follows, Mandeville recounts his strange friendship
with the son of Sir George Lisle (a famous royalist leader killed in 1648 and discussed
elsewhere by Godwin in his History of the Commonwealth). 21 Like Mandeville, Lisle has
acquired a melancholic disposition from his unfortunate circumstances. Together, they
form a relationship in which “we would sit silent together for hours, like what I have
heard of a Quakers’ meeting; and then, suddenly seized with that passion for change
which is never utterly extinguished in the human mind, would cry out as by mutual
impulse, Come, now let us curse a little!” (129). Yet, despite this strange relational
accord, they never realize their proposed “misanthropical club, where the knot that bound
the members together, and the feature that they held in common, should be a disappointed
and embittered spirit” (132), because they retain an aesthetic desire—“a refinement of
taste, and elegance of sentiment” (132)—that impedes them from choosing additional
members. Thus their refusal to include others implies that they retain an entirely different
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See Volume 2, Chapter 18, and Volume 3, Chapter 3, for Godwin’s discussions of the last stand and
deaths of George Lisle and Charles Lucas.
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goal than sociality. The shared practice of silence and cursing does not represent an
interaction between Mandeville and Lisle; rather, it is an attempt by both parties to
encompass the whole, to incorporate the outside within themselves. 22 When they part
ways, Mandeville alludes to this shared dark space: “Misanthropy at least, the God that I
worship, is the gainer [of our parting]. You hate me, because I am calumniated; and I hate
you because you are unjust. The hatred that existed this morning, has spread its empire
wider, and has gained two additional subjects to exercise itself upon” (138). Although
they are no longer in society with each other, their mutual hatred has fortified the nonrelation that appears as misanthropy within the social. Similarly, the apology that Clifford
offers is hardly necessary or effective because what Mandeville wants is not unity, but to
be indistinguishably part of a totalizing relational ontology that would encompass both of
their subjectivities. 23
While Mandeville feels he has gained the upper hand in his moment of rage
against Clifford, partly because the contingent freedom he expresses in his body
successfully stands against what Clifford thinks is the necessity implicit in the social
narrative of reconciliation, the novel is more generally interested in the social’s strategies
for sublimating this freedom. In this way, it continues to explore issues raised initially in
Political Justice and Caleb Williams. Thus, in the scene in which Henrietta attempts to
unite her brother to her secret betrothed, Clifford, Mandeville is forced not only to
relinquish his hatred of his rival in exchange for some indistinct promise that he “may
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As Mandeville remarks, he is unable to utter Clifford’s name, despite knowing that such an utterance
would have ensured that “I should have become a different man; I should have been lightened” (133), and
this inability gestures at the spectre of desire that continues to haunt him. If he had been able to exorcise
that name, he implies here, then he might have successfully articulated the totality he wished to encompass
with his cursing.
23
See Jean-Luc Nancy’s description, mentioned in Chapter 1 above, of “le semblable” (Inoperative 34).
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reasonably expect that the world will reward my generosity” (163), but also to submit to a
public airing of his lost reputation. He is aware of the primary effect of this attempt by
the social to reintegrate its narrative:
The time had been, when the bare mention of this name [of Sir Joseph
Wagstaff], and that as the prelude to a story, and before so numerous and
respectable a company, would have driven the colour from my cheek, and
have deprived me at once of speech, of hearing and sight; I should by
turns have glowed like fire, and been covered from head to foot with a
deathlike dew. (165)
Yet, in the face of this material possibility, Mandeville “show[s] that [he] can endure
what requires much fortitude to endure” by requesting himself that Clifford tell the story
of his exploits with Wagstaff. Significantly, the effect of this deliberate capitulation is to
aggravate that momentarily suppressed transcendent desire into a full-blown madness.
Following Clifford’s account, Mandeville finds that he cannot stay and discovers—in a
description that plays upon the elements of his name, Man-Devil—that “I was but half a
demon, when I came out at the park-gate, and set my first step into the forest. But now
my better angel, my new-found virtue, was driven from my side as with a puff of wind;
and Mandeville was himself again” (172). Having undergone “a vehement and a terrible
effort” to “suppress my nature,” Mandeville discovers that, “in proportion to the exertions
that it had cost me, was the vehemence of the recoil” (173). He had bent his transcendent
desire in a perverse manner to serve social expectations; upon breaking the bounds of this
exertion, however, that desire expresses itself as madness.
Because this scene of madness occurs outside the social (beyond “the park gate”),
it cannot serve as an effective example of how madness can produce dark sympathy. A
striking example of madness erupting in proximity to the social, however, occurs near the
end of the novel during Mandeville’s conversation with Henrietta. He has discovered the
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news of what he sees as her betrayal in becoming engaged to Clifford and attempts to use
(what he sees as) “reason” against her. As we have seen in Godwin’s other work, on the
success or failure of this venture depends his inclusion within the social realm: Henrietta
has resolved to align herself only with her brother if she is able to dispute the Montagus’
charge of madness. At first, she finds “no touch of insanity” and the positive implication
is immediately clear to Mandeville: “Henrietta, who was the jewel of the earth to me, and
to whom all the rest of the world was only the crust and the setting, was mine. Her heart
was mine” (315). In his discovery of Henrietta’s sympathetic response to his use of
reason, however, Mandeville’s sanity slips upon the momentary elision of a social
narrative by the transcendent desire he has for his sister. His language of property traces
the edge of the social, remaining within its bounds, even as its semiotic implications,
reflected in his “energy unbounded, and the deepest pathos” (315), push him towards a
radical break with the social. His “soul was wrought too high; and the cord by which
every thing that was dear to me was suspended, could hold no longer” (315). Unlike other
incidents in which Mandeville’s madness helps to preserve his transcendent desire within
the social, this moment of an intense desire for the other—not in her freedom, but as a
totalized and restricted object—prompts a madness that casts him out of the social
altogether. That is, the madness follows from the totalizing desire that he feels for
Henrietta in his moment of social relation with her. And yet, as we have seen in other
social expulsions, Mandeville’s sojourn outside the social is only temporary: the novel
itself, which he has written retrospectively, stands as a testament to his return.
Indeed, the closing pages of Mandeville reveal that our narrator’s entire account
follows from an act of violence that has forever bound him to the social realm wherein
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Clifford is the chief representative – at least from Mandeville’s perspective. With
Clifford’s act, in which he blinds his brother-in-law in one eye and leaves a long wound
“full across my eye and my left cheek: it descended even to my lips” (324), Mandeville
discovers not only a perverse form of being-with Clifford, but also the meaning of his
own traumatized story. 24 In Unclaimed Experience, Cathy Caruth connects traumatic
experience with the “striking juxtaposition of the unknowing, injurious repetition and the
witness of the crying voice” (3). These two elements of repetition and witness inform her
understanding of history as itself traumatic: an “oscillation” “between the story of the
unbearable nature of an event and the story of the unbearable nature of its survival” (7).
Caruth insists that “trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original event in an
individual’s past” (4), but rather that the traumatic experience is itself this disturbing
encounter with what cannot be known or assimilated into experience. Caruth’s analysis of
trauma illuminates all the more forcefully this experience of Being arrested or paralyzed
in the realm of becoming. Trauma, as the reverberation of a forgotten encounter with
“unexpected reality—the locus of referentiality” (Caruth 6), offers itself as both a
potentially viable representation of alterity—what Caruth describes as “the very
possibility and surprise of listening to another’s wound” (8)—and the horrible realization
of representation’s ongoing inadequacy to alterity. Thus when Mandeville declares, in
closing his narrative, that the wound functions “as a token that I was [Clifford’s] for
ever” (325), he draws attention not only to the larger significance of the act, but to its
essential, concealed role in the production of the narrative we have just finished reading.

24

As Jean-Luc Nancy points out, this phrasing may draw too strong a distinction between the two
conditions: “Whether it is aware of it or not, the contemporary discourse on meaning […] brings to light the
fact that ‘meaning,’ used in this absolute way, has become the bared [dénudé] name of our being-with-oneanother” (Being Singular Plural 1).

162
Indeed, the possibility that the entire novel is an extended attempt on
Mandeville’s part to transform his acute material experience into something textual—and
therefore amenable to the social imaginary—gains support in the strange philological
exercise that follows his description of the violent act.
My wound is of that sort, which in the French civil wars got the name of
une balafre. I have pleased myself, in the fury and bitterness of my soul,
with tracing the whole force of that word. It is cicatrix luculenta, a glazed,
or shining scar, like the effect of a streak of varnish upon a picture.
Balafré I find explained by Girolamo Vittori, by the Italian word
smorfiato; and this again—I mean the noun, smorfia—is decided by ‘the
resolute’ John Florio, to signify ‘a blurting or mumbing, a mocking or
push with one’s mouth’. The explanation of these lexicographers is
happily suited to my case, and the mark I for ever carry about with me.
(325)
At one level, this teasing out of the semiotics of his wound allows Mandeville to move
beyond the merely horrific: “When I first looked in my glass, and saw my face, once
more stripped of its tedious dressings, I thought I never saw any thing so monstrous”
(325). He has therefore “trac[ed] the whole force” of the word he uses to describe his scar
in order to narrate himself more completely into the social imaginary he retrospectively
appears to have sought all along: a world in which Clifford is tyrant. Useful for
understanding Mandeville’s pursuit of a vocabulary suitable to his predicament is Martin
Heidegger’s reading of the poet Stefan George’s line, “Where word breaks off no thing
may be.” Heidegger writes that “the poet has experienced that only the word makes a
thing appear as the thing it is, and thus lets it be present” (“The Nature of Language” 65).
Mandeville’s philological exuberance in this closing paragraph marks his attempt to
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make the thing [das Ding], which is to say the relational determination between him and
Clifford, appear. 25
Thus the word that Mandeville uses in the first instance, une balafre, links him
with the French Civil Wars (which Pamela Clemit suggests “[p]robably refer[s] to the
French Wars of Religion 1562-98” [325n.b]), echoing his own sense of religious struggle
with Clifford. The deliberateness of Mandeville’s diction finds further support in his
reference to cicatrix luculenta, which late seventeenth-century dictionaries such as the
Dictionnaire Nouveau François-Latin (1689) connect with “balafre” (90). 26 His choice of
simile, suggesting that the scar is “like the effect of a streak of varnish upon a picture,”
underplays the martial context from which the phrase derives and instead enables him to
locate himself in the place of the unjustly injured victim—vandalized, in effect, by
Clifford’s attempts to restore him. Anthony Jarrells similarly interprets this reference as
an attempt to express how Clifford’s weapon “tarnishes the picture painted by the
conniving lawyer Holloway, by Mandeville, by Godwin himself” (28).
Returning to “balafré,” Mandeville attempts to produce a more complete
European philology for his wound, and therefore a more complete synchronic history for
his relation with Clifford, by passing from French into Italian and then finally into
English. The scholastic tone of this passage especially, exemplified by the parenthetical
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Heidegger describes how “the Old High German word thing means a gathering, and specifically a
gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a contested matter” (“The Thing” 172). Yet the
philological turn Heidegger makes in tracing “thing” (in the conventional sense, a material object) to “an
affair or matter of pertinence” (that is, a social context) is itself problematic in ways Mandeville’s closing
speech discloses.
26
The Latin phrase appears to originate in the seventh of Cicero’s Philippics, a speech in which he
criticizes Mark Antony’s brutality, “After having equipped his own companion and intimate friend in the
armor of a Thracian, he slew the miserable man as he was flying; but he himself received a palpable
wound, as the scar proves” (7.17; in Latin, the italicized portion reads: “…luculentam tamen ipse plagam
accepit, ut declarat cicatrix”). In this context, the wound draws attention to the horrific violence of its
bearer, perhaps a much more accurate description of the circumstances in the novel.
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moment in which Mandeville corrects himself (“…smorfiato; and this again—I mean the
noun, smorfia—is decided by ‘the resolute’ John Florio, to signify…” [325]), further
highlights the irony implicit in his attempt to narrate his horrific material experience. Yet
the irony is lost on Mandeville, as he appears in the closing lines really to believe his own
textual self-fashioning. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest in the final sentence an
analogy between Clifford’s defensive act and what he describes as the manner in which
“certain tyrannical planters in the West Indies have set a brand with a red-hot iron upon
the negroes they have purchased, to denote that they are irremediably a property” (325).
Such an analogy, not only deeply incommensurate with Mandeville’s actual situation, is
also an attempt to overlook the way Clifford’s violence reveals the transcendent desire
these rivals share. For, unlike the slaves, forced and constrained to act as commodities
within the modern British economic system, Mandeville’s encounter with Clifford
involves a degree of will. Although he sees himself as a victim, the violent signature
Clifford has given him represents the best possible outcome for Mandeville’s
misanthropy, as it allows him to express materially both the catastrophic results of his
transcendent desire (thereby preserving it) and his social desire, which lends him a firm
identity confirmed through the social sanction of sympathy.
Thus, to take up once more the final paragraph of Mandeville in closing this
chapter, we find in Mandeville’s attempt to trace a monumental change in his lifeexperience the crux of a struggle that Godwin has already explored many times: “Before,
to think of Clifford was an act of the mind, and an exercise of the imagination; he was not
there, but my thoughts went on their destined errand, and fetched him; now I bore
Clifford and his injuries perpetually about with me” (325). Mandeville, like his fellow
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misanthropes, finds the realization of his transcendent desire obstructed by a social
narrative that cannot be circumvented. Yet he discovers a possible “bastard course,” to
borrow Derrida’s phrase for reading against the dialectical grain, 27 in the experience of a
contingent representation: “Every time my eye accidentally caught my mirror, I saw
Clifford, and the cruel heart of Clifford, branded into me” (325). Misrecognizing himself
repeatedly, he experiences a kind of conversion (as we also see indicated in his
description of “b[earing] Clifford and his injuries perpetually about with me,” which
alludes to 2 Corinthians 4:10, where St. Paul describes the Christian as “[a]lways bearing
about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made
manifest in our body”) and perverse identification with his one-time rival. 28 This marks a
bifurcation in time, as he says, “My situation was not like what it had hitherto been”
(325). With Clifford’s stroke, a completely new hermeneutical dimension gets layered
over the preceding three volumes so that the reader perceives the profound effect of
Mandeville’s past-tense voice throughout the novel. This outcome is not a
straightforward capitulation to the social; rather, it reveals how the misanthrope organizes
his necessary entrenchment within the social in such a way that forms of transcendent
desire can still find paths (albeit twisted ones) to expression.

This struggle to escape or resist the social, without any sense that such a thing
could be possible, characterizes all of Godwin’s writing. In his early reflections on
sympathy, he pinpoints its double-edged character: as something at once necessary to

27

See Derrida, Glas 6.
Tilottama Rajan introduces this term, “perverse identification,” in a number of contexts, including
Romantic Narrative (136), where she uses it to describe Falkland’s stubborn commitment to taking
Alexander as a model.

28
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human happiness and yet also implicated in power-systems that confound that happiness.
Hoping to attend to the desire for an unmediated relation to others with an appeal to
justice, Godwin attempts to undermine the purely mimetic functions in sympathy (which
make it so amenable to the sharing of mere opinion) by positing a transcendent
conception of reason as the catalyst of human action. As we see in Caleb Williams
especially, however, transcendent reason is extremely susceptible to social influence.
Godwin’s efforts to discern an expressive mode for that transcendent desire begin in the
novel’s exposition of the differences between necessity and contingency.
Using Political Justice and Caleb Williams, I have shown how Godwin aligns
sympathetic narratives with a certain deployment of reason: namely, one that promotes
necessity without acknowledging its inscrutable, material, and therefore contingent core.
In matters of identity and relational desire, this reliance upon narrative corresponds to
what I have called the “social desire” for the other, which in the eighteenth century
appears primarily under the guise of sympathy. Against this sympathizing social subject,
Godwin posits a figure—first in Falkland, but even more extensively in subsequent
novels—whose desire for identity and relation exceeds the bounds of narrative: the
misanthrope. If Bethlem Gabor reminds us of the misanthrope’s ongoing position within
the social realm, then Godwin’s other major misanthropes (Fleetwood and Mandeville)
demonstrate the function of madness in disclosing the misanthrope’s repressed
transcendent desire. Sympathy relies upon causal narratives to effect a relation in society.
Social desire is reasonable precisely in the commonsensical way that Hume and Smith
understand it to be reasonable. It must avoid the inscrutable element that Descartes
discovers for reason and which Hume ultimately rejects. The desire that circulates within

167
the social realm is thus characterized by the necessary relationship of cause and effect;
misanthropic desire, when it is able to escape this economy momentarily and express
itself, appears as madness. Godwin shows the complicity of narrative in reinscribing
social desire, yet also the inextricable quality of social desire as it inevitably seems to
return following the failure of transcendent desire.
Godwin believes that the experience and operation of sympathy is central to the
human condition. This centrality, however, makes it dangerously susceptible to external
direction or manipulation. Even under an ostensibly “rational” protocol such as we see in
Hume, sympathy also fails to account for the full scope of our desire for the other.
Godwin’s reaction to the problems inhering in sympathy represents one important
response in which the social desire of sympathy comes to be viewed as traumatic, yet
unavoidable. The transcendent desire Godwin has his Rousseauian misanthropes display
must ultimately fail or be repressed or displaced within a constricting social framework,
precisely because of the conflicting desires of human experience. Godwin’s contribution
is to explore the extreme expressions of this conflict in order to discern the ongoing
possibility of justice in the face of the stability and security of government. For Godwin’s
friend and one-time disciple, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the transcendent is what makes
the social – in its best sense – possible. Thus the task of the desiring subject is to uncover
this transcendent core that has become increasingly occluded by society in its present
state. This view undergoes substantial revision over the course of Coleridge’s career, as
he both discovers the necessary implication of materiality within transcendent desire and
the insurmountable difficulties this poses to the possibility of community. Drawing upon
mechanisms of sympathy in his earlier work, Coleridge attempts to extrapolate its
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resonances into a worldview of a fundamental harmony. This conception, however,
cannot survive the physical and social disruptions he experiences over the ensuing years,
leading to an attenuation of transcendent desire in his thought. Nevertheless, as with the
other authors studied here, this attenuation is not also a rejection. Instead, the appeal of
dark sympathy leads them to retain a space for such desire, even in its apparent
impossibility.
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CHAPTER FOUR
“And art thou nothing?”: The Fragility of Transcendent Desire in
Coleridge’s Life and Poetry

I may not call thee mortal then, my soul!
Immortal longings lift thee to the skies:
Love of thy native home inflames thee now
With pious madness wise.
— from Coleridge’s 1793 Cambridge Prize Greek Ode,
translated by Robert Southey

William Godwin’s response to the limitations of the social was partly to show
how transcendent desire drew upon figures of materiality – violence, trauma, and
madness – to assert itself in spite of these constraints. For Godwin’s friend and
sometimes critic, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, this response abandoned hope in the social
too quickly. Although he also recognizes how social sympathy fails to account for the
total scope of human desire, Coleridge spends much of his life attempting to find a way
to integrate transcendent desire with his belief in the possibilities of social forms. As was
the case for Godwin, however, Coleridge’s literary inquiries into transcendent desire
encounter an inscrutable force that prompts him repeatedly to develop alternative
strategies for managing this integration. This force – materiality – is the resistance and
affective friction that accompanies every attempt to develop an imaginary framework for
expressing transcendent desire. While his early work attempts to mitigate this by
reinforcing transcendent desire in the form of an ideal rather than something more fluid
and capacious, his later writings’ more sustained reflections on the impact of materiality
refuse him this option. Instead, Coleridge ultimately endeavours to articulate the
conditions that might permit transcendent desire to unfold, not as a sympathy for the
other that would form the basis of a new kind of society, but as a darkly sympathetic
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event, signaling the persistence of community in spite of an overwhelming sense of
dejection. 1
In this chapter, I will begin by exploring a key example of Coleridge’s initial
attempt at integrating desire from early in his career: the pantisocratic schema he
developed with Robert Southey, which would have seen them travel to America to
establish a commune of universal egalitarianism. By tracing the rise and fall of this
imaginary, I want to introduce Coleridge’s particular configuration of the dynamics of
social and transcendent desires. Pantisocracy represents an attempt to establish social
conditions capable of supporting an ideal vision of community as characterized by
proximity between its members, proximity to nature, and the absence of mediating
systems or structures. At least in its initial conception, it is a vehicle for expressing a
transcendent desire for the other. Its failure foreshadows similar obstacles Coleridge will
face in developing that transcendent desire more fully in his poetry. Thus I will follow up
this section with a closer examination of the nature and operation of transcendent desire
in his “conversation poems,” where Coleridge attempts to articulate the object of this
desire as a relationship or harmony that serves as the condition for the possibility of all
things. While this anterior relation is sometimes called “the one Life” in his writing (and
in critical discussions of his early philosophy), I am interested in detailing a broader
understanding of transcendent desire, which encompasses the one Life, yet also goes
beyond it. My reason for taking this approach is to chart a longer trajectory for the
development of Coleridge’s thinking on desire, which extends far beyond the
conversation poems to permeate other examples of his work, including “Christabel”
1

As I have suggested elsewhere, I am deploying “community” in the sense Jean-Luc Nancy uses, taking it
as a largely non-intentional proximity that forms relation by virtue of nothing greater than a sharing in
Being.
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(1797, 1802) and his later poetry. Pantisocracy and the one Life describe in different
ways an orientation to the other as universal and therefore inclusive even of the desiring
self. Jean-Luc Nancy’s description of being singular plural is helpful for elaborating
Coleridge’s view: “Being is put into play among us; it does not have any other meaning
except the dis-position of this ‘between’” (27). By positing this anterior relation as the
ultimate object of both Coleridge’s political schema (in its nascent form) and his
philosophy, it becomes possible to assess its role in his subsequent work as well.
This assessment is complicated by Coleridge’s growing sense of what I have been
calling “materiality.” In both pantisocracy and his early conversation poems, Coleridge
attempts to negotiate a place for his transcendent desire within the constraints of the
social. Yet he also encounters less manageable obstacles. These obstacles take the form
of prominent interruptions to the narratives (or imaginaries) of desire Coleridge
constructs for himself; like Paul de Man’s “prosaic materiality of the letter,” these events
of alterity not only force Coleridge to shift his narrative into a more explicitly
transcendent (and, by extension, artificial) register, but also draw attention to the
narrative itself as narrative. As I discussed in Chapter 2, sympathy is limited in its
capacity to narrate or represent the experience of another person or of the self. That
which lies beyond this capacity is a materiality that social forms cannot account for. An
example of such an event might include Coleridge’s encounter with the paradox of
Southey’s desire to retain servants in the pantisocracy, which leads in part to the
schema’s breakdown. Generally, though, at this early point in his thinking, Coleridge is
able to mitigate the disruptive effects of materiality through an appeal to greater
abstraction or by burying these contradictions more deeply within his idealism. Hence,
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for instance, his humble about-face in response to Sara’s reproof in “The Eolian Harp”
represents a retreat into orthodoxy, which at the same time allows him to protect the
transcendent kernel of his desire for “the Incomprehensible.” By reinforcing the bounds
of his imaginaries, such as with his pantisocratic appeal to “duty,” Coleridge is able to
keep the unsettling impact of materiality sufficiently at bay.
While he resists the ways these dark affects threaten to nullify his desire,
Coleridge appears also to be attracted to their inherent unrepresentability and hence their
potential (and paradoxical) serviceability in relation to transcendent desire. The infinite
quality of that desire, implicitly inconceivable because of its scope, resonates with the
defining mechanism of materiality, which is its capacity to escape all attempts at limiting
it. Coleridge will explore the nature of these limits at greatest length in his unfinished
poem, “Christabel,” where Christabel’s transcendent desire intersects in a horrible and
unrepresentable moment with the pure materiality of Geraldine’s body. Indeed, it is this
very encounter that marks both her desire as transcendent and the object of that desire as
exceeding any constraints that Christabel might attempt. That is, the attempt to desire and
the failure of this attempt combine to disclose the materiality of the object. This
interaction of transcendent desire with materiality serves as a particularly powerful
example of dark sympathy because of its description of the ensuing rejection of
Christabel’s desire by Geraldine. By staging this communication of desires—on the one
hand, Christabel’s transcendent desire and, on the other hand, Geraldine’s social desire—
and indicating its inherent tendency to failure, Coleridge experiments with an
understanding of community defined as event and proximity. This represents an
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important shift from his previous attempts to find a sustainable and more idealistic
definition such as in his alignment of duty with pantisocracy.
Coleridge’s effort to develop this understanding of community unfolds at greater
length in his later poetry, begun after he meets Sara Hutchinson at the end of 1799. 2
Although Coleridge does begin to perceive the social’s antagonism towards transcendent
desire (such as appears in the case of his rash marriage to Sara Fricker), he continues to
experiment with the possibility of discovering a proximity to others that might sustain
both forms of desire. I will argue that these experiments are characterized by the affect he
calls “dejection.” As he demonstrates in the poem of the same name, dejection is not
simply a wholly despairing separation from others; it can also be productive of a bare,
inoperative community in which the event of hope or desire remains, even if failure
follows immediately in its wake. Thus, beginning with “Dejection: An Ode” (1802),
Coleridge initiates a more resigned tone for his poetry enabling him to move towards the
sheer materiality of dark emotions that cannot be grasped. 3 As a result of his “afflictions”
(many of which he details in the original poetic letter to Sara Hutchinson upon which he
based his subsequent, less personal, ode), he discovers that the central Romantic image of
what Wordsworth called the “corresponding breeze” – the wind – has gone mad. Rather
than “Melodies round honey-dropping flowers, / Footless and wild, like birds of
Paradise” (“Eolian Harp” 23-24), the noise of inspiration has become as “the Rushing of
an Host in rout” (“Dejection” 111). This traumatic encounter with the materiality of an

2

J. C. C. Mays identifies Coleridge’s “later poetry” with the period after Coleridge met Sara Hutchinson
(“Later Poetry” 89).
3
Morton Paley draws attention to this “most celebrated poetic valedictory” as describing a “connection
between ‘abstruse research’ and the failure of poetic power […] with such conviction that few have
questioned it” (Coleridge’s Later Poetry 3), referencing the poem’s lines regarding Coleridge’s plan “to
steal / From my own nature all the natural Man” (89-90).
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unrelenting “grief” reveals that intervening imaginaries can no longer succeed in
suspending the impact of the object of desire’s fundamental alterity. Moreover, this is a
grief that “finds no natural outlet, no relief, / In word, or sigh, or tear” [23-24], which
signals its sharp distinction from the comforts of the imaginary.
As he describes in “The Blossoming of the Solitary Date-Tree” (1805), Coleridge
can now only “listen” for the voice of his beloved, knowing at some level that “’tis not
thine! Thou art not there!” (19). This declaration is not to deny the reality of a voice
heard or, to borrow from another late poem, which I explore at greater length below, the
truth of “an image with a glory round its head” (“Constancy to an Ideal Object” [30]).
Instead, Coleridge acknowledges the insuperable gap between an adequate social form
and the transcendent object of a community always only to come. To recognize this gap,
he must submit his visceral response to transcendence to the materiality of “all that resists
appropriation” (Derrida, “Typewriter Ribbon” 353). As I argue in Chapter 1, Hume’s
solution to the problem of alterity in the Treatise represents a major re-fashioning of the
central figure of philosophical exercise: a turn from a solitary individual to an active
social participant. Coleridge’s inability to make a similar turn in response to alterity
presses him in an entirely new direction. By withdrawing from the social, he retains only
the outline of community and takes up dejection itself as a description of a way of
relating to others – of desiring the other – that is both invested in and dissatisfied with the
social. Nevertheless, this dynamic becomes increasingly untenable in his later poetry as
he begins to question the very possibility of such a community.
To borrow a formulation from Lacanian psychoanalysis and to provide a
theoretical touchstone for my subsequent readings, Coleridge’s struggle is ultimately not
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to arrive at any kind of demystification or “reality,” but to question whether “traversing
the fantasy” is itself a worthwhile or meaningful endeavour in the first place. In Lacanian
terms, traversal here would be the work of rejecting the imagined belief that the social is
transcendent; that is, rejecting the belief that “things as they are” is not only descriptive,
but prescriptive. 4 While Coleridge increasingly perceives the limits of the fantasy, his
thought is characterized by an ongoing inquiry into the methods that may be available for
sustaining it nonetheless. Desire requires such social frames or what Slavoj Žižek
describes as “a symbolic prohibition” or “Law” (Plague 46); by contrast, drive is the
realm of materiality. Žižek observes that
drive can be said to be “meta-physical”: not in the sense of being beyond
the domain of the physical, but in the sense of involving another
materiality beyond (or, rather, beneath) the materiality located in (what we
experience as) spatio-temporal reality. In other words, the primordial
Other of our spatio-temporal bodily reality is not Spirit, but another
“sublime” materiality. (Plague 42)
If traversing the fantasy is a matter of moving beyond desire into the “truth” of drive,
then the affective dimensions of such a traversal, for Coleridge, correspond to his love of
desire for its own sake, on the one hand, and his paralyzing fear of a world of pure drive,
on the other. As Žižek suggests elsewhere, “Once we move beyond desire—that is to say,
beyond the fantasy which sustains desire—we enter the strange domain of drive: the
domain of the closed circular palpitation which finds satisfaction in endlessly repeating
the same failed gesture” (Plague 40). The movement between these states informs the
trajectory of his developing understanding of community.

4

Jodi Dean glosses Žižek’s understanding of “traversing the fantasy” as “giving up the fundamental
fantasy that sustains desire. Thus, whereas the pervert knows the truth of desire, the analyst knows that
there is no truth of desire to know” (89).
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Pantisocracy: An Experiment in Socializing Transcendent Desire
In the summer of 1794, Coleridge befriended the radical poet, Robert Southey.
Drawing them together was a potent idea, pantisocracy, sparked by the writings of radical
philosophers of the period and fuelled both by Coleridge’s relentless imagination and by
Southey’s radicalism. As the name implies, pantisocracy was a theory of equal
governance—a “flat model” of social organization. Their plan was to follow Joseph
Priestley to the banks of the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania. There, twelve men and
twelve women would live in proximity with nature, pooling resources and sharing in the
(according to Coleridge, very minimal) labour required for self-sustenance. Yet a little
more than a year later, the plan had collapsed leaving Coleridge both married and bitterly
estranged from Southey. 5
Pantisocracy was an attempt to create a society that might accommodate the
transcendent relation implied by sympathy. Coleridge’s early optimism about the social is
not surprising given the general excitement about the possibilities entailed by radical new
forms of society such as were forming in America and France. As Margaret C. Jacob
notes, “There is as much continuity – as there is rupture – between Enlightened social
practices and the heated fraternizing of the 1790s, between the Enlightenment as lived
earlier in the clubs and salons and the political socializing of radicals and Romantics”
(25). Artists during the early 1790s express a strong interest in amplifying the
imaginative potential of this social impulse – as, for instance, William Blake does in
5

Kelvin Everest suggests that “Pantisocracy itself lay behind the community that Coleridge actually
succeeded in bringing about, briefly, in Nether Stowey. And Nether Stowey is one defining context of the
best conversation poems” (10). Whether or not Nether Stowey represents a concrete manifestation of the
ideals of pantisocracy is ultimately irrelevant as, only eighteen months later, Coleridge was also to abandon
“his family in the cottage at Nether Stowey, and all the friends and places associated with the eighteen
months of his life in that small community” (290). Here, as elsewhere, material circumstances clash with
Coleridge’s attempt to integrate transcendent desire and the social.
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nearly contemporaneous poems such as America: A Prophecy (1793). 6 Arguably, the
schema’s greatest intellectual debt was to Godwin’s Political Justice, with its principles
of a “genuine system of property,” its rejection of institutions, and above all its effort to
imagine an entirely different kind of society. 7 In a poem called “Pantisocracy” (1794), 8
Coleridge explores whether a transcendent quality might be applied to a social form.
Thus he imagines the future pantisocratic society as a place just beyond the “Sublime of
Hope [...] / Where Virtue calm with careless step may stray” (5, 6; emphasis mine). The
amplification of the social’s aesthetic dimension, he suggests, results in a receding of the
social’s explicit structure. Unlike those “Joys, that were” (2), which the speaker rejects as
contributing to an accumulating “weigh[t]” of “Shame and Anguish” (3, 4), the
pantisocratic vision, appearing like “the rising Sun” that “dart[s] / New rays of Pleasance
trembling to the Heart” (13-14), prompts “Tears of doubt-mingled Joy” (10). Thus
society as it presently exists appears as a negative encumbrance physically burdening its
participants, while the future order appears as a source of intense pleasure and without
restraints. Nevertheless, this is not a rejection of the social, as we see at times attempted
by Godwin’s misanthropes: instead, it is an exchange of one social imaginary for another,
this time charged with transcendent potential. As we will see, Coleridge would develop
this idea further in “The Eolian Harp.” These early conversation poems emphasize not a

6

Cf. Saree Makdisi, William Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s, for an extended discussion of
Blake’s unique understanding of the potential – and failings – of the new social forms emerging at the end
of the eighteenth century.
7
See William St. Clair for an extended description of the ways Political Justice influenced Coleridge and
the other pantisocrats (96-98).
8
E.H. Coleridge notes that, although the poem was not published until 1849 in The Life and
Correspondence of R. Southey, it did bear the name “Pantisocracy” as early as 1795, Coleridge having
included it in the handwritten collection of his poems that he gave to Susanna Estlin of Bristol (whose
husband, John Prior Estlin, was a Unitarian minister there) sometime that year. Notably, the poem is based
on lines contributed by Samuel Favell.
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society-less transcendent reality, but a different, transcendent mode of society; in
pantisocracy, the roots of this idea (as well as its inherent limits) already appear.
The transcendent dimension of pantisocracy in the poem overlaps with its
recourse to feeling – what Coleridge calls “the wizard Passions” (8). These feelings are
organized around a sense of possibility, figured as the irresponsible freedom of a
“careless step” (6) in a dance to the “the moonlight roundelay” (7). By contrast, the “joys
that were” associated with “the evil day” of previous social systems find expression in the
angular imagery of “precipices of distemper’d Sleep” (11) and “fierce-eyed Fiends” (12).
This distinction between the amorphous and the rectilinear recalls one of Coleridge’s
earliest statements about pantisocracy in a letter to Southey: “When the pure system of
pantisocracy shall have aspheterized [...], instead of travelling along the circuitous, dusty,
beaten highroad of diction, you thus cut across the soft, green, pathless field of novelty!
Similes for ever! Hurrah!” (CL 1:84). 9 Where the “highroad of diction” suggests an
unreflective acceptance of things as they are, the “pathless field of novelty” opens up a
space for lateral association in labour and expression and an analogously horizontal
organization for society. Thus, despite its socially pragmatic intentions, the promise of
pantisocracy was found in its capacity for opening a space for thinking beyond
pragmatism. Indeed, as Coleridge represented it initially, the idea should destabilize one’s
social practices: “at the last place I preached Pantisocracy and Aspheterism with so much
success that two great huge fellows, of Butcher like appearance, danced about the room
in enthusiastic agitation” (1:88).

9

“Aspheterization” was Coleridge’s word for the universal distribution of property, which he coined based
on the Greek word spheterizein, which means to take for one’s own.
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As the idea of pantisocracy unfolded over the course of Coleridge and Southey’s
youthful (and admittedly short) friendship, the lingering negative effects of those
problematic “joys that were” increasingly come to be recognized as what Coleridge calls
with equal irony Southey’s “innovation[s]” to the “leading idea” of pantisocracy (CL
1:114). Thus, as James McKusick points out, Southey (perhaps realizing that the farm
work would be much more arduous than his friend would admit) suggested to Coleridge
that “they bring labourers with them from England to do the heavy farming work” (125).
Southey claimed that they would be treated as equal, yet would be doing work for which
their lack of education fitted them. Coleridge could not condone this. If the idea of
pantisocracy is “to make men necessarily virtuous by removing all motives to evil – all
possible temptations” (CL 1:114) – then the alterations that Southey introduces are in fact
attempts to counteract this impulse. Pantisocracy was intended to be a system for freeing
virtue from the constraints of a corrupt society; hence, the ongoing desire for such
“motives to evil” represents a nostalgia incompatible with vision. By coming to
understand pantisocracy as an ideal (and having a “leading idea”) whose significance was
in its status as an ideal, Coleridge protected himself from Southey’s conservative
backsliding. Yet, notably, this shift required a rejection of the amorphous and semiotic
impulses (to borrow Kristeva’s term) that had suggested pantisocracy in the first place.
Coleridge’s early love, Mary Evans, describes this impulsive aspect of
Coleridge’s personality in a letter she wrote to convince him to give up on pantisocracy:
“There is an Eagerness in your Nature, which is ever hurrying you in the sad Extreme”
(qtd. by Coleridge in CL 1:112). She goes on to cite Ophelia’s speech: “O what a noble
mind is here o’erthrown, Blasted with Exstacy” (1:112). As many critics have pointed
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out, Coleridge’s tendency to pursue “the sad Extreme” and an almost self-destructive
state of “ecstasy,” even as he continues to desire social acceptance and affirmation,
informs the divided tone of much of his writing. 10 Over the course of its development,
pantisocracy’s capacious potential as unthought—that potentiality Coleridge initially
perceived as the “novelty” and “careless[ness]” of the idea of pantisocracy—is restrained
as Coleridge discovers increasingly the fragility of this way of thinking. As Colin Jager
notes of the pantisocracy poem, “This is celebratory but ambivalent language, as if even
in the midst of his idealization of America Coleridge understood that the choice was not
between bondage and freedom but between one kind of powerful myth and another”
(para. 52). Pantisocracy begins as a concrete intention to realize a transcendent idea in the
world and was supported by concrete actions not least of which was Coleridge’s
marriage; however, it comes to be further and further removed from any interaction with
that which might reveal its limits as an imaginary. Indeed, as he writes near the end of his
friendship with Southey: “Pantisocracy is not the question: its realization is distant—
perhaps a miraculous millenium” (CL 1:158).
The ultimate failure of Coleridge and Southey’s friendship (and of pantisocracy)
derives in part from this substitution of the openness of the unthought with the structure
and constraint of “duty” as a social ideal. The chief cause of the rift, from Coleridge’s
perspective, was Southey’s abandonment of what he calls “Virtue” (1:161). An
unswerving commitment to the principles of pantisocracy was required of its members; in
Coleridge’s view, Southey’s various capitulations disrupted the actual relation implied by
the ideal. In the letter, Coleridge describes himself as faithful to duty—the newly ascribed
10

Cf. Perry writes that “Coleridge is the great case of this kind of division, a man in two minds about which
of two minds a man should be in” (2). His review of Coleridge criticism responding to this “doublemindedness” follows on pp. 3-4.
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ideal of the pantisocratic system. From his perspective, duty demands that he cut his ties
to real life relations in favour of the transcendent relation promised by pantisocracy.
Thus, he writes, “You remember what a Fetter I burst, and that it snapt, as if it had been a
Sinew of my Heart” (1:164), referring to his past love for Mary Evans and his repression
of it in order to “do [his] duty” and marry Sara Fricker.
Finally, in Southey’s contemplation and resolve to join the clergy despite his
atheism, Coleridge perceived the end of their friendship. No longer venerating his friend,
Coleridge comes to see Southey as “one who had fallen back into the Ranks; as a man
admirable for his abilities only, strict indeed in the lesser Honesties, but like the majority
of men unable to resist a strong Temptation – FRIEND is a very sacred appellation – You
were become an Acquaintance” (1:166). In describing this shift in their relationship,
Coleridge attempts to enter into an exclusively social relation with his one-time friend: a
mere acquaintanceship in which “literary Topics engrossed our Conversation” and for
which “shaking the Hand [...] is assuredly the pledge of Acquaintance, and nothing more”
(1:167). This effort of segregating Southey from the realm of transcendent possibility that
he understands pantisocracy to be aims at reinforcing that space; however, this very
process of giving up Southey to a lesser, social relation recalls for Coleridge the earlier
mode of desire that had been undermined – that is, transcendent desire as unthought
rather than ideal. Thus he closes his letter enumerating what has been lost:
You have left a large Void in my Heart – I know no man big enough to fill
it. Others I may love equally & esteem equally: and some perhaps I may
admire as much. But never do I expect to meet another man, who will
make me unite attachment for his person with reverence for his heart and
admiration of his Genius! I did not only venerate you for your own
Virtues, I prized you as the Sheet Anchor of mine! [...] But these Things
are past by, like as when an hungry man dreams, and lo! he feasteth—but
he awakes, and his Soul is empty! (1:173)
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While the rift has come about partly because of Coleridge’s turn to an idealized social
desire rather than an ongoing acceptance of what he will come to call “the
Incomprehensible” element of community, the melancholy of this parting description
renews the transcendent element momentarily and raises the possibility of a dark
sympathy persisting between them. As I will explore in greater depth below, Coleridge’s
desire for community can resemble what Jacques Derrida calls “impossible mourning”:
hence, even though Southey lives, Coleridge still experiences “the dark light of this
nothing [of the dead other]” in which he “learn[s] that the other resists the closure of our
interiorizing memory” (Memoires 34).
Nevertheless, the lesson is only a passing one as Coleridge allows himself once
more to transform the unthought element (i.e., the “large Void in my Heart”) into a new
ideal. As he writes to Southey in April 1800, “The time returns upon me, Southey! when
we dreamt one Dream, & that a glorious one – when we eat together, & thought each
other greater & better than all the World beside, and when we were bed fellows. Those
days can never be forgotten, and till they are forgotten, we cannot, if we would, cease to
love each other” (1:586): the darkness of their breakup has vanished. 11 Preserved in this
new ideal is a relation that no longer exists in a material sense – a relation that has been
purchased at the cost of its material sense. Instead, Coleridge suggests that the memory of
the “one Dream” and its accompanying day-to-day realization can contain in suspension
the love they cannot share. This is a relation that attempts to maintain both forms of

11

There is a materiality that skirts the edges of Coleridge’s memory here as he attempts to shift the deep,
quotidian intimacy of his and Southey’s eating and sleeping together into a “dream” register that ultimately
neutralizes its excessive or even potentially erotic content.
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desire by positing the social form as the hope of the transcendent form’s future
fulfillment.

Transcendence in Coleridge’s Early Poetry
Although the hope surrounding pantisocracy itself retreats, leaving a wreck of
broken and twisted relationships in its wake, Coleridge does not abandon the initial
impetus of discovering a social form capable of sustaining transcendent desire. Instead of
a concrete political system, however, Coleridge leans upon poetry to articulate this
vision. In particular, his development of “the conversation poem” represents a key
strategy for continuing the experiment begun with pantisocracy. 12 While pantisocracy
pictures a society that mirrors transcendent desire expressed as novelty and possibility,
conversation marks a more pronounced distinction between the transcendent and the
social. Rather than a straightforward implementation or marshaling of transcendent desire
as a social reality, conversation posits the transcendent as an object from which Coleridge
can derive a (social) ethos of radical vulnerability and openness. To be radically
vulnerable with another person is to give the other the power to deny or affirm the self. 13
It is a way of rendering the other other, and thus it releases the transcendent desire
encrypted within sympathy, as I explored in Chapter 1. This process of encryption, I have
argued, occurs when a transcendent desire comes up short in the face of the impossibility
12

Although he only subtitled one poem a “conversation poem” (“The Nightingale”), critics have used the
category to talk about a range of poems that tend to avoid supernatural themes and are addressed to close
friends. Frederick Burwick lists the poems typically included in the set as: “The Eolian Harp” (1795),
“Reflections on having left a Place of Retirement” (1795), “This Lime-Tree Bower my Prison” (1797),
“Frost at Midnight” (1798), “The Nightingale” (1798), “Dejection: An Ode” (1802), and “To William
Wordsworth” (1807) (“Coleridge’s Conversation Poems” 168).
13
Although not about Coleridge, Anne-Lise François’s Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted
Experience offers a very useful and comprehensive description of the related notion of passivity understood
in a productive rather than conventionally negative sense.
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of its being fully represented, let alone satisfied. This experience of being obstructed
produces an anxiety that initially prompts a turn to more socially sustainable and stable
structures of signification. Thus, in his dissatisfaction with Southey, Coleridge had been
able to mitigate the effects of anxiety through an appeal to a more robust sense of the
object of desire. Yet, as I also suggested regarding the affect of anxiety for Romantic
writers, there is an amenability to the work of the negative in their writing and thought
that allows it to function productively as well. This productivity does not get fully
explored until “Christabel” and later; however, even with the conversation poems,
Coleridge is increasingly interested in developing strategies for drawing upon the
productive side of anxiety rather than simply circumventing it as he seems to do with
pantisocracy.
For Coleridge, “conversation” functions as a kind of monologue performed in the
presence of an unrealizable other. 14 It is a self-revelation to the other, yet without an
accompanying expectation that this revelation will be reciprocated or even accepted. To
transplant Wordsworth’s wistful encounter with his sister Dorothy in “Lines Composed a
Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey” into a Coleridgean register would require that his
declaration, “May I behold in thee what I was once” (121), become emphatically a
question and one in earnest. In conversation, Coleridge enters into a bond with the other
person in an intimacy that is potentially traumatic. As Emmanuel Levinas writes, “To

14

Along these lines, Stephen Miller suggests that Coleridge was more precisely a “monologist” than a
“conversationalist” (180). He cites as support William Hazlitt’s description of Coleridge as “the only
person who can talk to all sorts of people, on all sorts of subjects, without caring a farthing for their
understanding one word he says – and he talks only for admiration and to be listened to, and accordingly
the least interruption puts him out” (“On the Conversation of Authors” 1:74; qtd. in Miller 180). Similarly,
Madame de Staël is reported to have said, “[A]vec M. Coleridge, c’est tout à fait un monologue” (qtd. in
Holmes 2:340).
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approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant
he overflows the idea a thought would carry from it” (Totality and Infinity 51). 15
In this section, I will begin with one of Coleridge’s earliest conversation poems,
“The Eolian Harp” (1795) in order to demonstrate the careful structure Coleridge gives to
his transcendent desire, instantiated here as the one Life. Not only does he locate this
structure prior to the social relationships in which he finds himself, but he also entertains
the idea as something with universal and even theological implications. 16 Following the
failure of his attempt to realize transcendent desire within a social frame, this more
careful exploration of the transcendent – especially through the One Life philosophy –
aims at developing not simply an ideal like “duty,” but an expansive Truth in the sense
described by Slavoj Žižek in his discussion of the “meta-physical dimension” as one in
which “the infinite Truth is ‘eternal’ and meta- with regard to the temporal process of
Being” (Ticklish 151). Further developing this sense of the anterior relation, “Frost at
Midnight” (1798) introduces the concept of multiple social forms, including forms that
Coleridge might hope to imagine for his son, Hartley. This shift helps him to circumvent
the constraints he encountered in “The Eolian Harp.” By positing the film on the grate as
a “companionable form,” Coleridge marks the primacy of alterity in characterizing the
object of desire. That is, rather than emphasizing the passivity of the subject, the poem
works to draw out the unaccountable in the other. The implication is a greater attendance
15

Cf. David Haney, The Challenge of Coleridge, for extensive connections drawn between Coleridge and
Levinas.
16
This approach was common to several conversation poems, as Avery F. Gaskins argues, following M.H.
Abrams, in connecting the conversation poems with the seventeenth-century metaphysical poets, whose
tone and even form these poems often seem to reflect. Gaskins suggests that the poems take the form of
meditations inflected by the “philosophical and theological views” over which Coleridge was wrestling
during the time of their composition: “He was trying to decide whether to be fully committed to writing or
to the ministry of the gospel, and as a result, often attempted to make his poems serve a holy purpose”
(628).
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to the difficulties entailed in attempting to relate with “the Incomprehensible” via an
expression of desire, whether that be social or transcendent. “The Nightingale” (1798)
takes up more directly the relation of transcendent and social forms of desire, yet
emphasizes ultimately the impossibility of such a transition or integration. In that poem,
it is the otherness of the birds’ song that exceeds the maiden’s ability to enter into relation
with the birds. Nevertheless, Coleridge continues to hope that this obstacle may be
overcome in the case of his son. In each case, the solitary speaker of the conversation
poems emphasizes a particular phenomenology of desire: a declaration of the speaker’s
lack in the face of an other who is often absent and, if not absent, always silent. Never
receiving a response, however, the hopeful poems also pave the way for Coleridge’s later
work, in which the speaker—unlike the Ancient Mariner, whose curse also gives him
power—discovers the insuperable gap between himself and the object of his desire. This
ultimately disables his radical posture with a dejection that is both productive and
increasingly traumatic. 17
Although Coleridge does not explicitly include the One Life in “The Eolian Harp”
until its 1828 iteration in Sibylline Leaves, 18 the idea is already half-formed in the
penultimate stanza of the poem’s manuscript version, in which he muses:
17

Indeed, although I am not taking it up here, having already discussed it in my opening Preface, the Rime
of the Ancient Mariner (1797-98) might serve as a useful gloss on the transition from the conversation
poems into Coleridge’s later work. In the first place, the wedding-guest’s social desire to join the wedding
partly resembles the conversational mode Coleridge takes for granted in the early poems. Just as the
wedding-guest “beat[s] his breast” when “he heard the loud bassoon” (“Rime” 31-32), so does Coleridge
lament the “Beauties and feelings” he has lost because of the injury imprisoning him in the famous limetree bower of the poem (“Lime-Tree” 3). Unlike the wedding-guest, however, who “cannot choose but
hear” (“Rime” 18), the speaking subject of conversation poems that appear more as monologues than
dialogue retains the ability to desire and to hope. Above all, it is this capacity for hope that will undergo
severe rethinking in the work Coleridge produced towards the end of his life.
18
In the 1817 version of this poem, Coleridge describes a very apposite view of “a world like this” in
which “even the breezes, and the common air, / Contain the power and spirit of Harmony” (27-29);
nevertheless, he does not include the famous lines containing “the one Life” until the later edition. That
said, he may have used the term as early as 1799, during his time in Germany. Seamus Perry notes that
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And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic Harps diversely fram’d,
That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the Soul of each, and God of all? (44-48)
The pantheism of this sentiment barely lingers before Coleridge moderates himself under
Sara’s “more serious eye” (49). What marks Sara’s reproof as abrupt, however, is that
Coleridge introduces this idea of a pervasive relation (“the One Life”) in the form of a
question. By overdetermining the significance of her husband’s speculation, Sara both
gives weight to it and undermines the retraction that Coleridge offers in response. The
speculative quality of his initial suggestion requires an intervention from the outside to
give it force. In the first place, Coleridge conceives of the idea of the One Life as “a
thought uncall’d and undetain’d” and just one of “many idle flitting phantasies” (39, 40).
Its ephemeral character emphasizes the sense that it arrives from outside – “uncall’d,”
which is to say, prompted by something other than the speaking subject. At the same
time, neither can the idea be simply a passing thought rising “[o]n vain Philosophy’s ayebabbling spring” (57), as he suggests later. Despite his assertion that it is a “flitting
phantas[y],” the idea’s domination of the poem lends it a gravity that belies Coleridge’s
defensive backpedalling. After all, the “wild and various” (42) thoughts are already
contained in the pre-established scene of the poet, stretched out, and “tranquil mus[ing]
upon tranquility” (38). In this self-figuration as a “subject Lute” (43), Coleridge
counterposes his physical body (“my indolent and passive brain” [41]) against an exterior
intellectual multitude from which he receives this very “thought uncall’d” (40). The
account of this reception arranges itself around the central question, “And what if,” which

“Carlyon, one of his companions in Germany in early 1799, recalled that ‘his concentrated definition of
Spinozism was, “Each thing has a life of its own, and we are all one life[”]’” (Uses of Division 115-16).

188
as a speculation figures for Coleridge the social form conversation must take if it is to
serve as a vehicle for desiring transcendence. Such a form allows the multiple vectors
that compose this conversation to remain in suspense: the self’s transcendent desire for
what he will call the “Incomprehensible,” the self’s social desire for the social other, and,
underlying it all, the repeated references to a world apart from these desires.
The relational implications of the kind of speculation Coleridge entertains here
are made immediately obvious in the poem. On the one hand, the question disturbs the
social order of the family unit. Although she does not respond in recorded words (and
thus allows Coleridge to maintain the monological character of the conversation), Sara
“[d]arts” “a mild reproof” with her eye, thereby “holily disprais[ing] / These shapings of
the unregenerate mind” (50, 49, 54-55). The interruption of the social gaze of judgment
(itself a form of desire) marks Coleridge’s speculation as being in conflict with the social.
On the other hand, when Coleridge declares that “never guiltless may I speak of him, /
The Incomprehensible! save when with awe / I praise him, and with Faith that inly feels”
(58-60), he is offering an explanation that, rather than accounting for this judgment,
reintroduces the relational mode that prompted the judgment in the first place. In
imagining this harmonious union of the receptive mind (notably, characterized in
physical terms) with the transcendent, all-pervasive, “intellectual breeze,” Coleridge
inadvertently undermines the sufficiency of the dogma he rehearses in the closing lines
describing God, “[w]ho with his saving mercies healed me, / A sinful and most miserable
man, / Wilder’d and dark” (61-63). The relational structure of Sara’s dogma conceives of
a self infinitely in the debt of God and demands therefore that Coleridge “walk humbly”
(52). Furthermore, by associating this structure with Sara’s judgment, Coleridge suggests
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that the social order itself is partly characterized by just such an attitude of selfabnegation. Yet Coleridge’s own explanation, which he suggests through juxtaposition is
in keeping with this dogma, contradicts such an active (if destructive) role for the self.
Instead, any encounter with “[t]he Incomprehensible” fails unless it is preceded by
“awe”: in other words, it fails unless the other precedes and permeates the self. In this
way, the speculative orientation (“And what if ...”) that precedes the social judgment (of
“hol[y] disprais[e],” a phrase that we should note implies the paradoxical claim to, in
fact, comprehend the Incomprehensible, which would only be possible if the self
preceded that other) more closely approaches the radical passivity of Coleridge’s selfcorrection than does the appeal to humility.
Written three years later, “Frost at Midnight” continues this sense of an anterior
relation that somehow resists even as it informs the social realm of the day-to-day. Yet,
rather than opening with a domestic social setting, as “The Eolian Harp” does with its
description of “My pensive Sara” (1), “Frost at Midnight” begins with the other – the
frost – “perform[ing] its secret ministry” (1). This reorientation enables the rest of the
poem to extend into regions of thought that are barred in Coleridge’s earlier attempt. In
the first place, the emphasis on the alterity of this object of desire underscores the
secondary, responsive character of the desiring subject’s relation to it. The “secret
ministry of frost” (72), which resonates with the earlier idea of the Incomprehensible,
gestures towards inscrutable operations that invite a response from the observer. A
similar invitation is implied in “The Eolian Harp” and produces Coleridge’s initial
interest, Sara’s rejection, and Coleridge’s subsequent demurral; however, the prominence
of Sara’s response and the overall speculative character of the poem subjects the reality
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of the Incomprehensible to the response, rather than the other way around. In “Frost,” this
order has been rectified and the object of desire is allowed to remain ultimately distinct
from the subject’s imagining of it. Furthermore, the options for responding to it are
presented in stark terms: either one may respond like those from the “populous village”
(11) or one may respond like those who “shalt wander like a breeze” (54).
Coleridge describes the response of the first person (his youthful self) to this
secret ministry in oblique relational terms: as a liminal desire for the unknown, imaged in
the poem by the “film, which fluttered on the grate” (15) and which is conveniently
called a “stranger.” 19 Coleridge’s boyhood “hop[e] to see the stranger’s face” (41), which
affects him so physically, represents an extension of what he describes in one version of
the poem as “the living spirit in our frame, / That loves not to behold a lifeless thing” (2021). 20 The film in the grate activates his relational desire, which cannot abide a “sole
unquiet thing” (16). Thus its associated “dim sympathies,” which “[m]ak[e] it a
companionable form” (18, 19), do not belong to the film itself, as in a pantheistic model,
but rather originate in a space that has given both subjects and objects in the world the
desire for others. This view leads Coleridge to describe himself as always on the lookout
for strangers. Yet what he desires even more is to cultivate the second response in his
son, whom he hopes “shalt learn far other lore” (50) – namely, the “eternal language,
which thy God / Utters, who from eternity doth teach / Himself in all, and all things in
himself” (60-62). He is asking that his son be guided by the wind itself as an embodied
Eolian harp. The realm into which he hopes his son will be caught up is the world of the
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Notably, this response is identical to that of one reared in “the great city, pent ‘mid cloisters dim” (52).
E.H. Coleridge cites these lines as appearing in the version printed in the Poetical Register, 1808-9
(1812).
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“one Life,” “the harmonious interrelationship of free individual and immanent One”
(Perry 79).
Notably, the contrast Coleridge depicts between himself and his son has less to do
with the scope of their transcendent desire than it does the conditions that facilitate its
expression. Thus, as with “The Eolian Harp,” Coleridge is able to imagine a social world
charged with a transcendent tone. Like Blake’s grain of sand, Coleridge perceives even
the film in the grate as a potential access point into the Incomprehensible, which harbours
an alterity the extent to which he has not yet understood. By raising his son Hartley
outside of “the great city” (52), he hopes to give him much greater opportunity for
encountering the transcendent. Nevertheless, as we see in the poem’s circling back to the
initial image of the frost’s secret ministry, this knowledge of the “eternal language” that
speaks the interrelatedness of all things can emerge even for one like Coleridge himself.
Although an awareness of it depends upon “that solitude, which suits / Abstruser
musings” (5-6), it is still present in the thick social context of the “inmates of [his]
cottage” (4), the “populous village” (11), and the “numberless goings-on of life” (12).
Still, while this promise of access in spite of social demands gives the poem a comforting
quality, Coleridge’s closing description of the frost as “Quietly shining to the quiet
Moon” (74) reasserts the materiality of this “secret” world that cannot be fully
assimilated into the symbolically driven world of the social.
Coleridge deepens his inquiry into the limits of transcendent desire and its
possibilities for community in the only poem he himself called “A Conversation Poem”:
“The Nightingale.” The poem opens with an anecdote that we might read as the inversion
of Coleridge’s hopes for Hartley in “Frost at Midnight.” Instead of one who learns to
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speak “that eternal language,” which implicitly precedes and transcends the self, we
encounter
some night-wandering man whose heart was pierced
...
And so, poor wretch! filled all things with himself,
And made all gentle sounds tell back the tale
Of his own sorrow[.] (16, 19-21)
Coleridge’s sounding of “dim sympathies” with the film in “Frost at Midnight” contrasts
sharply with this solipsistic poet who sees himself everywhere reflected in nature. Indeed,
it is telling that in “The Nightingale” Coleridge suggests (in remarkably similar language
to that used in “Eolian Harp”) that such a poet “had better far have stretched his limbs /
Beside a brook in mossy forest-dell, […] Surrendering his whole spirit” (25-26, 29). The
result, he insists, will be that “his fame / Should share in Nature’s immortality [...] and so
his song / Should make all Nature lovelier, and itself / Be loved like Nature” (30-31, 3234).
The continuum that begins in “dim sympathies” and ends in “surrender” is a kind
of sharing, much like Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of “partage.” Brian Holmes describes the
multiple meanings of “partage” in Nancy’s work as including not only “sharing,” but also
“an incessant parting that persists in all sharing, precluding any fusional communion, as
well as any ‘shareholding’ or commerce in indivisible shares” (396 n.10). Insight into this
primordial sharing is the “different lore” that Coleridge mentions in his address to
Wordsworth and Dorothy in the next stanza – and, presumably, it is the same “lore” that
he hopes his son will learn in “Frost at Midnight.” Against it, he positions the “meek
sympathy” of poets who in all likelihood will ignore his warning and “lose the deepening
twilights of the spring / In ball-rooms and hot theatres” (36-37). These two versions of
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relation – either a “dim” sympathy or a “meek” one – differ primarily in terms of their
structural emphasis. The former emphasizes an other that transcends the intellectual and
emotional limits of the self – its dimness descriptive of the necessary obscurity of a
relation with that which is truly other. The latter emphasizes the self and, more precisely,
a social self embedded only in a world whose primary purpose is to reflect the self’s
projections. The meekness of their sympathy points to the paucity of their desire.
The relational ontology towards which Coleridge asks poets to orient themselves
in passivity finds an apposite image in his description of “a grove / Of large extent, hard
by a castle huge, / Which the great lord inhabits not” (49-51). Presented as a space
explicitly outside the social (that is, in this case, feudal) realm, the grove is a field of
unimpeded conversation:
But never elsewhere in one place I knew
So many nightingales; and far and near,
In wood and thicket, over the wide grove,
They answer and provoke each other’s song,
With skirmish and capricious passagings,
And murmurs musical and swift jug jug,
And one low piping sound more sweet than all—
Stirring the air with such a harmony... (55-61)
One may enter into such a field, as Coleridge suggests in his description of the “most
gentle Maid / Who dwelleth in her hospitable home / Hard by the castle” (69-71).
Nevertheless, although “she knows all their notes” (74), she is only able to watch as
“Many a nightingale perch giddily / On blossomy twig still swinging from the breeze, /
And to that motion tune his wanton song / Like tipsy Joy that reels with tossing head”
(83-86). The discovery that conversation at its limit is synonymous with the underlying
relation that he had speculated about in “The Eolian Harp” is accompanied by the
realization that this realm cannot contain the desiring subject.
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Žižek argues that “[d]esire emerges when drive gets caught in the cobweb of
Law/prohibition” (Plague 43). Likewise, the passivity we witness in all of these poems –
from meek speculation and self-censoring under Sara’s reproof in “The Eolian Harp” to
his submissive attitude towards his son (who “would place his hand beside his ear, / His
little hand, the small forefinger up, / And bid us listen” [94-96]) in “The Nightingale” – is
provoked by a law that commands such an ongoing fidelity to the social order. Thus
Coleridge – and the maiden in the poem – is refused leave to pass over into the “tipsy
Joy” of full-fledged conversation. Instead, the social restrains him in each instance,
demanding that he frame his transcendent desire within the limits of a realizable
imaginary. At this early stage, Coleridge does not seem to view these demands
negatively. Although he certainly perceives these constraints as limitations, there is a
dialectical quality to his one-way conversations, in which he attempts to revise and
rework his transcendent desire in response to such social pressures. His goal, as we see in
his hopes for Hartley, is to reimagine the social altogether, as inherently inflected by
transcendent desire. Yet, as he presses his understanding of transcendent desire still
further, as he does in “Christabel,” the social appears inherently opposed to the
capaciousness such desire posits.

“Christabel” and the Social Catalyst of Materiality
With both pantisocracy and the conversation poems, Coleridge sought a
harmonization of the social and his transcendent desire. Where pantisocracy fails because
of its inability to navigate the rifts Coleridge encounters in his ideal of duty and virtue,
the conversation poems give him the opportunity to posit a more developed idea of what
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is required of the desiring subject in desiring the transcendent other. His effort to
understand this relationship between desire and alterity continues to occupy Coleridge’s
thought in work such as “Christabel.” As was also the case with the poems discussed
above, Coleridge explores the way different social forms interact with the demands of the
transcendent; however, what “Christabel” suggests is that the social itself is generated by
an inability to encounter the radical alterity of materiality, figured in the poem by
Geraldine’s body. Unlike Coleridge’s earlier efforts, therefore, “Christabel” represents a
more sustained critique of the social. Critics have connected the counter-social character
of the central relationship of “Christabel” to, among other things, Coleridge’s own
contemporaneous considerations of the cultural aftermath of the French Revolution. For
example, James Mulvihill describes the complex parallels between England’s “fear of
invasion” and the fears explored in the poem’s narration. Andrea Henderson similarly
suggests that the poem reflects the contemporary anxiety about how to respond to the
French Revolution. She writes, “The problem that those characters [in the poem] face is
that in the world of ‘Christabel’ the only alternative to stifling tradition is terrifying
indeterminacy” (883). The poem’s complex exploration of the relation between affect and
social life takes precedence in these readings and invites reflection on the depiction of a
conflict of the imagination: the social in tension with what lies outside or beyond the
social. Indeed, the broader psychological implications of these readings complement my
argument about the poem.
In the poem, Christabel is a desiring subject seeking a transcendent relation and
harbours a desire that is marked variously throughout as excessive and socially
subversive. As her foil, Geraldine serves to reveal both the nature of Christabel’s desire
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and that desire’s fraught status within the social realm. Throughout (and especially in Part
I), an idea of the transcendent as that which not only exceeds expression, but inherently
resists expression, similar to the unthought “novelty” of Coleridge’s initial idea of
pantisocracy, comes under review as does its (im)possibility apart from social forms.
Ultimately, the event of excessive desire – a darkly sympathetic moment between
Christabel and Geraldine that has been called everything from mysterious to perverse to
abusive – remains unrepresentable and therefore incommensurate with the social’s total
domination of the scene in Part II. As in Michel Foucault’s reading of the Cartesian
cogito, about which he writes that it leaves open a space beyond mere thought, a space
which was aligned with all that “I am” besides thinking (cf. Order 326), Christabel’s
desire cannot be assimilated into the social order of her father’s house, which has also
attempted to structure her self-understanding as we see in the many comments made by
the biased narrator. The poem’s internal analysis of the interactions of desire with the
socializing process proves useful, therefore, for establishing the terms of my larger
argument, especially in distinguishing between social sympathy as the ratification of
social desire and dark sympathy as both symptomatic of transcendent desire and fatal to
it.
The initial series of events in the poem exemplifies the trajectories that these
desires take. Having been kidnapped by five bandits who have threatened an imminent
return, Geraldine asks Christabel (on more than one occasion) to “[s]tretch forth thy
hand.” Yet Christabel initially (if implicitly) refuses to do so. Instead, she asks for a
story: “How camest thou here?” (76). The story that Geraldine tells, as Karen Swann
notes, represents an oblique response to Christabel’s questions about “identity and
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origins,” and may be summarized as, “I am like you, and my story is like your own”
(151). It is only once Christabel has this story in mind that she is able to offer protection
to Geraldine. This desire for story resembles Hume’s description of how sympathy arises.
As Hume writes:
When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its
effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation,
which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an
impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become
the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original
affection. (204)
The idea conveyed begins in the understanding, but grows under the influence of feeling.
In Christabel’s case, this narrative so grips her that she imagines her role in protecting
Geraldine as a kind of completion of Geraldine’s story, promising that her father will
“guide and guard you safe and free / Home to your noble father’s hall” (110-11).
Christabel throughout has a sense of sharing an experience with Geraldine, so that when
they make it back into the safety of the castle walls, she cries, “Praise we the Virgin all
divine / Who hath rescued thee from thy distress!” (139-40). In sympathizing with
Geraldine’s narrative, Christabel attempts to make it her own.
This effort is presented in the narration as socially disruptive – and it is evident
from the opening lines that this poem is concerned at least in part with the role social
forms ought to play in organizing or structuring desire for the other. A strongly marked
narrative voice identifies its support of the existing feudal organization early on when it
asks accusingly of Christabel, “what makes her in the wood so late, / A furlong from the
castle gate?” (25-26). The inappropriateness of her behaviour is underscored by a brief
remark about Christabel’s privilege as a daughter “[w]hom her father loves so well” (24).
More pervasively, the narrator establishes the setting by locating “the castle clock” (1) at
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the centre of all the events. To be on the side of the Baron is to “maketh answer to the
clock” (9), which we later discover is the Baron’s existential mechanism, “knell[ing] us
back to a world of death” (333). The socially sustaining work of the clock is also
explicitly tied to the work of sympathy, as Geraldine declares: “I thought I heard, some
minutes past, / Sounds as of a castle bell. / Stretch forth thy hand (thus ended she), / And
help a wretched maid to flee” (100-103). This clock-governed social matrix constitutes
the dominant narrative framework for the poem.
Throughout, the narrator explicitly pits Geraldine as a threat to this narrative,
imperiling social stability. Perhaps the most telling of the narrator’s signals to us that
Geraldine is supposed to represent a counter-social force is the unwitting effect she has
upon the castle guard dog. For, when the narrator asks, “What can ail the mastiff bitch,”
he is asking a question specifically about a disturbance in the dominant social narrative’s
clock-time. As we see in the opening stanza, this “toothless mastiff” is the paradigm for
“mak[ing] answer to the clock” with his regular “sixteen short howls, not over loud” (9,
12). By prompting an unprecedented “angry moan” (148) and thereby disturbing the
social realm’s regularity, Geraldine reveals her potential for establishing a new narrative
entirely – a potential that irresistibly attracts Christabel both at the social and
transcendent levels of desire. As Henderson observes, “the contention that Geraldine can
be understood as the embodiment of social disruptiveness — incomprehensible novelty
— encoded as sexual and moral indeterminacy immediately raises the question of why
such a mystification should be necessary” (883). 21 While it is obvious that the narrator’s
pointed suspicions about Geraldine are meant to signal her as not belonging to the social
21

Notably, Henderson uses two of Coleridge’s key terms for what I have been calling the transcendent
object of desire: namely, “the Incomprehensible” and “novelty.”
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of which he understands himself to be a criterion of normality, his emphasis on her
physicality and status as an object of desire (especially Christabel’s desire) suggests that
the true source of Geraldine’s conflict is to be found in the contradicting premises for
relationship that she enables Christabel to think.
Against the narrator’s claims and Christabel’s hopes, Geraldine begins to assert
her own form of desire once she is safely within Christabel’s bedroom. The effect of this
is not only to dispute the normative status of the castle social imaginary, but also to
differentiate her own counter-social desire from the desire that Christabel displays, the
object of which I want to align with the transcendent. In the first place, Geraldine
engages in a ritual of toasting her host, declaring: “All they who live in the upper sky, /
Do love you, holy Christabel! [...] for the good which me befel, / Even I in my degree
will try, / Fair maiden, to requite you well” (227-28, 230-32). The ritualistic qualities of
this speech gain some explanation when they are read alongside the narrator’s
epigrammatic close to the Conclusion to Part I, which repeats the idea of this surveying
cloud of witnesses: “But this she knows, in joys and woes, / That saints will aid if men
will call: / For the blue sky bends over all!” (329-31). In both cases, Geraldine and the
narrator appeal to an imaginary meant to mask over one of the key implications of
materiality, which is the terrifying uncertainty it implies as pure contingency. As Anya
Taylor writes, “The sky will still be blue whether the child suffers or not,” yet the idea
allows us to be “[s]uspended in our judgments” (67). As a form of ritual that shares its
vocabulary with such a promise (and which the narrator’s repetition reveals to be
complicit with the social), Geraldine’s toast attempts to establish the scene of desire upon
a social footing. Yet her ostensibly good intentions fail because she cannot account for
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the excessiveness of the desire that follows. Indeed, as I have already suggested,
Geraldine’s values throughout (and especially in Part II) should not be understood as
antithetical to those of Sir Leoline. Despite the narrator’s characterization of her as a
threat, she is not attempting to tear down the social order, but instead to establish one of
her own (that is, one not organized under the Baron). Rather, it is Christabel who
discovers the limits of sympathy in the face of materiality, for it is her desire for
Geraldine that unravels the socializing intentions of both her father and her object of
desire.
This desire is depicted, notably, as sexual, and critics have very rightly focused on
the charged erotics of the poem, particularly in its first part. 22 Throughout, the desire for a
relation that is greater than the social motivates much of the action. Thus, as we have
seen, Christabel, dreaming of her lover, meets a beautiful woman, and carries her across
the threshold of her home. She brings Geraldine into her room unannounced, shares wine
with her, and prepares for the intimacy of “shar[ing] [her] couch,” as she puts it earlier
(122). The drama is undoubtedly one of courtship (Taylor 64) – or even seduction – from
their first meeting. Nevertheless, it is also a drama of social expressions of desire (which
is to say, “appropriate” expressions), as Christabel seeks to “comfort fair Geraldine”
(105), “beseech[es]” her “courtesy” (121), and even “devoutly crie[s]” (137) with the joy
of having arrived safely in the castle court. In the bedroom, these parallel desires enter
into conflict, revealing their incompatibility as Christabel looks to Geraldine to provide
an unassailable ground for her personal narrative and Geraldine refuses. The event
reveals an excessive desire stripped of the social structures that have served to temper and
22

Anya Taylor breaks these readings down into those who “see the heroine Christabel initiated into love”
and those who “see her as a more or less innocent Eve falling into the snares of a demon from preternatural
realms or a Satan” (Erotic Coleridge 60).
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contain it thus far. Christabel’s gaze upon Geraldine undressing is the climactic moment
of her radical vulnerability, a moment just prior to the loss of the supplemental social
tone, in which she manifests her complex desire in a posture of passive waiting and
expectancy. Indeed, we do not even know what Christabel’s own response is to what she
sees, since the narrator so immediately interrupts to inform the readers that it is “[a] sight
to dream of, not to tell!” (253). 23 After Christabel makes her observation, however, there
is no reciprocation; rather, Geraldine, affronted, casts a spell on her so that she cannot
reveal what she has seen. If the conversation poems imagined radical passivity as a way
of accessing the transcendent object, such as the One Life, then “Christabel” represents a
pointed criticism of this posture.
Part of the reason that the poem is forced to criticize this posture of vulnerability
is because of how Coleridge’s earlier experiments failed to account for the unforeseeable
influence of alterity. Indeed, the libidinal disconnect between Christabel and Geraldine is
occasioned by the work of materiality in the poem, where materiality is an absolute
alterity that escapes description. Not only does it figure obliquely as Geraldine’s unseen
body, but it also figures as an unexpected physicality of consciousness. Thus, after her
toast, Geraldine tells Christabel to go undress, further asserting the social role she hopes
to create as an alternative mother, but Christabel finds that she cannot obey: “But through
her brain of weal and woe / So many thoughts move to and fro, / That vain it were her
lids to close” (239-41). 24 This passage recalls Hume’s famous description of the mind as
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Significantly, the only dreamer we have encountered so far is Christabel herself, who “had dreams all
yesternight / Of her betrothed knight” (27-28), inviting us to ask whether this declaration on the narrator’s
part is not also an injunction to his lady Christabel that she keep her dreams to herself. Andrew M. Cooper
glosses this line as deriving from “the prudish voyeurism of the Part I narrator” (96).
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Alan Richardson notes that “[t]he use of ‘brain’ to connote mind is rare in English poetry before the
1790s” (55).
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“a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (163). Hume’s account
of the mind derives from his radical scepticism and his sense of the unstable character of
human understanding. To deal with this unmanageable multiplicity, Hume introduces
sympathy. Our perception of the other provides us with a stable impression around which
to organize our selfhood as a similarly stable idea. Likewise, we are told that, unable to
close her eyes due to this encounter with her own physicality, “half-way from the bed
[Christabel] rose, / And on her elbow did recline / To look at the lady Geraldine” (24244). Yet the connection Coleridge makes between Christabel’s awareness of bodily
processes that she cannot account for and her sympathizing gesture discloses immediately
the more-than-social motivation of this act of looking. This inward sense prompts her
sudden “defi[ance]” (260) of the dictate of the social to go to bed – here, ventriloquized
by the replacement-mother, Geraldine. Her transcendent desire for a narrative that might
provide her with a stable selfhood outside the social leads her to attempt to look upon her
sympathetic other. And in this moment of excessive desire, the constraints of social
sympathy come into clear view:
Beneath the lamp the lady bowed,
And slowly rolled her eyes around;
Then drawing in her breath aloud,
Like one that shuddered, she unbound
The cincture from beneath her breast:
Her silken robe, and inner vest,
Dropt to her feet, and full in view,
Behold! her bosom and half her side ——
A sight to dream of, not to tell!
O shield her! shield sweet Christabel! (245-54)
Notably, this “beholding” does not reveal so much as it gestures towards an
encounter with alterity: in the moment of looking, materiality affects the imaginative
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space of sympathy. A manuscript version of the scene has Christabel behold a more
conventionally monstrous sight: “her bosom and half her side – / Are lean and old and
foul of hue” (252-53) – phrasing to which Coleridge returns in Part II as part of that
section’s social emphasis. In the published version of Part 1, by contrast, it is an
incommunicable sight, a sight that exceeds the possibility of sympathy as “the
communication of sentiments,” which, in its incommunicability, profoundly disrupts
Christabel’s self-understanding, hitherto grounded upon such sympathy. Indeed, what has
entered into sympathy is both the unaccountable materiality Christabel discovers within
herself as she attempts to sleep and the unspeakable materiality she beholds in Geraldine.
Like Godwin’s “magnetical sympathy,” this is a relation that precedes subjectivity. This
particular sharing does not confirm the identity of either woman, but rather it undermines
both by drawing them into the expressly non-identical field of alterity.
An urgent question that the scene raises is the significance of Coleridge using the
female body in particular as his figure of the trauma of materiality. The role of the
problematic narrator may mitigate this question somewhat by recalling the social
imaginary that the narrator is attempting to set up as a backdrop for the two women’s
actions. This imaginary frames the revelation of Geraldine’s body to Christabel, so that
the traditionally patriarchal and misogynistic rhetoric of the social is reinforced by
extension. The narrator’s reaction to Christabel’s assertive activity in the forest—and the
implicit irony with which the reader is meant to read the narrator’s commentary—is
suggestive of a critique at work in the poem. Furthermore, critics have noted the way in
which Geraldine is positioned as a highly charged site of representation specifically. 25
25

For example, Dennis Welch writes, “Although this poem is ‘entirely domestic,’ as one early reviewer
suggested (Matthew 435-36), many of its critics see in Christabel and her relationship with Geraldine a

204
Thus, on the one hand, the fact that the female body is aligned both with alterity and with
horror can be read as an extension of Coleridge’s ironically extended critique of the
social in the voice of the social. Nevertheless, on the other hand, this reading is naïve and
far from complete unless it is accompanied by a recognition that Coleridge is struggling
with a similar dynamic to the one he encountered with pantisocracy. As was the case with
pantisocracy, in which the instability of the unthought understood as both
“incomprehensible” and “novelty” gives way to the ideal of duty, Coleridge’s
deployment of the female body as a figure for alterity represents a reliance upon
stabilizing frameworks capable of managing the expansiveness of his desire. Unlike his
approach to pantisocracy, however, Coleridge is at least partly aware of his capitulation
in the figure, as demonstrated by his alteration from the manuscript’s explicit description
of Geraldine’s body to his occluded description in the narrator’s voice. The implication of
this modification is that it preserves the transcendent character of Christabel’s desire for
the duration of the encounter, thereby leaving open the possibility that it continues as
unthought, despite the narrator’s protests.
Indeed, witnessing Geraldine’s material body disrupts Christabel’s initially
totalizing objectives. For, in her unaccountable physicality, Geraldine reveals the
boundlessness of Christabel’s own desire. Yet such a disruption, rather than marking
totality as impossible (as in Hume), here serves to elaborate and better articulate the
nature of that totality: for Christabel, totality is infinity. Moreover, in this final moment
before Christabel’s undoing, Geraldine herself seems balanced on a knife’s edge as she
neurotic struggle to cope with sexual maturation. To Roy Basler, for example, Geraldine represents ‘sexual
necessity’ that draws the repressed Christabel toward irrational behaviour (25-51). To Charles Tomlinson,
Geraldine represents the ‘fatal woman’ of the Gothic tale, an agent symbolizing guilt and neurosis in
Christabel (105, 107). Susan Luther asserts that the protagonist projects her guilty feelings of sexuality onto
the ghost Geraldine in a subconscious wish to grow up by a ‘self-imposed martyrdom’ (50-86).” (163-64).
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meets Christabel’s gaze, uncertain how to react: “Deep from within she seems half-way /
To lift some weight with sick assay, / And eyes the maid and seeks delay” (257-59).
Having discovered Christabel’s desire, Geraldine “seeks [to] delay” the extreme relation
that threatens to ensue. Contained within the social vehicle of sympathy, Christabel has
successfully communicated her own radical vulnerability to Geraldine, who now reflects
this vulnerability in turn. Yet the consequence of such a repetition is an unasked-for,
shared traversal of fantasy, which draws both Geraldine and Christabel into the realm of
drive, figured here as the realm of the unconscious. Geraldine attempts to delay this
relation because, unlike Christabel, her desire is not infinite in scope, but aims only at
being “lord of thy utterance” (268). She desires only to supplant one narrative with
another and is uninterested in a transcendent relation beyond narrative such as Christabel
seeks. As in pantisocracy, we may note the socializing tone of this desire. The curse
Geraldine casts upon Christabel forces her to submit to a single, monolithic narrative,
making her unable, like Cassandra, to articulate her experience for others. If the
transcendent and the social have thus far been parallel components of a complex and
dynamic relational desire, Geraldine’s curse represses the transcendent and encrypts it
within a sympathetic narrative that is no longer adequate to the full scope of desire at
work in the scene. This inadequacy translates, on the one hand, into Christabel’s
subsequent traumatized silence and, on the other hand, into her being cast out of the
social realm of her family as Geraldine takes her place in Part II.
If the (non-)revelation of materiality in Part I shuts down Christabel’s
transcendent desire by catalyzing the need for social limits, it also allows the desire for
the other to take on new intensities that subsequently respond to these limits. In Part II,
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relational desire is depicted both in the form of conventional sympathy and in what
Coleridge calls “forc’d unconscious sympathy” (609). 26 The first form of sympathy
appears in the account of a ruined friendship between Sir Leoline and Lord Roland, the
man Geraldine claims as her father. The Baron’s fraught history has important libidinal
parallels to his daughter’s experience. Like Christabel, the Baron’s “brain” (413) comes
into opposition with the “constancy” of the “realms above” (410). This material site for
thought stores a “madness” (413) that is incompatible with the friendship of his youth.
Exchanging insults, the two friends part ways (415-18). Yet the rift that remains, a shared
wound similar to what we find in Godwin’s writings, suggests that the desire that linked
them to one another ran deeper than a merely social friendship:
But never either found another
To free the hollow heart from paining—
They stood aloof, the scars remaining,
Like cliffs which had been rent asunder. (419-22)
This account of the aftermath of dark sympathy following the failure of its social
reinforcements repeats the scene of the previous night in which a similar affront takes
place (“Then suddenly, as one defied, / [Geraldine] Collects herself in scorn and pride, /
And lay down by the Maiden’s side!” [260-62]). Likewise, it repeats the image of a
shared wound: “Thou knowest to-night, and wilt know to-morrow, / This mark of my
shame, this seal of my sorrow” (269-70). Even as the disclosure of dark sympathy
anticipates the breakdown of its social enframing, the void it foresees does not
correspond to desire, but rather to drive. Thus the now-friendless Baron greets “[e]ach
matin bell” with the bleak reflection that it “[k]nells us back to a world of death” (333).

26

The closest the second part comes to describing transcendent desire is in the half-formed dream that
Bracy the bard recounts. Reflecting inversely the varnished social narrative of the Conclusion to Part I, the
dream reveals the traumatic truth of what has unfolded, but through a kind of anamorphosis.
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The implosion of desire (such as we also see, for instance, in Audley Mandeville’s
melancholia) does not leave room for any form of sympathy – and, especially, not dark
sympathy, which seems to depend in Coleridge’s work upon an excess of desire.
Nevertheless, the social appears able to reconstitute the void left by desire. In a beautiful
moment of such reconstituted sympathy, Sir Leoline “stood gazing on the damsel’s face: /
And the youthful Lord of Tryermaine / Came back upon his heart again” (428-30).
Unfortunately, this imagined reunion is founded upon a lie.
By contrast, when Christabel discovers herself under the influence of “a forc’d
unconscious sympathy,” there is no resolution of desire. This ongoing suspension
indicates both that this unique form of sympathy resides outside the social and also that it
relies upon some form of the dynamic of passivity Coleridge developed in his earliest
conversation poems. Furthermore, the mechanics of “forc’d unconscious sympathy”
elude the understanding of the narrator: “The maid, devoid of guile and sin, / I know not
how, in fearful wise, / So deeply she had drunken in / That look” (599-602). The ongoing
work of transcendent desire in this scene remains necessarily “incomprehensible” to the
narrator. Yet, if transcendent desire is present, then it must nevertheless be expressed
within the constraints of dark sympathy because it has been evacuated of its content and
is sustained through the combined pressures of the social and of the memory of
materiality. Between, on the one hand, the confusion of the narrator (and the Baron’s
equal disturbance at the sight of Christabel’s “dizzy trance” [589]) and Christabel’s own
ongoing recollection of “no sight but one” (598), on the other, the look Geraldine makes
towards her that is “somewhat of malice, and more of dread” (586) and “of dull and
treacherous hate” (606) can be taken as an event paradoxically responding to Christabel’s
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desire for sympathy. As we saw with Mandeville, the traumatic blow that Clifford finally
delivers to Mandeville gets taken up into a similar event of dark sympathy, signified
forever afterwards by the wound across Mandeville’s eye. Likewise, while this “forc’d
unconscious sympathy” does not result in a physical wound, it joins victim and
perpetrator together in an interwoven dynamic dramatized by both women taking the
roles of Eve and the serpent interchangeably. Nevertheless, like Coleridge’s momentary
dark sympathy with Southey after the collapse of their friendship, it must be described as
only an event. After all, Christabel attempts to reintegrate the social in the following
stanza, as she throws herself at her father’s feet to entreat him to send Geraldine away. As
with Geraldine’s curse, the social builds (or re-builds) itself upon the ruins of an
unmanageable encounter with materiality.
As I have tried to show in my discussion of Christabel’s desire for Geraldine, the
social is intimately tied to the destabilizing experience of materiality. Drawing upon the
mechanisms of desire that resist the void that such an experience attempts to open up, the
social constructs itself upon the trauma of the encounter. Nevertheless, for Christabel,
what has led her to this encounter in the first place is her transcendent desire for
Geraldine. Her subsequent discovery of the alterity that lies within her object of desire
leads to her subjection to a curse, the origin of which is Geraldine herself. Just as
Coleridge discovered the difficulties of socializing the transcendent in his pantisocratic
experiment, so does Christabel realize that even counter-social desires, such as she
perceived in Geraldine and with which she resonated, are still social and must therefore
ultimately fail to satisfy. A notable difference between these realizations, however, lies in
Coleridge’s recognition of the obstacle posed by materiality. The odd Conclusion to Part
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II reflects upon this obstacle from another perspective, discussing the radical limitations
imposed upon feeling by phenomenality, so that even “love’s excess” (664) can be
skewed and twisted into “words of unmeant bitterness” (665) by an imaginary that is
unable to sustain the transcendent. Coleridge’s effort to allow the unthought character of
Christabel and Geraldine’s relationship to remain unthought may have played a role in
the poem’s ongoing incompletion (despite his having plotted the remainder of the
poem). 27 Nevertheless, Coleridge continued to search for a community capable of
supporting his transcendent desire—even if only in an absolutely attenuated form. His
1802 poem, “Dejection: An Ode,” marks the beginning of this journey.

Dejected Desire in Coleridge’s Later Poetry
The fragmented state in which “Christabel” remains suggests that Coleridge could
no longer realize the resolution he had depicted in many of his conversation poems.
(Admittedly, this resolution often seems like a ruse even in these earlier poems, whether
it is Sara’s “more serious eye” in “The Eolian Harp” or Coleridge’s hope—and implied
self-dissatisfaction—in “Frost at Midnight” that Hartley would “learn far other lore”
[50].) As I have suggested, this inability results partly from his attempt to push radical
passivity to its limit, thereby discovering in it the oppressive edge of transcendent desire:
namely, its point of intersection with materiality and its function in actually generating
the social. Hence, the attempt to embody a transcendent philosophy like the one Life in
27

Coleridge had envisioned the poem having five parts, yet he never completed it. Coleridge’s inability to
finish the poem has been the subject of much critical reflection. In his early study, The Road to Tryermaine,
for instance, Arthur H. Nethercot declares his goal to be “to hunt down that ‘elusive clue’ and even to
capture the quarry that left it” (vi). Nethercot speculates on the identity of Geraldine, the implications of the
various scenes in the poem, and includes, among others, James Gillman’s synopsis of what would have
happened had the poem been finished, though he does not give it much credence.
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the world or to represent transcendent desire poetically often runs up against expressions
of materiality that Coleridge found ways of displacing, usually by aligning the
transcendent with the ideal or metaphysical rather than with the unthought or metaphysical. Thus, for example, Coleridge can resolve the problem of Southey’s antipantisocratic backsliding by reasserting (and rendering more emphatic and absolute) the
idealistic principles of pantisocracy. With “Christabel,” however, Coleridge articulates a
dimension of transcendent desire that cannot be re-assimilated—a limit to the possibility
of transcendent desire imaged darkly as the “sight to dream of, not to tell” and
represented as an event that persists even after it is submerged beneath the multiple
narratives of Part II. Like Mandeville’s wound, the sight Christabel has encountered
structures everything that follows from it. Thus Geraldine teaches Christabel that, after
transcendent desire is rendered absolute in the face of the void of materiality, all possible
forms of satisfaction (even, in Christabel’s case, that of speech) will be denied to the
desiring subject. To desire the transcendent is ultimately to discover its inaccessibility—
at least for the one who desires it.
This discovery produces what Coleridge calls “dejection,” which I will posit as a
category of “dark sympathy” because of its liminal position between transcendent and
social desires and the central role failure plays in its development. The social
relationships that Coleridge explores in the early conversation poems and that Christabel
entertains at least upon first encountering Geraldine cannot overcome the pressure of an
absolutely transcendent desire. This pressure leads inevitably to an encounter with the
materiality that transcendent desire implies. Thus, for example, Coleridge’s submission to
the domestic scene at the end of “The Eolian Harp” occurs not only because he is able to
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elevate the disapproval of his spouse to a transcendent register by calling her “Meek
Daughter in the family of Christ” (53), but also because of the subject-exploding
possibility implied in his question about whether the soul itself might in fact only be a
resonance—a reverberation—of an incomprehensible exteriority that precedes it, even as
“God of all” (48). The social, in this case, is his only reprieve; however, the poem itself
indicates that there will be a return of the repressed even if he does not realize it. With
“Dejection,” Coleridge begins to come to terms with the effect of this social reprieve.
Even Coleridge’s inability to decide upon an addressee for this so-called “conversation”
poem, as I explore at greater length below, suggests that the category of the social has
come under suspicion. Thus he continues to perceive the backdrop of alterity that he
described in his earlier conversation poems; however, he finds himself cast out from any
relation with it.
This perception of alterity, I am arguing, signals an ongoing investment in
community – particularly in the bare, inoperative sense Jean-Luc Nancy describes. When
J. Hillis Miller glosses Nancy’s “community” as the sense that “[w]e cannot help but
share our existence with others” (21), he describes the way such community reveals the
incidental nature of the desiring subject. Coleridgean dejection, however, recalls how
such a disclosure is also a revelation of powerlessness, emerging out of a profound sense
of separation. This sense of separation thus inflects the idea of community with what
Jacques Derrida calls, after Paul de Man, “true ‘mourning’” (Memoires 31). Derrida
writes:
True “mourning” seems to dictate only a tendency: the tendency to accept
incomprehension, to leave a place for it, and to enumerate it coldly, almost
like death itself, those modes of language which, in short, deny the whole
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rhetoricity of the true (the non-anthropomorphic, the non-elegiac, the nonpoetic, etc.) (31)
Derrida’s definition describes well the movement Coleridge seems to make away from a
fascination with “the Incomprehensible” (which is also an attempt to submit it to the
phenomenal frame of, for instance, the Eolian harp metaphor) to the mere acceptance of
it. Yet this schema of “true mourning,” which involves both introjecting the other’s
memory while also respecting the alterity of the other, is, Derrida admits, ultimately
impossible, “even though it is in part a hard and undeniable necessity” (35). The dynamic
of attempting a true mourning and failing is one that Coleridge exemplifies in his late
poetry.
As a way of drawing out Coleridge’s ongoing attraction to community, even if
framed by the anti-social affect of dejection, I want to read three of Coleridge’s later
poems: “Dejection: An Ode,” “Constancy to an Ideal Object” (1804-7? 1822?), and
“Love’s Apparition and Evanishment” (1833). These poems are united in their
articulation of an unbridgeable gap between the desiring self and the object of desire.
While each one posits different reactions to this impasse, the poems all reflect a view of
transcendent desire as radically attenuated. “Dejection,” indicating its relatively early
position, maintains a hope that the materiality of the other, which has made community
impossible for Coleridge, might not have the same effect on others. “Constancy,” with its
third-person description of the figure of the woodman assuming the position of a
transcendently desiring subject, renders the fear about the desire for alterity somewhat
more universal by asking the fatal question (though also not answering it): “And art thou
nothing?” (25). By the end of his life, Coleridge’s optimism is nearly gone, as he
indicates with the cruel and cynical image of the “lone Arab, old and blind” in “Love’s
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Apparition and Evanishment.” Waiting for “the aid, which Heaven alone can grant” (7),
the figure does not seem aware of the sheer desperation of his position. If the material
underpinnings of the “image with a glory round its head” in “Constancy” remain hidden
from the woodman, though revealed to the reader, they are even more pervasive
throughout “Love’s Apparition and Evanishment” as precisely this threat of death, which
returns us once more to the question of mourning that Derrida raises. Nevertheless, the
poem’s structure, framing a snapshot of Coleridge himself steeped in dejection between
two metaphors, reveals that the mobility of dejected desire persists even in this darkness.
Indeed, where “Christabel” closes with our heroine unable to speak and Coleridge, in the
Conclusion to Part II, questioning whether speech even has the ability to express
transcendent forms of desire, these instances of dejected desire in Coleridge’s later poetry
suggest a renewed attempt to face such obstacles.
As many critics have noted, “Dejection: An Ode” serves well to distinguish the
“conversation poems” that precede it from the much darker poems – conversational and
otherwise – that Coleridge will write over the last three decades of his life. 28 Coleridge
himself encourages this interpretation, with his nostalgic remembrance of “a time when,
though my path was rough, / This joy within me dallied with distress” (76-77) as opposed
to his present experience of a dark “habit of my Soul” (93). As I have tried to show
above, prior to around 1800, Coleridge’s poetry and life experiments are often driven by
the possibility of integrating transcendent desires with the social realm. Thus the early
conversation poems I have discussed regularly acknowledge a transcendent condition—
sometimes figured as the “One Life”—and attempt furthermore to inflect Coleridge’s
28

For example, Seamus Perry writes: “‘Dejection’ (PW I:362-8) is sometimes seen as marking a decisive
turn in Coleridge, away from the objective interest in experience allowed for by the One Life, and toward
the subjectively unifying life of the sovereign mind” (Uses of Division 143).
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social context with that transcendent condition, such as he attempts with marriage in “The
Eolian Harp” or with childrearing in “Frost at Midnight.” “Dejection: An Ode” marks the
commencement of a shift in Coleridge’s thinking, where the hope he has of belonging to
or locating such a society begins to wane. While the dominant reading of the poem takes
it as a description of what J.C.C. Mays calls (borrowing from the poem itself) Coleridge’s
“loss of the shaping spirit of imagination” (2:696), I want to focus on its status as a
conversation poem and thus return to the relational structure he introduces in his previous
work. Read in this way, the poem does not mark the end of hope’s role in Coleridge’s
exploration of desire. As he writes in the final stanza, he continues to hope for his
addressee, even if he can no longer hope for himself: “To her may all things live, from
Pole to Pole, / Their life the eddying of her living soul!” (135-36). Nevertheless, this hope
for others is also a holdover from the passivity of the earlier conversation poems and thus
– in light of his critique of passivity in “Christabel” – becomes increasingly tenuous as
his sense of the effects of materiality develops over the latter part of his career.
The first complete version of what comes to be called “Dejection: An Ode” was
written on April 4, 1802 as a letter addressed to Sara Hutchinson, and it was later
published—now addressed to the generic, “Edmund”—in the Morning Post on the day of
Wordsworth’s marriage to Mary Hutchinson (October 4, 1802). Wordsworth himself also
made an appearance in one of its iterations before Coleridge finally settled on “Lady” as
the title for his conversation partner in the final printed form, appearing in 1817. The
poem describes the speaker’s past experience of transcendence, which he can no longer
feel. If this transcendent condition corresponds to “Joy” and “Life,” then the condition
under which he now suffers is “[a] stifled, drowsy, unimpassioned grief / Which finds no
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natural outlet, no relief” (22-23). He calls this experience “Reality’s dark dream” (95), or
simply “dejection.” These terms—“Joy” and “Dejection”—serve as two poles that
Coleridge has set up to describe his affective existence. Moving between the two is
another term that has appeared again and again throughout his poetry: “hope,” which he
uses in three places in “Dejection” alone. Where “Joy” and “Dejection” correspond,
respectively, to the possession or lack of the transcendent object, “hope” is the catalyst
and engine directing Coleridge towards the former and away from the latter.
As we see with pantisocracy’s “Sublime Hope,” these themes have currency
earlier in Coleridge’s work. Thus, in “This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison” (1797),
Coleridge desires that his friend Charles Lamb “Struck with deep joy may stand, as I
have stood, / Silent with swimming sense” (38-39). Notably, with “Lime-Tree,” this hope
for the other is also a hope for the self, so that he is able to add in the closing lines, “‘Tis
well to be bereft of promis’d good, / That we may lift the soul, and contemplate / With
lively joy the joys we cannot share” (65-67). In “Dejection,” while Coleridge similarly
hopes that the addressee may “ever, evermore rejoice” (138), the “afflications [that] bow
me down to earth” (82) have transformed his encounter with the corresponding breeze of
“The Eolian Harp.” Not only does he determine that “I may not hope from outward forms
to win / The passion and the life, whose fountains are within” (45-46), but he also
discovers that these resources have been “rob[bed]” (83) from him.
Nevertheless, although he no longer finds joy in the transcendent other, it
continues to inform his self-understanding. Ironically, the chief victim of his separation
from the transcendent is the social. Throughout “Dejection,” social forms are repeatedly
shown as broken or breaking down. For example, the wind (described now as “a scream /
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Of agony by torture lengthen’d out” [97-98]) gives him to think “the Rushing of an Host
in rout, / With groans of trampled men, with smarting wounds—/ At once they groan
with pain, and shudder with the cold!” (111-13). As Godwin demonstrates so well,
violence offers a useful gesture to materiality because of its visceral and non-reflective
content. 29 Thus, as he permits the transcendent object he desires to remain other, an
exercise that involves refusing to phenomenalize materiality in terms that allow a relation
to form, he also refuses to have recourse to the social as Hume did. The second image
Coleridge offers recalls the materiality (or we might say in this instance,
“mater[n/i]ality”) of “Christabel.” With the image of a lost child who “now moans low in
bitter grief and fear, / And now screams loud, and hopes to make her mother hear” (12425), Coleridge depicts the anxiety that arises from an encounter with materiality similar
to that experienced by Christabel under Geraldine’s curse. Not only the transcendent
potential of the mother and child bond, but also its social corollary, are overwhelmed by
the solitude imposed by the alterity Coleridge discovered in allowing the object of his
desire to remain unthought. As with Freud, the longing that Coleridge felt in the dark has
become a kind of fear of the dark. Following a suspicion of the social in any form that
began in “Christabel,” Coleridge traces its limit in “Dejection” in order to show its
inability to sustain a transcendent desire for the other in its materiality.
Having determined the impossibility of integrating the transcendent and the
social, Coleridge explores strategies for gaining proximity to the other via an alternative
understanding of community. The turn to the addressee in the closing lines of the poem
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Along these lines, Georges Bataille observes, “Violence, excess, delirium, madness characterize
heterogeneous elements to varying degrees” (“Psychological Structure” 142). According to Derrida’s
definition of it as “all that resists appropriation,” materiality is synonymous with such heterogeneity, which
Bataille goes on to note is, in its reality, “that of a force or shock” (143).
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helps to uncover the dark sympathy that motivates him. As we have seen in other
conversation poems, the transcendent other that Coleridge desires occupies a complex
relation with the social other to whom he addresses the poem itself: on the one hand, it
draws the addressee towards Coleridge by serving as the impetus for the poem; on the
other hand, it separates the addressee insofar as the addressee is generally unable to enter
into the transcendent desire as Coleridge presents it. In “Dejection,” however, the
transcendent other as Coleridge now understands it—“Thou Wind, that rav’st without”
(99)—is at odds with the object that Coleridge wants the “Dear Lady” to desire. Indeed,
the implication throughout is that what Coleridge understands now as a profound alterity
is the true reality behind the “Joy” he preaches to his addressee. Yet his hope is still
tempered with a fear that the trajectory of desire he has journeyed is inevitable for those
who desire the other, as we see in his comment that “small thoughts have I of sleep: / Full
seldom may my friend such vigils keep!” (126-27). The closing stanza reveals
furthermore that the addressee is already on this path, as she is suffering like Coleridge
has: “Visit her, gentle Sleep! with wings of healing, / And may this storm be but a
mountain-birth” (128-29). Thus, despite the poem’s suggestion of separation and
Coleridge’s claims of solitude, a suffering, “dejected” community is already being
described in between the appeals to the joyful transcendent desire Coleridge wishes he
could recall. In the end, his hope for the other stalls their mutual descent into melancholy,
creating a dark sympathy that permits Coleridge to posit a transcendent object of desire
that he gains indirect access to through the suspension of the other’s similar incapacity to
desire it.
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“Dejection” establishes conditions under which the transcendent other can remain
in a position of potential desire, even as it also records Coleridge’s serious assessment of
the nature of the transcendent object he desires. To accomplish this, Coleridge mobilizes
both his anxiety as well as the implicit anxiety of his addressee and emulates a
transcendent desire that circumvents the limits of materiality that he gestures towards in
his description of the wind’s madness. Although he recognizes that he himself cannot
manage this madness and shape it once more into the joy that he remembers feeling, his
hope that his addressee might be able to amounts ultimately to a rejection of the
unthought. In “Constancy to an Ideal Object,” this strategy is no longer available to him
as he has abandoned the conversational mode in favour of an objective mode from which
he only just escapes via his unanswered question, “And art thou nothing?” (25). His
investigation in the poem into the nature of transcendent desire brings him to the brink of
rejecting the reality of its object altogether, yet his refusal to decide on the “reality” of
desire – his own or another’s – allows a similar suspension to take place to that which he
enacts in “Dejection.” Like Geraldine’s hesitation before rejecting Christabel’s invitation
to be desired as a transcendent object, Coleridge uses the central question of this poem to
explore the role such hesitation plays in facilitating transcendent desire.
Coleridge frames the “yearning Thought” (7) that drives “Constancy” within a
dynamic that moves between transcendent and social modes of desire, so that the absolute
characterization of it as “[t]he only constant in a world of change” (3) is undermined and
questioned by socializing descriptions of it as “loveliest Friend” (16). This dynamic
appears again in reverse a few lines later when Coleridge declares his desire “[‘t]o have a
home, an English home, and thee!’ / Vain repetition! Home and Thou are one” (18-19).
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Moving from an understanding in which he draws a distinction between the social and the
transcendent, Coleridge goes on to collapse this distinction in favour of identifying a
transcendent object of desire. Indeed, his realization at the end of the first stanza is that it
is precisely this transcendent characteristic that makes “[t]he peacefull’st cot” (20) more
than just “a becalmed Bark” (22). The transcendent gives the social meaning, as he had
discovered in his conversation poems. However, the important question that leads into the
second stanza, “And art thou nothing?” (25), represents a shift in thought from the
conversation poems into the realm of dejection. To ask this question after noting the
transformative role of the transcendent in the effective unfolding of social desire is to
interrogate the reality of “home” and all other social forms.
Despite this ambivalence about the transcendent character of his object of desire
(and, complexly, his social addressee), this second stanza discerns ultimately that the
transcendent dimension Coleridge repeatedly perceives is related to a materiality he
cannot assimilate. This other is not simply “nothing” (25), but rather it is also an “other”
that exceeds the one who observes it. Notably, the subject desiring this other is described
as a “woodman,” a figure that appears in several of Coleridge’s poems, including the
“Dejection” ode. There, addressing the “Wind, that rav’st without” (99), Coleridge
suggests contra his appeal only a few years earlier to the innate harmony that unites the
wind with the harp or the spirit of the imagination with the mind, that the underlying
materiality of inspiration is better fit for a “pine-grove whither woodman never clomb”
(101) than for any lute. By distinguishing the site of nature from the human observer,
Coleridge makes a similar move to the one he would later make with “Constancy,” where
the natural phenomenon stands apart from the described experience of the woodman that
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the poem observes. This reinforced separation—which is notably hidden from the
woodman himself—recalls the separation of the maiden from the nightingales and is also
in keeping with the trajectory Coleridge’s thought takes beginning with “Dejection.” The
woodman’s observation of the “image with a glory round its head” (30), like the
“yearning Thought, that liv’st but in the brain” (4), is an experience of relation, or at least
of desire for the other. When he appears in both “Dejection” and earlier, 30 the figure of
the woodman functions generally in opposition to transcendent desire—hence his
necessary absence from scenes of potentially transcendent quality. Even in “Constancy,”
the ironic position of the narrator in relation to the ignorant woodman serves to question
the woodman’s understanding of what constitutes the transcendent. The glow he
worships, Coleridge indicates discreetly in a scientific footnote, is a mere trick of
nature. 31 Because of the vantage point Coleridge offers the reader, this “trick” serves as a
symbol for the unknown in nature, which is itself an expression of materiality’s alterity.
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Two earlier instances of the woodman may serve to showcase the development of Coleridge’s figure in
his poetry. In “France: An Ode,” written in the spring of 1798, Coleridge mentions the woodman in
similarly absent terms. Instead of imagining this absence as liberating the Dionysian scene of materiality
envisioned in “Dejection,” however, the woodman who does not appear participates in a stanza meant to
invoke “those objects in Nature, the contemplation of which had inspired the Poet with a devotional love of
Liberty” (CP 1:463). In this situation, the speaker describes himself winding through the woods “Where,
like a man belov’d of God, / Thro’ glooms, which never woodman trod, / … / Inspir’d beyond the guess of
folly / By each rude shape, and wild unconquerable sound!” (10-11, 13-14). Before its appearance in
“Dejection,” the figure of the woodman also appeared in one of Coleridge’s earlier poems, “The Raven”
(1798), as an antagonistic force. Having described the wanderings of the titular Raven and his “Wife,”
Coleridge introduces “a Woodman in leathern guise: / His brow, like a pent-house, hung over his eyes” (2425). Prefiguring the doomed mariner about whom Coleridge would write later that same year, the
Woodman wordlessly destroys the Raven’s home and children to gather wood for building a ship. When
the ship sinks in a storm, the Raven discovers that “REVENGE WAS SWEET!” (42). Unlike the woodman
in “Dejection,” whose absence is what would make the “pine-grove” a suitable venue for the “scream / Of
agony by torture lengthen’d out” (97-98), the Woodman’s own actions are what prompts “the sea-shriek of
their perishing Souls” (39) in the earlier poem.
31
In his biography of Coleridge, James Gillman describes Coleridge’s attempt in 1799 to witness the
“spectre of Brocken” – the phenomenon he describes in “Constancy” – during his visit to Germany. For his
account of the phenomenon, he quotes from a “Mr. Jordan” who describes the experience in a manner that
resonates with the poem: “there appeared before me, though at a great distance towards the Worm
mountains, the gigantic figure of a man, as if standing on a large pedestal” (142).
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If the poem is partly an attempt to explore the nature of the object of transcendent
desire, then it is also an attempt to document the experience of that desire. In the case of
the woodman, Coleridge describes what might be called (after Schiller) a “naïve”
experience of the transcendent desire for the other. Yet his own description of desire as it
unfolds over the course of the poem cannot be undone by the extended simile of the
woodman. Instead, it remains suspended in the question that opens the second stanza and
in the promise of the title itself: that Coleridge’s commitment to the ideal object will
remain “constant.” As we have seen, however, this constancy undergoes several
permutations over the course of Coleridge’s career: from the relentless commitment to
“duty” in pantisocracy, to the radical passivity advocated in the conversation poems, to
the unasked-for engagement of “forc’d unconscious sympathy” in “Christabel,” to the
ambivalent retention of a hope for the other and not the self that he deploys as a feature of
dejected desire. The trajectory of this development is one that moves towards an
increasing attenuation of what it means to be “constant.” Indeed, as we can see in the
closing line of “Constancy,” which draws attention to the woodman’s mistake (“Nor
knows he makes the shadow, he pursues!” [32]), the implication is that the true nature of
the unthought is in fact irrationality and ignorance. To be constant to a community with
that which might in fact be nothing, the poem implies, is a kind of superstition that jars
against the rationality embodied by the poem’s footnote. Yet this suggestion is also not a
rejection. Indeed, it appears that Coleridge’s constancy remains to the end of his writing
career, though by that time it has narrowed in duration and substance to an event of desire
only. In this way, the object of desire and its expressibility in light of the inscrutable
materiality Coleridge asserted in “Christabel” can finally be aligned in such a way that
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the unthought becomes possible without turning over immediately either into more stable
and social idealisms, on the one hand, or into simple ignorance, on the other.
Where Coleridge compares his transcendent desire with that of the “enamoured”
(but also deluded) woodman in “Constancy to an Ideal Object,” his later self-fashioning
as a “lone Arab, old and blind” (“Love’s Apparition” 1) in “Love’s Apparition and
Evanishment” reflects a further conceptual shift from the active pursuit of the
transcendent object to an increasingly resigned acceptance of that object’s inaccessibility.
The figure of the Arab, who also appears in “The Blossoming of the Solitary Date-Tree,”
is drawn from a number of sources, including Book 5 of Wordsworth’s The Prelude and
the Travels of James Bruce. 32 This figure expresses Coleridge’s feeling of nomadism not
only in his own life generally, but also as a defining characteristic of the Romantics. Yet,
notably, the poem does not describe a wandering nomad, but rather one in stasis: a person
“[s]ome caravan had left behind / Who sits beside a ruin’d well” (2-3). Abandoned by the
wandering caravan of Romanticism, the Arab has also lost his sight, a feature that recalls
(if it also inverts) the condition Coleridge claims for himself in “Dejection.” There, he
describes his diminished capacity: “I see them all so excellently fair, / I see, not feel how
beautiful they are!” (37-38), which implies that true poetic vision has abandoned him,
leaving him “gaz[ing]—and with how blank an eye!” (30). Similarly blind and alone, the
lonely Arab comes to serve as a figure of dejected desire.

32

For Wordsworth, see The Prelude (1805): “He seemed an arab of the Bedouin tribes; / … Much rejoiced
/ The dreaming man that he should have a guide / To lead him through the desart” (5.78, 81-83). The
connection between Coleridge and James Bruce was first made by Lane Cooper in a 1906 article, “The
Abyssinian Paradise in Coleridge and Milton.” Cooper’s observation has been taken up several times since,
including in E.S. Shaffer’s ‘Kubla Khan’ and the Fall of Jerusalem, where Shaffer writes in an endnote of
Coleridge’s use of “Bruce’s descriptions of Arab nomadism” (329n.42).
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Tilottama Rajan writes of “Love’s Apparition and Evanishment” that it is
distinguished by “the absence of a sympathetic auditor, which confirms the separation of
vision from allegory by exiling conversation into soliloquy” (Dark Interpreter 238).
While I have suggested that all of Coleridge’s conversation poems are monologic to
begin with, Rajan’s observation underscores the shift in intention that seems to be at
work in this poem as well. Although the conversation poems did not contain dialogue,
they had a dialogic intent, positing an addressee outside the self. With “Love’s
Apparition and Evanishment,” the addressee is Coleridge himself. 33 Like Christabel, his
restfulness is disturbed (and he wonders if his vision is “a transient sleep, perchance, /
Flitted across the idle brain” [13-14]); however, unlike in that poem, where Christabel’s
eyes are forced open to behold the other in its unaccountable materiality, Coleridge finds
that “a trance, / Turn’d my eye inward” (16-17). This failure of the poem to transport him
into the space of the other might stem from its use of allegory, which Paul de Man argues
was, for Coleridge, “purely mechanical, an abstraction whose original meaning is even
more devoid of substance than its ‘phantom proxy,’ the allegorical representative; it is an
immaterial shape that represents a sheer phantom devoid of shape and substance”
(“Rhetoric of Temporality” 191-92). 34 In other words, allegory does not appear to go far
enough.
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To take up Rajan’s later work on Romantic Narrative, we might posit an analogous distinction between
“the lyrical consciousness,” which is “present to itself, able to bypass the reflective and reflexive mode of
language in song, or at least to make language the true voice of feeling” (12), and a peculiarly Romantic
form of “narrative” as “a process in which the self discloses its difference from itself” (14). Thus, although
the conversation poems appear as narratives in the conventional sense of positing a world with multiple
actors, their monologic character makes the potential interlocutors secondary to their expression of a
feeling that language is enabled to carry unproblematically; by contrast, Coleridge’s later poetry inquires
into the ways alterity can surface and disrupt even from within the self.
34
De Man is here quoting from The Statesman’s Manual.
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Yet this inability to orient him towards what Levinas might call “welcoming” the
other is in keeping with what the impulse of dark sympathy has come to mean for
Coleridge. Like the community of “impossible mourning,” dark sympathy catalyzes a
paradoxical relationship in which, on the one hand, the other gets appropriated into the
self’s understanding of itself and its relations and, on the other, the other remains
irreducibly other. As Derrida writes, “If there is a finitude of memory, it is because there
is something of the other, and of memory as a memory of the other, which comes from
the other and comes back to the other” (29). The memories Coleridge recalls stir the
possibility of reigniting the kind of transcendent desire that he entertains in his
conversation poems; however, the threat of death brooding over the poem – figured as the
doomed Arab, the drooping flower, and the corpse of Hope – refuses such optimism.
Nevertheless, in each instance, the poem repeatedly gestures to a moment in which that
possibility of relating to the transcendent other seems realizable. Whether it is the Arab
gazing towards heaven (7), Coleridge’s experience of having his “eye [turned] inward”
(17) by a “transient sleep” passing across his brain (13-14), or Love’s (futile) kiss upon
her sister’s lips (24), the event of desire each moment expresses posits a community
characterized by uncertainty, passivity, and risk. These elements of materiality not only
resist appropriation into the dominant social narrative, but also refuse to coalesce into the
kind of imaginary we might see in either the One Life or pantisocracy.
Instead, as both this poem and “Constancy to an Ideal Object” demonstrate, the
momentary recovery of this relational proximity qua inoperative community also makes
it “die anew” (28). If Coleridge’s tendency earlier in his career was to substitute a stable
metaphysics for the capaciousness of the unthought, then his later work following
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“Christabel” allows the unthought to merge with the finitude of death, an important idea
that Mary Shelley will also develop. The darkness of dejected community results from
the gradual, decades-long attenuation of Coleridge’s idealism. Moreover, this decline
begins early on with his deep attraction to what Seamus Perry calls “the uses of division,”
which ensures that idealism appears for him never as a straightforward unity, but rather
as an attempt to think “multeity” – a set of relations. Unable to develop a sustainable
imaginary for idealism, Coleridge turns to face the “sight to dream of, not to tell” at the
heart of any idealism and discovers community – understood as mere being-with – in the
midst of his failed transcendent desire.

If dark sympathy in Coleridge’s poetry appears as a momentary surfacing of hope
in the midst of dejection, then his growing recognition of the way materiality wholly
encompasses him is largely responsible. Differently from Godwin, the destabilizing
impact of the materiality of desire for Coleridge is initially an experience he works to
avoid. His thinking has been driven by imaginaries such as pantisocracy or those he
describes via conversation; the realm of drive on the underside of such desire erodes the
efficacy and pervasiveness of these imaginaries and prompts him to retreat into a pseudotranscendent mode characterized by its abstraction, rather than its limitless scope. What
“Christabel” and Coleridge’s later poetry suggest, however, is that the object of
transcendent desire cannot be separated from materiality. As a vehicle for the imaginary,
transcendent desire is not identical with materiality; however, its definition as potentially
infinite necessitates that it overlap with the radical inscrutability of materiality. To return
to the opening discussion of traversing the fantasy from desire into drive, we may note
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that Coleridge’s attraction to forms of desire is forced to recognize how desire itself can
be undermined by an insufficient attention to drive. The fantasy of his desire, appearing
as the harmony of a life in the pantisocracy or as the primordial unity of the one Life,
demands that all outlying elements be encompassed by it. This includes the experience of
that which exceeds his ability to re-present it. Such experience, as Žižek reminds us,
emerges from the realm of drive. Desire seeks to satisfy itself with a remainder still left
over to perpetuate that desire through difference: that remainder emerges as a result of
Law or prohibition. As we have seen in “Christabel,” drive circumvents such symbolic
constraints in a moment of pure jouissance, which is then recapitulated within the social
framework of desire; however, this recapitulation signals the epochal shift of the event of
materiality that has preceded it. With his later poetry, Coleridge takes up this event as the
starting point for community, rather than desire. “Dejection,” therefore, can be read as
bidding farewell to his emphasis upon transcendent desire, which he further deconstructs
in “Constancy.” When, in “Love’s Apparition and Evanishment,” he observes the
destructive effect of love upon hope – of an idealized social desire upon transcendent
desire – he is expressing a more developed position on the nature of the bare community
he has resigned himself to: namely, that community is not the expression of transcendent
desire, but of its failure. 35
For both Godwin and Coleridge, all concrete forms of relation persistently fail to
accommodate the sheer scope of desire posited by sympathy. In the extreme relations
Godwin forges between Falkland and Caleb, or Mandeville and Clifford, and the
35

As we see in prose writing, such as Aids to Reflection (1825) or On the Constitution of Church and State
(1829), Coleridge continued to reflect upon social forms of desire; however, unlike his early attempts,
Coleridge has relegated this work of reflection to the “abstruse research” he posits in “Dejection” as that
which protects him from the effects of materiality.
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unspeakable relation we see between Christabel and Geraldine in Coleridge’s poem, a
potentially sympathetic union loses its socializing restriction, revealing a violent and
totalizing energy. This energy produces the figure of the misanthrope for Godwin and, in
Coleridge’s later work, what he called “dejection” or “reality’s dark dream.” For Mary
Shelley, this dark energy of materiality suggests itself as the grounds (or ungrund) for
community itself. As I hope to show, the issues sympathy raises form a central
problematic throughout her work. This problematic retraces the conflict sympathy
implies for the Romantics between its social manifestation and what seems to be its
transcendent core. By imagining worlds in which Coleridge’s “sight to dream of, not to
tell” takes on a central and defining place within the psychological – or even literal –
landscape, Shelley forces events of dark sympathy to occur, obstructing any attempt to
retreat into the safety of an imaginary – either social or transcendent – and facilitating a
more extended reflection on the nature of a community that lies beyond desire.
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CHAPTER FIVE
“[T]he thorny truth of things”: A Community Beyond Desire in Frankenstein,
Matilda, and The Last Man

“... I know, at least I have often suspected, that you have a
tendency, partly constitutional perhaps & partly owing to
the turn of your philosophy, to look over-intensely at the
dark side of human things...”
— Letter from Leigh Hunt to Mary Shelley (SC 6:845)

I have been arguing that sympathy takes on an agonistic quality in the Romantic
period, instantiating a tension between, on the one hand, the conflicting, though both
imaginary, fields of sociality and transcendence, and, on the other hand, a newfound
sense of radical otherness and its effects. Mary Shelley takes up this uneven triad of
sociality, transcendence, and materiality in her novels, developing an account of
community that attempts to face materiality directly. In the previous chapters, I have
attempted to show that Godwin’s and Coleridge’s respective articulations of this
encounter I am calling dark sympathy emerge partly under the pressure of a more robust
sense of alterity, inaugurated via the materialist paradigm of the eighteenth century and
the materiality it gestures towards. Shelley posits a similar event, while also exploring the
accompanying tendency to resist this materiality, which her work suggests has the
dangerous potential of allowing an ideology of the aesthetic to substitute for a more
limitless desire. For Paul de Man, an ideology of the aesthetic aligns with the tendency to
accept as unproblematic the category of the aesthetic as a bridge for getting from ideas to
life in the world. 1 In other words, aesthetic ideology mistakes imaginaries – even

1

In his reading of Kant’s third critique, Paul de Man contrasts Schiller and Kant to describe a similar
movement to the one that Shelley’s novel charts from a sublime in support of the social to a sublimity that
not only undermines it, but leaves subjectivity itself also in ruins, providing, I want to suggest, the grounds
for an alternative form of community. For de Man, Schiller silently revises Kant’s theory of the sublime by
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transcendent imaginaries – as somehow complete and true to life. This chapter reads
Shelley’s deployment of dark sympathy in three of her novels as developing a critique of
such aesthetic ideology as merely an amplified form of desire that fails to take account of
materiality. Against such a false transcendence, Shelley posits an analogy between
transcendence and the very materiality that aesthetic ideologies seek to deny. I will focus
on Shelley’s first two novels, Frankenstein and Matilda, in order to sketch out her inquiry
into the limits of sympathetic desire and to establish the place of this radical alterity,
which haunts the edges of the transcendent in her thought. 2 In The Last Man, I will argue
that Shelley returns to the site of the social in order to determine the possibilities that may
remain for any sympathy—even a dark one that lingers after the end of all human
relations.
Of all the characters that appear here, the nameless Creature of Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein perhaps embodies best this dissertation’s central argument about the

shifting his terms from an asymmetrical set of ideas appearing as the mathematical and dynamic sublime,
which de Man describes as “shot through with dialectical complication” (“Phenomenality and Materiality”
73), to the straight-forward and totalizing polarity of the theoretical and practical sublime. The Schillerian
concept of the sublime (which de Man describes as “psychological” as opposed to Kant’s “philosophical”
approach [“Kant and Schiller” 141]) exists within a tropological system, which appears at least partly
analogous to the Lacanian Symbolic order. Through the trope of chiasmus (which de Man identifies as a
central trope in Schiller’s style [135]), Schiller offers up the imagination as a mechanism that overcomes
the limits of representation, “remedy[ing] our incapacity” (146), by segregating the intellect from the threat
of reality. De Man’s theory of aesthetic ideology will prove important for my reading of The Last Man, as
this novel focuses especially upon the relation of aesthetics to materiality within the context of the sublime.
2
My decision to discuss Matilda rather than Valperga is largely pragmatic due to the size and complexity
of the latter novel. Both works offer a picture of the deep problems associated with social desire and align
the transcendent form of desire with the materiality of grief and trauma that cannot be expressed. Indeed,
Valperga accounts more extensively for this latter point than Matilda, as Euthanasia experiences a dark
sympathy for Beatrice fuelled in part by the trauma the latter has experienced in a way that Woodville
never does with Mathilda. Likewise, I have omitted discussion of Shelley’s later novels, The Fortunes of
Perkin Warbeck (1830), Lodore (1835), and Falkner (1837), as the critical question of their role in
Shelley’s larger corpus extends somewhat beyond the scope intended for the chapter. (For a brief review of
how “critics have narrativized [Shelley’s] corpus” (11), see Tilottama Rajan’s introduction to Valperga
[11-13].) Nevertheless, of these, Falkner could be read as articulating a dark sympathy between Elizabeth
and Falkner, which is suggestive particularly in light of Betty Bennett’s argument about “Shelley’s
Reversioning of Elizabeth from Frankenstein to Falkner,” as Elizabeth of Frankenstein never seems to
experience this in any way.
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Romantic era’s engagement with a problem eighteenth-century philosophy ultimately
evades: that, at the limits of sympathy, a desire for the other persists. Thus, for instance,
Victor’s pursuit of his Creature across the ice fields of the north—intent on his
destruction, even as he preserves him by telling their story to Robert Walton—exhibits
several characteristics of dark sympathy. These reverberate to the end of the novel, where
the Creature is permitted to give a closing defense and in effect gets the last word.
Offering no comment, Walton only observes the final “darkness and distance” (244) into
which the Creature disappears, suggesting an openness to the inscrutable, material quality
of the Creature. This openness circles around the (im)possibility of sympathizing with the
Creature and suggests, though Shelley does not take it further in her first novel, an
alignment between the absence of desire and community. As we have seen elsewhere, the
desire for the other as transcendent often gets submitted compulsively to a desire for the
other in its social role, which is to say a phenomenal or even imaginary form. Coleridge’s
pantisocratic experiment, for example, follows this trajectory. The philosophical
confidence in this strategy of desire faces increased challenges over the course of the
eighteenth century, as the idea of transcendence begins to merge with what Jacques
Derrida calls “all that resists appropriation” (“Typewriter Ribbon” 353), or materiality.
The result is that the socializing drive of the eighteenth century, epitomized by sympathy,
repeatedly comes up against the socially inassimilable reality that Mary Shelley describes
as “the thorny truth of things” (Last Man 360).
In her introduction to the 1831 edition of Frankenstein, Shelley recounts how the
initial idea for her novel prompted a recourse to the language of sympathy. She writes,
“Swift as light and as cheering was the idea that broke in upon me. ‘I have found it! What

231
terrified me will terrify others” (358; emphasis mine). Predicating the universal appeal of
her idea upon an assumption of shared identity, Shelley not only takes sympathy as the
modus operandi of her writing practice, but also organizes that sympathetic exercise
around a mutual anxiety—the terror of the other. While Shelley suggests a pivotal role
for sympathy in facilitating human social understanding, she also recognizes its limits
and inherent artifice. In that same introduction, she describes her “affection for [the
novel], for it was the offspring of happy days” (358). Those days involved “many a walk,
many a drive, and many a conversation, when I was not alone” (358)—days very unlike
the bleak present Shelley implies for herself.
A similar opposition appears in the fictional introduction of The Last Man, where
she writes: “My labours have cheered long hours of solitude, and taken me out of a
world, which has averted its once benignant face from me, to one glowing with
imagination and power” (7). This movement into a world of the imagination is a
movement into an earlier time of sympathy, as she avers: “For awhile my labours were
not solitary; but that time is gone; and, with the selected and matchless companion of my
toils, their dearest reward is also lost to me” (6). By extension, such a movement implies
a departure from the actual, present time. With the loss of her life with Percy, Shelley
suggests that she has also lost the foundation that might give meaning to the work of her
imagination. As she had written a few years earlier, only months after Percy’s death,
“When I meditate or dream on my future life, one idea alone animates me – I think of
friends & human intercourse – if I do not say, ‘how flat & unprofitable!’ – I weep to
think how unstable all that is” (Journals 2:430). In the wake of such extreme loss,
Shelley uncovers the horizon of sympathy’s possibility. There remains a temporary
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power in “[l]iterary labours, the improvement of my mind, & the enlargement of my
ideas” to “elevate me from my lethargy” (Journals 2:431-32), which resembles
Coleridge’s initial use of suspension as a method for avoiding dejection; nevertheless, the
sympathetic content of these occupations is distinguished from an idea of sympathy that
can no longer be sustained. Shelley’s personal experience of this divergence reflects a
long-spanning critical investigation of sympathy and its limits, as I have tried to show in
previous chapters. Her exploration of this experience in her writing takes these ideas
about the dark side of sympathy still further.

Against Transcendence in Frankenstein
Critics have regularly drawn attention not only to Shelley’s interest in sympathy,
but also to her peculiar take on it. By far, Frankenstein has attracted the most critical
attention both generally and with regards to the subject of sympathy. David Marshall,
most prominently, argues that Frankenstein “specifically focuses on the causes and
effects of sympathy’s failure” (181). While Shelley affirms in that novel a generally
sympathetic character for human relations, she diverges from the eighteenth-century
moral philosophers in what she takes to be sympathy’s greatest asset and its central idea:
an emphasis upon alterity. The potentiality this entails is at the same time that which
grounds sympathy and enables it to be more than just mere sociality. Along these lines, I
want to argue that Frankenstein introduces a dark sympathy that is, on the one hand,
deeply connected with the desires of its three narrators: Robert Walton, Victor
Frankenstein, and the Creature. On the other hand, the novel also resists the work of dark
sympathy by permitting a nostalgia for the social to foreclose upon it. Thus, in the first
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place, I will explore briefly how Shelley’s use of framing narratives enables her to
introduce the question of sympathy as an orienting theme for the novel—and,
furthermore, how the framing narratives showcase sympathy’s troubling limits as the
narratives of each frame rub up against each other in competition for approval. I will then
focus on each of these narratives to show how they depict the intersection of sympathy
with social and transcendent forms of desire and, ultimately, with drive. Walton is
compelled by sympathy, yet is ultimately unable to distinguish between social and
transcendent desire, imagining that his ambition resembles Victor’s. Never fully facing
the materiality that accompanies transcendent desire, he is forced to return to the social
realm at the close of the novel. By contrast, Victor could be read as the antithesis of a
sympathizing subject: not only does he reject his Creature’s appeals for sympathy, but he
also rejects Walton’s. Yet, if Victor fails to sympathize, then to what does he direct his
transcendent desire? As I will argue below, his transcendent desire is ultimately directed
towards the void of his own identity, which he expresses through the ambivalence of his
desire itself. When this ambivalent desire intersects with the void in identity that is
signalled by the Creature, an event of dark sympathy occurs as he perceives for a moment
the impossibility of that desire. Nevertheless, although she depicts moments of dark
sympathy throughout to emphasize desire’s insatiability, Shelley does not ultimately
allow this dark sympathy to express its full implication. Instead, as I have suggested, the
novel remains only open to materiality, as it remains oriented by Walton’s entrenched (if
also unwanted) position within the social realm.
Jeanne Britton argues that, if the novel seems to depict the failure of sympathy, it
also performs sympathy successfully through its narrative approach, as each narrating
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voice sympathizes with the voice it frames (3). At the heart of the novel is the Creature’s
story, embedded within his creator’s narrative, which is also embedded within the letters
of Robert Walton to his sister—each of these narrators trust implicitly the imaginative
vision that has been passed on to them, and they seek to replicate it faithfully. On the one
hand, Shelley borrows this form from writers such as Godwin. As we see in Caleb
Williams, for instance, Caleb as a first-person narrator is able to incorporate the
experience of his rival, Falkland, via the narrative of Falkland’s servant, Collins. On the
other hand, a key difference between the two approaches lies in the status each one gives
to these narratives. In Caleb Williams, Caleb openly admits his active involvement as an
editor, inviting us to question his reliability in light of the larger mystery of the novel. He
writes: “I shall interweave with Mr. Collins’s story various information which I
afterwards received from other quarters [...] To avoid confusion in my narrative, I shall
drop the person of Collins, and assume to be myself the historian of our patron” (66).
This manipulation of the text is notably absent in Frankenstein. Instead, Robert
Walton makes a point to describe the fidelity with which he records Victor’s tale: “I have
resolved every night, when I am not engaged, to record, as nearly as possible in his own
words, what he has related during the day” (62). Victor likewise adopts the voice of the
Creature without any reference to the mediation this transfer implies: “I consented to
listen; and seating myself by the fire which my odious companion had lighted, he thus
began his tale” (128). In both cases, the force of sympathy operates on the narratives as
an implicit mark of their authenticity. The Creature’s story affects Victor despite the fact
that it is being re-narrated by Victor himself retrospectively. He explains to Walton: “The
latter part of his tale had kindled anew in me the anger that had died away while he
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narrated his peaceful life among the cottagers” (169). Similarly, Walton describes to his
sister the future plans for the manuscript of Victor’s story: “This manuscript will
doubtless afford you the greatest pleasure: but to me, who know him, and who hear it
from his own lips, with what interest and sympathy shall I read it in some future day!”
(62). Britton observes that “Frankenstein offers a version of sympathy that is constituted
by the production and transmission of narrative as compensation for the failures of faceto-face sympathetic experience” (3). Likewise, the over-determined appeals that each
narrator makes to his respective auditor regarding the effectiveness of the narrative itself
aims to cover over the indeterminacy each one faces in actually sympathizing.
For the reader as well, the respective narratives posit themselves as deserving of
sympathy; 3 however, in the movement between these narratives, as we see in Victor’s
description of how his anger was “kindled anew” (169) by the narrative, the reader
encounters the limits of sympathy. Although the narratives explicitly invite sympathy, the
very boundaries that separate them also expose sympathy’s ambiguities, including the
impulse to sympathize with that which is potentially unsavoury or even villainous. For
example, even after discovering Victor’s complicity in the deaths of his loved ones and
the other disturbing incidents composing the biography, Walton continues to sympathize
with him, observing how Victor’s “fine and lovely eyes were now lighted up with
indignation” (231). 4 Indeed, by comparing the individual narrator’s self-determined

3

Alan Rauch writes: “Shelley’s narrative technique is an inclusive one, conscripting the reader into a
participatory process that is diametrically opposed to Frankenstein’s isolationist and exclusionary
methodology” (229).
4
Cf. Jonathan Lamb’s interesting discussion of what he calls (after Milton’s introduction of the term)
“horrid sympathy.” This “requires a transit from the realm of the human into another unprecedented zone of
experience, where a bond is formed with alien thoughts and feelings” (98). Nevertheless, I would
distinguish “horrid sympathy” from dark sympathy because of how it serves as an extended mode (rather
than an event), which involves “the loss of ownership which Milton distinctly represents as a transfer of
authorship, a loss of symmetry, and a breakdown of narrative” (96).
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framing of how he wishes to sympathize with his selected object of desire to the way the
text seems to suggest he should be relating to that object, we can take up the ambiguity of
sympathy in a manner that can be extended into Shelley’s similar investigation in
Matilda. Unlike Frankenstein, however, Matilda represents a sustained gazing into the
dark materiality of this ambiguity, from which there can be no retreat.
In Victor, Captain Robert Walton believes he has found a kindred spirit. He writes
to his sister: “I said in one of my letters, my dear Margaret, that I should find no friend on
the wide ocean; yet I have found a man who, before his spirit had been broken by misery,
I should have been happy to have possessed as the brother of my heart” (60). Walton
finds himself attracted to Victor for a number of reasons, chief of which is a “sympathy
and compassion” for the stranger’s “constant and deep grief” (60). He imagines, as
sympathy insists he must, that Victor “must have been a noble creature in his better days,
being even now in wreck so attractive and amiable” (60). This assumption, founded upon
sympathy, says more about Walton than it does about Victor – for, as we come to
discover, Victor is not really so “noble” as he is ambitious, and herein lies the true source
of Walton’s partiality. Earlier, when he is describing his desire for a friend, Walton
specifies: “when I am glowing with the enthusiasm of success, there will be none to
participate my joy [sic]; if I am assailed by disappointment, no one will endeavour to
sustain me in dejection” (53). This language of “success” and “disappointment” is
explicitly linked with Walton’s demand: “I desire the company of a man who could
sympathize with me; whose eyes would reply to mine” (53). If sympathy involves an
imaginative exchange in which the self comes to understand itself through the assessment
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of others, Walton discovers in Victor an expansiveness that he hopes to emulate. Walton
describes his first impressions of Victor, lately come aboard his ship:
I never saw a more interesting creature: his eyes have generally an
expression of wildness, and even madness; but there are moments when, if
any one performs an act of kindness towards him, or does him any the
most trifling service, his whole countenance is lighted up, as it were, with
a beam of benevolence and sweetness that I never saw equalled. But he is
generally melancholic and despairing. (58)
While Victor presents Walton and his men with a mysterium that must be disclosed,
articulated through a litany of emotions, Walton works throughout to overcome this by
offering Victor’s actions an explanation. As we have already seen, the locked trunk in
Caleb Williams and the “sight to dream of, not to tell” in “Christabel” both posit
plenitudes-figured-as-voids at the heart of the darkly sympathetic relations they depict.
By contrast, in Victor, Walton sees his own wide ambition reflected back to him as
potentiality.
Hence, what is the nature of Walton’s desire for Victor and, perhaps of equal
importance, how does Victor want to be desired? Walton’s attraction to Victor’s
expansiveness and ambition suggests that he desires Victor transcendently, as an other
defined by its limitless scope. Notably, however, the text does not seem to agree with
Walton’s assessment of his desire. In the first place, Victor appears to reject this kind of
desire, asking for only a social connection with Walton. While he calls Walton “my
friend” (231) in places, it is clear that he does not mean what Walton means by this word.
Instead, he tells Walton directly: “when you speak of new ties, and fresh affections, think
you that any can replace those who are gone?” (233). Secondly, where other examples of
transcendent desire (including those found in the novel itself) repeat the incapacitating
event of dark sympathy that we see in Christabel when her desire is pressed to the limit,
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Walton never suffers this. Instead, when he finds his ambition truncated by a reluctant
crew, Walton declares, “It requires more philosophy than I possess, to bear this injustice
with patience” (237). Walton’s desire for Victor, which he characterizes as deriving from
the same transcendent orientation he perceives in him, is ultimately only a “philosophy,”
or “aesthetic ideology.” In that same passage, we see the terms he uses to describe the
experience of having his desire denied: “Thus are my hopes blasted by cowardice and
indecision; I come back ignorant and disappointed” (237). In all cases, he is describing
conditions whose value is determined by the social (what he calls soon after, his “hopes
of utility and glory” [237]).
Where Walton imagined himself to desire the transcendent, while remaining
entrenched within the social, Victor is unclear about what and how he desires. In
particular, in the course of his self-exultations at having discovered “the cause of
generation and life” (80), Victor is ambivalent about whether the desire that motivates
him is transcendent or social in character. In imagining a “new species” that “would bless
me as its creator and source” (82), he both posits a society for the future and positions
himself as the transcendent object of his creation’s desire. He has, it would seem, a
transcendent desire for the social and a social desire for the transcendent. In the first
place, this uncertainty is useful for providing the initial mediation between Walton/the
social and the Creature/materiality. Victor’s uncertainty about how he should desire is
passed on to the reader and thus further problematizes the sympathy that is meant to unite
the narratives. His ambivalence also makes possible a suspension of judgment regarding
the Creature, despite the fact that Victor makes clear that he wants to destroy him.
Because Victor’s intentions are unclear – does he want to destroy the Creature as a way
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of fulfilling his pursuit of transcendent desire, or does he want to destroy him for the sake
of society as a whole or in vengeance for his losses – the reader cannot fully sympathize
with him or fully enter into agreement with him about what should happen to the
Creature. Thus, against Victor’s own obvious intentions, the text reveals the deeper level
at which he is connected with his creation. At the base of this indeterminacy, moreover, is
Victor’s inability to come to grips with materiality, which might also serve as the catalyst
for his dark sympathy with the Creature.
Victor’s incapacity is depicted with startling clarity in his fear of the Creature he
has spent years making. Despite having anxiously anticipated the moment of life for his
creation, Victor reacts violently to the event itself: “I had worked hard for nearly two
years, for the sole purpose of infusing life into an inanimate body. For this I had deprived
myself rest and health. I had desired it with an ardour that far exceeded moderation; but
now that I had finished, the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and
disgust filled my heart” (85). In the context of the scene as a whole, Victor
psychologically inhabits an indeterminate space, depicted in the novel by his “traversing
my bed-chamber, unable to compose my mind to sleep” (85) and a short while later,
“walking up and down” the courtyard, “listening attentively, catching and fearing each
sound” (86). The affective content of this indeterminacy is anxiety, which Melanie Klein
contends, “originates in the fear of annihilation” (29). As I have suggested, this anxiety
may be linked to the restricted status of transcendent desire within the confines of the
social. Hence, again, it expresses the uncertainty about the nature of Victor’s desire. The
dream Victor has almost immediately following the birth is also suggestive of this theme
of libidinal ambiguity. On the one hand, the dream articulates a latent desire for the
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social: “Elizabeth, in the bloom of health, walking in the streets of Ingolstadt” (85).
These streets figure as the social world that Victor believes he has left behind. Yet reentry into that social life, exemplified in his embrace of Elizabeth, results in a revelation
of another desire: as many critics have noted, the desire to transcend the mother and
create life without recourse to reproduction. 5 Ultimately, the indeterminacy of his desire
produces a similarly indeterminate object of desire. In the first place, Victor’s description
immediately after witnessing his creation posits the Creature’s materiality as what
Kristeva calls the “abject,” which she argues “is radically excluded and draws me
towards the place where meaning collapses” (2). As abject, the Creature profoundly
disrupts both Victor’s social world and his understanding of the transcendent. Kristeva
writes of it as “[i]maginary uncanniness and real threat, it beckons to us and ends up
engulfing us” (4). As we also saw in the case of Geraldine’s abject body, such an
experience of “beckoning” and “engulfing” can also serve as the grounds of a new social
altogether, one built precisely upon the desiring subject’s inability to face such
overwhelming materiality. As George Haggerty writes,
Frankenstein’s creature, sensitive, intelligent, loving, an alter ego, as it
were, of whom he could take pride, comes to seem gargantuan, misshapen,
scarcely human, and grotesque, and, in almost direct proportion to the
ways in which he is treated, violent, excessive, and threatening not just to
Victor’s circle of intimates, but to culture itself. (42) 6
Ultimately, Victor’s ambivalence feeds into his transcendent desire. Indeed, it
serves to define transcendent desire as Godwin’s Fleetwood does, “want[ing] something”
5

Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar pick up on the work of Ellen Moers and of Marc Rubenstein to note how,
“after much study of the ‘cause of generation and life,’ after locking himself away from ordinary society in
the tradition of such agonized mothers as Wollstonecraft’s Maria, Eliot’s Hetty Sorel, and Hardy’s Tess,
Victor Frankenstein has a baby” (232).
6
Timothy Morton sees Shelley as gradually “nudg[ing] the idea of culture away from […] the allencompassing, grave, and aestheticized authority of layers upon layers of tradition” (263) towards a sense
of culture as “neutral medium” or space of contact “which opens to encompass as many participants as
possible” (265).
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(233), but not knowing what. In other words, his ambivalence provides the grounds for
expressing desire as a kind of undecidability. Nevertheless, the novel cannot permit such
undecidability. An interminable pursuit of the Creature, endlessly retreating into the
North, would ably figure this form of transcendent desire and its fraught relation to
materiality. Yet Victor’s death in the presence of Walton makes this impossible and
serves as another instance of how the novel chooses to withhold the full impact of dark
sympathy. Victor’s death also ensures that there is no final interaction between him and
his creature, such as we see in Caleb Williams between Falkland and Caleb. This
circumvention of an encounter permits Walton (and the reader) to retain an open view,
even imagining the grounds for possibly sympathizing with the Creature. Walton’s initial
response to the Creature had been “a mixture of curiosity and compassion” (240);
however, he attempts to reject these feelings in order to render the Creature abject once
more. In the midst of Walton’s attempt to narrate the Creature out of his grief and back
into guilt (“It is not pity that you feel; you lament only because the victim of your
malignity is withdrawn from your power” [242]), though, he is interrupted: “‘Oh, it is not
thus – not thus,’ interrupted the being” (242). The interruption stays Walton’s refusal to
sympathize and gives the Creature the opportunity to remind the socially susceptible
Walton of the gaps in his sympathy:
I did not satisfy my own desires. They were for ever ardent and craving;
still I desired love and fellowship, and I was spurned. Was there no
injustice in this? Am I to be thought the only criminal, when all human
kind sinned against me? Why do you not hate Felix, who drove his friend
from his door with contumely? Why do you not execrate the rustic who
sought to destroy the saviour of his child? (243)
These words touch precisely upon an area for which Walton has been seeking sympathy
from his silent sister, having had his own “craving” recently obstructed. By allowing the
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Creature to have the last word – and a single narrative, rather than one in conflict with his
creator’s – Walton creates the conditions for sympathy to continue, despite the novel’s
own reminders of the ways in which sympathy must ultimately fail.
The crux upon which sympathy fails elsewhere in the novel is the materiality
embodied by the horrible and fascinating Creature himself, whose narrative occupies the
central place in the novel. Indeed, the seemingly paradoxical idea that such an
embodiment could have a narrative or could express desire is precisely at the heart of
what makes sympathy impossible for Victor and others in the novel. The De Lacey scene,
which marks an important turning point for the Creature as his first extended contact with
others, draws together several of these issues. In the first place, Shelley uses the blank
slate represented by the Creature to explore the idea of narrative itself as a placeholder
for identity. Such identities, she implies, are constructed from the exercise of sympathy,
so that the desires of others come to cover over the profound otherness the desiring
subject discovers within itself. The other result of this reliance upon narrative is that the
symbolic realm is never confronted as alien or irreducibly different: instead, the
imaginary is treated as a natural bridge to things as they are. By tracing the development
of this aesthetic ideology through the experience of the Creature, Shelley offers a key to
the earlier appearances of this ideology in the desires of Walton and Victor. In both cases,
desire in all forms – both social and transcendent – remains enclosed within an imaginary
that materiality does not ultimately pierce. Indeed, the inextricable connection between
the Creature’s desire and his capacity for expressing it suggests that the materiality of the
Creature is never truly encountered by either Walton or Victor. Rather, in each case, the
desiring subject remains within the realm of desire. An important exception to this
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entrenchment in the novel is the sudden revelation of the Creature to the De Lacey
patriarch, which uncovers both the utterly destabilizing force of materiality and the event
of community that it instantiates. Although the novel does not take this discovery further
– preferring, as we have seen, to remain ultimately within desire – Shelley will
investigate the encounter with materiality at greater length in subsequent work discussed
below.
David Marshall shows how, “as he watches the drame bourgeois and tragédie
larmoyante of the De Lacey family, the monster plays the role of the ideal sympathetic
spectator in a theatre” (214). In this way, Shelley seems to explore more directly Smith’s
theory of sympathy than Hume’s. Marshall sets the stage of sympathy as the Creature
gazing unnoticed through “a small and almost imperceptible chink, through which the
eye could just penetrate” (Frankenstein 134), upon the inhabitants of the home arranged
like a “tableau de famille” (Marshall 214). The unilateral conditions under which this
experiment in sympathy takes place very much follow the kind of spectatorship model
advanced in Smith’s work. As Smith writes early in Theory of Moral Sentiments, “By the
imagination we place ourselves in [the other’s] situation” (4). For Marshall, it is precisely
“[t]he theatrical conditions of sympathy” that “seem to dictate sympathy’s failure, either
by leading sympathy to the limits where it must discover its own impossibility, or by
underlining its epistemological barriers” (216). 7
I want to suggest that the sympathy that leads the Creature into this symbolic
realm of language emerges out of his already existing feeling of affinity for the life he
7

Britton points usefully towards John Bender’s revision of Marshall. She writes, summarizing Bender, that
“though Smith’s language is theatrical, sympathy is, by its nature, narrative” (8). While this observation is
helpful in terms of the broader operations of sympathy in the novel, Marshall’s use of “theatrical” remains
relevant for the De Lacey scene in particular. Bender makes this argument in Imagining the Penitentiary:
Fiction and the Architecture of the Mind in Eighteenth-Century England, Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987.
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discovers in the cottage. Moreover, partly because theatrical sympathy is enmeshed in
“representations” (216) that transform and limit such feelings, the urgency that
immediately precedes the cold reality of difference disclosed at the catastrophic ending of
the scene represents a brief re-emergence of this desire. Notably, this semiotic desire –
described exclusively in terms of affect and emotion (“sensations of a peculiar and
overpowering nature: they were a mixture of pain and pleasure” [134]) – mostly lies
outside Marshall’s analysis. Nancy Yousef comments that Marshall offers “an evocative
reading that nevertheless ignores the novel’s paradoxical use of an acquired aesthetic
sensibility to represent a first moment of untutored responsiveness” (158). For, as Yousef
reminds us, the scene is part of a much larger exploration of the nature of development.
She writes, “The creature’s first glimpse of the cottagers from his dark hovel is not that of
one unacquainted with human manners but the informed gaze of a sensitive observer”
(158). Yousef argues that the Creature’s own narrative contextualizes his semiotic
experience of the desire for the other within a larger social construct, figured not only in
his reading of Milton, Goethe, and others, but also in his personal exemplification of the
social theories of Locke and Rousseau. Thus the Creature’s observation of the De Lacey
tableau is supported and supplemented by readings of such cultural artefacts as Paradise
Lost, Plutarch’s Lives, Volney’s Ruins, and The Sorrows of Young Werther. He draws
attention to his experience of reading: “I can hardly describe to you the effect of these
books. They produced in me an infinity of new images and feelings” (152). As he goes on
to describe, these books provide him with a way of understanding himself. For instance,
of Paradise Lost he says: “I often referred the several situations, as their similarity struck
me, to my own” (154). The result is that the Creature establishes an anterior backdrop of
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desire for himself constructed out of the desires of others – sympathy, in this way, is
made to precede itself.
Having entered into the realm of desire, the Creature develops strategies for
maintaining such desire. Although he contrasts it explicitly with his fear of “the
barbarous villagers” (136), the longing he experiences to join the De Lacey family offers
an imaginative screen for mitigating such dark emotions. Drawing together his
burgeoning social desire for others and his desire for knowledge, which has driven his
actions thus far, the De Lacey family and the Creature’s watching of them form a closed
circuit of sympathy, which the Creature wants only to close more tightly through his full
inclusion. Thus, for example, in his conversation with the blind patriarch of the De Lacey
family, the Creature equivocates, struggling to keep their discussion at an abstract level.
For every one of De Lacey’s concretizing questions (“... are you French?” “Are these
Germans?” “Where do these friends reside?”), the Creature seeks to suspend the details.
He attempts to avoid addressing his physical condition, which has thus far been treated as
a site of horrible materiality by others, inviting De Lacey instead to enter into a given
imaginary: “But let us change the subject. I am an unfortunate and deserted creature; I
look around, and I have no relation or friend upon earth” (158). As the violent conclusion
of the scene indicates, the Creature may well be right to avoid the material. Furthermore,
although it is not successful because of this sudden entrance of De Lacey’s family, the
Creature is able to evoke feelings of sympathy in his auditor. Thus De Lacey promises: “I
also am unfortunate; I and my family have been condemned, although innocent: judge,
therefore, if I do not feel for your misfortunes” (159). Yet De Lacey makes this
declaration as if Smithean sympathy were unproblematic, as if Smith’s early recognition
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that “our senses will never inform us of what [our tortured brother] suffers. They never
did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person” (3) did not in fact carry the seeds for
invalidating sympathy from its inception. Social desire, this scene suggests, will fail in
the face of the absolute uncertainty represented by the other.
In this culminating scene, two key manifestations of this materiality of the
unknown surface: De Lacey’s blindness and the Creature’s grotesque appearance. 8
Notably, neither of these materialities “appear” in the sense that they are represented – as
well they cannot. We do not gain insight into the cause of De Lacey’s blindness; he was
blind even when the family lived in Paris. With the exception of his general dependence
upon his children, De Lacey does not seem to experience his blindness as a disability.
Indeed, the Creature does not immediately realize the old man’s blindness, as De Lacey is
so supported by “the love and respect which the younger cottagers exhibited towards
their venerable companion” (136). The fact of his blindness instead erupts into view as
the condition of possibility for the Creature’s making contact: “I had the sagacity enough
to discover, that the unnatural hideousness of my person was the chief object of horror
with those who had formerly beheld me” (157). In choosing to enter the social field
precisely at the moment when his materiality is the least threatening, the Creature further
confirms his ideological investment in the aesthetic. The promise of this approach is
underscored in De Lacey’s own assurance that, “I am blind, and cannot judge of your
countenance, but there is something in your words which persuades me that you are
sincere” (159). And, of course, the Creature is being sincere – within certain limits. The
Creature could have overcome his reticence and attended to De Lacey’s demand for

8

The Creature’s encounter with the materiality of Felix’s strength is cast here in an explicitly non-material
mode as a “supernatural force” (160).
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concrete detail, or he could have pursued the alternative he later proposes of
“familiariz[ing] the old De Lacey to me, and by degrees have discovered myself to the
rest of his family, when they should have been prepared for my approach” (161). Had he
done this, the possibility is raised that the threat he poses may have been averted and a
slow sympathy forged through the gradual slippage of blindness into a new
understanding. Yet this idealistic (naïve) view is only possible if the symbolic world of
the social never has to encounter the materiality of the other, as Walton desires. The
Creature’s plan depends upon a long, slow modulation of narrative, an accumulation of
interpretive strategies and figural tactics, which his conversations with De Lacey would
produce for the others. He imagines the success of his social desire to rest upon a textual
self-fashioning and, in general, this approach is at work in the circuit of desire that
motivates the De Lacey family. 9 On the contrary, as the wordless scene of violence that
follows Felix’s entry into the room indicates, materiality once revealed cannot be allowed
to co-exist with the imaginary of their home and, once De Lacey’s “blindness” about the
Creature’s constitution has been removed, his only reaction is one of horror.
The sympathy that momentarily precedes this scene has notably occurred in the
dark – that is, in the literal darkness of De Lacey’s blindness, which allows him to
suspend, as Coleridge does in the conversation poems, any judgment that might block or
obstruct relation – and also in the phenomenological darkness of the Creature’s material
otherness to himself. This latter sense gets represented in the Creature’s description of
how Felix “with supernatural force tore me from his father, to whose knees I clung,” an
impossible or absurd image of the violent underside of sociality, given what we know of

9

The textual-affective tenor of their family is revealed in the names: Felix as happiness; Agatha as
goodness; and Safie as wisdom or possibly purity.
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the Creature’s immense size. Yet, at this moment, the Creature is psychologically a child
and his physical posture reflects this self-understanding. The implication of this
psychological inversion seems that such an introjection derives not from the bleak
backdrop of existence (as in Nietzsche), but from society itself. 10 Shot through with
social desire, the scene of violence generally depicts the social and transcendent desires
of the cottage’s inhabitants turning in upon themselves in an effort to protect the
imaginary within which they both find expression. A non-imaginary transcendent desire
for the other surfaces finally as dark sympathy in this climactic scene, when De Lacey
shouts in response to the Creature’s plea: “Great God! [...] who are you?” (160). Still
residing in darkness, De Lacey comes face-to-face with the momentary rending of the
social construct in which he had found some sense of security.
Caught up in De Lacey’s words, “who are you,” is the sense of having passed
momentarily out of one realm of experience into another, as indicated by his exclamation,
“Great God!” His questions up to this point have been pointed and certainly aimed at
discovering the Creature’s identity, yet only in terms of finding a ground from which to
sympathize. He thus addresses the Creature with the kind of invitation to social sympathy
that we also saw in Christabel’s initial encounter with Geraldine: “If you will
unreservedly confide to me the particulars of your tale…” (159). Once the Creature’s
self-restraint is removed by the entry of Felix, De Lacey suddenly realizes that the stakes
are in fact much greater than mere sociality. Not only is he now asking about the
stranger’s identity in the absolute, rather than the relative social sense, his question also
draws attention to the much more fundamental influence his blindness has over his
10

In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche writes: “The Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence.
That he might endure this terror at all, he had to interpose between himself and life the radiant dream-birth
of the Olympians” (42).
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circumstances; that is, he discovers by means of his blindness the radical alterity that
exists beyond the secure walls of his family unit.
Slavoj Žižek describes the novel as an example of how
the inaccessible/traumatic Thing-beyond-representation itself becomes
‘subjectivized’ [...] the Thing is first constructed as the inaccessible X
around which my desire circulates, as the blind spot I want to see but
simultaneously dread and avoid seeing, too strong for my eyes; then, in the
shift towards drive, I (the subject) ‘make myself seen’ as the Thing – in a
reflexive turn, I see myself as It, the traumatic object – Thing I didn’t want
to see. (The Ticklish Subject 365)
Not only does this shift happen to De Lacey, but also to his family as each member is
pressed beyond the scope of their social function to become expressions of affect and
pure emotion. Unlike the movements of desire we encounter in Walton and Victor, which
produce a forward movement in their respective narratives, the effect of an encounter
with drive, which their vision of the Creature facilitates, is a break with narrative
altogether. The Creature recounts the chaotic scene: “Agatha fainted; and Safie, unable to
attend to her friend, rushed out of the cottage. Felix darted forward […] and struck me
violently with a stick” (160). The social illusions that have hitherto rendered the cottagers
only sad or melancholic disperse to reveal not simply gentleness in Agatha, but extreme
sensibility; not only an oppressed spirit in Safie, but terror; and not only resentment in
Felix, but outright violence. The Creature’s appearance has also effectively concluded the
narrative of the cottage, as Felix indicates to his landlord: “The life of my father is in the
greatest danger, owing to the dreadful circumstance that I have related. My wife and
sister will never recover their horror. I entreat you not to reason with me any more”
(162). Felix’s desire to “fly from this place” and from his landlord’s “reason” (162)
originates in the disruption the Creature has made to the functioning of their social desire.
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If this is the possible result of an encounter with materiality, then it is perhaps not
surprising that the novel shuts down Victor’s transcendent desire and ends aboard the
ship, with Walton, returning to the safe shores of the social realm. Yet, as I have shown,
the novel has also raised enough questions about the demands of the other and the cost of
desiring it to omit any final statement from Walton as the representative of the social.
While the effect of giving the Creature a final defense is to invite the reader to
sympathize with him, the horror at the heart of Frankenstein, captured in De Lacey’s at
once terrified and fascinated cry, presses upon any attempt to take up materiality as itself
an object of desire. Indeed, the novel implies that this option is ultimately not available to
the desiring subject. As we see exemplified by the De Lacey household and reflected in
the circuit of desire that Walton establishes for himself with Victor, the realm of desire is
closed. Nevertheless, if desire remains impervious to materiality in this novel, suggesting
that De Lacey’s cry comes from some other place entirely, Shelley’s subsequent work
creates scenarios that explore the possibility that materiality might nevertheless produce
other effects. Yet, to press her understanding of what both transcendent desire and also
that which exceeds desire, namely, the materiality of drive signify for community,
Shelley will need to create situations in which access to the social has been cut off.

The Materiality of Relation in Matilda
In Matilda, Shelley can attend much more closely to the transcendent question of
“who are you,” since the novel’s central conceit involves an expulsion from the social
realm and an exploration of the form of human desire that remains. Discussing the
novella, Pamela Clemit suggests that “most critics have read this story of incestuous love
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between father and daughter as an uncontrolled expression of private anxieties
concerning Mary Shelley’s relationships” with Godwin and her husband (“Changing
Conception” 64). The implication that this is merely a kind of “psychobiography,” which
at some level it surely is, assumes a version of transcendent desire that I have thus far
suggested Mary Shelley was suspicious of throughout her work, namely, a desire that is
merely an epiphenomenon of social desire, amplified aesthetically even as it is also
stripped of its anchoring in reality. After all, if the story represents primarily a working
through of “private anxieties,” then we might expect a movement towards resolution,
reflecting (as opposed to informing) the developmental trajectory of most novels, rather
than one that tracks towards what Mary Jacobus calls “unreadability” (201). Indeed, the
novel’s textual history suggests just such a movement towards negativity; unlike the
Creature, whose social desire only ceases after the death of his maker, Shelley’s novel is
transformed from the hopeful and didactic The Fields of Fancy into the much bleaker
Matilda. Clemit and others suggest that it is possible to link Shelley’s revising of The
Fields of Fantasy into Matilda by means of “evidence that Mary Shelley planned to
publish Matilda for Godwin’s benefit” (67); however, the evidence usually advanced in
support of this position is the date she began writing the revision – November 9, 1819,
which happened to be the same day she heard about Godwin’s loss of a lawsuit.
Tilottama Rajan argues that it is “preposterous to assume that even Godwin would
publish a text which, however, disguised […], was clearly a daughter’s accusation against
her father” (“Mary Shelley’s Mathilda” 49). She suggests that “[t]he transmission of the
manuscript to Godwin is, rather, a part of a highly overdetermined psychic text” (49).
That is, the novel does more than work through Shelley’s demons: it attempts to exorcise
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them altogether by mobilizing its very materiality in the direction of Shelley’s desire.
Ranita Chatterjee continues Rajan’s argument in her suggestion that, “[f]or Shelley, the
manuscript of Matilda itself becomes the vicarious path to a new self, the old self
allegorically represented by the character of Mathilda” (144). In response to the novel,
Godwin suggested that “there ought to be, at least if [it] is ever published, a preface to
prepare the minds of readers” (qtd. in Clemit 67-68), underscoring the fact that he is
choosing to remain ignorant about its status as an accusation. As Rajan suggests, Matilda
functions in this respect as what she calls a “textual abject,” which she distinguishes from
the abject in its more general sense by suggesting that the non-textual does not make
itself available for incorporation or recovery as the textual might. 11
I would like to take up this idea in order to suggest that the aspect of transmission
in the textual abject might give insight into the work of dark sympathy for Shelley.
Shelley’s desire for the Other, expressed in the form of her novel, is not only directed
towards Godwin, but also towards all that Godwin represents, including her dead mother,
her childhood, her ambition, England, and a life in which the horrible losses she has
experienced might not have occurred. This desire breaches the bounds of what the Novel,
as an artefact of aesthetic ideology, deems to be possible for desire. Shelley’s original
version, The Fields of Fancy, closed with Mathilda submitting to such an impoverished
conception of transcendence, as she imagines herself “listening to lessons of Wisdom
which will one day bring me to him when we shall never part” (406). By contrast, the
revised ending closes with an ambiguous statement: “Farewell, Woodville, the turf will
soon be green on my grave; and the violets will bloom on it. There is my hope and my
11

Rajan gives as an example of the (non-textual) abject, “the creature in Frankenstein” that “is associated
with monstrosity and filth” (45). Yet we might note that such associations are not present for De Lacey in
his moment of radical uncertainty.
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expectation; your’s [sic] are in this world; may they be fulfilled” (67). With only italics to
mark an implied transcendent meaning, Shelley’s narrator finds her hope both in the
future world where she anticipates meeting her father and, more explicitly, in the fact of
her death and the impact of its sheer materiality upon the world. This hope of the textual
abject lies expressly outside of the social – at remove not only from Woodville’s world,
but also from the aesthetic world of The Fields of Fancy in which “lessons of Wisdom”
might succeed in facilitating passage between worlds.
As Clemit notes, Shelley wrote The Fields of Fancy between August 4 and
September 12, 1819, following the deaths of her children, the most recent being William
in June of that year (“Changing Conception” 65). That the same horrific
psychobiographical conditions that later gave birth to the traumatic expressions in
Matilda also form the background for Fields suggests that Shelley’s revisionary choices
are artistic in nature. In particular, I want to suggest that this earlier work can be read as
an experiment in the aesthetic ideology she has touched upon in Frankenstein. This
reading finds support partly in one of its sources, Mary Wollstonecraft’s unfinished Cave
of Fancy (1787), 12 which proposed a series of tales as vehicles for educating the reader.
Similarly, Fields takes as its setting the “part of these Elysian Gardens” “devoted to those
who as before in your world wished to become wise & virtuous by study & action here
endeavour after the same ends by contemplation” (354). This work of education that the
story attempts represents an effort to manage the transcendent desire the narrator
expresses upon discovering that the spirit Fantasia may be able to lead her to the Elysian
Fields: “The Elysian fields — I exclaimed with a quick scream — shall I then see? I
gasped & could not ask that which I longed to know” (353). Unlike in Matilda, where
12

Janet Todd calls Shelley’s Fields a “reworking of her mother’s unfinished tale” (“Introduction” v).
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that desire is allowed to expand until it intersects with the full force of materiality, the
story’s first iteration involves an attempt to submit desire to an aesthetic ideology that
might enable it to unfold productively. As Marc Redfield notes regarding the relationship
of subject formation and aesthetic education, “the subject of aesthetics comes into
existence by identifying with an exemplar” (21). The Fields of Fancy’s failure, which
Matilda attempts to rectify, occurs in its attempt to substitute social desire in the place of
the transcendent; as the final line of the story indicates, the social cannot take the desiring
subject far enough. Thus, as we have seen, in death, the speaker declares: “I am here not
with my father but listening to lessons of Wisdom which will one day bring me to him
when we shall never part” (406). By contrast, when Woodville attempts to provide
Mathilda with similar lessons, the great gap between his social desire and Mathilda’s
transcendent desire becomes clear.
Articulating this emphatically transcendent desire in Matilda requires Shelley to
establish clear boundaries to mark the contrasting social realm. An important
representative of social desire, as I have already suggested, is Mathilda’s last friend,
Woodville. While the novella’s earlier discussion of Mathilda’s father’s friends also
explores the appearance and effect of social desire, Woodville, whom Shelley earlier
called Lovel, Welford, or Herbert (Matilda 350 n. 19), brings together several of the
novel’s earlier images of social relation and activity. He embodies a sociality that is
charged with the aesthetic, and thus offers a useful counterpoint to the anti-social
transcendent desire that Mathilda expresses, emphasizing how idealism can be co-opted
back into sociality. Moreover, Woodville, as a stand-in for Percy Bysshe Shelley,
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presents an alternative social vision in the form of an ethical responsibility. He introduces
this theory after Mathilda has invited him to commit suicide with her. He responds,
I will never desert life untill [sic] this last hope is torn from my bosom,
that in some way my labours may form a link in the chain of gold with
which we ought all to strive to drag happiness from where she sits
enthroned above the clouds, now far beyond our reach, to inhabit the earth
with us. (59)
Woodville’s social program builds upon a more collaborative optimism about human
progress than appears in Frankenstein, yet he relies upon the same grounding mechanism
as Victor or Walton; for, at the heart of his ethics is a faith in the success of sympathy. He
argues, “if I can influence but a hundred, but ten, but one solitary individual, so as in any
way to lead him from ill to good, that will be a joy to repay me for all my sufferings,
though they were a million times multiplied; and that hope will support me to bear them”
(59). Moreover, this movement “from ill to good” need not be permanent. As he suggests
to his melancholic friend, “if you beheld on lips pale with grief one smile of joy and
gratitude, and knew that you were parent of that smile, and that without you it had never
been, you would feel so pure and warm a happiness that you would wish to live for ever
again and again to enjoy that same pleasure” (60). The suggestion that the sympathetic
event is sufficient to serve as the basis of what is a transcendent question – the propriety
of existence – is undermined radically only moments afterwards. For, although these
“were indeed words of fire and produced a warm hope in me” (60), it ultimately “was
only a momentary relief” (60): the society into which Woodville aims to draw Mathilda
relies upon an elision of the question about existence in favour of an amplification of the
event of sympathy.
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If this implied mark of insufficiency in Mathilda’s reaction indicates the
boundaries of social desire, then this novel also charts the attempts by characters to pass
out of social desire altogether. Mathilda herself is a strange case as she does not appear to
reside within the social realm even prior to her father’s disclosure of the secret. For
instance, she barely notices the attentions of her suitor, “the young man of rank,” or of
others, desiring instead her father with an excessiveness that foreshadows the father’s
excessive desire for her. 13 When she hears of her father’s planned return, she declares in
an ambiguous moment, which foreshadows her father’s own declaration, “He will love
me!” (15). Raised – like so many Romantic protagonists – to regard the Wordsworthian
Sublime as somehow normative, Mathilda begins in transcendent desire, rather than
discovering it retrospectively in the suspension of social desire. 14 As I will argue below,
Mathilda’s initiation into the realm of the social occurs, not when she discovers her
father’s love for her, but rather when she discovers his self-understanding of it as
incestuous. Indeed, incest represents the term around which the social-transcendent
conflict turns in this novel.
Unlike Mathilda, the father begins explicitly within a social order—namely, near
the top. Born into wealth, he is—like the rejected suitor—“a man of rank” (6) and,
especially as he grows up, is motivated by the views of his friends. He possesses a “social
temper” that “could never enjoy itself if every brow was not as free from care as his own”
(7). Moreover, he embodies the ideological mentality of social constructs in his
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“consider[ing] queer and out of fashion all opinions that were exploded by his circle of
intimates” and being “dogmatic and yet fearful of not coinciding with the only sentiments
he could consider orthodox” (7). The ostensibly transcendent core of this social desire –
another desire, “one secret hidden from these dear friends” (7), somehow in conflict and
yet also inversely aligned with his social desire – is his love for the daughter of “a
gentleman of small fortune” (7), Diana. The love is somehow caught up with every aspect
of his selfhood, except its social dimension:
It was a passion that had grown with his growth; it had become entwined
with every faculty and every sentiment and only to be lost with life. None
knew of their love except their own two hearts; yet although in all things
else, and even in this he dreaded the censure of his companions, for thus
truly loving one inferior to him in fortune, nothing was ever able for a
moment to shake his purpose of uniting himself to her as soon as he could
muster courage sufficient to meet those difficulties he was determined to
surmount. (8)
The description of the father’s transfer of affections from his social group to
Diana alone is a scene of sexual initiation: “Diana had torn the veil which had before kept
him in his boyhood” (9). Yet this passing out of the social realm of his school-days into
the maturity of his marriage proves to be just one form of sociality supplanting another.
This new realm of what appears—if nothing else, for its intensity—to be the expression
of a transcendent desire for the other is, in fact, organized by the same aesthetic ideology
that guided Walton and Victor. Shelley describes the false horizon the father inhabits as
harbouring a subterranean darkness: “Thus my father, born in affluence, and always
prosperous, clombe without the difficulty and various disappointments that all human
beings seem destined to encounter, to the very topmost pinacle [sic] of happiness: Around
him was sunshine, and clouds whose shapes of beauty made the prospect divine
concealed from him the barren reality which lay hidden below them” (9). The great fall
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that follows signifies for Shelley a discovery of the truly transcendent core of relational
desire. Her account of this fall, which occurs for both parties in the course of Mathilda’s
pursuit of her father to his death, establishes the terms for analyzing a transcendent desire
that might successfully escape the social.
The action of the pursuit scene originates in the father’s declaration of his love for
Mathilda. Anne-Lise François and Daniel Mozes draw attention to the form this catalyst
takes, comparing it to another representation of fatal violation from the previous century:
“Clarissa allows herself to die because of an act done to her body while she was
unconscious, Shelley’s heroine insists on the immateriality of the action – a speech act –
which produces her own death” (60). While the events of the pursuit scene unfold out of
that immaterial event, it is only when the father’s guilt manifests itself in writing
(something that Judith Barbour, writing about this novel, calls “the repression of
presence” [102]) that he resolves to commit suicide and that Mathilda takes on the role of
incestuous daughter (“he was my lover” [37]). In fact, rather than marking a beginning of
her new life, the immaterial speech act marks an ending. Critics have described the scene
as Shelley’s exposition of the limits of Wollstonecraft’s egalitarian vision. Anne Mellor,
for instance, writes, “Father-daughter incest thus becomes the most obvious flaw in Mary
Shelley’s vision of the egalitarian bourgeois family, the point at which the inherent
inequality of the family is starkly revealed” (199). Mathilda’s life with her father is a
more than imperfect rendering of Wollstonecraft’s ideals in Vindication. François and
Mozes write,
Wollstonecraft advocates the cultivation of ‘modesty’ or ‘a reserve of
reason’ founded upon knowledge. In Matilda, we find, indeed, a father
who tries to protect his daughter from knowledge, and a daughter who
demands that she should not be shielded from it. Yet when the daughter’s
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demand for ‘education’ is met, the result is not Wollstonecraftian virtue.
The truth does not empower Mathilda. (67-68)
Rather, I would like to argue that this scene of disclosure repeats the event in
Frankenstein’s De Lacey episode in which the patriarch encounters the blank face of the
Creature’s alterity. In the moments leading up to her father’s confession, Mathilda
adheres to a Godwinian principle of sincerity, insisting to her father: “Speak that word; it
will bring peace, not death […] Yes, speak, and we shall be happy; there will no longer
be doubt, no dreadful uncertainty; trust me, my affection will soothe your sorrow; speak
that word and all danger will be past and we shall love each other as before, and for ever”
(27). Mathilda’s ideology of the spoken word, which precedes the scene of reading that
seems to fall under the purview of what de Man calls the “materiality of the letter,”
insofar as it represents an invitation for her father to enter into the presence implied by
speech, is a subset of the aesthetic ideology I have identified here as giving rise to a false
transcendence. The problem is that the presence into which Mathilda invites her father to
enter is primarily a socially determined presence, so that when he finally discloses his
secret, “My daughter, I love you!” (28), his transcendent desire becomes a more readily
identifiable social desire called incest. This translation of desire requires, therefore, that
he follow up his declaration with further explanation both in speech and, finally, in
writing. The social presence he has been forced to adopt proves inadequate. He tries to
express this sense of inequivalence in his letter, “It is a strange link in my fate that
without having seen you I should passionately love you. [...] At length I saw you. You
appeared as the deity of a lovely region, the ministering Angel of a Paradise to which of
all human kind you admitted only me” (33). The language here is of Dante’s love for
Beatrice, as the father himself notes, and his love remains for him a “sinless passion” that
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appears to resume the false horizon he earlier inhabited with Mathilda’s mother, what he
calls, “a fool’s paradise of enjoyment and security” (34). From the father’s perspective,
his desire for Mathilda cannot be called incestuous at this point. This changes, he writes,
“when I saw you become the object of another’s love; when I imagined that you might be
loved otherwise than as a sacred type and image of loveliness and excellence” (34). The
transposition of his transcendent desire into a social context does not simply modify, but
in fact evacuates the transcendent implication entirely, even retrospectively. The father’s
desire for his daughter is and has always been incestuous.
Against the ideology of the spoken word, which promises the father a
comprehensible presence with his daughter under the auspices of his love for her, the
father rapidly discovers the limits of that social presence. He explores these limits in the
letter he writes to her, which (like Walton’s final letter) unfolds more or less in “realtime.” It is broken into three parts, each of which charts a movement towards the choice
of suicide. The movement it describes can therefore be taken as providing a
psychological foreshadowing of the pursuit that ensues and that culminates with
Mathilda’s own desire for death. In the first part, he explains the history of his love for
her, both apologizing for “betray[ing] your confidence” and “endeavour[ing] to pollute
your mind” (32) and promising to “expiate these crimes” through separation (32) and
“remorse” (35). As he describes his past in this section, he emphasizes his former role as
“parent and only friend” (32). The second, much briefer, part of the letter follows his
standing outside her door. He assumes she is asleep, yet we know from what Mathilda
has already said that she “heard a gentle step ascending the stairs; I paused breathless,
and as it approached glided into an obscure corner of the room” (31). Her father allows
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himself to call down a benediction upon what he assumes is his sleeping daughter – an
act that appears extremely problematic in light of his ongoing desire for her: “Peace,
Hope and Love be thy guardians, oh, thou soul of my soul: thou in whom I breathe!”
(36). The sentence that begins the final part of his letter demonstrates that the ambiguity
of the preceding declaration is no longer supportable within a social context: “I fear that
some expressions in it might displease me” (36). On the surface, this third part appears to
reiterate the main features of the first part: insisting on their separation, on his guilt, on
her need to move on beyond grief, if possible. Nevertheless, his closing declaration of “a
gratitude that will never die, and that will, indeed it will, outlive guilt and remorse” (36)
suggests a realization that his earlier hope (“if remorse may expiate guilt, I shall be
guiltless” [35]) is impossible. He does not imagine a reunion after death as he does in the
first section; instead, he dwells upon an abstract reconciliation that he might gain through
the speech-act of Mathilda’s forgiveness.
The three parts of the letter appear to reflect the distinct roles the father assumes
for himself: first, as caregiver; second, as lover; and finally, as lawgiver. His passage
through each of these roles reflects a similar dialectic at work in sympathy. Like
sympathy in its conventional sense, the image of the father as caregiver joins together
social and transcendent impulses in the form of what Julia Kristeva calls “the nondesiring but loving father” (248). In her discussion of the analyst’s responsibilities during
treatment, Kristeva describes how
the analyst interprets his desire and his love, and that sets him apart from
the perverse position of the seducer and from that of a virtuous Werther as
well. […] By ensuring a loving Other to the patient, the analyst
(temporarily) allows the Ego in the throes of drive to take shelter in the
following fantasy: the analyst is not a dead Father but a living Father; this
non-desiring but loving father reconciles the Ideal Ego with the Ego Ideal
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and elaborates the psychic space where, possibly and subsequently, an
analysis can take place. (Kristeva Reader 247-48)
Mathilda’s father, in his self-interpretation and self-narration for his daughter, presents
his love for her as transcendent and pure and yet also doomed from the outset – a tragic
combination that he feels gives him “some claim to your compassion” (33). The field into
which he calls both himself and Mathilda is expressly social, despite his claim that “I will
wander away from you, away from all life – in the solitude I shall seek I alone shall
breathe of human kind” (35), which recalls the promise of Frankenstein’s creature.
Sociality, as we have seen, is primarily an imaginary mode, rather than physical one.
Undergirding the transcendent inflection of his social desire, then, is the aesthetic
ideology Mathilda raises earlier in her entreaty that he speak. His regular allusions to
Dante and, more generally, the narrative form of this part of the letter further suggest that
it represents his attempt to redress the insufficiencies of his earlier speech to her. Yet, in
the second section of the letter, the ruse the narrative is meant to play fails as he allows a
counter-transference to problematize his self-image as loving father. In imagining
Mathilda to be asleep, he overdetermines the libidinal content of his love for her,
revealing once more a transcendent desire whose containment within the social is
impossible. The father’s brief disclosure of his ongoing passion for Mathilda ends
abruptly under the influence of the final persona, the father as lawgiver. As Žižek
suggests of the relationship between desire and drive, “[d]esire emerges when drive gets
caught in the cobweb of Law/prohibition” (Plague 43). Resolving to separate himself
from her forever, the father now writes, “although I have forfeited your filial love, yet
regard them [these last words] I conjure you as a father’s command” (36). Over against
the second persona he has briefly assumed, he reasserts in the third part of the letter his
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patriarchal duty in a series of commands issued to the daughter he expects will pardon
him (“you will forgive me” [36]).
In this final section the father underscores his guilt – as he had in the first section
– as a remainder of a desire that contradicts the social order. That he seeks forgiveness
suggests that this transcendent desire remains encrypted within the social. More than this,
however, he also raises the possibility that Mathilda is guilty too. The first section of his
letter suggests that he has “deprive[d]” her; “cast [her] out shelterless”; “blasted” her
hopes; “destroyed” her “peace and security”; “set the seal of distrust and agony on [her]
heart and brow”; and “endeavoured to steal away her loveliness to place in its stead the
foul deformity of sin” (32-33) – all actions that appear to fall under the categories with
which he opens his letter: “I have endeavoured to pollute your mind, and have made your
innocent heart acquainted with the looks and language of unlawful and monstrous
passion” (32). In other words, the father himself is responsible for precipitating her fall
from innocence. In the third section of the letter, by contrast, he is less direct in assuming
this responsibility. Repeatedly, he asks her to “[r]esolutely shake of[f] the wretchedness
that this first misfortune in early life must occasion you” and insists that she “let not this
check for more than a moment retard your glorious course” (36). The impersonality of his
phrasing, in which he gestures at the event without at the same time claiming
responsibility for it, posits a new social context, which both he and his daughter now
inhabit. Thus, in ordering Mathilda to remain “ignorant of my destination,” he levies a
rhetorical accusation against her: “You will not follow me, for when I bannish [sic]
myself would you nourish guilt by obtruding yourself upon me? You will not do this, I
know you will not” (36). The guilt he mentions seems mostly likely to be his own, yet he

264
also implies through his interdiction and language (“obtruding”) that to follow him
against his wishes as the lawgiver would be not only to incur guilt, but to “nourish” a
guilt that is already present in the form of her existing desire for him.
The trajectory the father takes in his letter reflects the critical trajectory of
sympathetic desire in Romantic writing. As the narrative meant to inspire sympathy (as in
section 1) fails to account for a transcendent desire that it cannot contain (as in section 2),
it is forced to substitute a purely social exchange of desire (as in section 3’s exchange of
the “gift” of grief for pardon) in light of the impossibility of retaining that transcendent
desire. Yet, as in the Romantic critique of sympathy, the outcome of this trajectory is not
satisfaction. Rather, an element of that earlier transcendent desire remains both for
Mathilda and her father. Mathilda recognizes the unconscious significance of her father’s
letter (“The words of his letter by which he had dissuaded me from this step [of following
him] were those that determined me” [36]), and her psychoanalysis of it points her
towards his unspoken intention: “the more I studied the letter the more did I perceive a
thousand slight expressions that could only indicate a knowledge that life was now over
for him” (37). She discovers, in other words, a drive towards death in her father, which
she adopts herself in the second part of the novel. Yet, before she will submit herself to
such a drive, Mathilda determines against her father’s wishes to pursue him.
It is unclear what Mathilda’s objective is in pursuing her father. The chief reason
she gives is that “he must yet live for if he were dead all would surely be black as night to
me!” (37). This disposition continues her previous obsession with her father, yet her
desire for him has now become devoid of any positive character as we see in her prayer,
which describes the diminishment of her desire: “Oh! God help me! Let him be alive! It
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is all dark; in my abject misery I demand no more; no hope, no good: only passion, and
guilt, and horror; but alive! Alive!” (37). Mathilda’s own uncertainty about the object of
her pursuit recalls the blindness of De Lacey, which inadvertently permits him a closer
proximity to the Creature’s materiality and enables him to overlook those aspects of the
Creature that still express his materiality (e.g., his voice, his halting narrative, his sudden
and unannounced appearance, his overall mystery). Likewise, Mathilda’s retention of a
single imaginary, the hope that her father will live, and self-abnegating abandonment of
all other imaginaries for herself enables her to put off the inevitable encounter with the
materiality of her father’s desire for her. Yet, differently from De Lacey, for whom the
dark sympathy of his question, “who are you,” is an event that can hardly be called
productive, the ruins of Mathilda’s transcendent desire for her father, expressed now as
the bare, unqualified hope that he will exist, are sufficient to support her movement into
the unknown.
Her prayer also depicts her incorporation of the father’s implicit accusation. Thus,
if he remains alive, Mathilda will be able to share with her father the social relation of
grief and pardon he has envisioned for them. Yet, even as she finds “one word, that half
screaming was perpetually on my lips; Alive!” (37), at another level, she resists that
desire that he live. This resistance is evident both from her repeated remark that “I did not
weep” (also, “No tears fell yet I sobbed” [37]; “I shed no tears but my eyes wild and
inflamed were starting from my head” [39]) and from the important role her earlier dream
of her father’s death plays in directing her steps. This resistance, I want to suggest, is a
symptom of a transcendent desire. Like her father’s desire for her, Mathilda’s desire for
her father eludes linguistic description to the extent that it remains distinct from social
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desire. While the character of this desire has been explored at length in psychoanalytic
readings of the novel, I want to return to what Mary Jacobus calls “the trace of the
unrepresentable” (201) in order to gain a better understanding of the material constitution
of that trace. For, if a fundamentally ambiguous guilt expresses the affective content of
Mathilda’s transcendent desire, her decaying body marks its place. The broader
implications of this innovation for a theory of dark sympathy reside in its showing the
place of overlap between materiality and the desire for the other, a dimension that Shelley
will take to its limit in The Last Man.
In the second part of Matilda, guilt functions as a lubricant for Mathilda’s
interactions with the world. If this was originally a function to be taken up by sympathy,
as Mathilda’s intimations of desiring sympathy suggest (“I began again to wish for
sympathy” [46]), then guilt does not fall into the same trap sympathy does of collapsing
into a merely social desire, eliminating the transcendent. (Notably, she discovers in
Woodville’s intense social sympathy the irony “that I who in solitude had desired
sympathy as the only relief I could enjoy should now find it an additional torture to me”
[56].) Rather, like misanthropy in Godwin or dejection in Coleridge, guilt – even (or
especially) “guilt that lacks a name” (61) and is inscribed upon Mathilda’s decaying body
– offers a negative space within the social order that escapes its complete determination.
Rajan writes that incest in the novel “operates not just as part of a Symbolic economy,
but also on the border between the Symbolic and the semiotic” (“Melancholy” 50). By
extension, the guilt that ensues from this incestuous desire intersects this border,
appearing not only in the context of the Symbolic order, yet also deriving its force from
the misapprehension of semiotic energy. Similarly, Mary Jacobus describes Mathilda’s
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melancholic sense of guilt “as a failure of ‘symbolization’ – the failure to find adequate
forms of literary representation for the affect that underlies it” (173).
François and Mozes have explored the implications of this failure of
symbolization in their essay on agency and gender in Shelley’s novel. Specifically, they
are interested in exposing the indirect agency someone like Mathilda can possess; that is,
the way in which she can be seen as guilty in the eyes of society, despite having done
nothing wrong directly. They argue that “Mathilda is a mental actor in this text and thus
capable of the ‘agent’s regret’ that drives the latter two-thirds of the novel” (66).
Modifying a distinction made by Anne Mellor between a masculine Romanticism that
“assimilat[es]” through violence and an idea of the feminine as “socialization,” they
suggest that Matilda “present[s] a narrative in which erotic subjects do indeed elide the
recognition of otherness and threaten to become mirrors to one another, but not because
the masculine succeeds in absorbing and conquering the feminine. Rather, each character
is destroyed by the violence of his or her own passions” (70). Shelley gains this
equivalence by submerging direct action within a much more widespread passivity. Not
only does Mathilda devote herself to becoming “a youthful Hermitess dedicated to
seclusion and whose bosom she must strive to keep free from all tumult and unholy
despair” (44), but the father also cannot be said to have “acted directly” in declaring his
love for his daughter. Instead, through a kind of passive aggression, Mathilda presses her
father to reveal his secret. He suggests that a more effective and direct path to discovering
this secret would be if she “tore my heart from my breast and tried to read its secrets in it
as its life’s blood was dropping from it” (27). From his perspective, he is a victim of
circumstances (“I was betrayed into this net of fiery anguish” [33]). The significance of
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this diffusion of an ambiguous guilt in the novel is that, although it is contingent upon the
social order’s acknowledgment of it, it depends upon more than just the point de capiton
of society’s agreed taboo against incest. Rather, it requires a vehicle in which to inhere.
The father’s movement in his letter from desiring forgiveness and reparation to a
resolution of suicide indicates his growing awareness of an inverse relation between the
imaginary and materiality. He suggests as much to Mathilda before divulging the secret
in his invitation that she tear out his heart. The benefit of this violent approach is that
“you may console me by reducing me to nothing – but your words I cannot bear” (27).
The words that he cannot bear are, as I have suggested, part of a false transcendence that
Mathilda has yet to recognize. His preference for a bloody death that draws attention to
his physical body puts this materiality in contrast to the textual promise Mathilda extends.
After she enters into her melancholy, she discovers a similar opposition, which reaches
its culmination in Woodville’s attempt to dissuade her from suicide. As I have suggested,
Woodville’s ethic presupposes the power of the aesthetic to organize lives within a
smooth continuity. Her invitation to Woodville, “to accompany me in this dark journey”
and to “find [his deceased betrothed] Elinor and what I have lost” (57), signifies her
entertainment of a similar textuality, alluding to the myths of Proserpine, Orpheus and
Eurydice, as well as to the framing narrative of the novel’s previous iteration as The
Fields of Fancy. She describes death in conventionally literary terms (“we shall find light
after we have passed the dark valley,” referring to Psalm 23 [57]) and also in terms of the
literature of Shelley’s family, as we see in Mathilda’s italicized quotation of Mary
Wollstonecraft’s mother’s last words, “A little patience, and all will be over” (57), which
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Wollstonecraft used in her own work. 15 Yet, as in the closing scene of The Sorrows of
Young Werther, in which the melancholic protagonist (and also the reader) is brought
face to face with the gruesome physical effects of his suicide, Mathilda’s attempt to gain
Woodville’s support through sympathy fails because she does not truly want what his
impoverished version of sympathy offers. As we see in a defining moment of particular
insensitivity, Woodville is not speaking the same language as Mathilda; he “bade me take
cheer, and to encourage what happy thoughts I could, untill [sic] time and fortitude
should overcome my misery, and I could again mingle in society” (61).
The final chapter of the novel discloses more completely the novel’s vehicle for
the transcendent desire that cannot occupy the social realm: Mathilda’s dying body.
Following Mathilda’s departure, she continues for a time under the aesthetic ideology
Woodville has left behind to console her. She “pictured to [her]self a lovely river such as
that on whose banks Dante describes Mathilda gathering flowers” (62), and, although her
imaginings are interspersed, finally, with real tears, “I wept, but gently, lest my sobs
should disturb the fairy scene” (63). This visionary mood is pierced as she attempts to
enter more fully into the role of Dante’s Mathilda by stooping to pluck a flower, “on that
bleak plain where no flower grew” (63). This scene of awakening is one of disenlightenment, or rather of occlusion. Not only does she see “no object that told me
where I was,” she discovers that “I had lost myself” (63). The accidental nature of her
situation, which will lead to her death, as opposed to her romantic plan of suicide, puts
her under the dictates of blind necessity. Shelley’s association of Mathilda at this point
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Godwin noted this in his Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (53).
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with the Ancient Mariner is thus poignant. 16 Like the Mariner, Mathilda discovers a
much larger framework at work in spite of herself. If both may be taken as literary
manifestations of Hume’s image of the radical skeptic adrift in a Cartesian sea of doubt,
then, where Coleridge suggests that the social cannot stymie the effects of transcendent
desire, which merely continue to haunt it, Shelley suggests that there may not be any
possible return to the secure shores of sociality. Instead, she anticipates a more complete
reconciliation with her transcendent desire in the form of death.
The literary references she makes during this period are telling for charting a
movement out of false transcendence towards a more totalizing desire. Finding in the
moon a “presence [that] gave me a hope” that she might find her home, she invokes it
with early lines from Coleridge’s “Christabel,” which appear themselves to be a critical
parody of the Gothic tradition; in other words, rather than immersing herself in an
ideology of the aesthetic, she mobilizes temporarily an ironic treatment of the aesthetic. 17
The second reference she makes, during her address to the sun and the earth, is to
Wordsworth’s “A slumber did my spirit seal.” In positing herself as “[r]olled round in
earth’s diurnal course” (8), Mathilda abandons her subjectivity and aligns herself – or
rather her body, now bereft of self – with the necessary unfolding of the earth’s
processes. This shift in her thinking allows her to “find it sweet to watch the progressive
decay of my strength” (65). Against the threat that this decay raises, Woodville has
16

Clemit, in the Pickering edition of Matilda, notes the allusion to Coleridge’s poem in Mathilda’s
statement, “When I awoke it rained,” which Clemit suggests points to line 300 of The Rime of the Ancient
Mariner (63 n. c). Also see François and Mozes, pp. 70-71, who make a similar comparison between
Mathilda and the Mariner.
17
Mary Jacobus suggests that, in the novella, “Quotation becomes a figure for melancholic and
incorporatory acts of reading; these texts impinge from the past with an unsymbolizable message because
they have been ‘devoured’ in piecemeal fashion” (198). This reading overlaps with my own insofar as we
both wish to point to Mathilda’s awareness of the limits of the aesthetic. I want to emphasize moreover that
Mathilda’s recourse to the aesthetic is prompted primarily for Woodville’s sake as an effort to
communicate along social lines at least in her dying.
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insisted that she must “Hope and your wounds will be already half healed: but if you
obstinately despair, there never more will be comfort for you. Believe me, my dearest
friend, that there is a joy that the sun and earth and all its beauties can bestow that you
will one day feel” (62). For Mathilda, hope resides by contrast in the disinterested
continuation of earth’s processes, “the turf will soon be green on my grave; and the
violets will bloom on it” (67). In leaving behind a narrative for Woodville, she engages
the social on her own terms, continuing in a transcendent desire for her father the
fulfillment of which does not depend upon its successful invocation of sympathy. This
new understanding of hope, a theme which has been central to my exploration of
sympathy, gets taken up once more and with a much greater scope in Shelley’s postapocalyptic novel, The Last Man. As Coleridge suggests in his late poem, “Work without
Hope,” “Hope without an object cannot live” (14); however, Shelley’s fourth novel posits
a world in which the object – all objects, save one – continues alone. Instead, imagining a
world without people, without subjects, she enquires into the possibility of a hope for the
other (perhaps a more precise way to describe the transcendent desire for the other) that
precedes the self.

The Last Man: Hope and the Remains of Sympathy
Where Shelley’s first two novels explored the question of the fate of
transcendence in the face of the socializing impulse, The Last Man asks about what
happens to us “in the wake of society,” as Jean-Luc Nancy describes community
(Inoperative Community 11; emphasis original). The central social imaginary that appears
in the novel—the ideal society at Windsor—fails to satisfy transcendent desire; however,
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the novel also suggests a more developed means of orienting oneself towards materiality.
In The Last Man, materiality is signified by the plague, which functions as an insuperable
obstacle to the successful formation of imaginaries or, as Peter Melville describes it, as “a
coldly indifferent or absolute form of otherness in itself” (141). In the face of the end of
humanity, this group of friends comes to resemble the description Nancy offers for
community as “the presentation to its members of their mortal truth (which amounts to
saying that there is no community of immortal beings: one can imagine either a society or
a communion of immortal beings, but not a community)” (15). Indeed, the novel as a
whole can be read as the unfolding of such a “presentation” of death—an unfolding that
similarly tracks the group’s movement from society to something more like community. 18
Unlike Frankenstein and Matilda, The Last Man contains a complex social nexus
at its heart in the tight-knit group of Lionel, Perdita, Adrian, Raymond, and Idris. 19 They
are related to each other by blood, friendship, marriage, and politics, and in this way
epitomize the Romantic concept of sociality. Critics have noted the novel’s function as a
roman à clef, in which characters such as Adrian and Lord Raymond appear as “faint
portraits” (in Shelley’s words [Letters 1:577]) of Percy and Lord Byron, respectively. 20
The members of the group may be mapped provisionally onto a continuum stretching

18

Peter Melville draws attention to the clash in the novel between the North Americans and Adrian’s troops
as an example of how an encounter with death forms “what becomes a reconstructed community through
the commonality of death” (166-67). Yet this imagined community should perhaps be more properly called
a society as the positive outcome of such a “reconstruction” implies that the encounter with death has been
re-narrated through an imaginary (similar to that described by Adam Smith in his discussion in Theory of
Moral Sentiments of sympathizing with the dead [16]) in order to suspend the threat that death must
necessarily imply.
19
Charlotte Sussman writes, “Although The Last Man is named for the ultimate solitary individual, Mary
Shelley’s novel devotes much of its energy to representing human aggregates, to imagining populations”
(286).
20
Anne Mellor (248 n. 21) points to two early readings: an article by Walter E. Peck (196-219) and also
Elizabeth Nitchie’s book, Mary Shelley—Author of “Frankenstein” (68-75, 94-95, 102-4). Lee Sterrenburg
writes that “[t]he novel is, in fact, so obviously a roman à clef that critics sometimes tend to see it as little
else” (327).
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from the most intimate form of social desire to its most amplified. Thus, if Idris advances
a domestic desire for family, as we see first in her concern for her brother and then in her
maternal preoccupation with her children and husband, then, at the other side of the
spectrum, we might find her brother Adrian, who comes to adopt a “[s]trange ambition”
in aiming to “save one of [England’s] mighty spirits from the deadly shaft” (247).
Between these poles, Perdita, Lionel, and Raymond shift positions as the novel
progresses.
If Adrian occupies a place seemingly impervious to materiality, then the character
of Lord Raymond offers by contrast a fruitful starting point for discussing the rise and
fall of the Windsorian social imaginary. From the beginning, Raymond embodies a more
straightforward political sociality. Yet the influence of Perdita, for whom he initially
refuses to pursue the position of Lord Protector (“He had exchanged a sceptre for a lute, a
kingdom for Perdita” [93]), tempers this tendency with a transcendent inflection. 21 Once
he resolves to pursue the position after all, the conflicting dimensions of his political
sociality emerge more fully:
Thus, while Raymond had been wrapt in visions of power and fame, while
he looked forward to entire dominion over the elements and the mind of
man, the territory of his own heart escaped his notice; and from that
unthought of source arose the mighty torrent that overwhelmed his will,
and carried to the oblivious sea, fame, hope, and happiness. (117)
21

Shelley regularly describes Perdita in transcendent terms. Her desire for Raymond in particular appears
transcendent: “She erected a temple for him in the depth of her being, and each faculty was a priestess
vowed to his service” (92). After she discovers Raymond’s secret connection to Evadne, this transcendent
desire inverts: “‘Vase am I,’ she thought, ‘vase brimful of despair’s direst essence’” (135). In searching for
Raymond in Greece, she reveals that her transcendent desire for him has come to depend upon an
introjection of Raymond’s own socially determined ambition: “He would rather have died such a death,
which will be recorded in history to endless time, than have lived to old age unknown, unhonoured. Nor
can I desire better, than, having been the chosen and beloved of his heart, here, in youth’s prime, before
added years can tarnish the best feelings of my nature, to watch his tomb, and speedily rejoin him in his
blessed repose” (211-12). Perdita chooses this false horizon for herself in a manner similar to Mathilda,
whose solitude and especially suicidal tendencies derive in part from the narrative her father has given to
her.
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The apparently transcendent dimension of his sociality, which overlaps with Robert
Walton’s idea of “glory,” comes up against “the territory of his own heart,” which
Shelley describes as “unthought of,” and which seems to be synonymous with the
passions, particularly as they are depicted in Hume’s epistemology. Yet, where Hume
would suggest interposing sympathy as a means of controlling the passions, Raymond
exchanges both his domestic and political social contexts for a martial social context in
Greece that will attend more closely to his ambitious desire by putting his national
sympathies to work mobilizing his passions.
Lionel’s opposition to Raymond’s conduct is based upon his ideal “that steady
adherence to principle was the only road to honour; a ceaseless observance of the laws of
general utility, the only conscientious aim of human ambition” (150). While the content
of the latter part of his ideal is socially oriented, the overall form and thrust of it is
transcendent and may foreshadow Lionel’s status as the Last Man, a figure of the
inverted place Shelley envisions for the subject as a spectre haunting materiality. By
contrast, Adrian’s immediate support of Raymond’s action further underscores the
implicit sociality of his aesthetically transcendent disposition. Thus, when he quotes
Christ in support of this perspective, “there are many mansions in my father’s house,” in
order to argue “that the modes of becoming good or great, varied as much as the
dispositions of men, of whom it might be said, as of the leaves of the forest, there were
no two alike” (150), Adrian is advancing an idealistic pluralism (grounded, as we see
here, in the aesthetic validation of biblical literature) quite distinct from the constancy
that Lionel insists upon as the subject’s necessary responsibility towards the other.
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The scene of struggle that both Raymond and Lionel imagine is one that
resembles the conflict of scepticism that Hume posits as he attempts to rid his system of
insubstantial spaces of transcendence. Thus both perspectives identify an aspect of their
social imaginary with “illusion” and suggest an alternative beyond the veil. For Lionel,
the illusion is the “splenetic fit” that has caused Raymond to renounce the Protectorate
and abdicate his responsibilities to Perdita. The alternative course is a return to selfmastery: “Master yourself, Raymond, and the world is subject to you” (152). Implicit in
this approach is a resumption of social sympathy (“our love, honour, and duty will again
be manifested towards you” [152]), which suggests that at this early point in Lionel’s
development he continues to hold sociality out as a means of satisfying desire – even
transcendent desires (i.e., “the world” in subjection). Raymond identifies the illusion as
one that Perdita has projected onto him: “With [Perdita] it was pretty enough to play a
sovereign’s part; and, as in the recesses of your beloved forest we acted masques, and
imagined ourselves Arcadian shepherds, to please the fancy of the moment” (153). The
charge Raymond levies against Perdita is that her transcendent desire is false, suggesting,
“I know, though she does not, how false the veil is which she has spread over the reality”
(154). The greater perspective Lionel’s narrative affords the reader on the situation makes
this moment into a potential point of critique of what Anne Mellor calls “masculine
Romanticism,” in which the immoral positions of its chief representatives (Adrian-Percy
and Raymond-Byron) are revealed. 22 The implication is that the scheme Raymond plans
to escape Perdita—his dramatic “return to Greece” (153)—is not transcendent either, but
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Mellor argues: “In social terms, the novel pits [Shelley’s] ideology of the egalitarian bourgeois family
against those human and natural forces which undermine it: male egoism, female masochism, and death. In
political and philosophical terms, The Last Man first undercuts the dominant systems of government of the
early nineteenth century and then shows that all cultural ideologies are but meaningless fictions” (144).
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rather represents a continuing investment in sociality under the guise of something
greater.
Mitigating this potential critique, however, is the darkly sympathetic light in
which these figures are often cast. Thus, what ultimately pierces the veil that Raymond’s
transcendent action attempts to weave is his death in the ruined and vacant city of
Constantinople. Lionel posits this opposition between false transcendence and materiality
in his description of Raymond’s corpse – recalling once more the way the body serves
Shelley as a vehicle for expressing materiality:
Yesterday those limbs were worth an universe; they then enshrined a
transcendent power, whose intents, words, and actions were worthy to be
recorded in letters of gold; now the superstition of affection alone could
give value to the shattered mechanism, which, incapable and clod-like, no
more resembled Raymond, than the fallen rain is like the former mansion
of cloud in which it climbed the highest skies, and gilded by the sun,
attracted all eyes, and satiated the sense by its excess of beauty. (207)
These final lines recall the similarly social father of Mathilda, whose joyous marriage to
Diana and inherited wealth seemed to elevate him to a heavenly realm that obscured the
dire reality below. 23 Like that father, Raymond discovers too late “the hurricane that tears
me” (194) between the entwined social desires for Perdita, his friends, and glory, and the
starkly distinct transcendent desire to complete “the will of fate” (194). Encountering this
new impulse in spite of himself, he says, “I know not why; I seem to myself to be
entering a darksome gulph; the ardent spirit of the army is irksome to me, the rapture of
triumph null” (184). This impulse leads him towards a realization of his impending death,
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As noted earlier, Mathilda describes: “Thus my father, born in affluence, and always prosperous, clombe
without the difficulty and various disappointments that / all human beings seem destined to encounter, to
the very topmost pinnacle of happiness: Around him was sunshine, and clouds whose shapes of beauty
made the prospect divine concealed from him the barren reality which lay hidden below them. From this
dizzy point he was dashed at once as he unawares congratulated himself on his felicity. Fifteen months
after their marriage I was born, and my Mother died a few days after my birth” (10).
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that “[f]rom the many-peopled earth, from the sympathies of man, from the loved resorts
of my youth, from the kindness of my friends, from the affection of my only beloved
Perdita, I am about to be removed” (194). Raymond strives to retain a social desire in the
form of glory (“to lose all—to lose with life and love, glory also! It shall not be” [194]),
yet this aesthetic satisfaction is also denied to him as his followers “shr[i]nk back” from
the task of entering Constantinople. Finally, any majesty involved in his entrance
evaporates as the city falls, killing him. Attempting to conjure security or hope from what
appears to be a sublime vision of the city’s destruction, Lionel writes: “For a moment I
could yield to the creative power of the imagination, and for a moment was soothed by
the sublime fictions it presented to me” (200). This false transcendence fails to sustain
him, however, as “[t]he beatings of my human heart drew me back to blank reality”
(200). Lionel describes this blank reality as a kind of object without a subject, in which,
“I called aloud for him—through the darkness of night, over the scorching ruins of fallen
Constantinople, his name was heard; no voice replied—echo even was mute” (200).
Lionel opposes his encounter with blank reality to the “sublime fictions” that no
longer satisfy. As these false hopes wither with the death of Raymond, the novel’s
treatment of the sublime more generally also deserves close attention. There are several
moments of an explicitly sublime character, and these come to be increasingly associated
with the figure of absolute materiality: the plague. The most marked scene of the sublime
occurs as Adrian and the others make their way towards Geneva by way of the Jura. In
the course of describing the presentation of nature’s “unrivalled beauties in resplendent
and sudden exhibition” using expressly sublime language (“the yawning abyss” [418],
“scaleless altitude,” “unattainable ether,” “vast immensities,” “jagged crags” [419]),
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Lionel describes an experience that suspends the horror that has preceded it: “Carried
away by wonder, I forgot the death of man, and the living and beloved friend near me”
(419). As we see in the scene that follows the remnant’s encounter with the sublime in
nature, Lionel’s retrospective scepticism proves accurate. He describes their discovery of
a father and daughter at an organ in a church in which she plays Haydn’s “New-Created
World” (420). Like an auditory echo of the visual splendour that has preceded it, this
experience produces sublime feelings: “transported as we had been by the loveliness of
nature, fancying that we beheld the abode of spirits, now we might well imagine that we
heard their melodious communings” (420). This possibility is dramatically undermined
by the sight they behold of the weeping daughter hoping – since “she had not courage to
disclose the truth” (421) – to fool her blind father into believing that nothing has changed.
(We might recall also the blindness of De Lacey, who also serves initially as a figure for
an obliviousness to materiality; however, in both cases, it is precisely this obliviousness
that enables both men to endure materiality rather than descending into violence or
horror.) This truth that she will not disclose is not only the social reality of their solitude,
but also the reality of her impending demise. Notably, the remnant’s approach contributes
to this fate, as “[t]he very day that we arrived she had been attacked by symptomatic
illness” (421). As Kant recognizes, the sublime contains within it the conditions for its
own undoing as its capacity for excess and saturation leads to a revelation of what it can
never include and thus can never overcome through cognition alone.
The Last Man’s manner of raising the question of the sublime takes up the larger
themes related to the status of sympathy in the Romantic period. Against the possibility
predicated by conventional sympathy that the experience of the other might be imagined
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successfully and form the basis for one’s selfhood, the illusory quality that Shelley
associates with this aesthetic mode insists upon an irrecoverable remainder for alterity.
To desire the other in a way that attempts to account for this remainder without also
recovering it requires the kind of transcendent orientation Shelley raises in Matilda, in
which the desire for the other takes the form of a submission to the diverse effects of the
other. Yet, because of its narrow scope, Matilda can only sketch the barest outline of this
transcendent desire before its attendant psychological and social contingencies occlude it.
In The Last Man, by contrast, the implications of an event such as Mathilda’s willing
submission to her father no longer play a role. Instead, in the novel’s positioning of the
sublime within the context of a global, human death without supplement, without a
“blessed[ness]” or hope that might recuperate death for humanity, Shelley questions the
possibility of desire apart from any imaginary (which would include both the self and the
other) and thus apart from any mobilization of one’s own will. In the wake of the plague,
there is now only “the thorny truth of things” (360). In this way, the transcendent desire
that Shelley posits implies a distinctly deconstructive understanding of the relationship
between the other and the self – a relationship in which the other reveals to the self the
very otherness that composes the self. This disclosure transforms the nature of hope –
that most transcendent of virtues – not only in terms of its spatial value (i.e., utopia), but
also in terms of its temporal value (i.e., the future).
For instance, in his self-comparison with Robinson Crusoe, Lionel posits a
difference that resembles the difference Coleridge offers for pantisocracy, between “joys
that were” and the “sublime of Hope.” Yet, unlike the youthful Coleridge, Lionel shifts
this distinction out of the idealist register and into the materialist register, which Shelley
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has spent much of her previous novels exploring. Although both he and Crusoe are
solitaries, Lionel remarks: “Yet he was far happier than I: for he could hope, nor hope in
vain—the destined vessel at last arrived, to bear him to countrymen and kindred, where
the events of his solitude became a fire-side tale” (448). Lionel has also been at work
producing a tale of his adventures, but, unlike Crusoe’s, it is addressed to a friend yet to
come. This is a messianic figure, as we see in the message he leaves behind him as he
journeys towards Rome: “Friend, come! I wait for thee!” (456). This friend-to-come, the
reader of his tale and falsifier of his claim to be “the Last Man,” is also at the same time a
member of “THE ILLUSTRIOUS DEAD” to whom Lionel dedicates his book (466). 24
As was the case with Mathilda, the Other with whom Lionel has come to sympathize is
associated with death and therefore with a materiality that undermines every imaginary.
In Matilda, this subversion took place in part by means of the insufficiency of her
literary allusions to account for the anti-social nature of her desire as well as her
repudiation of the social possibilities for which Woodville lives. In The Last Man, the
exercise of writing a novel appears futile given its lack of a reader (at least in the context
of it serving as the memoirs of the last person on earth). Nevertheless, where Matilda
attempts only to escape recapitulation into the social, as does its narrator, The Last Man is
deeply invested in uncovering the possibility of community. Although this exercise of
writing is performed in absolute solitude, it has emerged out of a sympathetic impulse.
Lionel’s earlier attempt to “discipline my sorrowing heart to sympathy in your joys,”
namely the joys of animals (459), is unsuccessful at inaugurating a new form of relation.
When Lionel is therefore forced to abandon yet another social imaginary, he begins
writing. At the end of a year’s work, he realizes that his waiting for the one to come was
24

Barbara Johnson emphasizes the novel’s explicit alignment of the reader with the dead (265).
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a “delusion.” Moreover, it is a delusion that he has only exchanged “for another as
delusive, as false” (467), namely, the work of writing. Nevertheless, these intentional
delusions all serve to open a space in which he may approximate more closely a desire
for the other that we come to associate in the novel with the end of humankind. Lionel
describes the background of this seemingly self-destructive desire:
Could I have seen in this empty earth, in the seasons and their change, the
hand of a blind power only, most willingly would I have placed my head
on the sod, and closed my eyes on its loveliness for ever. But fate had
administered life to me, when the plague had already seized on its prey—
she had dragged me by the hair from out the strangling waves—By such
miracles she had bought me for her own; I admitted her authority, and
bowed to her decrees. (464)
Lionel’s submission to necessity, which he confusingly distinguishes from “a blind power
only” by personifying it as “fate” and ascribing to “her” an “authority,” gives him a
strange, materialist kind of hope. Indeed, any hope for the other that might derive from it
– including his desire for future readers – does not retain a social-humanist conception of
the other. In this way, it offers the basis for an alternative transcendence grounded in
materiality, rather than the imaginary. The disturbing manner by which “fate” comes to
“b[uy] me for her own” in the novel illustrates the space in which transcendence and
materiality overlap.
The representative of the plague ensuring Lionel’s conversion to a hope
understood as necessity is a fevered black man, whom Shelley describes as a “negro half
clad” (336) and whose “breath, death-laden,” infects Lionel with the disease that
nevertheless fails to end his life. Although Shelley has Lionel personify the plague and its
accompanying devastations throughout the novel, its singular appearance here, though
literally embodied in a human form, seems, ironically and problematically, the least
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human. In order to establish the event as an encounter with alterity, Shelley layers
descriptions in this scene, which notably appears framed by the activity surrounding the
death of Lionel’s son. Not only does she distinguish this victim of plague racially, she
describes him as a man that does not speak; as partly naked; “writhing under the agony of
disease”; having “a convulsive grasp” (336) – in other words, he is not only a figure that
refuses assimilation into the social, but also an abject figure that escapes attempts to
elevate it into an object of transcendent desire, conventionally understood. The Creature
in Frankenstein provoked a materiality, yet was also deployed as a way of deconstructing
the desiring subject. The man here appears as an object of materiality, which Shelley
characterizes in terms of uncontrolled nervous energy, a-signifying communication, and a
body marked by its surfaces and disfiguration; however, his actions do not reflect desire.
The events that lead up to this encounter, which I want to suggest exemplifies Shelley’s
idea of transcendent desire for the other, chart the trajectory out of sociality and towards a
material transcendence. Lionel enters the room of the dying man accidentally, thinking
that the “groan” he hears is that of his son, so that the domestic desire for the knownother (i.e., Alfred) inadvertently leads him into the region of the truly other. As in
Godwin, the social continues to play a role in housing its others. Similarly, the event of
dark sympathy in the De Lacey episode in Frankenstein is only possible within the
context of the De Lacey home, hence it is perhaps unsurprising that the home ceases to be
viable after the eruption of transcendent desire in the scene. Yet, if the surplus desire in
the social leads him actively into the darkness of the dying man’s room, Lionel’s
encounter with the alterity that awaits him occurs first through his senses (“a pernicious
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scent assailed my senses” [336]) and then literally through the violence of “the sufferer”
(336). In both cases, Lionel is a passive recipient.
This passivity is especially strange given the frame of the dying child; for, in
the seemingly simultaneous moment that his senses are “assailed,” his “leg clasped,” and
he hears “a groan repeated” (336), Lionel’s only response is to experience “sickening
qualms, which made their way to my very heart” (336). These “qualms” originate in his
anxiety for his son, certainly, but also in the way the threat of his son’s illness (for, at this
point, Lionel can only continue to assume that the groan comes from his son – he has not
yet seen the true sufferer) cuts through his desire to see his son, revealing a desire for his
own self-preservation. Nevertheless, his social desire remains. Thus, when the man
finally grasps him, Lionel describes himself as attempting to escape “[w]ith mixed horror
and impatience” (336), that is, with mixed reactions to the obstruction of multiple forms
of desire. What Lionel does not realize in this moment is that this encounter means his
salvation: as Alan Bewell notes of the embrace, it “functions as inoculation rather than
contagion” (313). 25 Nevertheless, the racist overtones of the social imaginary with which
Lionel identifies himself conceal from him what might become possible for community –
a future community that does not (and cannot) appear in the novel. Lionel’s literal inspiration by the other ensures that the other’s materiality offers a space beyond the social
relation Lionel has with his dying son for articulating a manifold desire for him in his
otherness. Lionel desires to see his son, on a social level, to affirm his love for him or to
express concern for him; at another level, he desires to be with his son for multiple,
ineffable reasons that not only blur the boundaries of their respective identities, but also
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Bewell further suggests persuasively that the scene might “serve as an allegory of the fearful embrace of
colonial encounters” (313), which he shows to be a pervasive theme in the novel.

284
effect a separation (and therefore a reinscription of his identity) originating in his fear of
death.
Notably, this fear disappears after Lionel recovers from his bout of plague.
When he embraces the other, Lionel is initially afraid not only of the literal plague, but
also of the other’s unknowability. This fear keeps him trapped within a primarily social
form of desire, despite the other threads of desire at work. Lionel’s survival of the plague
is, therefore, according to Jan Plug, “important not because he is the last representative of
the human race so much as because he interrupts the totalizing movement of the plague”
(160). This totalizing aim of the plague mirrors the totalizing aim of society before its
fall: as Lionel declares in the novel’s opening paragraph, “So true it is, that man’s mind
alone was the creator of all that was good or great to man, and that Nature herself was
only his first minister” (9). 26 What Shelley proposes – not only in this novel, but in
Frankenstein and Matilda as well – is an ongoing relation, which will serve to
perpetually undermine totalities in order better to maintain a vision of the other. Thus the
“interrupt[ion]” that Plug refers to is not an obstruction of the plague’s movement, but a
kind of temporization that opens up a parallel time in which Lionel comes to sympathize
with the absolute unknown:
Peril will now be mine; and I hail her as a friend—death will perpetually
cross my path, and I will meet him as a benefactor; hardship, inclement
weather, and dangerous tempests will be my sworn mates. Ye spirits of
storm, receive me! ye powers of destruction, open wide your arms, and
clasp me for ever! if a kinder power have not decreed another end, so that
after long endurance I may reap my reward, and again feel my heart beat
near the heart of another like to me. (468-69)

26

Johnson aligns this opening description of England with “the image of a certain conception of man which
will be progressively demystified throughout the novel that follows” (265).
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Lee Sterrenburg suggests that the novel “deals with politics, but ultimately it is an
antipolitical novel. The characters in the novel discuss and try to enact various reforming
and revolutionary solutions, but all such endeavors prove to be a failure in Mary
Shelley’s pessimistic and apocalyptic world of the future” (328). While I question
whether it may be going too far to call the novel “antipolitical,” I also wonder whether
“politics” remains a suitable term for the kind of relationship envisioned by the end of
The Last Man: better, perhaps, is “community.” Not only does this distinction underscore
the limits that Shelley sets for social desire, to which Sterrenburg’s essay draws our
attention (“No political remedies will avail against it [the plague], nor will society survive
its ravages” [331]), but it also emphasizes the novel’s attempt to think an alternative
being-together that might account for an alterity that lies not only outside the polis, but
also outside what is typically considered “other.” 27

Taking up the project she leaves in suspense at the close of Frankenstein, Shelley
thus turns more fully towards the alterity that the Creature presented in that novel. As De
Lacey discovers, the materiality that he cannot perceive forms a bond with his desire to
know “who are you”; however, that novel circumvents further inquiry into the
ramifications of this bond by having Walton return to the social fold. By positing
Mathilda’s body as the site of her father’s illicit desire, Shelley resists sublimating alterity
within a more manageable imaginary, such as she also attempted initially in The Fields of
27

Another way of considering this is from the perspective of time – where the absolute other to be taken
account of resides in or is aligned with the future. Both Walton and Victor are notable for their anxieties
about the judgements of future generations. In The Last Man, however, to look to the future at all implies
an indeterminate orientation towards the other. After all, the novel’s preface is set in 1818, the year in
which the narrator discovers the ancient prophecies of the Cumaean Sibyl. These prophecies, it seems,
contain a precise forecast that traces the end of the world to the year 2100. In light of the rest of the novel,
the chief lesson of this strange temporality is that the other demands above all openness – whether that is
figured as an open door or an open wound is less clear.
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Fancy. If materiality and the dark sympathy characters like De Lacey experience for it lie
at the core of what it means to desire the other, then Matilda is above all a work about the
place of such desire at the far limit of the social. To move beyond that limit, as Mathilda
does, appears to be possible only through death. In The Last Man, Shelley presses even
this understanding of desire further, as Lionel, ultimately, exhibits a transcendent desire
finally free of the social. Recalling Coleridge’s attenuated desire in his late poetry, we
can read in Shelley’s novel an impossible setting within which to trace a more complete
unfolding of dark sympathy. Lionel’s response in the closing paragraph of the novel
explicates one possible outcome:
I form no expectation of alteration for the better; but the monotonous
present is intolerable to me. Neither hope nor joy are my pilots—restless
despair and fierce desire of change lead me on. I long to grapple with
danger, to be excited by fear, to have some task, however slight or
voluntary, for each day’s fulfilment. I shall witness all the variety of
appearance, that the elements can assume—I shall read fair augury in the
rainbow—menace in the cloud—some lesson or record dear to my heart in
everything. (470)
Somewhat differently from Godwin’s traumatized encounter with materiality or
Coleridge’s reluctant submission to it, Shelley explores the shape of a community turned
to face materiality. The sympathy that Lionel discovers with his future reader is, like all
sympathy, predicated upon a kind of falsehood – that he might be able to imagine
adequately the other’s experience. Nevertheless, the impossibility of that future reader
also draws attention to the materiality of the novel’s deployment of hope. While this
materiality demands an end to imaginaries that substitute feasible or programmatic social
desire for troubling, though potent, transcendent desires, it also compels the imagination
to attempt again and again the sympathetic act of reading. Thus, while Lionel’s practice
of reading at the end of the novel, which he does in order “to conceal me from myself,
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and immerse myself in the subject traced on the pages before me” (465), represents an
important return to the aesthetic, it is a return that also recognizes the gap that separates it
from the Real. The stability of social desire is an irresistible draw, as he notes upon
reaching Rome: “At length, then, I had found a consolation. I had not vainly sought the
storied precincts of Rome—I had discovered a medicine for my many and vital wounds”
(462). Yet it is also inadequate. In the remains of sympathy’s ongoing and necessary
failure to satisfy, Mary Shelley depicts a community with the other emerging not out of
desire, but from the wide uncertainty that lies beyond hope even as it also makes it
possible.
Encountered repeatedly by the figures in this study, this dark materiality of hope
is fundamentally an acceptance of finitude. In the aftermath of this collapse of desire,
however, the community that remains is not simply drive, as Coleridge teaches us in his
later poetry. Instead, there remains some residual impulse—a dark sympathy for the other
that maintains the connection with the other even when all other desires have failed. As
Percy Shelley’s Ianthe, or Godwin’s misanthropes, or Coleridge’s mariner, or Mary
Shelley’s Mathilda all recognize in a variety of ways, desire persists paradoxically even
after the forms of desire—social or transcendent—cease. Where Hume responds to the
“immense depths of philosophy” (169) by repressing transcendent desire within a desire
for the social, Shelley and the other Romantics studied here find that their transcendent
desire for the other grows under the influence of a materiality that they cannot ultimately
resist. Neither a site of “Sublime Hope” nor necessarily a threat, the communities beyond
desire to which they have been led by dark sympathy are ultimately points of access to
the “thorny truth of things” that has attracted them all along.
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CODA
The Cost of Dark Sympathy
“How many tears & spasms of anguish this solitude has
cost me lies buried in my memory — formed to feel
pleasure in society —in intercourse with persons of wit &
genius & the busy scene of life — how against the hair has
fortune ever stroked me! — Well — it is well nigh over.”
— Mary Shelley, journal entry for 21 October 1838

Although I have closed my study with a discussion of The Last Man, this novel
marks neither the end of Mary Shelley’s writing nor of Romanticism. Likewise, the gaps
that have appeared in my chapters on Godwin and Coleridge – omitting, for example,
Godwin’s voluminous historical writings or Coleridge’s prose works – signal a tension
that I have tried to gesture towards, but have not made the central focus. This tension is
well phrased in the opening line of Emmanuel Levinas’s Totality and Infinity, in which
he quotes from Rimbaud: “‘The true life is absent.’ But we are in the world” (33). If
Romantic writing is perhaps most regularly conceptualized in terms of its transcendent
tendency, then its standard history is also typically understood as a gradual retreat into
the social idealism of the Victorians. The modern myth of this apparently inevitable and
conservative turn to the social after a brief libidinal struggle certainly gains many
examples during this period. Accusations could be and were levied against all three of the
writers I have taken up, with Godwin assuming a government post in his last years,
Coleridge identifying increasingly with orthodoxy in church and state, and Shelley
“bowdlerizing” the radicalism of her late husband. 1 Furthermore, the irresistibility of

1

William St. Clair notes that in 1833 the Whig Government appointed Godwin “to the post of Office
Keeper and Yeoman Usher of the Receipt of the Exchequer” (485). On the subject of Shelley, accusations
of “bowdlerization” continue even today, with a (very one-sided) debate appearing on the online listserv for
the North American Society for the Study of Romanticism (NASSR-L) as recently as September 2013
(https://listserv.wvu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A0=NASSR-L).
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social desire is a regular theme in many of the texts I have taken up. Dark sympathy
cannot, it seems, be extended into an ongoing mode of being with others; it remains an
event only. One of the costs of dark sympathy is the gap on the other side of the event, in
which social desire returns, but with a reinforced sense of its inadequacies.
Jean-Luc Nancy observes that discussions about community often emphasize or
narrate the ways in which it has been “lost, or broken” (Inoperative 9) by society. He
disputes this claim, however: “Society was not built on the ruins of a community. It
emerged from the disappearance or the conservation of something – tribes or empires –
perhaps just as unrelated to what we call ‘community’ as to what we call ‘society’” (11).
The radical alterity that materialism introduces in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries suggests an insufficiency in sociality itself, to the extent that its reliance upon
narrative, image, and system cannot accommodate a materiality understood as that which
resists representation. A major aim of this study has been to unpack more fully the scope
of this alterity and the kinds of desires it produces in the period. As I note in the Preface
and elsewhere, social desire has justly been one of the key approaches to studies of
sympathy. I have tried to account at least superficially for this influence in the
organization of the chapters on each author. Although partly chronological in nature, the
order of the chapters has also been intended to express something of the ebb and flow of
the social’s influence through the period. Godwin’s suspicions about the social are not
entirely taken up by Coleridge, for instance, nor does Shelley embrace either Coleridge’s
idealism or Godwin’s optimistic opinions about a perfectibility that would undergird an
improved society. Likewise, the development of each author’s thought on the social
rarely overlaps. Godwin’s adjusting view on the role of partiality in political justice
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distinguishes him from Coleridge, whose pantisocratic pretensions were both more
sectarian than political justice and less threatening than Mary Shelley’s exploits as a
youth. Rather than organizing my discussions in terms of an ideological movement (for
example, from Coleridge as social idealist to Godwin to Shelley), I position Coleridge
between Godwin and Shelley (these latter two of whom are perhaps the most
ideologically similar) in order to highlight the different attitudes each of the three authors
has towards the social. This hopefully can help to draw out the way these attitudes shift
over the course of each one’s career.
Yet, if we return to Nancy’s observation, these modulating attitudes towards “the
social” may in fact beg a question about the very possibility of retreat or conservation. If
dark sympathy is an event, then how accurate are these terms in describing a social desire
that subsequently ensues after its “failure”? I have used this vocabulary in several places,
partly to mark its inoperative (désœuvré) dimension; however, from another perspective,
the language of “failure” participates in precisely that nostalgic view of community that
Nancy critiques. Likewise, the standard idea of a Romantic retreat from the transcendent
to the social both overlooks the evental nature of the desire itself and silently authorizes
the Victorian interpretation of the Romantic period as a lost community out of which a
perhaps less ideal, yet ultimately more stable and successful society could emerge.
Matthew Arnold’s famous pronouncement on “the English poetry of the first quarter of
this century” as having “about it, in fact, something premature; and that from this cause
its productions are doomed, most of them, in spite of the sanguine hopes which
accompanied and do still accompany them, to prove hardly more lasting than the
productions of far less splendid epochs” (8, emphasis mine) reiterates this view almost
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explicitly. My focus on the way transcendent desire presses against the social has been
part of a larger effort to dispute this reading. 2 By focusing on dark sympathy as a vehicle
of desire for the other capable of temporarily circumventing the social to some extent, I
hope that this project will invite further inquiry into similar forms of this contingent event
of relation, which might also upset or interrogate the truth of things as they are.
Thus, even in the midst of this attempt to appropriate Romanticism, dark
sympathy may persist. After Mary Shelley died, her son and daughter-in-law discovered
Percy’s heart in her travelling desk, wrapped in silk between the pages of Adonais. 3 From
one perspective, the anecdote offers a possible allegory that has continued to affect (and
effect) the way Mary tends to be read into the Victorian period. The travelling desk, a
relic itself from her time writing Frankenstein, 4 follows her out of the poverty and social
rejection of her youth, into Field Place, the ancestral home of the Shelleys, where she
moved with her son, the baronet, Sir Percy Florence Shelley, in 1849. Hence, as the story
goes, the failed community of the Romantics finds its social redemption in the
sentimental idealism of the Victorians. There, in the seat of what Godwin had called,
describing aristocracy, “a scheme for rendering more permanent and visible by the
interference of political institution the inequality of mankind” (PJ1 2:478), the desk lay
2
Joel Faflak and Julia M. Wright’s collection, Nervous Reactions: Victorian Recollections of Romanticism,
speaks strongly to this subject. In the introduction, they note: “the Victorian privileging of an idealistic and
largely apolitical Romanticism elided its diversity, political and otherwise. Moreover, this elision is a
suggestive one for scholars interested in the transition from one period to the other, not as a change in the
Jaussian ‘horizon of expectations’ but as a transition that was constructed to secure that horizon and with it
the fiction of sociocultural stability. For a feeling, politicized Romanticism thus becomes, for Victorian
writers, ‘sentimentalism’ (frequently the pejorative term of sensibility for nineteenth-century writers),
Byronic egotism, radicalism, and sensationalism—a Romanticism with addictive properties and thus a
pathology within the body politic that demands either curing or excision” (8) – or, we might add, discursive
translation via periodization, biography, and abstraction.
3
See Julie A. Carlson, 195.
4
Carlson notes that the desk in which Percy Florence Shelley and his wife discovered the relics was “the
very desk that was returned to her on 7 October 1822, having been left in Marlow in 1818” (195). She
finished writing the last volume of Frankenstein in April, shortly after she and Percy moved to Albion
House in Marlow, Buckinghamshire (see Sunstein 130).
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unopened until the first anniversary of Mary’s death. After the heart’s discovery, Lady
Shelley had it buried with Mary as well as the disinterred and displaced bodies of
Godwin and Wollstonecraft. Especially near the end of the century, the story was spread
widely: 5 it appears to perfectly accommodate the approach the Victorians had taken to
socializing the Romantics (and, foremost, P. B. Shelley). 6 The heart, they might say, is a
sign of the Romantic longing that Mary continued to harbor even after she began
producing more domestic or “safe” novels such as Lodore and Falkner. 7 Functioning like
Walter Pater’s “gem-like flame,” the heart takes the best of what the Romantics thought
and said – offering, perhaps, an “intimation of immortality” or “the world in a grain of
sand” – and transmits it into a more socially capable era.
Yet an interesting aporia emerges in late-nineteenth-century discussions of
Shelley’s heart that points back to the manner in which dark sympathy persists in spite of
the apparent slow retreat of Romanticism. For example, William Michael Rossetti’s
poem, “Shelley’s Heart,” describes in transcendent terms how the heart “shall dart /
Pangs of keen love to human souls” (5-6). As Rossetti noted in his diary, however, the
poem was rejected from The Fortnightly Review: “Morley wouldn’t stand my Shelley
sonnet. Professes to think it ‘very perfect’ in execution but ‘terribly physical’ in idea”
(qtd. in Hawley 82). Put into poetry, the materiality of this symbol grows unmanageable.
5

The story seems to have been originally popularized in Edward Dowden’s 1887 biography of P. B.
Shelley (2:534). Edward Trelawny mentions taking the heart from Shelley’s pyre in his 1856 Recollections
of the Last Days of Shelley and Byron (137-38).
6
See Eric O. Clarke’s chapter on “Shelley’s Heart” for an excellent overview of the Victorian reception
and sanitization of Shelley and with specific commentary on the discussion of Shelley’s heart – both literal
and figurative – in the period.
7
Mary Poovey writes: “After composing the novels that show most clearly the influence of her mother’s
self-confidence and Percy Shelley’s aesthetics—Frankenstein (1818), Mathilda (1819), Valperga (1823),
and The Last Man (1826)—Mary Shelley began to use her literary career both to defend her behaviour and,
more significantly, to so characterize it that it would need no defense; in other words, she sought to make
her behaviour conform to conventional expectations of what a woman should be. Her last three novels—
Perkin Warbeck (1830), Lodore (1835), and Falkner (1837)—demonstrate the refinement of this strategy”
(116).
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The nature of Mary’s desire for Percy – or the desire for the other more generally –
harnesses the opacity paradoxically communicated by the physicality of the heart to
articulate a form of relation that cannot be understood or comprehended without some
reserve. While the attempt on the part of Victorian writers to integrate this opacity into
their social idealism reveals in part their need to mitigate it, it also recalls the complexity
of sympathetic desire. For, although the event of dark sympathy interrupts or disputes
social sympathy because of its implicit effort to undo the stabilities of the social, it may
nevertheless serve as the basis for a new work of sympathy, located in the reader’s
recognition of the unbearable draw of the other and a momentary sharing of the difficult
work of being in the world.
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